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Summary 
 
In the ‘Requirement of Consent for the Transfer of Shares and Freedoms of Movement: 
Toward the Liberalization of Private Limited Companies – A comparative study of the laws 
of Portugal, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States and its interplay 
with EU law’, I try to shed light on the dynamics of private limited liability companies 
(PLLCs), and how they can be legally designed to become efficient units of economic 
development in Europe and the United States. I take a social sciences approach to the legal 
question: How does the design of clauses establishing restrictions on transfer of shares of 
private limited liability companies affect investment made in these companies and their 
consequent development? To answer this question, I develop two parallel lines of 
investigation. First, I undertake an embedded historical study to trace the evolutionary 
patterns of PLLCs in six countries. Furthermore, I longitudinally track the standards of 
behavior of market agents in the selected jurisdictions. Second, I develop my legal research 
by looking at an anomaly regarding the transfer of shares and changes in the ownership 
structure of these business organizations. Transfer of shares in PLLCs is, for the most part, 
regulated by default rules which impose restrictions on transfers. Typically, the parties do not 
contract around these default rules. The anomaly lies in the fact that, even though 
shareholders of these companies do not opt out of these rules, shareholders often ignore them 
and/or breach them at a later stage. To understand this phenomenon, I collected data to learn 
how often these rules are included in the companies’ articles of association, their content and 
the allocation of decision-making power in the company. My empirical work was based on 
the analysis of more than 200 articles of association of companies in Portugal, France, Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom and operating agreements of limited liability companies 
(LLCs) in the United States. I also analyzed almost 100 court decisions in the selected 
jurisdictions. My findings tend to confirm the hypothesis that shareholders of these companies 
normally do not contract around default rules, but they ignore them or breach them in order to 
maintain an engrained status quo in the company. My findings also show that there is a 
phenomenon of cross-over of the same contractual provisions to the articles of association of 
other companies in the same jurisdiction and to the ‘constitutional’ documents of companies 
in other jurisdictions. Sometimes, this happens over a time span of 100 years.  
Theoretically, I try to bridge the gap between natural sciences and social sciences and 
frame my investigation by applying evolutionary theory to law. Methodologically, I use 
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comparative law, and law and economics. Given the context provided by the historical 
research, I compare market agents to selfish genes. I try to explain how PLLC’s law has been 
primarily designed at the market level through a process of coordination and competition 
between market agents favored by a principle of natural selection. PLLC law was created at 
the lowest level through experimentation and a network of lawyers, who acted like legal 
engineers, notaries and courts. Under these circumstances, only optimal legal solutions were 
preserved and reproduced. The legislation came after. Thus, I define law as a byproduct of 
private ordering manifestations. Richard Dawkins, for his part, might well define it as an 
'extended phenotype’. 
However, a delicate balance exists between cooperation and coordination among market 
agents at the lowest level in these business organizations. Evolution at the market level is 
limited particularly by the weak enforceability of the default rules that market agents do not 
contract around, and the bargaining failures these rules do not prevent. Hence, I normatively 
compare the role of lawyers, legislatures, regulators (or politicians) and courts to that of the 
scientist who uses biology as a cognitive tool to tame the silver fox through a process of 
artificial selection. By drawing this analogy, I dwell upon the concept of path-dependence in 
law and how it can be broken through legal engineering and experimentation. Most 
importantly, I make use of the biological notion of pleiotropy (the capacity of one gene to 
widely affect different phenotypic traits), which does not have a corresponding normative 
concept in law. Pleiotropy in this setting would refer to inheritance of legal solutions. Thus 
applied, fields of corporate law, contract law, and property law are shown to be related in 
unexpected ways. Further, the application of the notion highlights unintended consequences 
stemming not only from market dynamics, where lawyers arguably play an important role, but 
also from the way legislatures design law. The effects of restrictions on share transfer on the 
'physiology' and 'morphology' of property rights in shares is illustrative, and a banner of this 
dissertation. In addition, because the concept of evolution has its own limitations, I suggest 
that law should be seen as a commodity that can be designed at the institutional level to 
overcome such limitations at the market level. In terms of my paradigm, this window of 
opportunity for new legal policies has much to do with the fact that the genetic traits of 
markets tend to be preserved, but the biological process does not. Accordingly, by playing the 
role of the scientist that tames the fox, legislatures are in a position to design the best default 
rules and lawyers are able to engineer the best legal solutions for these companies. They have 
the opportunity to promote ‘cross-fostering’ of PLLCs to advance their reproduction and 
longstanding development. This may lead to the hybridization of these business organizations 
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for specific rules of partnership law (e.g., dissolution at will) or corporation law (e.g., put 
rights) may be used to surpass bargaining failures and strengthen property rights of 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders in cases of deadlock or bilateral monopolies. 
At the policy level, this is undertaken through a model legal policy that interconnects society, 
legislatures, courts and regulators (politicians), and the market at a point where law is created 
from the bottom-up. At the economic level, I am calling for the liberalization of private 
limited liability companies which, I argue, may be potentiated by market integration and the 
promise of jurisdictional competition in Europe as a form to press for change in legal policy.  
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Law is ‘social engineering’ and legal science is a social 
science.
1
 
 
“What is law?” (a question that has little practical 
significance if, indeed, it is a meaningful question at all).
2
 
 
Corporate law is inherently a messy business.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 K. Zweigert & H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, tr. Tony Weir, 3rd ed., NY, Clarendon 
Press,Oxford, 1998, p. 45. 
2 Posner, Richard A. Posner, ‘The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987’, Harvard Law 
Review, vol. 100, No. 4, 1987, p. 765. 
3 Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy’, Illinois Law Review, vol. 2009, 1, 2009, 
pp. 131-166 (166). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study has a fourfold purpose. First, it returns to basics and emphasizes contractual 
aspects of corporate law.4 In fact, this research puts small businesses in the spotlight: it looks 
at their history, at the essential elements of the market structure in which they operate, and at 
their governance and ownership structures in order to test the efficiency of and reasons for 
default rules on transfer of shares. Second, this research aims to show how the law fails to 
keep up with practice, and why it may be the case that we need more or less law.5 Third, it 
proposes a theory of incentive default rules framed by an evolutionary approach (evolutionary 
theory of incentive corporate default rules) which conceptualizes default rules as commodities 
with a contractual purpose which is primarily created at a lower level than legislatures – the 
market. Fourth, as a comparative law study it tries to provide an answer to two sub-questions: 
Do the above-noted default rules vary across jurisdictions, and if the selected jurisdictions 
have similar problems of parties ignoring the default rules, what might explain the differences 
and/or similarities of the rules across jurisdictions?; and, Does the law lag behind or stay 
current with practice in the various jurisdictions, which might say something about the 
efficiency of lawmaking across countries?  
Law, perceived more and more within the context of global phenomena,6 lacks a 
universally accepted definition. Thus, the question What is law today?’ awaits a 
comprehensive answer. Crucial to this inquiry is a thorough consideration of the normative 
foundations of law, or more technically speaking, of the sources of law. But it requires a great 
deal more: the main discourses fleshing out the law must be kept in mind (culture, economics, 
rational choice theory, evolutionary theory). Moreover, a choice must be made as to the nature 
of the arguments necessary to explain the meaning of law.7  
                                                             
4 The term ‘company law’ is mostly used in the United Kingdom, whilst ‘corporate law’ is widely used by 
American scholars and in American jurisprudence. I use it here interchangeably.  
5 See Kobayashi, Bruce H. And Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Law as a Byproduct’, Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and 
Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-27, 2011. 
6 See Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, ‘Globalization, Nation-States and the Legal Field: From Legal Diaspora to 
Legal Ecumenism?’ in idem, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emamcipation, 2nd. 
ed., London, Butterworths, LexisNexis, 2002, pp. 163-311. 
7 See Case, Mary Anne, ‘Is There a Lingua Franca for the American Legal Academy?’, in Mertz, Elizabeth (ed.), 
The New Legal Realism, Cambridge University Press, 2013. University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 647, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2296602 (accessed on 
19 August 2013), p. 4 (arguing that ‘… whether or not there is a lingua franca in the legal academy, there is a 
vernacular, the language of doctrine’. Referring in particular to the American case she submits that ‘Doctrine is 
the vernacular of American law along a variety of dimensions: It is not imported from another discipline, but 
indigenous. While some of its characteristic words and phrases originated elsewhere and some have penetrated 
to broader American society, it is spoken fluently only by lawyers’. Focusing on the American example, this 
author resists accepting law and economics as the dominant language of legal academy. 
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This study takes an evolutionary approach to law and asks: How does the design of 
clauses establishing restrictions on transfer of shares of private limited liability companies 
affect investment made in these companies and their consequent development?
8 This is the 
research question driving this comparative study.9 The underlying idea is that as long as these 
business associations have an adequate legal structure, they can become relevant players in 
the market, with the ability to attract investment, and lock in capital. In this way, such 
associations find themselves in the position of being able, if necessary, to draw the attention 
of legislatures and courts to the need for reform.10 Given the above, the following sub-
questions may be asked: Are PLLCs capable of overthrowing public limited companies? Are 
they able to overcome the policy trends that have been aligned for so long in favor of public 
limited companies? The answer, at least in the United States, seems to be ‘yes’.11 Moreover, 
one can ask, would it be beneficial for firms to mix corporate and uncorporate features, 
thereby blurring the distinctions between the two categories of firms?12 For example, in Part 
                                                             
8 See Deakin, Simon, ‘Evolution for our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics’, Current Legal Problems, vol. 55, 
No. 1, pp. 1-42; Hansmann, Henry et. al. ‘The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective’, in 
MacCahery, Joseph A. et al (eds.), Private Company Law Reform: International and European Perspectives, 
2010, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 15-22; and Zumbansen, Peer, and Callies, Gralf-Peter (eds.), Law, 
Economics and Evolutionary Theory, Cheltenham, United Kingdom; Northampton, MA, USA, 2011. In some 
instances of this dissertation it will come clear to the reader that I am trying to understand the behaviour of 
corporate constituencies using what one would define in economic parlance ‘economic models of behaviour’. 
This might be true. I will not, however, use technical economic terminology. 
9 See Davies, Paul L., Introduction to Company Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 283 (stating that 
‘Providing a legal framework which facilitates the growth of small companies is particularly important in public 
policy terms’). 
10 This idea calls to mind the literature on law and finance. This literature, which is best substantiated by the 
work of La Porta et al., seeks to empirically demonstrate the connection between the qualitative features of legal 
systems and the nature of capital markets and corporate governance structures in different countries. See, for 
instance, La Porta, Rafael et al., ‘Law and Finance’, Journal of Political Economy, vol 106, No 6, 1998, pp. 
1113-1155. My work, as described in the text, focuses on private companies and on the type of market there is or 
can be for their shares. In order to understand the macroeconomic impact these companies can have through the 
design of efficient rules included in their articles of association, my work thinks small first. It tries to explain the 
micro-level dynamics of these business associations’ ownership structures. Additionally, it looks at relevant 
articles of association and operating agreements to clarify if and how these business associations and their 
constituencies can be at the top of their game when it comes to developing new and efficient governance 
structures. This common tendency to link law and development has a long history: it was pioneered by classical 
social theorists such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber. On one hand, the challenge now in the twenty-first century 
is offered by globalization of markets and legal institutions, and on the other hand by legal pluralism at the 
national and transnational levels.  
11 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Uncorporating the Large Firm’ in idem, The Rise of the Uncorporation, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 193-246. 
12 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Limited Liability Unlimited’, 24 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 1999, pp. 407-
450 (proposing an alternative to business association status – the ‘Contractual Entity’). Also see Ribstein, Larry 
E., ‘Uncorporating the Large Firm’, in idem, The Rise of the Uncorporation, cit., pp. 193-246; and Williamson. 
Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, New York, The 
Free Press, 1985, p. 159 (in trying to provide an answer to the question ‘why can’t a large firm do everything 
that a collection of small firms can do and more?’ Ribstein states that ‘…at least for many projects that do not 
require an enormous research commitment, large companies are becoming increasingly aware that the 
bureaucratic apparatus they use to manage mature products is less well-suited to supporting early stage 
entrepreneurial activity. Hybrid forms of organization result’). 
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III, Chapter 1, I propose dissolution at will as a mechanism of governance of contractual 
relations between corporate constituencies. When would that be beneficial, especially bearing 
in mind that uncorporations (partnerships, limited partnerships and LLCs), allow shareholders 
to choose their level of autonomy? How much autonomy do shareholders really need?13  
This study is inspired by a number of default rules regulating the transfer of shares in 
private limited liability companies (PLLCs) in Europe and the United States. These rules are 
Article 228(2) of the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code (Código das sociedades 
Comerciais) referring to the Portuguese sociedade por quotas, Article 2469 of the Italian 
Civil Code (Codice Civil) regarding the società a responsabilità limitata, s. 544 (1) of the 
United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 regulating the private limited company, § 18-702 of 
the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and § 603 of the New York Limited Liability 
Company Law regulating the limited liability company (LLC) in Delaware and New York, 
respectively. Except s. 544 (1) of the Companies Act 2006 and Article 2469 of the Italian 
Civil Code, which establish a default principle of free transferability, all the other rules 
provide restrictions on transfer of shares. These are not restrictions on access to capital 
markets. These restrictions impose an obligation not to transfer the shares of PLLCs. In many 
circumstances, if transfers are not consented to under these rules, they have no effects vis-a-
vis the company and other non-transferring shareholders. However, they still have effects 
between the parties to the share sale and purchase agreement. These restrictions, besides being 
provided by default rules, also are introduced by the parties into the companies’ articles of 
association. In the case of France, the respective rule is a default regarding the majority 
requirement to consent to a transfer, but the imposition of restrictions on transfers is 
mandatory.  
These rules and the procedures that they invoke yield different approaches to transfer of 
shares in PLLCs.14 I am interested in the exogenous effects of these rules: I wish to determine 
how they affect PLLCs’ development.15 By inquiring about the sources of development of 
PLLCs, I am not necessarily advocating access to capital markets for these companies. 
Indeed, the companies may wish to grow without becoming public. In addition to the analysis 
                                                             
13
 The terms shareholder and member are used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
14 For a different, but also interesting approach see Möslein, Florian, Dispositives Recht: Zwecke, Strukturen und 
Methoden, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2011. 
15 An investigation of their endogenous effects alone would be very difficult to assess by means of a cross-
country observation whether they matter and have a causal effect on these business associations. 
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of default rules, I pay close attention to selected case law regarding disputes over the transfer 
of shares of PLLCs.16  
Despite the research question upon which this study is based, I do not assume the utility 
function of law for the development of PLLCs. I am instead interested in understanding why 
it is that their members would care about the effect of ‘jural principles’ on their company’s 
development. (A crucial point that I will develop is exactly which members would care.) I 
want to discover how their interests and goals are shaped by their membership. Therefore, to 
show the importance of the legal framework of PLLCs in each jurisdiction and why it is worth 
studying how their shares are transferred as well as the complexity of their ownership 
structures, Part 1 presents an introductory historical account of their legal regime and the 
above-mentioned rules. This task is undertaken by analysing the minutes of parliamentary 
debates, operating agreements of LLCs17 and articles of association published in the country’s 
Official Gazette, the Companies House, UK18 or treated in WestlawNext and Bureau van Dijks 
databases such as Amadeus, Astree, in France, Aida in Italy, Orbis, in the United States, and 
Fame in the United Kingdom. With this introductory account of the history of PLLCs, Part 1 
explains why these business associations exist. I also hope to shed light on the rationale 
behind the creation of restrictions on transfer of shares, and to explain why these governance 
techniques are designed as they presently are. Ultimately, this embedded historical analysis 
seeks to show what the existence of default rules implies about the historical development of 
business association law in the selected jurisdictions.19  
An in-depth analysis of samples of case law in the selected jurisdictions disclosed four 
pivotal elements: shareholders’ opportunistic behavior; bargaining failures; difficulties in 
combining action among shareholders, and among shareholders and other non-shareholder 
constituencies such as creditors; shareholders holding-up others; and, finally, situations of 
                                                             
16
 See Poteete, Amy R. et al., Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in 
Practice, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 46 (‘The more lawlike and specific a 
theory, the more readily it can be tested through carefully selected case studies...’). 
17 These agreements contain specific requirements regarding the transfer of shares or sale of membership 
interests. In this context, see Romano, Roberta, ‘Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis’, 
Emory Law Journal, vol. 39, 1990, pp. 1155-1189 (1160-1161) (stating she collected a random sample of 180 
Delaware publicly held companies which adopted in their charters a limited liability provision following the 
enactment in this state of a statute limiting directors’ liability). 
18 The Companies House is an Executive Agency of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
where all limited companies in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland are registered.  
19 See Martino, Paolo Di, ‘Lobbying, Institutional Inertia, and the Efficiency Issue in State Regulation: Evidence 
from the Evolution of Bankruptcy Laws and Procedures in Italy, England, and the United States (c. 1870-1939)’ 
in Batilossi, Stefano; and Reis, Jaime (eds.), State and Financial Systems in Europe and the USA: Historical 
Perspectives on Regulation and Supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Farnham, Surrey; 
Burlington, Ashgate, 2010, pp. 41-54 (51) (asserting that ‘…the past is important in shaping the availability of 
present options.’ This is how he defines path-dependency). 
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deadlock which resemble bilateral monopolies within the company,20 and for which articles of 
association do not provide efficient exit mechanisms or other relevant provisions.21 These 
problems tend to overlap and are likely to be mentioned in the literature in respect to the 
publicly held company. Interestingly, however, they also appear in the PLLC. For instance, 
cases adjudicated by courts in Portugal suggest that there is a downside to the freedom of 
contract enjoyed by shareholders in these companies. Shareholders introduce restrictions on 
the transfer of shares to protect their status quo (or to maintain the status quo provided by the 
law), ownership structure and control of the company.22 At a certain point, however, they face 
difficulties in acting together in their common interest and in the interest of the company.23 
Furthermore, conflicts between these companies’ constituencies are normally and more easily 
internalized by contract. Therefore, Part II, Chapter 1 examines potential agency problems 
and problems of private governance as they appear in the context of the environment framing 
the relationships among shareholders and between them and directors / managers in these 
business associations.24 In particular, it provides an account of the purpose of establishing 
                                                             
20 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs, Stanford Law 
Review, vol. 38, N.º 2, 1986, pp. 271-301 (279) (arguing that ‘The more power minority shareholders have, the 
more likely is deadlock. The possibility of deadlock also exists where the number of shareholders is small and 
shares are distributed so that votes can be evenly split’. These two authors link deadlocks to opportunistic 
behavior and rent seeking). Also see Posner, Richard, Economic Analysis of the Law, 3rd. ed., 1985 (dwelling on 
the problems of bilateral monopolies in closely held corporations). 
21 My initial intuition was confirmed by the literature after a thorough analysis of case law. See Whincop, 
Michael J., ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’, Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, vol. 19, 1999, p. 30 (claiming that ‘A great deal of work remains to be done in analysing how 
the protection of entitlements in corporate law doctrine affects this process of coalitional bargaining’). Also see 
Miller, Sandra K., ‘Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the Interests of Others 
Beyond the Contracting Parties’, American Business Law Journal, vol. 46, 2, pp 243-278 (259) (apropos the lack 
of considered negotiation in LLCs noting that her ‘…preliminary findings point to the possibility of significant 
differences in legal representation between controlling and noncontrolling investors. The evidence also points to 
the fact that LLC investors may well enter into LLC agreements without having carefully reviewed and/or 
negotiated terms. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that such investors would end up being well protected 
under a statutory regime that permitted the elimination of fiduciary duties or which required the express adoption 
of duties’).  
22 I am here referring to economic control.  
23 Regarding the case of the United Kingdom under a historical perspective, see Harris, Ron, Industrializing 
English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization 1720-1844, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 92 (mentioning that within the taking by individuals instead of municipal corporations of river navigation 
projects in England in the early eighteenth century, there was growing need to share the burden of financing such 
projects. Harris, although referring to the corporate form, explains that ‘...a standard act named undertakers and, 
in so doing, in fact prohibited transferability of their interests to individuals not named in the act. A problem 
occurred when the financial resources of the undertakers ran out before construction was completed. Original 
undertakers may then have wanted to desert, to be replaced by new undertakers, or to add more undertakers to 
share the financial burden with them. A formal solution could be to amend each act when new individuals 
joined, but this solution was not very practical. A more practical solution was to ignore the authorizing status on 
this point and to transfer shares by agreement between the outgoing and incoming undertakers’. Further 
historical examples of this kind are presented by Harris in his book. 
24 Agency problems between shareholders and managers / directors of the companies are more frequently 
referred to in the United Kingdom and United States literatures. These countries, at least regarding the public 
company, are characterized by dispersed ownership and very strong securities markets. The situation is different 
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restrictions on transfers, considering that often these restrictions are ignored and shares are 
transferred in breach of the company’s articles.25  
My hypothesis is that when legislators select default rules the substantive preferences of 
parties may change, but they do not necessarily do so, even when, for the sake of competition 
in the market and according to an evolutionary pattern, that change would be desirable. 
Parties prefer to preserve the status quo in their contractual arrangements. They seem to want 
to keep this status quo regardless of the purpose of the default rule. Why does this status quo 
exist? To what extent does it affect the development of business associations? Is there a 
relationship between the development of PLLCs and the type of defaults selected by 
legislators and courts? These are the questions I am trying to answer.  
Notwithstanding the hypothesis I have ventured above, I view defaults as neither useless 
nor redundant.26 On the contrary, I want to ‘test’ whether and to what extent their nudging 
effect can be used to induce the development of these business associations.27 From an 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
for Continental Europe where public companies display more concentrated ownership, and agency problems are 
held in check by majority shareholders and other non-shareholder constituencies such as creditors.  
On the other hand, one can also assume that where the protection of property rights is weak, shareholders will 
feel the need to take a more hands-on approach with their business and, as consequence, handle the management 
of the company themselves, or keep a close eye on the management undertaken by the manager to whom they 
delegated these tasks. This, one can assume, would be the best way shareholders have to keep their influence in 
the company. However, if the protection of their property rights is stronger, shareholders will have problems 
with sharing their personal gains with outsiders. They may even tend to rely more on the managers they appoint.  
If this is true of some situations, it is not necessarily true of all situations, especially regarding the PLLC, where 
the separation between ownership and control is frequently unclear. I am not attempting to establish a causal 
effect between the strength of property rights and agency costs. This is explored further on in the dissertation.  
Also see Burkart, Mike et al., ‘Family Firms’, The Journal of Finance, vol. 58, No. 5, 2003, pp. 2167 – 2201 
(claiming that the separation of ownership and management suggests there is a superior corporate governance 
environment. They also call attention to the fact this separation is less likely to exist in family firms, even if 
publicly held. This, as such, they say, indicates poorly developed financial markets). 
25 See Ribstein, Larry E., and Lipshaw, Jeffrey M., Unincorporated Business Entities, 4th ed. Newark, 2009, p. 
447 (claiming that ‘…transfer restrictions – particularly the unanimity requirement for transfer of management 
rights – impose costs that may exceed their benefits. Given the limited liability of LLC members and the 
centralization of management in many LLCs, the transfer of management rights in an LLC is not the sort of 
momentous event that it may be in a general partnership. The “majority in interest” may create confusion, 
particularly under statutes that provide generally for voting based on member contributions or on some other 
basis’). Also see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms’, 73, Washington University Law 
Quartely, 1995, pp. 369-432 (418) (clarifying that limitations on the transferability of shares are incompatible 
with the efficiency hypothesis he presents in the paper. As he puts it ‘Restrictions on transferability necessitate 
costly negotiations for consent and the potential members may opportunistically withhold their consent. 
Moreover the costs of restricting exit may be particularly high if members have given up voice by opting for 
centralized management’).  
26 See Black, Bernard S., ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis’, Northwestern 
University Law Review, vol. 84, 2, 1990, pp 542-597 (555) (stating that ‘The quintessential avoidable corporate 
rule is the default rule that begins “unless otherwise provided in the charter (or bylaws)”. This means that, 
according to the triviality theory ventured by him in his paper, defult rules are necessarily trivial. However, 
counter to Black, I think there still is much left in the corporate glass). 
27 See Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99, No. 1, 1989, pp. 87-130 (in the context of strategic behaviour of the 
parties, Ayres and Gertner (proposing ‘penalty default rules’ which incite the disclosure of information by one of 
the parties to a contract). 
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evolutionary point of view, I endorse the understanding that law, including common law, is 
not a spontaneous order. I call it a 'byproduct of informal manifestations of private ordering'.28 
Richard Dawkins would probably call it an 'extended phenotype'. A short biographical note is 
in order. A recent visit to the American Museum of Natural History called my attention to 
experiments regarding the domesticated silver fox. The experiments undertaken in the former 
Soviet Union and later in Russia showed that as a consequence of a selective breeding 
process, foxes bred in a peculiar environment of domestication developed dog-like 
morphological and behavioral traits including color of fur, size of ears and skull, barking and 
submission. These experiments suggest two things. First, there is a natural response and 
evolutionary process of adaptation of living beings to purposeful actions of tameability. The 
analogy with law boils down to the idea that the 'morphology' of law is likely to be 
conditional upon the context and environment in which it is applied and on the stimulus to 
which it is subjected. Second, sometimes things are linked in a way we do not expect, and this 
linkage is likely to change the environs as a result of new traits they develop. Thus, there are 
unintended consequences in this process of path-dependence or pleiotropy in law.29 I derive 
from this idea in Part II, Chapter 1 a new conceptualization of property rights. Restrictions on 
transfer of shares are likely to change the 'morphology' and 'physiognomy' of property rights 
in shares. Their absolute nature is modified. Like the silver fox, they are ‘tamed’. This notion 
of pleiotropy in corporate law based upon the drawing of contractual clauses restricting 
transfers of shares of PLLCs is further extended in Part II, Chapter 2. Here, I try to understand 
how restrictions on transfers affect the share sale and purchase agreement and the implications 
of these restrictions for the definition of shares. The pleiotropy idea is also extended in Part II, 
                                                             
28 By considering that law is not a spontaneous order I am referring to legislation and legal solutions adopted by 
legislatures. The idea is that legislation and legal solutions always come afterwards. See Ratnapala, Suri, ‘The 
Trident Case and the Evolutionary Theory of F.A. Hayek’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 13, 2, 1993, pp. 
201-226 (referring to ‘deliberate law making’ as a relatively recent human activity). Also see Ratnapala, Suri, 
‘The Trident Case and the Evolutionary Theory of F.A. Hayek’, cit. p. 211 (claiming that Hayek does not deny 
the need for legislation. Legislation is sometimes required in relation to tasks for which the rules of a 
spontaneous order are inappropriate. Legislation is also required to correct the sometimes unsatisfactorily 
directions in which the common law develops. But Hayek insists that if liberty is to be preserved, legislation 
which affects rules of just conduct should themselves imitate nomos. That is to say, they should be general, end-
independent and applicable to an indefinite number of unknown future situations. They should not be calculated 
to achieve particular material results). Additionally, see Benson, Bruce L., ‘The Spontaneous Evolution of 
Commercial Law’, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 55, 3, 1989, pp. 644-661 (644-45) (arguing that ‘…rules of 
property and contract necessary for a market economy, which most economists and legal scholars feel must be 
“imposed”, have evolved without the design of any absolute authority’).  
29 See Whitman, Douglas Glen, ‘Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems’, Constitutional Political 
Economy, vol. 9, 1, 1998, pp. 45-66 (50) (arguing that ‘If changes in the traits of an organism can shape the 
environment as well as be shaped by it, the very idea of optimal adaptation gets murky because it is unclear that 
a steady-state relationship between organism and environment will always occur’). See Whitman, Douglas, 
‘Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems, cit. pp. 52-53 (referring to pleiotropism in the context of 
cultural evolution). 
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Chapter 3 where I try to demonstrate that restrictions not only affect property rights in shares, 
but also are likely to affect the governance of the company to the point that it is necessary to 
pierce the ownership veil of the company to understand who really is in control of the 
decision-making. This knowledge is important because it sheds light on how consent to 
transfer is executed, and how that can affect the exercising by shareholders of property rights 
in their shares. Moreover, the act of piercing would serve to unveil agency problems and 
conflicts between majority and minority shareholders in the PLLC. The blurred lines 
separating ownership from control in the PLLC make frequency of occurrence of these 
problems and/or conflicts difficult to determine. A third extension of the pleiotropy notion is 
undertaken in Part III, Chapter 1 where, after I demonstrate the superiority of property rules to 
liability rules and inalienability in Part II, Chapter 4, I suggest forms to contractually design 
the company’s articles of association to strengthen property rights in shares and prevent 
bargaining failures. 
In my view, the problem of path-dependence in biology and, to a certain extent 
pleiotropy in law, echoes political economy path-dependence and doctrinal path-
dependence.30 On one hand, there may be interest groups that lobby for a prevailing status 
quo.31 On the other hand, there may be an entrenched legal system which is not able to 
regenerate itself completely. Nothing new develops. Rather, there is an adaptation of existing 
legal solutions, which are in fact changed with the least possible effort. New legal solutions 
are often constructed upon the bits and bytes of the existing law. Some concepts and legal 
institutions tend to be coupled even when they generate suboptimal results. The question is: 
Can they ever be separated, and, if so, how? I suggest that path-dependence patterns and 
pleiotropy in law and legal doctrine can be broken by experimentation undertaken at a 
structurally lower level where lawyers, notaries, bar associations, non-governmental 
organizations, and law consumers in general are able to network and set rules before the 
legislator does.32 For instance, an attempt at strengthening property rights by drafting the 
                                                             
30 See Dawkins, Richard, The Selfish Gene, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976 p. 12 (arguing that ‘…the 
best way to look at evolution is in terms of selection occurring at the lowest level of all’. And he goes on saying 
that ‘…the fundamental unit of selection, and therefore, of self-interest, is not the species, nor the group, nor 
even strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the unit of heredity’.). 
31 See Ratnapala, Suri, cit, pp. 225-226 (advocating that nowadays judges are not immune to political lobbying. 
Unlike in former times, they are no longer insulated in their task of adjudicating. So, she submits that if common 
law is to be maintained, judges should justify the continuing relevance and value of the tradition of judicial 
restraint. This justification should be drawn upon a general political theory able to claim its autonomy in face of 
the pressure of political groups). 
32 The French case, for instance, is illustrative. The legislator, whilst reforming the legal regime of the SARL, 
has been inspired by and has drawn upon some of the solutions for professional organizations. The hope of some 
scholars is that if changes to the SARL follow the recommendations of representatives of these professional 
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company’s contract fosters this kind of experimentation. Following this point of view, I look 
at law and legal solutions from a bottom-up perspective to see which legal solutions work 
best.3334 I illustrate this with a three-level model of legal policy in Part II, Chapter 1. The first 
level is the level of the society. Level 2 is the level of legislatures, regulators (politicians) and 
courts. The third level is the level of the market where we can find 'genetic traits' of corporate 
default rules. This model highlights, for the most part, how the second and third levels are 
interwoven. It suggests that this interconnection is likely to affect the first level. The way it 
affects the level of the society (i.e., the aggregate), especially when it comes to define the use 
of resources to maximize benefits with the least cost, may imply that a decision must be taken 
as to whether one places greater value on the market or the society. It is a knotty issue. This 
model delineates my idea of a bottom-up approach to law and is meant to be a point of 
departure for legal policy.  
However, historical records I collected during this study show that in many instances 
law is contingent upon the influence of interest groups and unexpected circumstances that 
render it incapable of reflecting about the conditions of its own application and evolution.35 
Hence, this study rebuts assumptions of the type labeled by Korobkin as a ‘preference 
exogeneity assumption’ as well as theoretical models based on pronouncements of rational 
choice theory.36 This particular assumption is criticized by Korobkin, who considers it 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
organizations, they should find a favorable echo in practice and thus enhance the use of SARL. See Saintourens, 
Bernard, ‘L'attractivité renforcée de la SARL après l'ordonnance n° 2004-274 du 25 mars 2004’, Revue des 
sociétés, 2004 p. 207- (…). In the case of the United States, see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Evolution of the Modern 
Uncorporation’, in idem, The Rise of the Uncorporation, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 131 
(affirming that ‘…the main force driving the evolution of the LLC statutes appears to be lawyers who have an 
interest in promoting their individual reputation as experts in the area and in ensuring that the law of their home 
state was attractive to business formation’). Also see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Statutory forms for Closely Held 
Firms’, 73Wash. U. L. Q., pp. 369-432 (400) (stressing the central role of the practicing bar in both demanding 
and supplying legislation); and Ribstein, Larry E, ‘The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company’, The 
Business Lawyer, vol. 51, 1, 1995-1996, pp. 1-49 (4) (arguing that ‘The growth of the LLC has been spurred 
largely by state bar committees rather than by independent legislative initiaves’). 
33 I am not endorsing a self-regenerating evolutionary legal system precisely because I believe the situations of 
path-dependence I refer to in the text lead to suboptimal results. I am arguing that law can have a corrective 
effect when legislatures are able to stay connected with this network of stakeholders (lawyers, notaries and 
corporate law consumers) and the market, and draw the legislative process accordingly. For instance, there are 
historical and anthropological data revealing how far law can go in developing family enterprise. See 
Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko, Producing Culture and Capital: Family Firms in Italy, Princeton and Oxford, 
Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 170-173 (referring to the reform of the Italian Civil Code in 1975 and to 
the introduction of changes to inheritance law. These changes enabled women – mothers, daughters and sisters - 
to champion a new position in the company’s ownership structure). 
34 I thank Roberta Romano for her comments and for having discussed some of these ideas with me. Naturally, 
all mistakes and omissions are mine. 
35 This view differs from those suggested by proponents of ‘reflexive law’. 
36 See Korobkin, Russell ‘The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules’, Cornell Law Review, vol. 83, 3, 
1997-1998, pp. 608-687 (The assumption referred to by Korobkin is based on the idea that ‘...contracting parties’ 
preferences for the substantive terms of their contracts remain the same regardless of the choice of default rules’. 
For law and economics advocates parties’ preferences for substantive contract terms change most likely as a 
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dubious. His thesis is that ‘...contract default rules affect preferences, not because the law 
places its imprimatur on certain contract terms, but because people prefer the status quo to 
alternative states, all other things being equal’.37 He maintains that in order to overcome 
contractual inefficiencies lawmakers should create majoritarian rather than penalty default 
rules and tailored or nonenforcement default rules instead of untailored defaults in general. I 
disagree, however, with this normative conclusion. In my view, a status quo bias would not be 
neutralized simply by the introduction of majoritarian, tailored or nonenforcement defaults. If 
that were the case, courts, legislatures and lawmakers in general are not themselves affected 
by any status quo bias. My research thus far demonstrates they are. I think that the effects of 
jurisdictional competition on the development of systems of contract law, corporate law and 
property law in Europe is promising in this regard. 
This research is mainly supported by doctrinal sources, case law and empirical data 
collected through archival work.38 The purpose of using this sort of method in a legal 
investigation is to rethink companies’ evolution from a legal standpoint. Additionally, it 
inspires refinements of fundamental concepts such as property rights, ownership, and 
contract, as well as methods for comparison. In addition, sources accessed at multiple 
archives and libraries described in Part 1, Chapter 1 shed light on the relationship between 
corporate constituencies and the governance structures in these business associations. We 
shall see that shareholders do not perform in one-man shows, and that their relationships with 
one another and with other constituencies shape their behavior. The intricacies of the private 
sphere (e.g., asymmetries of information, trust, reputation, and expectations and how they are 
fulfilled by the law) will be illustrated by the case studies I have selected.  
This background work is germane to the kind of bargaining I am describing with 
reference to these companies. It is also relevant to clarifying the problems I am trying to 
‘diagnose’ in Part II. It may help explain how different bargaining processes inhere to these 
companies and are different from other types of institutional bargaining. Moreover, 
considering that disputes between members of these companies typically do not even reach 
the courts, case studies and archival material help to expose different microsituational 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
result of transaction costs and strategies to withhold private information and not so much because of a particular 
default term). 
37See Korobkin, Russell, cit., p. 623. 
38 Recognizing that law is increasingly an interdisciplinary field, see Posner, Richard A., ‘The Decline of Law as 
an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 100, No. 4, 1987, pp. 761-780. Also see 
Ulen, Thomas S., ‘A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the 
Study of Law’, U. Ill. L. Rev. 875, 2002, pp. 875-920; and Lawless, Robert M. et al. Empirical Methods in Law, 
New York, Aspen Publishers, 2010. 
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contexts.39 Matters are dealt with privately, and alternative dispute resolutions are found. 
Using rational choice theories is good for some groups. There may indeed be cases where 
people really behave strategically. This, however, is not always the case.40 It can be difficult 
to predict where and when we should expect certain types of behavior.  
I started my empirical research in September 2010 by collecting information on 
companies with registered offices in Portugal. In the second stage of my research – as of 
September 2011 to February 2012 –I went to historical archives in Italy and the United 
Kingdom. In the third stage of my research – as of May to July 2012 - I refined the data I had 
already collected and turned to companies located in France and Spain. Finally, as of 
September to December 2012, I concentrated on LLCs in the United States. In the cases of 
Spain and the United States it was very difficult to obtain the originals of articles of 
association and operating agreements of Srls and LLCs, respectively. In the US, for example, 
certificates of formation are public documents,41 but the relevant information may be lodged 
in non-filed operating agreements. Also, a voluminous number of operating agreements are 
not collected in any organized way. Moreover, these companies, unlike publicly held 
companies, do not benefit from a market for their shares, and their members often enter into 
other sort of agreements which are not public. Corporate behavior in the PLLC is not 
constrained by arranged markets such as financial and employment markets, at least to the 
same extent it is in public companies. Therefore, their profile has been established with the 
help of the data that have been possible to collect. 
While collecting material provided by historical and legal sources, and consulting 
newspapers of massive circulation such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, I 
came to realize that this study boils down to a discussion (perhaps today a bit less mainstream 
than before) about sources of law. Sources of law are and always have been influenced by 
political choices in the implementation of law, by moments of war and peace in the history of 
nations, by economic trends, and moral values, even when these values were not so evident 
when normative claims were made. Today, the old discussion must be held with new 
arguments made in the context of a global market and legal pluralism. The normative 
conceptualization of a global market and legal pluralism as well as the normative 
understanding of their effects at the national and transnational levels cannot be undertaken 
                                                             
39 See Poteete, Amy R. et al., ‘Small-N Case Studies: Putting the Commons under a Magnifying Glass’, in idem, 
cit., pp. 31- 63 (making an account of case study contributions for theory developing and testing). 
40
 See Poteete, Amy R. et al., cit. pp. 220-221 (arguing that ‘It is particularly upsetting to have one theory – 
rational choice theory – that explains how individuals achieve close–to–optimal outcomes in competitive market 
settings, but fails to explain how individuals will or will not cope with social dilemmas’). 
41 See the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act §18-201. 
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without considering phenomena of ‘cross-fertilization’ and fluidity in the law, and the 
existence of different types and layers of ordering to which the concept of ‘law’ may be ill-
fitting. Cultural patterns of behavior and the understanding of how markets and institutions 
(should) work,42 and forms of institutionalized power (disclosed by empirical data) cast a 
shadow over the construction of models for which my ultimate goal is ‘internal validity’.43 I 
kept this in mind while developing the ideas I present hereto.  
This dissertation presents a theoretical framework that is based upon evolutionary 
theory in law. It provides new theoretical arguments which are embedded in the empirical 
data collected. Every new thought stems from these data. They have been strategically 
compiled into annexes to this dissertation so that the robustness of the ideas can be confirmed. 
The purpose of framing the investigation with evolutionary theory is to yield solutions liable 
to reflect better the preferences of the overall consumer of corporate laws, in particular those 
who desire to invest in PLLCs. This framework shows how, according to different concepts of 
efficiency (i.e., Pareto efficiency and dynamic efficiency), it is possible to create default rules 
that overcome internal corporate deadlocks, and promote combined action and informed 
interaction, trust and binding reciprocity among company’s constituencies, competition, and 
therefore institutional evolution.44  
Additionally, I propose legal policies, and take into account the model of regulation at 
the EU level. I compare it with the United States market design. This market is not necessarily 
based on an a priori principle of regulation. In fact, I try to overcome the bias Europeans are 
often said to depart from, which is that (more) regulation is needed.45 This may not be the 
case.46 This begs the question which I pose from an evolutionary platform: Is it time to 
                                                             
42 See Kahn, Paul W., The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship, Chicago and London, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
43 This term is mostly used by literature on experimental methods dealing in particular with validity and 
causality. See Adcock, Robert and Collier, David, ‘Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative 
and Quantitative Research’, American Political Science Review, vol. 95, No 3, September 2001, pp. 529-546; 
and McDermott, Rose, ‘Internal and External Validity’ in Druckman, James N. et al (eds.), Cambridge 
Handbook of Experimental Political Science, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 27-40. By using 
the expression ‘internal validity’ in the text I want to call attention to the fact that broad generalizations based on 
the empirical results found in this study should be avoided. Data presented here point in a certain direction, but 
are not intended to be a platform for external validity.  
44 The word ‘coordination’ has been more recently used by mainstream literature. This, however, is not the only 
problem one has to deal with, at least when it comes to the assessment of the type of relationships putting 
together different corporate constituencies. 
45 See Whitman, James Q., ‘Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law’, The Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 117, 2007, pp. 340-406. 
46 This can be historically illustrated by the closed family firm, for which legal conceptions such as separate legal 
personality, managerial structure, transferable shares or membership interests, and the separation of ownership 
and control were not so relevant, but rather the values shared by the members of the family and long-standing 
traditions. The case of the unincorporated company is equally interesting. This corporate form (if one can fairly 
name it as such due to the convergence in it of partnership law, contract law, trust, agency, company law and 
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liberalize the PLLC, the most frequently used corporate form to invest and create capital? 
This question inevitably leads one to consider the potential role of markets, the political 
process, the courts, and the society in setting standards of legal evolution.47 It is also 
important to think about whether models enabling jurisdictional competition and the creation 
of a market for law better serve the evolutionary principle.48  
As a comparative study, this research will more efficiently reveal the preferences of 
consumers of corporate law than if it was reduced to a narrow methodological approach. To 
this end, the work is driven by a comparative matrix wherein I introduce elements for 
comparison in the six countries. This matrix is designed at an early stage in its empty form to 
be completed at a later stage upon the comparative synthesis. Moreover, the comparison 
between the United States and the selected jurisdictions in Europe is based upon the 
judgments adjudicated by national courts and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 
company law cases and on freedoms of movement.49 These judgments paved the way for 
jurisdictional competition in Europe. The purpose of this comparison is to evaluate whether 
national courts and the ECJ can play a role when it comes to breaking a prevailing status quo 
and can, thus, take the cognitive burden off the shoulders of members of PLLCs with regard 
to the choice of the best rules to govern their deals. The comparison I undertake herein does 
not include the study of tax and labor laws in the six jurisdictions; it does not scrutinize the 
role of stakeholders such as employees and creditors; it does not dwell upon the definition of 
public good, it does not compare the EU to the United States, and it does not engage in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
other applicable statutory law) developed ‘from below’, aside from the legal system. The unincorporated 
company was created in the private sphere without the authorization of the state. This was mostly the result of 
the work developed by entrepreneurs and their solicitors when developing the adequate framework that would 
serve their needs. See Harris, Ron, cit., pp. 27-28 and pp. 137-167. In addition, see Berstein, Lisa, ‘Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions’, 
Michigan Law Review, 2001, vol. 99, 7, pp. 1724-1790 (referring to an implicit system of private rules where 
reputation plays an important role and gossip serves as a negative incentive to non-cooperative actions taken by 
members of the cotton industry); Bernstein, Lisa, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 21, No 1, (Jan 1992), pp. 115-157 
(treating a peculiar system of private governance in the diamond industry where disputes are not resolved 
through courts and the application of legal rules created by the state is rejected). 
47 See Komesar, Neil K., Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, 
Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
48 See O’Hara Erin A., and Ribstein Larry E., The Law Market, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. Also 
see Butler, Henry N. and Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-
Shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’, 65 Washington Law Review, vol. 1, 1990, 
pp. 1-72 (58) (arguing that ‘...there is substantial reason to believe that a process of evolution of corporate rules 
through private ordering is preferable to a system of mandatory rules’). It is important to note that the terms in 
which the discussion about default and mandatory rules has been held in the United States and Europe is 
different. 
49 Centros (Case C-212/97, 9 March 1999), Überseering (Case C-208/00, 5 November 2002), and Inspire Art 
(Case C-167/01, 30 September 2003). 
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debate about the best methods of comparative law. By taking a social sciences approach to a 
legal question, however, it does introduce a wider debate about methodology in law. 
In sum, examining rules on transfer of shares creates a 'laboratory' in which to study 
significant jurisprudential issues, including the factors that result in differences or cause 
convergence among different legal systems, the effect of jurisdictional competition for the 
development of better rules (e.g., Do we need mandatory rules, different default rules, or no 
rules at all?) and fundamental policies of contract and business association laws across 
jurisdictions.50  
This dissertation is divided into three main parts. They correspond to the three different 
stages of comparative work. The first part is descriptive. It tries to look the PLLC in the face 
to unveil the profile of these business organizations in the six jurisdictions. This is 
accomplished by embedding into the legal research a parallel historical inquiry. The second 
part is an explanatory part wherein I evaluate the problems deriving from a potential scenario 
of un-consented transfer of shares. In the third part, I 'connect the dots' and relate the systems 
to each other. This is where the real work of comparison is undertaken, through the 
comparative synthesis. The comparative synthesis entails the cross-checking of results. I do 
this by answering the questions listed at the left column of the comparative matrix in respect 
to each of the six countries listed at its top row. The fourth part concludes and yields my 
thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
50 See Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Ribstein, Larry E, ‘Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for 
Limited Liability Companies’, University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 1, 2011, pp. 91-144; Ribstein, Larry E., 
‘The Evolving Partnership’, in MacCahery, Joseph A. et al. (eds.), cit., pp. 23-56; Romano, Roberta, The Genius 
of American Corporate Law, Washington, D.C., The AEI Press, 1993, pp. 24-28; Romano, Roberta, ‘State 
Competition for Close Corporation Charters: A Commentary’, Washington University Law Quarterly, vol.. 70 
(1992), pp. 409-416. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
METHODOLOGY: THE COMPARATIVE MATRIX AS A 
LABORATORY FOR RESEARCH
51
 
 
‘The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing 
‘absolute’ about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The 
bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is 
like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from 
above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; 
and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have 
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the 
piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time 
being’. 
 
Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London and New 
York, Routledge, (1959) 2002, 94. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter develops a method based on the construction of a comparative matrix to 
link each problem under investigation with the respective jurisdiction in which that problem is 
being observed and studied. Borrowing from the field of engineering, I call it a comparative 
matrix. To date, there exists no standardized method for comparison of legal systems or 
elements of different legal systems. This matrix is an analytical space, and functions as a 
laboratory that is designed to be used both as a starting point and as an instrument for the 
comparative synthesis at the end of the work of comparison.52 At this point, the comparative 
matrix not only streamlines the research, but also organizes the ways in which problems are 
examined in the context of my laboratory.53  
                                                             
51 This chapter is based on the presentation I gave at the British Association of Comparative Law (BACL) 
Postgraduate Workshop on Comparative Law, Kent Center for European and Comparative Law, Kent Law 
School, Canterbury, United Kingdom on 19 and 20 June 2012. I thank the participants for their comments. 
52 See Part III, chapter 3. 
53 Relevant questions regarding which and how legal systems and topics for comparison should be selected must 
be answered before the endeavour of comparison starts. But when it comes to the method, the researcher enjoys 
considerable leeway to implement it. See Kamba, W. J., ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework,’ The 
International and Comparative Law Quaterly, vol. 23, 3, 1974, pp. 485-519 (517) (saying that ‘It seems plain … 
that systematic comparison consists of a combination of a number of techniques or approaches which leave 
considerable room for individual judgment’). Also see Gerber, David J., ‘System Dynamics: Toward a Language 
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The comparison follows a functional principle. However, I attempt to harmonize the 
focus on the purpose of specific rules with the context within which they were designed. The 
use of comparative law to analyze and describe the law within a context creates a bridge to an 
interdisciplinary avenue in the field of comparative studies.54 I do this by taking a social 
sciences approach to legal research in order to explain why law is how it is.55 This task is 
additionally complemented by the evolutionary theoretical framework that tries to clarify 
what law is (or it can be) alongside the legal categories that inform the standardized 
knowledge of it. 
Finally, the comparative work and the creation of a method is meant to provide tools to 
test the falsifiability of the following hypothesis: When legislators select default rules the 
substantive preferences of parties may change, but do not necessarily do so, even when, for 
the sake of competition in the market and according to an evolutionary pattern this change 
would be desirable. Parties prefer to preserve the status quo in their contractual arrangements. 
Importantly, they seem to want to hold onto this status quo regardless of the nature of the 
default rule. Given this hypothesis, I scrutinize case law regarding transfer of shares, which 
are mostly un-consented. My goal is to provide a sense of the number of disputes regarding 
transfer of shares that actually reveal the intention of corporate constituencies to maintain a 
status quo in the company regardless of the ‘legal infrastructure’ they have selected. Also, the 
comparison allows for an explanation of the collected data, and to understand the differences 
and similarities across the jurisdictions selected. 
Section 1 presents the comparative framework. It explains the object of the comparative 
research and the problems that are investigated. In addition, it clarifies the methodology for 
the comparison and introduces as well as extends the concept of comparative matrix as a 
laboratory for research. Section 2 dwells on the empirical method and elucidates the choices 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
of Comparative Law?’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 46, 4, 1998, pp 719-737 (claiming for a 
theoretical framework for corporate law). See Reimann, Mathias, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law 
in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 50, 4, 2002, pp. 
671 – 700 (686) (arguing that ‘The most embarrassing theoretical weakness is the continuing lack of an 
understanding of what it really means to compare’). This naturally raises very difficult questions as to the 
method of comparison, which to this date has not fully developed in doctrine. 
54 See Reimann, Mathias, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth 
Century’, cit., pp.685-686 (considering that interdisciplinary work in comparative law is still an exception). Also 
see Legeais, Raymond, Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporains: Approach Comparative, 2nd ed., Paris, 
LexisNexis, Litec, 2008, pp. 253-258 (debating the need for a proper method of comparison). 
55 See Samuel, Geoffrey, ‘Is Law Really a Social Science?: A View From Comparative Law’, Cambridge Law 
Journal, 67, 2, 2008, pp. 288-321 (saying that comparative law, unlike other fields of law, must be defined as a 
social science. The comparatist lawyer is necessarily led to reason outside of an authority paradigm if she 
expects to make a sound contribution to legal epistemology). 
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and challenges faced with respect to it. Section 3 makes clear the larger theoretical framework 
of the thesis, that is, evolutionary theory in law. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The comparative framework 
 
i. The object of the comparative research and illustration of the problems under 
investigation 
 
This is a comparative study.56 As explained in the introduction to this dissertation, it 
aims to understand whether the design of default rules establishing restrictions on transfer of 
shares is likely to affect investment in PLLCs and their development. The following chapters 
can only be fully understood if a model of comparison is objectively presented beforehand 
and the object of the research is reflected therein.57 So that this can be easily grasped I shall 
give an overview of the problems which are addressed throughout the research. 
 
a. The public / private companies divide: Where does the PLLC stand? 
 
Business organizations are differently designed in the laws of the selected jurisdictions. 
However, there also are similarities that cut across the legal forms of these business 
organizations. Importantly, there is a line in all these jurisdictions dividing public and private 
companies. In the case of the United Kingdom, as it shall be described, this line is blurred, 
mostly for historical reasons.58 This distinction would only become apparent in the 1980s 
                                                             
56 For examples of studies on comparative company law studies, law and finance, and comparative corporate 
governance, see Kraakman, Reinier et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach, 2nd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2009; Gilson, Ronald J., ‘Controlling Shareholders and 
Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 119, 6, 2006, pp. 
1642-1679; Dyck, Alexander; and Zingales, Luigi, ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’, 
The Journal of Finance, vol. 59, 2, 2004, pp. 537-600; Roe, Mark J., ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure 
in Germany, Japan, and the United States , The Yale Law Journal, vol. 102, No. 8, Symposium: Economic 
Competitiveness and the Law, 1993, pp. 1927-2003. Interestingly, most research has been undertaken with 
regard to publicly held companies. 
57 As to the concept of comparative law and its method, see Zweigert, Konrad; and Kötz, Hein, Introduction to 
Comparative Law, 3rd. ed. (trans. Tony Weir), New York, Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1998, pp. 1-48. Comparative 
law has, however, developed a lot since this classic piece. See, for example, Reimann, Mathias, ‘The Progress 
and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, vol. 50, No. 4, 2002, pp. 671-700 (briefly listing relevant literature in this field); and Legrand, 
Pierre, and Munday, Roderick (eds.), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
58 See Part I, Chapter 3. 
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after the implementation of the Second EC Company Law Directive.59 The definition of 
private and public companies may be undertaken through the following variables: (i) limited 
liability, (ii) minimum number of shareholders, (iii) share capital (including minimum 
authorized capital and minimum paid up capital), (iv) transferability of shares, (v) and 
management or ultimate decision-making body. 
 
(i) The public company, PLC or corporation 
 
Public companies (also referred to in modern corporate law as publicly held companies 
or PLCs) were historically preceded by joint stock companies.60 They are typically limited 
liability companies. In other words, shareholders’ liability is limited to their contributions and 
only the assets of the company are liable for the company’s debts. Their shares are publicly 
traded in stock markets or, put differently, the value of their shares is subject to the scrutiny of 
a public market. Despite being categorized as public, these companies are not state-owned. 
Their securities are normally held by a large number of shareholders (or investors) which, but 
for very few exceptions, do not face any restrictions on their transferring of shares. Their 
share capital is disseminated and, for this reason, these business organizations are great 
sources of liquidity. Thus, unlike private companies, publicly held companies do not have to 
bear the heavy weight of borrowing. They are the legal form of big businesses and large 
corporations. The management of these companies is undertaken by a board of directors and 
is not diffused by the members. That is to say, generally, shareholders are not directors. The 
separation of ownership and control, that is distinctive of publicly held companies, has 
motivated extensive literature on ‘agency problems’ effected by the lack of incentives of 
managers.61 In spite of the advantages of limited liability and free transferability of shares, 
public companies are not flexible business organizations. In principle, they are not controlled 
by governments, but are subject to a considerable amount of state regulation and international 
                                                             
59 See Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976. It was implemented in the United Kingdom 
by the Companies Act 1980. This directive was amended by Directive 2009/109/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 16 September 2009. 
60 One of the famous early joint stock companies was the Portuguese East India Company, created in the 
seventeenth century. 
61 See Berle, Adolf. A, and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., 
New York, Harcourt, 1967; Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H. ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, vol. 3, No 
4, pp. 305-360; and Fama, Eugene F., ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, The Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 88, N.º 2, 1980, pp. 288-307. 
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principles of corporate social responsibility.62 They are constrained by corseting legal and 
regulatory provisions that implement strict rules of corporate governance, monitoring and 
financial disclosure. The legislation of each selected jurisdiction provides specific 
requirements regarding each of the above-specified five variables. 
In Portugal, shareholders of the Portuguese version of the PLC – sociedade anónima – 
enjoy limited liability. The minimum number of shareholders required is five. The minimum 
required share capital is €50,000.00. At least 30% of the share capital should be paid-up. 
Shares may be transferred freely, without prejudice of minor exceptions. The management or 
ultimate decision-making body is the board of directors (conselho de admnistração). In a 
similar way, the investors of the French PLC – sociétés anonymes – enjoy limited liability. 
The company may not number fewer than seven members. The minimum share capital is 
€37,000.00 and should be fully paid-up. Shares can be freely transferred. The management of 
the company is held by a board of directors (conseil d'administration). In Italy, investors of 
the Italian version of the PLC – the società per azioni – enjoy limited liability. The company 
may be founded with even one member. The minimum required share capital is €120,000.00 
and the minimum paid up capital is set at a threshold of 25%. Shares can be freely transferred. 
The management or ultimate decision-making body consists of a sole director or board of 
directors. In Spain, the shareholders of the PLC or sociedad anónima enjoy limited liability. 
The minimum required share capital is €60,000.00 and the minimum paid-up capital is 
€15,000.00. Generally, restrictions on transfer of shares are not provided. The management 
and representation of the company is in the hands of a board of directors (consejo de 
administración), but the general meeting of shareholders holds the ultimate decision-making 
power. In the United Kingdom investors of the PLC enjoy limited liability. The company 
must be incorporated with a minimum of two shareholders. The minimum required share 
capital is €57,100 or £50,000. Normally, no restrictions on transfer of shares are imposed. The 
management and ultimate decision-making power belong to directors working in the best 
interest of shareholders. In the United States, the PLC is also referred to as a ‘corporation’. 
For example, investors of Delaware corporations enjoy limited liability. The minimum 
number of founder members is one. There is no required minimum share capital or minimum 
paid-up share capital. Shares are freely transferable. However, it is important to stress that 
members of these business organizations may choose to restrict the transfer of shares or limit 
the admission of new members. In these circumstances, the corporation is referred to in 
                                                             
62 See ‘The Ten Principles’ of the United Nations Global Compact available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (accessed on 9 January 2014). 
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American literature as a ‘closely held corporation’.63 In the corporation, the ultimate decision-
making body is the board of directors. 
 
(ii) The private company or ‘uncorporation’ 
 
Private companies (also referred to as privately held companies) are business 
organizations whose shares are not publicly traded. Their articles of association often include 
restrictions on transfer of shares. The absence of a market for their shares explains the 
illiquidity of these companies’ shares. There are fewer shareholders, and these also frequently 
function as managers or directors. Hence, the separation of ownership and control in these 
companies is less evident than in publicly held companies. Sometimes, it is nonexistent. 
Often, the management of the company is attributed to all shareholders or to the majority 
shareholder(s). However, agency costs which in publicly held companies are, for the most 
part, caused by the split of ownership and control are not marginal in private companies. The 
samples of case law collected in all six countries suggest that it is likely that there be not only 
clashes of interests between majority and minority shareholders, but also between 
shareholders and managers. Given that there are fewer shareholders, it is understandable that 
as a rule these companies are less of a stage for problems of collective action than publicly 
held companies.64 However, these problems exist in private companies, especially when their 
distinctive contractual framework gives more power to certain constituencies than others and 
bargaining failures are difficult to overcome. Generally, private companies are less hampered 
by financial regulations and legal provisions of corporate governance. In many cases, they 
also are subject to beneficial tax treatment. This legal form includes the general partnership, 
the limited partnership, the private limited liability company (PLLC) and other variations of 
these entities. In American legislation and literature they have been clustered into the concept 
of ‘uncorporation’ to signify they are not corporations.65 This dissertation investigates the 
PLLC. Like the public company, the legislation of each jurisdiction foresees specific 
requirements for the PLLC which are distinctive features of this form. 
In Portugal, shareholders of the Portuguese version of PLLC – sociedade por quotas – 
enjoy limited liability, unless otherwise established in the articles of association. If 
                                                             
63 See Ragazzo, Robert A., and Moll, Douglas K., Closely Held Business Organizations: Cases, Materials, and 
Problems, St. Paul, MN, Thomson/West, 2006, pp. 367-383.  
64 See Hansmann, Henry, ‘Corporation and Contract’, American Law & Economics Review, vol. 8, 1, 2006, pp. 
1-19. 
65 See Ribstein, Larry E., The Rise of the Uncorporation, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010 (providing 
an insightful description of these business organizations). 
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shareholders are liable for corporate debts they will hold a right to be paid back by the 
company. The company must be incorporated with two or more shareholders. The minimum 
share capital of a Portuguese PLLC is freely established in the articles of association. It 
should be equivalent to the total membership contributions, which should not be less than the 
symbolic amount of €1. If the share capital is higher than the minimum required, at least 50% 
should be paid-up. In principle, shares must not be transferred to third parties other than 
spouses, ascendants, descendants and other shareholders without the consent of the company, 
unless articles of association establish otherwise. The company is managed by one manager or 
a management board.66 Managers are responsible for directing the company on all subjects 
that are not exclusively dependent upon on shareholders’ decisions. French PLLCs are also 
known as sociétés à responsabilité limitées. Shareholders enjoy limited liability. PLLCs may 
have even a single founding member (l'associé unique). The share capital is freely established 
in the articles of association. Transfer of shares is subject to restrictions. The management is 
undertaken by one or several managers who may or may not be shareholders. They decide on 
all matters that do not fall within the exclusive competence of shareholders. In the SARL 
there is no fully-fledged management board. Managers hold separate powers to represent and 
act on behalf of the company in accordance with the articles of association. In Italy, 
shareholders of the Italian PLLC – società a responsabilità limitata – enjoy limited liability. 
PLLCs must be incorporated with at least one shareholder. The minimum required share 
capital is €1 and the requirement of 25% of minimum paid-up capital applies. Shares are 
freely transferable, unless otherwise established in the articles of association. The 
management of the company rests on a sole director or board of directors who may or may not 
be shareholders. In Spain, the shareholders of the PLLC or sociedad de responsabilidad 
limitada also enjoy limited liability. The company may be incorporated by one or more 
shareholders. The minimum required share capital is €3,000.00, which should be fully paid-
up. Transfer of shares is subject to restrictions, unless otherwise provided by the articles of 
association. The management and representation of the company is undertaken by managers 
or a management board (consejo de administracion), but the general meeting of shareholders 
is the ultimate decision-making body. The United Kingdom private company grants its 
members limited liability. It may be founded with a single member. The minimum required 
share capital is £ 0,01. Shares are freely transferable, unless otherwise established in the 
articles of association. The ultimate decision-making power is held by directors who, as in the 
                                                             
66 In Portuguese literature, a distinction is made between ‘managers’ of PLLCs and ‘directors’ of PLCs. 
 44 
 
public company, are bound to act in the best interests of shareholders. The American version 
of the PLLC is the limited liability company (LLC). It is also referred to as a type of 
uncorporation. Taking, once more, the example of Delaware, LLC shareholder liability is 
limited to the amount of their contributions. LLCs may be incorporated by one shareholder. 
According to the law of the state of Delaware, no minimum share capital is required. 
Generally, LLCs’ shares or interests are assignable in whole or in part, except if the LLC 
agreement provides differently.67 The representation and ultimate decision-making body are 
defined by the LLC agreement. 
 
(iii)Hybrid entities 
 
In spite of the line dividing public and private companies, the traditional legal forms of 
business organizations are currently dealing with serious challenges effected by the 
emergence of alternative and hybrid entities. There are publicly traded limited liability 
companies as well as publicly traded partnerships. In 2010, The Economist reported that 
publicly traded partnerships and real-estate investment trusts were merging, and in the process 
were combining traits of publicly held companies or corporations and private companies such 
as partnerships. This same column provided the following passage:  
 
The most fashionable investment vehicles—leveraged buy-out firms, hedge funds and venture-
capital funds—are spearheading the “uncorporate” revolution. These firms are usually 
organized as partnerships, though some, such as the Blackstone Group, are also listed. 
Corporate raiders often raise money by creating funds in the form of partnerships. Their targets 
are often restructured as partnerships. This makes managers behave like owners rather than 
hired hands: they can lose money as well as making it and they have years to turn their 
companies around rather than answering to the stockmarket every quarter. Hedge funds can 
make money by buying companies and selling underperforming assets. Venture capitalists make 
money in the long term by lending their names and expertise to start-ups. Hedge funds and 
venture-capital firms also make money in their different ways by getting fund managers to 
behave more like partners, with “skin in the game”, as the modish phrase puts it.68 
 
                                                             
67 This rule has specificities deriving from the decomposition of LLCs’ shares into economic and management 
rights. They will be further explained in Part I, Chapter 3 apropos the United States case. 
68 See Wooldridge, Adrian, ‘The Eclipse of the Public Company: Traditional Listed Firms are Facing 
Competition’, The Economist, 19 August 2010 available at http://www.economist.com/node/16843627 (accessed 
on 10 March 2014). 
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I faced the hybridity of these legal forms while collecting a sample of LLC agreements 
on WestlawNexis to study the United States case. Many of these companies are contractually 
structured like equity funds. Their ownership and governance structures reflect this.69 For 
example, and as it is pointed out in the excerpt above, managers who are not owners behave 
like it. LLCs are structured more like corporations / publicly held companies perhaps because 
they are being used as business vehicles to enter the stock market at a later stage. 
In sum, the PLLC, which is the object of this study, is a private company whose 
shareholders enjoy limited liability. Its ownership and governance structures are not diffused, 
at least not as much as in publicly held companies. Its shares are often subject to transfer 
restrictions. However, this type of business organization is flexible in nature. They are mostly 
used by small businesses, but also are adaptable to big businesses. This fact has compelled 
some authors to forecast the ‘uncorporation’ of large firms as a form to overcome governance 
problems deriving from centralized management in publicly held firms.70 
 
b. Why are there restrictions on transfers? 
 
The transferability of shares, the company’s legal personality, the principle of limited 
liability, the management form (i.e., undertaken under a board structure or through collective 
decisions of shareholders), and the question of ownership of investors constitute the basic 
features of a company.71 This is especially the case for companies incorporated in the selected 
jurisdictions. I highlight the transferability of shares and the deviation from this principle with 
                                                             
69 I have noticed that one of the reasons that LLC members introduce restrictions on transfers has to do with the 
fact that they want to prevent any portion of the assets of the company to become ‘plan assets’ of any ‘benefit 
plan investor’ within the meaning of regulations issued by the US Department of Labor at Section 2510.3-101 of 
Part 2510 of Chapter XXV, Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations as modified by Section 3(42) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Paragraph b(4) of this regulation provides a definition of 
freely-transferable publicly traded securities. It also clarifies that the question of whether a security is freely 
transferable is a factual question to be determined on the basis of relevant facts and circumstances. However, if a 
security is part of an offering in which the minimum investment is $ 10,000 or less, the factors described in the 
several subparagraphs ordinarily will not, alone or in combination, affect a finding that such securities are freely 
transferable. Among those factors are different sorts of restrictions on transfers. 
70 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Uncorporating the Large Firm’, in idem, The Rise of the Uncorporation, cit., pp. 193-
246. For a distinction between private and public companies and an account of different forms of business 
organizations in the United Kingdom, see Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company 
Law, 8th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, pp. 13-32. Also see Cannu, Paul Le; and Dondero, Bruno, Droit 
des Sociétés, 3.ª ed., Paris, Montchrestien, 2009, pp. 2-14 (presenting the main types of business organizations in 
French law); Guyon, Yves, Droit des Affaires, tome 1, Droit Général et Sociétés, 6th ed., Paris, Economica, 
1990, pp. 211-223 (providing a classification of several forms of French commercial companies). Also see 
Cordeiro, António Menezes, Manual de Direito das Sociedades, II, Das Sociedades em Especial, 2nd ed., 2007 
(classifying different types of companies according to Portuguese law). 
71 See Armour, John, Hansmann, Henry, and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘What is Corporate Law’ in Kraakman et. al., 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law, cit., pp. 1-34. 
 46 
 
regard to the PLLC. Frequently, restrictions on transfer of shares in these companies are by 
default established by the law and subsequently introduced in their articles of association by 
their members. (Sometimes these restrictions are not provided by the law, but members of the 
company prefer to introduce them). The problem with transfer of shares in private companies 
is that restrictions on transfers, such as the requirement of consent of the company, managers 
or other shareholders, render more cumbersome the resolution of acrimonious behavior 
between shareholders and of situations of opportunistic behavior.72 This is true even in 
situations in which the law and the articles of association provide mechanisms to prevent 
shareholders from being locked-in to the company.73 
I maintain that criteria of economic rationality determine the inclusion of restrictions in 
the companies’ articles.74 When partners incorporate these business associations they attribute 
a greater value to those restrictions than to the right to freely resign from the company. They 
attribute a greater value to restrictions on transfers than to the attainment of immediate gains 
as a result of the sale of shares in a public market. They view these restrictions as more 
valuable than the possibility of decreasing investment risks by means of a greater dispersal of 
the share capital. This is so because the value of human capital should be added to the share 
                                                             
72 See Kalss, Susanne, ‘The Transfer of Shares of Private Companies’, European Company Law and Financial 
Law Review, vol. 1, 3, 2004, pp. 340-367 (352) (stating that the ‘The greater difficulty of trading shares in a 
private company and the fact that the consent of the other shareholders may be required for a sale makes solving 
a potential conflict by selling one’s shares more difficult for the shareholders in a private company’). Also see 
Thompson, Robert B., ‘Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasoable Expectations’, Washington 
University Law Quaterly, vol. 66, N.º2, 1988, pp. 193- 238 (196) (saying that ‘In a close corporation setting, the 
norm of free transferability of shares is illusory. Because of the size of the business and the small number of 
participants there is no ready market for interests in the enterprise’. He explains this more clearly in note 10 by 
asserting that ‘The lack of a ready market (1) makes valuation of shares uncertain, increasing the transaction 
costs of any participant seeking to sell; (2) precludes some participants from using the secondary market to 
provide ‘home-made dividends’ if the corporation itself does not declare dividends, (3) precludes reliance on the 
stock market to monitor managers; and (4) precludes the ability of uninformed investors to rely upon the market 
to monitor managers; and (4) precludes the ability of uninformed investors to rely upon the efficient market to 
set price instead of engaging in their own costly search for information’). 
73 The term lock-in is used differently in the text from the way it is used in Part III, Chapter 1. Here, by referring 
to ‘lock-in’ I mean a situation in which members become ‘prisoners of the company’, to use an expression 
propagated in French and Portuguese literature. For example, Article 231(1) of the Portuguese Commercial 
Companies Code regulates the refusal of consent and determines that if the company refuses to consent, it must 
make a proposal of redemption or acquisition of the share.  
74 Often legislators have established restrictions on transfers by mimicking the market. This has been the case in 
Portugal and Spain as it is shown by historical data presented below. This is a question of corporate law theory 
and policy. See, Black, Bernard S, ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, Northwestern 
University Law Review, vol. 84, 2, 1990, pp. 542-597 (showing that rules may be trivial in four situations: when 
they are market-mimicking, avoidable, changeable, or unimportant). Also see Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert, 
‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’, 99 Yale L. J, No. 1, 1989, pp. 
87-130; Bebchuck, Lucian Arye and Hamdani, Assaf, ‘Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution’, 96 Nw. 
UL. Rev., 2001-2002, pp. 489-520; and Hansmann, Henry, ‘Corporation and Contract’, 8 American Law and 
Economics Review, vol. 8, 1, 2006, pp. 1-19. 
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value of the corporation.75 It is important for a member to maintain a close relationship with 
her or his peers. Kinship, loyalty and trust are three other reasons for the inclusion of 
restrictions. PLLCs often emerge from family relationships. So, when a shareholder sells his 
or her shares without the company’s prior consent they are inevitably depriving other 
shareholders of that accrued value. Furthermore, shareholders normally agree on the division 
of profits, the exclusion or entry of new shareholders, and the acquisition of shares in other 
corporations to guarantee that the integrity of the ownership structure and control of the 
company stay as they were initially envisioned.76 Finally, sometimes members just want to 
operate with anonymity and avoid regulatory restrictions which otherwise would be imposed 
if it was a publicly held company. Therefore, they opt for ‘…keeping the partnership “close 
and tight”’.77 The PLLC structure tends to insulate the controlling members from passive 
investors and leaves the former with control over company investments.  
 
c. Transfer of shares and agency problems in PLLCs 
 
Transfers of shares – especially un-consented transfers of shares - are liable to trigger 
‘agency problems’. These problems vary according to the governance and ownership 
structures of the corporation.78 At this point, I shall emphasize that I question whether 
shareholders can properly be called owners of the company. A great deal of research has 
shown that they face considerable restrictions on their ability to control the corporation and its 
assets. Even taking into account that shareholders enjoy property rights in their shares or units 
                                                             
75 I refer to the human capital of both shareholders and employees. I believe the former is more important in 
PLLCs. The latter is more relevant in publicly held companies. 
76 See Easterbrook, Frank H. And Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 233 (... firms restrict the alienability of 
shares to ensure that those who are investors are also compatible managers. The restrictions also preserve an 
agreed-on division of profits’). 
77 See W.R. Huff asset management co., L.L.C.; KATO-SAN CORP.; DBC 1 CORP., Plaintiffs, v. THE 
WILLIAM SOROKA 1989 TRUST; KAYE WOLTMAN, successor trustee to the William Soroka 1989 Trust 
and Executor of the Estate of William Soroka; THE WILLIAM SOROKA CHARITABLE TRUST, Defendants, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17940. 
78 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, pp. 228-243 (refering to agency costs in closely 
held corporations). See also Armour, John; Hansmann, Henry; and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘Agency Problems and 
Legal Strategies’ in Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, cit., pp. 35-53; and Pratt, John W., and 
Zeckhauser, Richard J., ‘Principals and Agents: An Overview’ in idem (eds.), Principals and Agents: The 
Structure of Business, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1985, p. 10 (mentioning that information 
asymmetries can create agency loss or agency costs for capital (e.g. money and machines). For example, ‘… the 
owner of the capital, such as the outside shareholder in a closely held corporation, may have difficulty 
determining what his capital has produced’). The same may be true of the PLLC. 
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and that they hold residual claims to profits,79 they are not necessarily agents of the firm. 
Nonetheless, I refer to agency problems to illustrate that the same questions posed by the law 
of agency (e.g., Do shareholders owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders and the 
company?) may be asked in corporate law. The answers, however, are necessarily different 
because corporate law provides specific rules to determine shareholders’ rights and duties 
toward the corporation and other shareholders.80 The analogy is particularly apt when 
shareholders are simultaneously managers of the company.81 These companies, which are 
small and closely held by their shareholders, are often based on unwritten articles of 
association and operating agreements.82 Many of them are not even filed. Thus, what non-
transferring shareholders and third parties actually know, or are able to know, about the 
company is a highly significant question. In sum, my reference to agency problems is meant 
to account for situations in which the relationship that shareholders have with each other and 
with other corporate constituencies do not live up to expectations.  
With regard to these problems, the following is stressed. Although in PLLCs 
shareholders are often managers, they are not necessarily experts in a particular field. In 
practical terms, the management infrequently works under a complex board structure as it 
typically does in publicly held companies. Decisions are instead taken collectively 
(sometimes informally), but voiced in and outside the company by an activist or group of 
activist shareholders who lead the business activity of the company. Moreover, PLLCs are 
                                                             
79 See Bruner, Christopher M., ‘The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law’, Ala. L. Rev., 59, pp. 1385 – 1449 
(describing three theories of corporate governance: the nexus -of –contracts theory, the team production theory 
and the shareholder centric theory. He also explains how they fall into two different doctrinal views. I quote: 
‘…those premised on the board’s authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation and those 
premised on the board’s accountability to the shareholders who elect them’). As Bruner clarifies choosing one of 
these sides brings on different normative framework. The first understanding tends to emphasize the importance 
of governance structures such as the board of directors whilst the second understanding gives scant attention to 
claims related to shareholder ‘ownership’ and to their vulnerability to ‘agency’ problems.  
 80 Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Are Partners Agents?’, University of Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper No. 
LE08-004, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086745 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1086745. 
81 This can be nicely illustrated by what parties to the articles of association of a company establish content-wise 
in those articles. For instance, while establishing the methodological approach to the research, I have analysed 
numerous articles of companies in which registered offices were or still are located at the selected jurisdictions. 
The articles of the company Henry Bath & Sons, Limited - an old company incorporated in 1920 in England, and 
still active - provides that the parties to the agreement are simultaneously directors and managers of the 
company’s business and therefore are entitled in that capacity to participate in the profits of the company. 
Moreover, the articles say that it shall be no objection to the arrangements to be given effect under the articles 
that they – directors / managers - are in a fiduciary relation to the company, or that they participate as managers 
or otherwise in the profits of the company. Further, the articles do not foresee an independent board of directors. 
[italicized by the author]  
82 The text refers to a number of rules that the members end up agreeing on aside from the formal contract of the 
company. However, it is important to note that Article 2 of the First EU Company Law Directive requires the 
disclosure of the ‘instrument of constitution, and the statutes if they are contained in a separate instrument’. 
Moreover, at least in German-speaking countries and some of those which follow the French legal system, 
articles of association should be made in writing before a notary public.  
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mostly contract-based. Hence, I discuss the contracting inefficiencies that accompany the 
features of these business associations. For instance, the assumption that shareholder-
managers necessarily hold an encompassing interest in the company and for that reason would 
not behave opportunistically is unwarranted. Often, in addition to not being experts, they are 
also not subject to external monitoring.  
I also hope to clarify whether agency problems can be triggered by restrictions on 
transfers. If these restrictions indeed trigger agency problems, I try to determine whether they 
increase the likelihood that corporations will lag behind, diminish in value, and turn into 
undertakings in which it is neither attractive nor wise to invest.  
 
d. The research object 
 
In light of the above, I examine bargaining failures and risk of opportunism when 
ownership interests are transferred and different governance mechanisms are established in 
the articles of association. To this end, I adopt a functional standard to underscore similarities 
and differences between the selected jurisdictions.83 My goal is to show how different 
approaches and governance mechanisms set up by legislators and corporate constituencies are 
used to balance the exit and retaining of shareholders in the company.84 
Problems previously described are assessed as they appear in different settings of the 
selected jurisdictions. They are addressed within an overarching comparative scheme. This 
scheme is described in the next section. 
 
ii. Methodology for the comparison and comparative matrix for the laboratory 
 
I explore the transfer of shares in Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The criteria used for selecting these countries were that they should be 
representative of the Southern peripheral Europe (Portugal, Spain and Italy) and they should 
stand for bigger economies closer to global markets (France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States). These countries are rich sources of policy examples both because of the size of 
their markets and level of competition therein, and also due to the fact they have different 
                                                             
83 See Michaels, Ralf, ‘The functional Method of Comparative Law’, in Reimann, Mathias, and Zimmermann, 
Reinhard (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 339 
– 382 (Referring to the principle of functionality); Zweigert, Konrad; and Kötz, Hein, cit, p. 34 (stating that ‘The 
basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality’). Additionally, see Kraakman et 
al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, cit. (also adopting a functional principle). 
84 See Part III, chapter 1. 
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legal systems. Portugal, Spain, Italy and France have a civil law system, whilst the United 
Kingdom and the United States are bastions of the common law system. Nonetheless, the real 
work of comparison is developed at a later stage.85 It is undertaken by cross-checking the 
information introduced in a comparative matrix (Table 1) which synthesizes the results of the 
macrocomparison and microcomparison.86 This comparative matrix, however, also serves as 
a starting point of the comparative work.87 This essential instrument of the comparative 
research is based on a table with two entries.88 One of the entries contains the elements that I 
consider relevant for the comparison. These are listed in the form of questions. The other 
entry is comprised of the selected jurisdictions. I will register the variations of each element in 
the respective jurisdiction and subsequently cross-check the outcomes. This will help me 
carry out the comparative synthesis later on in Part III. 
The elements of comparison were selected on the basis of preliminary research on the 
topic and on the assessment of the relevant default rules in each jurisdiction. Additionally, I 
analyzed rule books on PLLCs yielding standard terms of articles of association89 as well as 
standard articles of association provided by notaries who customized them to specific clients. 
This preliminary research led me to conclude that legal rules, although different from one 
another, are not markedly so.90 This becomes clearer with the evolutionary approach I take 
herein, which puts forward an explanation for the crossover of legal solutions and the 
diffusion of corporate law. 
 
 
 
                                                             
85 See Part III, chapter 3 providing a comparative synthesis that gives the whole picture of the comparative work. 
86 See Zweigert, Konrad; and Kötz, Hein, cit, pp. 4-5 (defining macrocomparison and microcomparison). 
87 See Zweigert, Konrad, and Kötz, cit., p. 44. (referring to the need to build a system. They say that ‘…one 
needs to develop a special syntax and vocabulary, which are also in fact necessary for comparative researches on 
particular topics’). 
88 The adoption of a comparative table for the development of the method of comparison has been attributed to 
Isabel Magalhães Collaço – the first Portuguese female doctorate in law. Her degree was awarded in 1954. I call 
it ‘comparative matrix’ because this term better captures the anatomy of the comparison – the establishment of a 
network of intersections between the elements / questions listed in two different entries leading to the 
comparative synthesis at the end. 
89
 See Botelho, João, Formulários de Sociedades por Quotas, Lisboa, Petrony, 2009, pp. 212-214. This author, 
who is also a lawyer, suggests the wording of standard clauses in PLLCs’ articles of association. This 
phenomenon can also be illustrated by Brazilian and French literature. See Lambert, Alfred, Manuel Pratique 
des Sociétés de Commerce et par actions: Participations, Coopératives, Syndicats Professionnels, Sociétés de 
Secours Mutuels, Associations et Congrégrations, Paris, V. Giard & E. Brière, 1902; Ribeiro, J., Das Sociedades 
por Quotas de Responsabilidade Limitada, 2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro, Jacinto Ribeiro dos Santos (ed.), 1926; E 
Silva, Oliveira, Das Sociedades por Quotas de Responsabilidade Limitada: Doutrina, Jurisprudência, 
Legislação Nacional e Estrangeira e Formulário, Rio de Janeiro/ S. Paulo, 1956, pp. 177-192. 
90 See K. Zweigert e H. Kötz, cit., p. 34 (stating that the ‘…legal system of every society faces essentially the 
same problems, and solves these problems by quite different means though very often with similar results’). 
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Table 1 
Comparative Matrix 
 
  Portugal Spain Italy France 
UK 
(England 
& Wales) US 
1 - When and why was the law adopted? 
      
2 - What kind of restrictions on transfer of shares does 
the law foresee? 
      
3 - What is the purpose of restrictions on transfer of 
shares foreseen by the law? 
      
4 - Do these restrictions constitute a source of 
inefficiency (unenforceability) of the legal framework 
of transfer of shares? 
      
5 - How do legislators approach the transfer of shares 
and protect entitlements (inalienability rules, property 
rules, or liability rules? 
      
6 - What kinds of costs result from the transfer of 
shares according to the approach taken by legislators? 
      
7 - What kinds of agency problems derive from the 
transfer of shares according to the approach taken by 
the legislators? 
      
8 - In practice, do defaults reduce bargaining failures? 
      
9 - Is there a demand for efficient company (corporate) 
law rules? 
      
10 - What kind of ownership structure do these 
business organizations have? 
      
11 - On average, how big is the PLLC (i.e., how many 
shareholders do these business organizations have)? 
      
12 - What kind of control structure do PLLCs have 
(e.g., (i) one controlling shareholder; (ii) many 
controlling shareholders through a shareholder 
agreement or through occasional coalitions; (iii) no 
controlling shareholder)? 
      
13 - Which constituency is most likely to efficiently 
assess the transfer of shares (e.g., shareholders, 
managers, creditors, employees, consumers/ 
customers?) 
      
14 - Are the company's and shareholders' interests well 
protected considering the constituencies intervening in 
the transaction process? 
      
15 - Is the choice of the constituencies which are 
competent for the assessment of the transaction liable 
to be affected by the environment in which the 
company operates (e.g., financial context, taxes, links 
with hedge funds, and with the uncorporation of larger 
dimensions? 
      
16 - Is the (competitive) context in which the company 
operates likely to be a source of efficiencies which may 
lead to: (i) containment of bargaining failures; and (ii) 
allowing the evaluation of the right amount of benefits 
which should be granted to the shareholder who wants 
to leave the company? 
      
17 - Do default rules adopted by legislatures allow any 
single corporation to submit transaction costs to the 
constituencies which are more likely to correctly assess 
its commercial value? 
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2. The empirical method 
 
i. Data set 
 
This project includes data of different sources I collected in all six jurisdictions. I 
collected copies of manuscripts, private documents (e.g. letters, opinions), and 
correspondence between members of the Board of Trade in the United Kingdom as of the 
second half to late nineteenth century, constitutional documents of corporations in all six 
jurisdictions (e.g. minute books of board of directors, company ledgers, etc.), and newspaper 
articles (e.g. The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times) as of mid nineteen century to 
the second half of the twentieth century. For the purpose of collecting this data I visited the 
archives of the Portuguese National Library, the Newspaper Library of Lisbon, the Library of 
the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon, the National Archive of the Tower of the 
Tomb in Lisbon, the Central National Library of Florence, the Library of the Italian 
Parliament in Rome, the Camera di Commercio di Firenze, the Library of the European 
University Institute, the Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, the Business and IP Center 
and the Asian and African Studies department of the British Library, the National Archives, 
United Kingdom, the Guildhall Library, The London Metropolitan Archives, the Albert E. 
Jenner, Jr. Library of the University of Illinois College of Law, The Leo T. Kissam Memorial 
Library (Fordham Law Library), The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library (Columbia Law 
School), The New York Public Library, the Bibliothèque Nationale François Mitterand, the 
Archives Nationales (France), the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, the Archivo Histórico 
de Protocolos de Madrid, the Biblioteca Nacional de Espãna, the Archivo General de la 
Administración, and Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid. 
I also collected data from electronic databases. For the most part, the search included 
the terms: ‘private companies’, ‘private limited liability companies’, ‘transfer of shares’, and 
‘restrictions’. The earliest data varied according to the breadth of the various research engines 
(ex. Westlawnext, LexisNexis, Bureau van Dijk). I collected from these databases legislation, 
opinions, LLC agreements (Westlawnext), company information (BvD), and case-law 
(LexisNexis). Regarding the LLC agreements I found, however, that they are not widely 
available through Westlawnext. I realized that the best way to obtain these documents was 
through public companies Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Larger companies 
amend their operating agreements considerably. So where possible, I tried to gather all the 
 53 
 
interactions of the agreement that I could find.91 Those collected from Westlawnext in their 
amended and restated versions often contain an ‘entire agreement’ clause providing that the 
respective agreement constitutes the entire agreement among the members relating to the 
company and supersedes all prior contracts or agreements with respect to the company and 
the matters addressed or governed thereby, whether oral or written. Therefore, I used them as 
events of my sample. For several reasons, usually related to capital market transactions, 
American companies file a high amount of LLC agreements for subsidiaries. These 
documents are tremendously extensive.92 Nevertheless, the operating agreements are only a 
small portion and normally attached as exhibits which can be found more easily by searching 
for ‘operating agreement’. This sort of documents normally yields three, four, five or even 
more LLC agreements. The agreements are often very similar to each other. The interesting 
fact is that the similarity in the wording of the agreements is not exclusive to the United 
States. It is a cross-country phenomenon. It also happens in Portugal, France, Italy, and Spain 
which are countries with a civil law system. For example, while treating the events included 
in the samples of articles of association of Portuguese and French companies it was 
interesting to note that the wording of the clauses of articles of association of Portuguese 
companies, in particular those regarding the management, was very similar to those of French 
companies. The articles of association of French companies are dated as of 2000 onwards 
whilst in respect to the Portuguese case it was possible to find articles dated as of the 
beginning of the twentieth century until the decade of 2000s. What is more striking is the fact 
that this similarity in wording is apparent in different generations of articles of association. 
This not only hints something about path-dependence of legal solutions in the respective 
jurisdiction, but also the cross-over of legal solutions through imitation for centuries.  
In respect to case-law, the cases that did not address the keywords, such as the several 
forms of PLLCs in each country, transfer of shares, and restrictions were eliminated from the 
initial set of events. The analysis of the cases in my pool was complemented with factual 
scrutiny. The factual data compiled from each case included the court, date of the judgment, 
number of the sentence, the parties to the dispute, source, and the respective description of the 
case. Additionally, I have also listed the reasons courts put forward to justify the decision they 
upheld. I ranged the reasons which I have grouped in different categories while treating each 
                                                             
91 This was the case for Chrysler LLC's operating agreements included in my sample of American LLCs. 
92 A good example is the Form S-4 (Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933) for the Delaware 
company Huntsman International LLC which I analysed. Given that this was an exchange offer, I examined the 
prospectus which contained information about its ‘parent’ company – Huntsman Corporation – and Huntsman 
International LLC’s subsidiaries, including the respective operating agreements. This document is about 800 
pages long. 
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jurisdiction. Sometimes courts give more than one reason, and to the extent this was clear in 
the decision, I enunciated them where appropriate.93 I also created samples of articles of 
association of companies in all six jurisdictions. The articles of Portuguese companies were 
collected from the Diário do Governo. The respective companies were incorporated 
throughout the country. Articles of Spanish companies were sent to me by the Commercial 
Registry of Madrid.94 Articles of association of the French SARL were collected from the 
database infogreffe.fr, which makes publicly available data regarding commercial companies 
deposited at French Commercial Courts (greffes des Tribunaux de Commerce). Most of the 
articles of association of French companies in the sample are statuts constitutifs deposited at 
the Commercial Tribunal of Paris (Greffe du Tribunal de Commerce de Paris). The articles of 
the Italian SrL were collected from Gazzeta Ufficiale and Camera di Commercio di Firenze.95 
The targeted companies were incorporated in the Tuscany and Florence regions. The articles 
of association of United Kingdom private companies were collected from the Companies 
House Webcheck.96 All the companies were incorporated in England and a great part of them 
in the city of London. Finally, LLC agreements were collected from Westlawnext and 
LiveEDGAR.97 Most LLCs scrutinized were incorporated in the state of Delaware. 
 
ii. Methodological challenges and the one view of the Cathedral 
 
I borrow the expression ‘the one view of the Cathedral’ from Calabresi and Melamed.98 
My data vary both qualitatively and quantitatively, and my sources were differentially 
available. In some cases they do not even exist in all six jurisdictions. I turned this challenge 
into a tool of my comparative work. Putting it differently, the fact that some documents exist 
and others do not in certain jurisdictions helped me to trace the legislative and market profile 
of that particular jurisdiction. For instance, whilst documents in the United Kingdom are filed 
and readily accessible, in Spain most of the constitutional documents of the company are 
                                                             
93 Often the language used by courts is extremely intricate and phrasal constructions are confused. 
94 I thank Don Manuel Casero and his assistant, Alicia Martin for sending to me more than 100 articles of 
association. 
95 I thank Fabrizio Vanni and his assistant Antonella Stecchi for their help at the Camera di Commercio di 
Firenze. 
96See the URL: http://wck2.companieshouse.gov.uk//wcframe?name=accessCompanyInfo (last accessed on 13 
March 2014). 
97 LiveEDGAR is a database that makes EDGAR text searchable. EDGAR is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission's online site that allows investors to access annual reports (SEC Form 10-k), quarterly reports (SEC 
Form 10-Q), and other sort of documents. I thank then-graduate student Erik Krusch at Fordham University Law 
School for invaluable help on this task. 
98 See Calabresi, Guido, and Melamed Douglas, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, Harvard Law Review, vol. 85, No 6, 1972, pp. 1089-1128. 
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private, which makes difficult the task of sketching these companies’ profile. It also indicates 
that the Spanish PLLC is likely to be more private and closed than the average United 
Kingdom private company in terms of the publicity of the articles of association and possibly 
regarding the shareholder structure. In the United States, it is difficult to find operating 
agreements because they are private and are not filed in an organized way. Furthermore, in the 
process of screening documents that are not uniformly available, I noticed policy similarities 
across countries. Further, I noted instances in which measures and policies could have been 
implemented, but were not. Cultural nuances engrained in the law, the availability of business 
forms other than the PLLC, and the importance of the banking system and bankruptcy law 
may all figure into the choices made.99  
From a general perspective regarding the methodological challenges I faced to a more 
particular one, I note that the results of my research are based on reported cases that may not 
be a representative sample of all cases regarding un-consented transfer of shares actually 
decided. I am mostly doing a qualitative research based on case study. Furthermore, I hold 
information that many opinions are not included in the databases I had access to. It may also 
be the case that they are not even reported. So, results are also not representative of all cases 
of un-consented transfer of shares actually filed. As many cases are settled or do not even go 
to court, samples are not representative of the total number of transactions involving transfers 
of shares in which the problem of un-consented transfers of shares comes up. Due to the 
contractual nature of these business associations it is often the case that disputes are shuffled 
off before even getting to trial.100 Therefore, these limitations make it inappropriate to draw 
general conclusions as to the number of corporations in which the problems deriving from or 
leading to un-consented transfers in reality occur.101 Further, with respect to case law, data are 
not broken down between trial and appellate courts. There is, however, a noticeable tendency 
                                                             
99 A treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
100 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, 13 J. Legal Studies 1, 4 (1984) 
(developing a model suggesting that disputes selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will constitute 
neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes); George L. Priest ‘Selective 
Characteristics of Litigation’, 9 J. Legal Stu. 399 (1980), and George L. Priest, ‘Measuring Legal Change’ 
(1987) (Yale Law School Working Paper, Program in Civil Liability). These papers suggest that disputes 
selected for litigation will constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes. Even 
though this is true, the bias is not to the extent to hinder meaningful results based on the samples collected. This 
is so because case law is used as part of qualitative method to tell different narratives.  
101 See Priest, George L., and Klein, Benjamin, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 13, 1, 1984, pp. 1-55 (4) (developing a model suggesting that ‘…disputes selected for litigation (as 
opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes’). 
Additionally, see Priest, George L., ‘Selective Characteristics of Litigation’, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 9, 2, 
1980, pp. 399-421; and Priest, George L., ‘Measuring Legal Change’, Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, vol. 3, 2, 1987, pp. 193-225. These papers suggest that disputes selected for litigation will 
constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes. Despite this, the bias is not 
great enough to hinder meaningful results based on the samples collected. 
 56 
 
to include in the sample appellate cases. There are two reasons for this. First, the interesting 
aspect of courts of appeal is their systematic interpretation, following and encompassing what 
other lower courts have done.102 There are institutional rules that interfere with the 
interpretation of the law and the reading of a particular case, and this sometimes shows up in 
the judgments.103 Second, the respective research engines mostly provided decisions of 
appellate courts.  
Another aspect of the methodological challenges I faced is related to the selection of my 
samples of articles of association. My selection is not random, a term that denotes that each 
unit has an equal chance of being selected. The paucity of available information in some 
countries, as well as other resource constraints forced me to forfeit this valuable research 
principle. Notwithstanding, I have used a qualitative method, and I have made sure to cast a 
wide net for sources of articles of association and LLC agreements. Moreover, I have selected 
variables that are important for tracing the profile of the PLLC in each jurisdiction. These 
variables are the business name, the registered office, the commercial registry, the date of the 
articles of association, the number of shareholders and votes they hold in the company’s 
general meeting, the number of managers, the share capital, the business object and the 
transfer clause. I then checked my sample to see if it was representative on these particular 
variables, that is to say, if it was representative of the population of the companies in the 
jurisdictions in terms of size, earnings, ownership and governance structure. This task is 
undertaken with the help of statistical data for individual countries where information by 
years in respect to the variables I have chosen is available as of 2007 to 2012. These statistical 
data are provided by the European Commerce Registers’ Forum (ECRF) that has been 
sponsoring the ECRF ‘Benchmarking Survey’ as of 2012.104 This survey, which is informed 
by the European Commerce Register’s Forum Report 2013, aims at tracing trends in 
companies’ register at a regional level based upon data its authors collected in each 
                                                             
102 See Eisenberg, Theodore, and Schwab, Stewart J., ‘What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?’, 
The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 56 N.º 2, The Federal Court System, 1989, pp. 501-539 (517-519) 
(dewelling upon appellate courts’ tendency to affirm distinct court decisions in three categories of cases: 
constitutional tort, prisoner constitutional tort, and control group). 
103 At this point, I am not making a positive or a negative judgment of possible path-dependence issues. 
104 I thank Vito Giannella for providing me with statistical data, including the amount of share capital and 
number of shareholders of private limited companies, and the operation of business registries in all countries that 
participated in the survey such as Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, and several states of the United States, 
namely Delaware. Portugal and France are not participant countries, but the survey has managed to collect data 
from another Portuguese speaking country-Brazil- and Jersey, whose legal system has been greatly influenced by 
French law due to its geographic and historical proximity to France.  
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jurisdiction.105 It yields statistical information in respect to the variables I have selected 
regarding public and private limited companies. I focus on private companies. The graphics 
below treat these data regarding the operation of the business registry, the average share 
capital, the average minimum number of founders, shareholders and members of the 
management board, and the overall types of firms created in each region. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figure 3 (p. 16) 'Who Operates the Business Registry' from European Commerce Registers’ 
FORUM Report, 2013. Global benchmarking of business registration - ECRF, CRF and IACA Business 
registers survey by Staffan Larsson (ed.), Hayley E. Clarke, Julia Fatemi, Monica Grahn, Tanja Kothes, 
Magdalena Norberg Schönfeldt, Stacey-Jo Smith. 
 
                                                             
105
 See European Commerce Registers’ FORUM Report: Global benchmarking of business registration - ECRF, 
CRF and IACA Business registers survey by Staffan Larsson (ed.), Hayley E. Clarke, Julia Fatemi, Monica 
Grahn, Tanja Kothes, Magdalena Norberg Schönfeldt, Stacey-Jo Smith, 2013. 
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Source: Figure 13 (p.31) 'Average Share Capital for Company Type 2012, 2011 and 2010' from European 
Commerce Registers’ FORUM Report, 2013. Global benchmarking of business registration - ECRF, CRF 
and IACA Business registers survey by Staffan Larsson (ed.), Hayley E. Clarke, Julia Fatemi, Monica 
Grahn, Tanja Kothes, Magdalena Norberg Schönfeldt, Stacey-Jo Smith. 
 
 
 
Source: Figure 14 (p.33) 'Average Minimum Number of Founders, Shareholders and Board Members per 
Company Type' from European Commerce Registers’ FORUM Report, 2013. Global benchmarking of 
business registration - ECRF, CRF and IACA Business registers survey by Staffan Larsson (ed.), Hayley 
E. Clarke, Julia Fatemi, Monica Grahn, Tanja Kothes, Magdalena Norberg Schönfeldt, Stacey-Jo Smith. 
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Source: Figure 53 (p.85) 'Types of Firms Created in Different Regions' from European Commerce 
Registers’ FORUM Report, 2013. Global benchmarking of business registration - ECRF, CRF and IACA 
Business registers survey by Staffan Larsson (ed.), Hayley E. Clarke, Julia Fatemi, Monica Grahn, Tanja 
Kothes, Magdalena Norberg Schönfeldt, Stacey-Jo Smith. 
 
Finally, I am careful not to fall into the main trap that comparative and empirical work 
are likely to place in the way even of the most experienced researcher. That is, I avoid the 
hermeneutical risk of reading too much into the data I collected. Nevertheless, I do not always 
take a positive approach. I take a normative approach to law based on the data I found. This is 
illustrated by the structure of the dissertation. The objective of Part 1 is primarily positive. I 
try to explain the reasons that defaults were designed as they were, and why restrictions on 
shares are provided on the articles of association of all six jurisdictions. In Parts 2 and 3 my 
objective is, for the most part, normative. In these parts I clearly make a normative statement. 
 
3. The theoretical framework: Darwin’s Principle of Natural Selection, the Law and 
Economics 
 
This dissertation links in a dialectic way three fields: biology, law and economics.106 It 
is framed by an evolutionary principle, Darwin’s principle of natural selection, to explain that 
                                                             
106 See O’ Connor, Erin O’ Hara, and Stake, Jeffrey Evans, ‘Economics, Behavioral Biology, and the Law’, 
Supreme Court Economic Review, vol. 19, 2011, pp. 103-141 (explaining similarities and differences between 
economics and biology on one hand, and the similarities between law and biology, in particular behavioral 
biology, on the other hand. Regarding economics and biology, both disciplines surprisingly lie on similar 
 60 
 
law is not a given, but rather a construction. I try to give a sense of this by writing in an 
integrated fashion about doctrinal, comparative, and empirical works. The writing is held 
together by a comparative matrix (Table 1) that prevents theoretical diffusion and steers the 
effort of comparison. The link with the evolutionary principle that frames this dissertation 
rests on the idea that writing in an integrated fashion does not provide immediate definite 
results while research is ongoing, as would most likely be the case if the doctrinal, 
comparative and empirical parts were written separately. I have chosen this expositional style 
to show how the treatment of the hypothesis evolves throughout the chapters until the very 
end, where the reader will find the comparative synthesis.107 
This dissertation offers a theory of defaults by which it tries to submit a set of coherent 
statements and / or principles to explain how defaults can be designed to potentially induce 
market agents’ behavior, especially the ‘consumer’ of corporate law. Central to this theory of 
defaults is the principle of Pareto optimality and the idea of ‘pleiotropy’ in law. Whenever 
reference to efficiency is made, it should be understood as Pareto efficiency. I am interested in 
creating mechanisms for designing the best possible corporate default rules. Pleiotropy 
implies that we live in an interconnected world. In economics and social and political science 
literature, this idea has been developed through the concept of path-dependence.108 Pleiotropy 
in law also echoes the idea of path-dependence. I suggest that there may be a doctrinal, socio-
economic status quo that needs to be broken. Breaking the status quo means breaking any 
path-dependent behavior which is by itself an anomaly. The challenge is to determine whether 
law can do this by looking at the market and at what market agents are doing, and understand 
how they select the laws they are actually using.109 Additionally, legal pleiotropy implies that 
there are unintended consequences for legal rules and legal institutes stemming from the 
interaction between market and law. This thought does not follow the theory of systems and 
the construction of law as an ‘operationally closed autopoietic system’.110 It could not be 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
underlying concepts. In this triangle, law has a different face since it is more often positively and normatively 
explained through concepts closer to economics than to biology. This dissertation tries to challenge preconceived 
ideas that law and its evolution cannot be explained through the lens of natural sciences). Additionally, 
Zumbansen, Peer, and Calliess, Gralf-Peter (eds.), Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory, Cheltenham, 
United Kingdom; Northampton, MA, USA, 2011. 
107 See Part III, chapter 3. 
108 I do not dwell upon the concept of path-dependence in political sciences. See Steinmo, Sven, The Evolution of 
Modern States: Sweden, Japan and the United States, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
109 Refer to part III of this dissertation where I dwell on the concept of market while creating a bridge to the 
European internal market and the promise of jurisdictional competition in Europe. 
110
 See Luhmann, Niklas, Law as Social System (tr. by Klaus A. Ziegert, ed. Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, 
David Schiff, and Rosamund Ziegert), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. Also see Maturana, Humberto R., 
and Varela, Francisco J., Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, 
USA; London, England, D. Reidel Publishing Company, (1972) (1928). 
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otherwise, for I use idiosyncratic language to illustrate how law, economics and biology are 
connected in surprising ways. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This is a comparative study which uses a qualitative method of research. However, it 
casts its net over a wide range of documents such as articles of association and case-law to 
complement the profiling of PLLCs in the selected jurisdictions. These data were compiled in 
an annex to the dissertation that contains the analysis of more than two hundred articles of 
associations of PLLCs and nearly one hundred cases decided by courts in the selected 
jurisdictions. The comparative work is driven by a comparative matrix that yields the 
variables for the comparison. At this point, the comparative matrix is an empty table. It is 
meant to be filled, by the end of this dissertation, with the answers to the analytical questions 
it poses. I use a dynamic language which mirrors an interdisciplinary approach to law and the 
legal problems debated herein. Law is treated from the point of view of law and economics. 
The analogy with biology serves a descriptive purpose. Context-wise, history itself is used as 
a case study to illustrate the contingency of law and legal practices, and the path-dependence 
of legal solutions. I link method to epistemology. The method serves as a means to 
comprehend a social phenomenon (the status quo found within PLLCs) by way of legal 
knowledge. For example, the systematic interpretation of technical documents sheds light on 
phenomena of legal imitation, the role of lawyers in developing corporate forms, the behavior 
of certain corporate constituencies, and the ownership and governance structures of 
companies. Moreover, lawyers, who draft and are accustomed to reading legal documents, are 
at an advantage in understanding their structure and socio-economic significance. 
Methodologically, this dissertation embarks on a dialectic journey that starts with a 
hypothesis. I then try to falsify that hypothesis mainly through the six countries comparison 
and case studies. In the end, I arrive at a synthesis. On the one hand, I attempt to demonstrate, 
with reference to the legal concept of ‘due diligence’, that law can have its own method. On 
the other hand, I also show the permeability of law vis-à-vis other social sciences. 
Appreciating the extent of this permeability is a major challenge not only at the 
methodological, but also the substantive level. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
DISCLOSING THE PLLC’S LEGAL REGIME THROUGH A HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: 
THE CASES OF PORTUGAL, FRANCE, ITALY AND SPAIN 
 
 
 
An inspired theoretician might do as well without such empirical 
work, but my own feeling is that inspiration is most likely to come 
through the stimulus provided by the patterns, puzzles, and 
anomalies revealed by the systematic gathering of data, particularly 
when the prime need is to break our existing habits of thought. 
 
Coase, R. H., The Firm, the Market, and the Law, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 71. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter looks PLLCs in the face to understand their basic principles and main lines 
of ownership and governance structure. I present a historical account of the legal regime of 
these business associations in four out of the six jurisdictions I have selected: Portugal, 
France, Italy and Spain. Parenthetically, the German case may be ranked high among the 
possibilities for treatment, given that Germany is the motherland of the Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) – the German form of the PLLC. It was created in 1892 and it 
is frequently described in the literature as pioneering. However, while designing the 
laboratory for this investigation several factors were considered to establish the comparative 
matrix and the empirical research. One of these factors was the proficiency in the German 
language required to scrutinize historical documents and manuscripts. These documents are 
likely to disclose whether a form similar to the GmbH existed before 1892 in Germany and 
the reasons that led German legislators to formally adopt it at that point given that, as we shall 
see below, the PLLC existed in other jurisdictions before 1892 even if not legally accepted. To 
the best of my knowledge, there still is space in German literature to develop this issue.111 
                                                             
111 For recent literature on the subject see, for example, Völker, Bastian, Die Vinkulierung von GmbH-
Geschäftsanteilen, Schriften zum Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, Band 124, Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2013 
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In order to understand the PLLC’s legal regime I first try to strip it from any 
preconceived idea that spontaneity of the law is a given fact. I consider the law a byproduct of 
private ordering and subjective considerations individuals have about a particular rule-setting. 
The approach I take is based on the reading of parliamentary debates and specialized 
literature, and on the collection of empirical data. The case studies I present are narratives of 
the PLLC, and they were chosen to illustrate the profile of the PLLC throughout the second 
half of the nineteenth century until today. Their profile is given through the story-telling of the 
influence interest-groups have in shaping the law and their shadowed intervention with 
respect to legal options taken by legislators. Some of these legal options are frozen in time 
and in force today. The outcome is the creation of a platform of understanding of legal 
institutions and their natural contingency. This is done in the face of the PLLC in the sense 
that I try to lift the veil covering its private sphere. Moreover, in this chapter, I hope to make 
clear the reasons why some jurisdictions lag behind regarding the adoption of new forms of 
business organizations. I also strive to make apparent the main role state policies play with 
respect to the development of these business organizations. This chapter also provides an 
account of the means used by shareholders to protect the integrity of the share capital, of the 
governance structure and of shareholders’ interests by introducing restrictions on transfers. In 
fact, transfer of shares constitutes a laboratory which is in itself contingent, and which in itself 
creates a context. 
I have selected Portugal, France, Italy, and Spain as the jurisdictions whose elements I 
am comparing in this chapter. They have in common the fact of being countries with a civil 
law system. However, dealing with these countries not only means that I am comparing 
different legal systems, but also that I am bringing an international perspective to this 
dissertation. To talk about the laws of Portugal means talking about the laws of former 
colonies such as Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Easter Timor. 
To talk about the laws of Spain, means redirecting the heart of the matter to the laws of Latin 
America’s countries (which, as we shall see, are presumed in the literature to have influenced 
the adoption of the LLC in the United States). To talk about the laws of France means talking 
about the laws in force in French former colonies. To talk about the laws of the UK112 means 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(treating the German case and the problem of un-consented transfer under §15(5) of the Gesellschaften mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbHG); and Koch, Moritz, Die Vinkulierung von GmbH-Anteilen und ihre Auswirkung 
auf Umwandlungsvorgänge, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2007 (approaching the same subject). These 
dissertations do not take, however, an interdisciplinary approach. 
112 See Part I, chapter 3. 
 65 
 
not only thinking about the nature and purpose of United States laws, but also of other former 
British colonies such as those currently forming the Commonwealth.113   
History establishes the baseline for understanding current legal solutions in these 
jurisdictions. Lessons from the past will, hopefully, shed light on evolutionary trends, their 
similarities and differences over time in the selected jurisdictions, and will make it possible 
for new evolutionary schemes to be considered. In this chapter, I am telling three stories. 
First, I am telling a story of interests groups interfering with the outcomes of legislative 
policies. Second, I am telling a story of how the law is a byproduct of private ordering 
manifestations. Finally, I am telling a story of legal evolution of business organizations. These 
stories are informed in the text by three parameters: courts and legislatures (state), actors 
(equated with the society), and the market (economy). The special aspect of these stories is 
that I am looking at small businesses and at the variations of their ownership and governance 
structures in time through case studies and considerable archival work which serve as a 
qualitative platform for theoretical constructions.114 These theoretical constructions are 
highlighted in Parts II and III. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a 
historical account of restrictions on transfer of shares. It treats individually the cases of 
Portugal, France, Italy and Spain. Section 2 concludes. 
 
1. Restrictions on transfers of shares of private limited liability companies: An 
introductory historical account 
 
This section presents an introductory historical account of PLLCs and of rules on 
transfer of shares. My main goal is to demonstrate the importance of these companies and 
why it is worth studying their legal regime in the jurisdictions I have selected. There are 
elements that cannot be ignored such as the size of the country, its cultural homogeneity or 
diversity, its geographical features and its political culture. For the purposes of this study, 
however, I will try to answer the following questions: (1) What were the reasons for the 
                                                             
113 Part II of this dissertation was partially written in South Africa (Johannesburg) while I was invited to talk 
about my work to promising young African leaders. In that context, it was inspiring to see how small businesses 
operate, and how the design of the law is liable to facilitate the investment of market agents who, in this case, 
come from very different backgrounds and are in great number women. Also, in this context, it made sense to 
talk about the creation of an enabling environment for businesses with a focus on the role of law. 
114 In these countries the historical discussion has focused, for example, on whether the PLLC should be 
structured rather in a ‘personalistic’ or ‘capitalist’ way, that is to say, rather like a partnership or a corporation. 
This debate has also been held in Germany, for instance, which is considered by many as the country that 
provided the model PLLC – the GmbH, created in 1892. Here the GmbH looks much more like a corporation 
than the American LLC that is closer to a partnership. In general, the ‘capitalist’ view is largely dominant. The 
transferability of shares and the default rule for such transfer is relevant to the debate. 
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introduction of the PLLC in a given legal system?115; and (2) What is the historical nature of 
transfer clauses introduced in the articles of association? My research focuses on the analysis 
of the parliamentary debates in Portugal, France, Italy, and Spain that led to the 
implementation of the laws on PLLCs in these countries. Other documents were observed, for 
example, in the case of Spain I had access at the General Archive of the Administration 
(Archivo General de la Administración) to letters and statements of the General Direction of 
Industry (Dirección General de Industria), of the Delegation of Industry of Valencia 
(Delegación de Industria de Valencia), and of the Superior Council of Industries as of 1954 
and 1955.116 Additionally, I have analyzed articles of association published in the Portuguese 
Official Gazette (Diário do Governo) between 1905 and 2006, the articles of association filled 
with the Archivo Historico de Protocolos de Madrid and entered into between 1871 and 1887, 
and the articles of association deposited at the Commercial Registry of Madrid and the 
Regional Archive of the Community of Madrid (Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de 
Madrid) between 1961 and 2012.117 I also analyzed the articles of association published in the 
Italian Official Gazette (Bollettino Ufficiale delle Società per Azioni e delle Società a 
Responsabilità Limitata), deposited with the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicraft and 
Agriculture of Florence (Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Firenze) 
and deposited at the Registry of the Tribunal of Florence (Cancelleria del Tribunale di 
Firenze) between 1958 and 2009, and the articles of association of French SARLs deposited 
at the Greffe du Tribunal de Commerce de Paris the between 2000 and 2012. 
This was a slow-motion process of selection and reconstruction, which depended greatly 
on available time, resources and data. In addition, samples collected from each jurisdiction do 
not constitute representative samples of the entire universe of corporations.118 Yet, they give a 
                                                             
115 See Guinnane, Timothy et al., ‘Putting the Corporation in its Place’, Enterprise & Society, vol. 8, 3, 2007, pp. 
687-729. 
116 Archivo General de la Administración, Petition No. 973, Seccion 13, Box 71/6324. The archive did not 
provide a classification of PLLC (sociedades de responsabilidad limitada or SL). While developing the research 
I considered two possibilities. One of the possibilities was to analyze single companies. Yet most of them were 
publicly held companies (sociedades anónimas or SAs). The other possibility was to analyze documentation 
deposited with different ministries, and which conserved documents that revealed the relationship that a specific 
company had with the respective ministry. This company would be a Spanish SrL, and its documents would be 
filed along with other documents. 
117 Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid, Signature 136484. This box contained the Agreement of 
Mercantile Colaboration between Limac Producciones, S.L and Galerias Preciados as of 1995. In this context, 
the notarial deed of incorporation of Limac Producciones, SL was also included. I analyzed at the Archive the 
box with signature 21539 with documents as of 1953 of the Ministry of Industry / Provincial Delegation of 
Madrid with certificates of register of companies in the Industrial Registry. For the purpose of registration, the 
articles of association of the companies should be provided. Finally, I also scrutinized the box with the signature 
34640 with documents from the Regional Ministry of Economy and Labor, where articles of association of 
PLLCs were also included. 
118 Refer to Chapter 1, Section 2 above. 
 67 
 
sense of the heterogeneity of the variables I am studying. I provide a snapshot of the main 
historical lines of these business associations and transfer clauses included in their articles.119 
 
1.1 PORTUGAL 
 
I. State  
 
i. Parliamentary debates, the reasons for the adoption of the ‘sociedade por quotas’ and 
the Law of 11 April 1901  
 
Why did the Portuguese legislators create the PLLC or sociedade por quotas especially 
long before their creation in countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and 
the US?120 Some of the reasons underlying the proposal of the law of private companies for 
discussion in parliament were presented by the Commission of Civil Legislation of the 
Chamber of Deputies, on 23 February 1901.121 First, it was stressed that the proposal and 
implementation of the private company’s legal framework aimed at satisfying the claims of 
the Portuguese business class. Already in 1896, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Lisbon suggested that a law similar to the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbHG), published in Germany in 1892, be enacted. Subsequently, 
the Industrial Association of Porto and a commission consisting of some of the most 
distinguished entrepreneurs of that city made the same claims. Second, examples of systems 
of limited liability implemented in what were considered by then the ‘biggest commercial 
nations in the world’ were given. For instance, some states of the United States of America 
had implemented the homestead exemption. This was a legal regime of limited liability which 
prevented certain assets of the debtor from becoming a guarantee for the payment of his or her 
debts.122 Among such assets were the house or the capital deemed necessary for the 
sustenance of the family of the debtor. The English case was also mentioned. It established a 
system of limited liability allowing shareholders to create private or family companies, under 
                                                             
119 The analysis of minute books of PLLCs, letters, and other sorts of communications between shareholders, 
between shareholders and directors/ managers of the company, between directors, solicitors and accountants 
suggests that often agreements are entered into on the side of what is actually established in the articles of 
association. I will make reference to this point further on in the dissertation. 
120 In the Portuguese former colony Brazil the PLLC was adopted in 1919. 
121 For the access to the minutes of the parliamentary debates during the period of the Constitutional Democracy 
in Portugal (1821-1910), see URL: http://debates.parlamento.pt/page.aspx?cid=mc.cd (accessed on 15 August 
2011). For a special account of parliamentary debates on economic and financial issues, from 1821 to 1910, see 
URL: http://www.ics.ul.pt/debatesparlamentares/ (accessed on 15 August 2011). 
122 This applies to situations such as forced sales and bankruptcy. 
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the legal regime of joint stock companies. Their share capital should not exceed £100. In 
addition, it was argued that Germany, which at the time had a remarkable commercial and 
industrial growth, had recognized the need to create a new type of company to accommodate 
its extraordinary economic development. Therefore, for that purpose and to attend to the 
needs of small and medium entrepreneurs, it enacted the GmbHG on 20 April 1892. The 
claims of the Portuguese business class, and these three cases, especially the German case and 
the nine years of experience with the GmbH, were considered to be sufficient justifications for 
the Portuguese legislators and the deputies in the Parliament to agree on the implementation 
of this law.123 Furthermore, it is worth highlighting the words of Arthur Alberto de Campos 
Henriques, Minister of Justice at the time: ‘It mattered for United States, certainly similarly to 
what happened in Germany to legitimize the adoption of the new type of limited liability 
companies, their convenience to colonial firms’. The law was published on 11 April 1901, and 
entered into force three months later, on 1 July 1901. It was altered by Decree - Law 48843, 5 
August 19661.124    
PLLCs were perceived as an intermediate form between partnerships and joint stock 
companies. With this new type of company a new type of share was created – the quota.125 
Unlike the shares of joint stock companies, which were and still are represented by 
certificates, quotas are intangible. Furthermore, PLLCs were characterized by a special 
system of limited liability. As pointed out in the presentation of the draft law and its 
respective discussion in the parliament, the novelty in the legal regime of PLLCs was that in 
principle, the company’s assets would pay for the debts of the company, but shareholders 
would be subsidiary liable.126 Flexibility and adaptability to small businesses were also 
features of this type of company. The Portuguese legislators considered that these 
characteristics would foster the participation of shareholders in the management and 
supervision of the company; they believed features as such would be favorable to the 
resolution of problems of liquidity of insolvent companies, and would help the heirs of a 
merchant to keep their business. It was believed that these companies would stimulate private 
                                                             
123 In Germany, an important element to take into account was the fact that the Aktiengesellschaft was considered 
to be too restrictive for small businesses due to the high number of mandatory rules. Thus, the GmbH was 
created as a more flexible form. In Portugal, the profile of the joint stock limited liability company, at least 
between 1850-1914, is yet to be fully drawn. However, these were business organizations that were more 
complex than the PLLC or sociedades por quotas in terms of management and ownership structure. 
124 Later, Order 18946, 12 January 1962 required the application of PLLCs’ regime to provinces overseas. 
125 The same designation is used in Italian law. For ease of understanding I will refer to ‘share’ instead of 
‘quota’. 
126 See Maia, Pedro, ‘Tipos de sociedades comerciais’, in Abreu, J.M. Countinho de (ed.), Estudos de Direito das 
Sociedades, 9th ed., Coimbra, Almedina, 2008, pp. 12-15 (For an account of shareholders’ liability before the 
company and creditors of a PLLC). 
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investment from those who were not willing to invest in joint stock companies. The liability 
of shareholders in joint stock companies was also limited. But these companies could not be 
incorporated with fewer than ten shareholders. Moreover, the anonymity and the way share 
capital was divided into shares tradeable in capital markets were not suitable for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Additionally, legislators thought that PLLCs would suit 
shareholders unwilling to bear the unlimited liability for the company’s debts which 
characterizes partnerships. Hence, the Portuguese economic context, the claims of the 
business class, and the attractiveness of the new legal form constituted an advantageous 
setting for the implementation of PLLCs in Portugal at a very early stage.127  
What makes PLLCs special is the fact that their legal form suits the business plans of 
investors or entrepreneurs that need to think small first and want to keep their business 
between private parties, and therefore do not want to take the risk of investing in publicly held 
companies and in capital markets. Since its implementation in Portugal, the PLLC has been 
consistently used by SMEs.128 It is interesting to observe that from 1901 to 1939 the average 
amount of the share capital of PLLCs steadily decreased. One could think that the size of 
commercial enterprises was increasingly smaller and that the PLLC form managed to attract 
increasingly smaller enterprises. This is, however, a questionable inference to make. Firms 
could have a surplus or retained earnings. They could also take out more debt. Share capital 
alone does not reveal much about the company’s assets. Yet, the fact is that the use of the 
PLLC was skyrocketing. 
                                                             
127 In order to understand why the Portuguese business class lobbied with the Portuguese legislature to adopt the 
law, it is necessary to carry out a future comparative historical analysis examining the economic policies, the 
political situation, and the legal institutions already existing in countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. It is important to note that the PLLC was created in the United Kingdom in 1907 and in 
the United States much later, in the second half of the twentieth century. 
128 See Estatísticas das Sociedades, 1939, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Porto, 1941 (providing data on the 
evolution of the Portuguese form of PLLC – sociedade por quotas – between 1901 and 1939. These data refer to 
the number of PLLCs incorporated by sector of activity during the same period, and the amount of share capital 
of PLLCs. I have chosen to collect data referring to this period because of circumstances peculiar to the 
Portuguese economy. First, the adoption of the law creating PLLCs in 1901 coincided with a relative surge of 
industrial development in Portugal. Second, during the decades before the First World War, Portuguese and 
foreign economies were the set for a relative industrial development. The sample includes the years after the war 
so that statistics regarding the aftermath of the war can be compared to those regarding previous years. 
Additionally, see Estrutura e Dinâmica das Sociedades não Financeiras em Portugal, Estudos da Central de 
Balanços, Dezembro 2010, 2, Lisboa, Banco de Portugal, 2011, pp. 11-12 and 13 (showing the structure of the 
universe of non-financial corporations by legal form. According to the OECD’s Glossary of Statistical Terms, 
‘non-financial corporations are corporations whose principal activity is the production of market goods or non-
financial services’. As explained therein, this definition derives from statistical standards developed by 
international organizations such as the IMF, OECD, Eurostat and ILO. 
The study aforementioned aggregates data on these companies, including the Portuguese PLLC, as of 1991 to 
2009. It reveals that in 2009, 91% of non-financial corporations were PLLCs. The study suggests, however, that 
public held companies represented 50% of the aggregate turnover and 32% of the people employed in the sector 
of non-financial corporations. 
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Raúl Ventura, the author of a draft reform of the law of PLLCs, presented figures 
contained in statistics produced by a Portuguese body on 31 December 1964.129 These figures 
showed that out of 28,359 companies with registered offices, in the Metropolis, 23,549 were 
PLLCs. The remaining 935 were publicly held companies, 3,366 were partnerships, 7 were 
limited partnerships, 492 were cooperatives and 10 of another kind. Regarding the total 
amount of the share capital of all types of companies, which was 29,758.536$00,130 PLLCs 
altogether had a share capital of 6,995.234$00.131 This shows that it was generally accepted, 
also in the specialized literature at the time, that once adopted in Portugal, the PLLC became 
the preferred legal form for SMEs. This was not exclusive to Portugal. It also happened in 
other countries.132  
 
II. Actors 
 
i. The role of lawyers and other technocratic elites in drafting and disseminating the new 
legal form 
 
A historical perspective of PLLCs is important, whether the inclusion of specific clauses in 
the companies’ articles of association was a reflection of certain aspects of the Portuguese 
economic history, politics or society. Article 6 of the Law of 11 April 1901 established the 
free transferability of shares. It stated that shares were transferable in accordance with the 
law. However, §3 of Article 6 stated that the deed of incorporation might subject the transfer 
of shares to the consent of the company or to other requirements. Notwithstanding the fact 
that, in principle, shares could be freely transferred, in reality, shareholders often introduced a 
clause in the company’s articles restricting the transfer of shares. Consequently, it is important 
to understand whether there were reasons that determined the introduction of such restrictions 
in a significant number of articles of association. Imitation may be at the heart of this 
phenomenon. Technocratic elites usually have a dominant position in society, allowing them 
to distribute their services without any major barriers. This is particularly true for lawyers, 
notaries, solicitors or attorneys who may provide their clients with standard contracts and 
                                                             
129 The author neither identifies the body nor gives additional sources. 
130 The $ sign means the Portuguese currency at the time. 
131 See Ventura, Raúl, Apontamentos para a reforma das sociedades por quotas de responsabilidade limitada e 
anteprojecto de reforma da lei das sociedades por quotas, 2nd ed., Lisboa, 1969, p. 33. 
132 See Guinnane, Timothy et al. cit. 
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other template documents, especially when the legal market is small and not very 
competitive.133  
The analysis of a sample of 36 articles of association of Portuguese companies between 
1905 and 2006 revealed that many of them were exactly the same; only the names of 
shareholders, the registered office of the company, the amount of the share capital and other 
elements were different. Therefore, reproduction or imitation of clauses in articles of 
association already available in the market, either through drafted minutes or rule books 
yielding standard terms, is a plausible explanation for the inclusion of this type of restriction 
in a great number of companies’ articles of association.134 Other factors may have been the 
size of these companies, the number of shareholders and the kind of relationships among 
them. A family relationship between two shareholders might well make it more difficult for 
shareholders to accept the entry of a third party in the company. The list of possibilities is 
long.135 
The collection of the articles of association shows how shareholders, under a regime of 
free transferability, introduced with the help of their lawyers clauses restricting transfer of 
shares. These restrictions could be the requirement to obtain the consent of the company, of 
all shareholders, or of the management, the exercise of preemption rights by the company and 
its shareholders, a period during which shareholders could not leave the company, or formulas 
for determining the price of the sale. Furthermore, it was interesting to note that in this sample 
that there are companies that resemble in structure, amount of share capital, and number of 
shareholders joint stock companies. However, shareholders still chose to assign a 
personalistic character to the company by restricting the transfer of shares. Additionally, in 
some cases where there were restrictions on transfers, articles of association specified that 
only the majority shareholder could sell his or her shares, or at least sell them until a certain 
percentage of the value of the shares, to whom she deemed adequate. This captures the way 
                                                             
133 See Kalss, Susanne, ‘The Transfer of Shares in Private Companies’, European Company & Financial Law 
Review, pp. 340-367 (354-355) (referring to the role of the notary public in the compliance with formal 
requirements for the transfer of shares in a comparative perspective). 
134 See Botelho, João, Formulários de Sociedades por Quotas, Lisboa, Petrony, 2009, pp. 212-214; Lambert, 
Alfred, Manuel Pratique des Sociétés de Commerce et par actions: Participations, Coopératives, Syndicats 
Professionnels, Sociétés de Secours Mutuels, Associations et Congrégrations, Paris, V. Giard & E. Brière, 1902; 
Ribeiro, J., Das Sociedades por Quotas de Responsabilidade Limitada, 2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro, Jacinto Ribeiro 
dos Santos (ed.), 1926; E Silva, Oliveira, Das Sociedades por Quotas de Responsabilidade Limitada: Doutrina, 
Jurisprudência, Legislação Nacional e Estrangeira e Formulário, Rio de Janeiro/ S. Paulo, 1956, pp. 177-192. 
135 In the Italian case treated below, the introduction of restrictions is closely linked with the family nature of the 
corporations, with kinship and gender. The family corporation was a men’s business in which the name of the 
family should be clearly printed. Women, although they have gained more power over time through the 
ownership of shares, were passive members (a sort of ‘silent partner’) and excluded from the management. 
Therefore, in case they wanted to leave, often articles granted other members (brothers and the father) pre-
emption rights or rights of first refusal. 
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power and control in these companies were designed.136 This reality, in which articles of 
association attributed an intuitu personae137 nature to PLLCs, contradicted the capitalist and 
liberal vision the Portuguese legislature had in mind when it decided to import this legal 
form.138 
 
III. Market 
 
i. Transfers of shares in the old and new regime and taxonomy of case law 
 
One question poses itself: What is the historical purpose of transfer clauses included in 
the articles of association of Portuguese PLLCs? The Law of 11 April 1901 establishing the 
principle of free transferability was in force until 1986. On 1 November 1986, the 
Commercial Companies Code (CCC) came into force. This code repealed the Law of 11 April 
1901. As was affirmed by the Legislature in the preamble of the Code, the reform of German 
limited liability companies that had recently taken place was borne in mind. Moreover, in the 
title of the CCC referring to PLLCs, the Legislature took advantage as much as possible of the 
case-law and opinions of legal commentators developed under the Law of 11 April 1901. The 
law on transfer of shares was additionally altered. 
A sample of 7 cases held by Portuguese courts on Article 6 of Law of 11 April 1901, 
that is, under the regime of free transferability of shares, consistently yields bargaining 
failures between shareholders and between shareholders and managers representing and 
acting on behalf of the company. This qualitative sample comprises legal issues that can be 
assembled into a sort of ‘doctrinal clusters’.139 
 
1. Interpretation  
(i) Interpretation of the transfer clause introduced in the articles of association, especially 
when the restriction on the transfer of shares is established by means of a formula to 
determine the price or the costs sellers and buyers will have to bear with the 
transfer;140 
                                                             
136 Part II, Chapter 1 discusses more extensively the economic reasons for restrictions on transfers. 
137 This Latin expression refers to those relationships between specific people which cannot be transposed to 
other people. 
138 The Portuguese case, in this particular aspect, is similar to the Italian case below. 
139 See Kennedy, Duncan, ‘A Semiotics of Legal Argument’, Syracuse Law Review, vol. 75, 42, pp. 75-116. 
140 One could ask if restrictions are typically linked to other features. Are they more common when there is a 
very concentrated ownership structure? Are they more common when members commit to providing specific 
work to the company (human capital)? Part II, Chapter 1 lists a number of reasons for restrictions. From the 
 73 
 
(ii) Interpretation of article 6 and the meaning of restriction for the purpose of its §3. 
 
2. Functionality of restrictions on transfers 
(i) The exercise of preemption rights by the company and its shareholders; 
 
3. Un-consented transfer of shares 
(i) Transfer of shares or their donation without the company’s consent, when that 
consent was required by the articles of association; 
(ii) Transfer of the usufruct in the share without the company’s consent, when that was 
required by the articles of association for the transfer of shares. 
 
4. Formalities 
(i) Participation of the buyers or grantees of the share in the meeting of the company’s 
general assembly, when the company’s consent to the transfer of shares was not 
obtained, which was required by the articles of association. 
 
The cases collected show that courts, in a situation of conflict, tended to protect the 
interests of the seller and of the existing shareholders against the buyer. It seems that courts 
did not take the risk of letting the buyer enter the company through their judgments, 
especially when the articles of association foresaw some sort of restriction. 
After the reform, Article 228 of the CCC replaced article 6 of the Law of 11 April 1901 
and established a default rule141 on transfer of shares. This rule is still in force and is the 
absolute opposite of Article 6. Article 228(2) states that the transfer of shares between parties 
is binding but has no effect vis-a-vis the company, unless it consents to the transfer. In the 
words of some legal commentators, with the new rule the Legislature decided to mimic the 
market.142 Put differently, articles of association of most companies established restrictions on 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
samples of case law, where often the percentages or nominal values of the shares each party to the dispute holds 
is described, it is possible to learn that there is a strong relationship between the concentration of ownership and 
human capital and restrictions on transfers. There is also a connection between the concentration of ownership 
and the source of conflict. However, it would take an experiment or, at least, a wider sample of case law where 
the information about the ownership and governance structures of the respective company is provided to 
establish a causal relationship between ownership concentration and specificity of human capital and restrictions 
on transfers. It may be that restrictions are only included as a result of legal imitation or advice of the lawyer. 
141 Along with the necessary and justified protection of creditors and minority shareholders, the regime of PLLCs 
was created to be flexible, a characteristic that the Portuguese Legislature considered to be the most important 
factor in the spread of this type of companies. This flexibility is mostly achieved through default rules. 
142 In this context, see Bernstein, Lisa, ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 144, No.5, 1996, pp. 1765-1821 
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transfer of shares even at a time when the law did not require such restrictions. The case law 
outlined above under the old regime mirrors this assertion. Commentators say that the 
Legislature decided to change the law to reflect what in practical terms the actions of 
shareholders were whenever they incorporated a PLLC.143 However, so far, this assumption 
has never been empirically demonstrated. My discussion of the articles of association and 
case law is intended to help fill this gap.144 According to the information I collected, I would 
say that the historical purpose of transfer clauses included in the articles of association lies 
strongly on what has been the market performance. The legislators and courts administering 
the law seem to have taken this consideration closely into account. 
In addition to the companies’ articles and contentious disputes decided under the 
previous legal framework, I present a taxonomy of 26 cases on Article 228(2) adjudicated by 
higher courts in Portugal. The treatment of these cases serves two basic purposes. First, I try 
to link them to the history of Article 228(2) briefly described above. In attempting to establish 
this link, I seek to understand whether cases are the same as the ones existing before Article 
228(2) was introduced or whether with the adoption of the Commercial Companies Code and 
the introduction of Article 228, these cases changed and, as a result, there are new problems. 
These cases also yield bargaining failures between shareholders and between shareholders and 
managers representing and acting on behalf of the company. They are based on legal issues 
that I assemble according with the same clusters as above. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(challenging ‘the idea that courts should seek to discover and apply immanent business norms in deciding 
cases’). 
143 See Neto, Abílio, Sociedades por quotas: Notas e comentários, Lisboa, Petrony, 1977, pp. 91 and ff; and 
Ventura, Raúl, cit., pp. 45-46. Also see Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules’, 99 Yale L. J, No. 1, 1989, pp. 87-130 (115-116), and footnote 122 
(making a reference to those situations in which courts fill gaps with the provisions that most parties bargain for 
in contracts. As it is stated by the authors, this way of filling gaps has been labelled ‘mimicking-the-market’. 
And on this matter it is interesting to quote both Ayres and Gertner: ‘The ‘mimic-the-market’ approach to default 
rules ignores the fact that the type of parties who contract around a given rule depends upon the rule itself. 
Parties who dislike a given default rule will contract around it; if we change the default rule to mimic the 
contracts these parties write, other types of parties may contract around the new default back to the original rule. 
This process could cycle forever. Setting defaults that mimic the market therefore will not assure efficiency’. So, 
Ayres and Gertner consider that the implementation of a complete theory of default rules demands attention to 
what the parties want, whether they will get it and to costs associated with getting it or not). Also Black, Bernard 
S, ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 
84, 2, 1990, pp. 542-597 (showing that rules may be trivial when they are market mimicking). 
144 I use a qualitative method. Therefore, results only show one side of the Cathedral. They, however, shed light 
on shareholders and managers’ preferences and help predict and understand governance and regulatory choices 
in these companies. 
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1. Interpretation 
(i) The un-consented transfer of shares and the interpretation of the default nature 
of Article 228 (2), especially in situations where articles of association simply 
transpose Article 228(2) without further specifications; 
 
2. Functionality of restrictions on transfers 
(i) Cases in which Article 228(2) is also applicable such as the division of shares, 
partial transfer of shares, and the creation of rights of usufruct in the share. 
 
3. Un-consented transfer of shares 
(i) The un-consented transfer of shares between shareholders, family members 
and/ or third parties.145 In these cases, the validity of the transfer and/or the 
terms and conditions for the exercise of pre-emption rights granted by 
articles of association to shareholders and the company whenever a share is 
transferred are discussed.146  
 
4. Formalities 
(i) Specific performance of the promissory share sale and purchase agreement 
when the consent of the company for the transfer of shares was not 
requested by the seller; 
                                                             
145 See Perdices Huetos, Antonio B., Clausulas Restrictivas de la Transmision de Acciones y Participaciones, 
Madrid, Editorial Civitas, 1997 (referring to the Spanish law, at the time Article 20(5) LSRL 1953, argues that 
‘Las normas del derecho de sociedade se contentan de este modo con afirmar que la sociedad puede ignorar esa 
transmisión, pero se desentienden de determinar la suerte del negocio y de la transmisión misma, ignorando de 
esa manera el interés del resto de afectados: las partes, los acreedores de éstas, etc.’) (The rules of corporate law 
are satisfied in this way with affirming that the company may ignore that transfer, but they are not concerned 
about determining the fate of the business and of the transfer itself, by ignoring in that fashion the interests of 
those affected: the parties, their creditors, etc.). 
146 Regarding preemption clauses inserted in the company’s articles of association, they lose their original 
parasociality and relative effectiveness due its connection to the clause stating the requirement of the company’s 
consent. In other words, often articles of association, in addition to the requirement of the consent, state that 
shareholders and the company may exercise the respective preemption right in the share, which forms the object 
of the share sale and purchase agreement. This right can be exercised erga omnes because the preemption 
agreement included in the company’s articles of association does not only produce obligational effects among 
parties. Rights resulting from that agreement can be exercised against third parties as well. Therefore, it is 
relevant to understand how the preemption clause relates to the consent clause. Both clauses are forms of 
limiting the transfer of property rights in shares of PLLCs, and are often included together in the articles of 
association of the company. On this, see Cheves Aguilar, Nazira, ‘El Derecho de Adquisición Preferente como 
Cláusula Restrictiva a la Transmibilidad de las Acciones y de las Participaciones Sociales, Madrid, McGraw-
Hill, 1999. 
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(ii) The un-consented transfer of shares and the legality of resolutions of the 
company’s general meetings in which the vendor or the usufructuary 
participated and voted. 
(iii) Transfer of shares and compliance with legal requirements by the seller for 
obtaining the company’s consent (e.g., the convening of the relevant general 
meeting and the legality of resolutions taken by the remaining shareholders 
to decide on the transfer of shares).  
 
The clause establishing the requirement of the company’s consent to transfer of shares 
aims at preventing the involvement of third parties within the company’s structure against the 
latter’s will or that of its shareholders. However, the selected case law shows that, 
notwithstanding the existence of a clause in most companies’ articles of association requiring 
the company’s consent for the transfer of shares, the clause did not prevent shareholders from 
selling their shares, nor did it prevent disputes pertaining to power and control or decision-
making. There are some variations in the contents of the transfer clauses, namely regarding 
the transfer of shares between shareholders. In these cases, the transfer of shares is normally 
free of restrictions. This is not the case with shares transferred between spouses, ascendants or 
descendents which may be subject to restrictions. The consent of the company is always 
required whenever shares are transferred to third parties (often referred to by the Portuguese 
jurisprudence as ‘foreign’ to the company). Clauses establishing restrictions on transfer of 
shares have historically evolved together with the Portuguese PLLC, and have imbued in 
these companies a sense of closure that remains today, despite their failure to keep the 
company effectively closed.  
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1.2 FRANCE 
 
I. State 
 
i. The economic and social project of the société à responsabilité limitée and the 
creation of an experimental laboratory for the association of labor and capital 
 
The société à responsabilité limitée was created in France in 1863 by the Law of 23 
May 1863.147 These companies were, however, a variant of the joint stock company which 
was an exception to the rule in that it did not need a governmental authorization to be 
incorporated. Since they were in substance joint stock companies, the Law of 28 May 1863, 
under which they had been implemented, was repealed by the Law 24 July 1867, creating the 
société anonyme.148 At the beginning of the twentieth century there were six forms of business 
associations in France: The general partnership (société en noms collectives) the limited 
partnership (société en commandite par intérêt) the limited partnership with shares (société en 
comandite par actions), the joint stock company (société anonyme), the silent or undisclosed 
partnership (société en participation), and the société à capital variable.149  
In France the discussion about the adoption of a seventh form - the limited liability 
company similar to those created in Germany (1892) and in the United Kingdom (1907) - 150 
followed the reversion to France of Alsace-Lorraine, after the First World War.151 This region 
had been under German power until then and the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
                                                             
147 It was in the latter half of the eighteenth century that many events related to the uprising of the commercial 
society and transformations of commercial institutions of the Old Regime occurred. This was the case for 
business associations. New types and more complex forms of business associations were created. On this topic, 
see Kessler, Amalia, A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of Commercial 
Society in Eighteenth-Century France, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2007. 
148 See Journal de Sociétés, No. 5, May 1925, pp. 257 – 296 (260) (explaining that the new société à 
responsabilité limitée later created in 1925 was very different from the ones which existed in France with the 
same name between 1863 and 1867). 
149 The société en participation was regulated by Law 24 June 1921 but existed long before. Jurists would define 
it as a joint stock company following L’Ordonnance of 1673. See Bédarride, J., Commentaire du Code de 
Commerce, Livre Premier, Titre Troisième, Des Sociétés, 12th ed., Paris, Larose; Aix, Achille Makaire, 1876, pp. 
269-332 (saying that ‘Il faudra donc, dans le doute, recourir à ce que l’usage avait sanctionné. Le Code de 
commerce n’a rien inventé sur ce point; il s’est contenté de consacrer l’association en participation admise et 
consacrée sinon par la legislation, du moins par la pratique commerciale’) (It is necessary, therefore, in case of 
doubt to resort to what custom has sanctioned. The Code of Commerce has not reinvented anything at this point; 
it is satisfied to consecrate the société à participation, which was admitted and consecrated if not by the 
legislation, at least in commercial practice). The SaP does not have any legal personality. See Hudson, Maitland 
Alexis, France Practical Commercial Law, London, Longman, 1991, p. 48 (listing other forms of business such 
as the société cooperative, société d’économie sociale, société immobilière pour le commerce et l’industrie). 
150 See Part I, Chapter 3. 
151
 The authorization of ‘trade of limited risk with associations of capital and labor with limited liability’ 
(commerce à rique limité avec association du capital et du travail) was also on the legislative agenda at the time. 
See Documents Parlamentaires – Chambre, Annexe No. 3349, Session extr. – Séance du 16 Novembre 1921. 
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adopted in Germany in 1892 governed limited liability companies incorporated in that 
territory.152 Since 1919 several attempts had been made to change the French commercial 
legislation. The first bill was presented by MM. Mane Réville and Leredu in 1919. 
Nevertheless, it was considered to be an ‘abridged translation’ (traduction abrégée) of the 
German law of 1892.153 It was not adopted for it was thought it could not be adapted to 
French business associations. In January 1920, MM. Maillard and Georges Bureau offered a 
new bill. In March 1920 this bill was deposited at the Commission of Commerce and Industry. 
The bill was elaborated by the Committee of Commercial Legislation, which was presided by 
the honorable M. Lyon-Caen, and by the services of the Ministry of Commerce. The bill was 
debated and it was subject to the scrutiny and opinion of the French Parliamentary Trade 
Commission, and of several Chambers of Commerce, namely those of Strasbourg, Paris, 
D’Angers, Saumur, Mans, Cholet and Marseille.154 It also was evaluated by the Federation of 
Industrialists and Merchants and, in particular, by the Society of Legislative Studies. After this 
period of public debate, the proposed law for the creation of société à responsabilité limitée 
was presented by MM. Maillard and Georges Bureau to the Chamber of Deputies in 1921.155  
French legislators made sure to point out that the French proposed law on the limited 
liability company was profoundly different from the German law (the new law was defined as 
une oeuvre bien française).156 Specifically, not only were the organizational rules different, 
                                                             
152 According to the report of the Commission of Trade and Insdustry as of 16 November 1921 (see Documents 
Parlementaires – Chambre, Annexe 3349, Session extr. – Séance du 16 Novembre 1921), the legislative project 
of the société à responsabilité limitée should be applicable to the reversed territories of Alsaice-Lorraine in the 
same terms it would be applicable to all other French regions. In other words, limited liability companies 
incorporated under German law should be transformed into companies subject to the new French law. Alsaice-
Lorraine was, subsequently, divided into three French departments: Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and Moselle, where 
French law had to be harmonized with some local law in force there. All in all, it seemed that French legislation 
was committed to legislative unity. 
153
 See Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats Parlementaires, 1925, No. (illegible), Sénat, Séance 
du Mardi 17 Février 1925, p.118. 
154 The Chamber of Commerce of Lyon was doubtful as to the creation of the new form. It considered that the 
limitation of responsibility was keen to decrease confidence and commercial morality. 
155 See Annexe N.º 3349 (session extr. – Séance du 16 Novembre 1921), Documents Parlementaires – Chambre, 
pp. 146-152. Also see the notice presented by M. René Lafarge on behalf of the Commission of Civil and 
Criminal Legislation about the project tending to the adoption of the limited liability company, in Annexe N.º 
5165 (Sess. Extr. – 2.ª séance, 30 November 1922); Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats 
Parlementaires, Sénat, Session Extraordinaire de 1924, Séance du Jeudi 18 Décembre 1924; Journal Officiel de 
la Republique Française, Debats Parlementaires, Senat, Session ordinairede 1925, Séance du Mardi 17 Février 
1925; Journal Officiel de la République Française, Senat, Session Ordinaire de 1925, Séance, 30 Janvier 1925. In 
the literature, see Journal de Sociétés, No. 5, May 1925, pp. 257 – 296 (264-266) (explaining the elaboration of 
the Law of 1925). 
156 See Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats Parlementaires,1925, No. (illegible), Sénat, Séance 
du Mardi 17 Février 1925, p. 118 (where it is indicated that ‘Les groupements commerciaux et syndicaux, les 
chambres de commerce l’ont examine et certaines des observations présentées ont été retenues. Cést une ouvre 
bien française, qui mérite l’approbation du sénat) (‘The commercial and syndical groups, the chambers of 
commerce have examined it [the law] and some of the observations presented were kept. It is a very French 
work, which merits the approvation of the Senat’). 
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but also the rules pertaining to the functioning of the companies were diverse. However, 
nothing strikingly new was created since the new law was based on the French Law of 1867 
regulating the joint stock company (société anonyme). There was a broad understanding that a 
company with limited liability should be more of an enlarged partnership than a narrow 
corporation. So, French legislators did not immediately view the SARL as a company with 
manifest capitalist features.157 It recognized, however, that members should be given wide 
freedom to negotiate the legal regime for their businesses. In terms of policy, the adoption of 
the SARL was based on the principle of freedom (liberté) which was viewed as the hallmark 
of commerce (and everything else) in France. Also, legislators were not oblivious to the fact 
that it was important to take measures against the speculative practices put in place through 
the use of family companies. A further consideration was to provide guarantees of security by 
means of which interests of third parties such as creditors and of shareholders themselves 
would be protected. 
This bill addressed two different questions. The first was related to the legislative 
consecration of limited liability companies in France. The second question was connected to 
the obligation of these companies to allow their workers to share in the companies’ profits. 
The introduction of these business associations in the French legal system was viewed as a 
matter of utmost importance. On one hand, it was thought that they would close a loophole in 
French law, which did not anticipate companies in which members enjoyed limited liability. 
As a matter of fact, the opportunity given to members of these companies to limit their risks 
and their responsibility to their capital contributions was these companies’ distinctive 
feature.158 On the other hand, as a result of the reversion of Alsace-Lorraine to France it was 
reported that more than four hundred limited liability companies, which had previously been 
adopted under the German law of 29 April 1892, were integrated into the French legal 
system.159 Later, Alsace-Lorraine was divided into three departments - Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin 
                                                             
157 This differs, for example, from the Spanish case below. 
158 See Pellerin, Pierre, and Pellerin, Jean, The French Law as to “Private Limited Company” (“Société a 
Responsabilité Limitée”): A Pratical Handbook for Lawyers and Business Men, 2nd. ed., London, Stevens & 
Sons, 1956. This is not exclusive to France, however). 
159 Until the new law was fully adopted, two types of laws developed coterminously in the three departments of 
Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and Moselle: the local company law and the French company law. See the Law Regarding 
the Introduction of French Commercial laws in the Departments of Bas-Rhin and the Moselle in Journal Officiel 
de la République Française, Lois et Décrets, N.º 151, 3 Juin 1924, pp. 5043. Article 5 of this law states that ‘La 
legislation locale en matière commercial est abrogée, sauf les dispositions suivantes qui continuent à étre 
appliqué dans leur teneur au moment de la mise en vaguer de la present loi: Les articles 48 à 53 du Code de 
Commerce Allemand sur la procuration génerale (procura), mais seulement en ce qui concern les commerçants 
ainsi que les sociétés commerciales qui restent soumises à la loi locale et dans les conditions prévues par cette 
lois’) (‘The local commercial legislation is repealed except the following provisions that remain applicable in 
their content in the moment the present law enters into force: Articles 48 to 53 of the German Commercial Code 
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and Moselle – where the company with limited liability had already been adopted. The new 
bill was not only to be applied in these regions, but also in all French territory, including 
Algeria and other French colonies.  
The société a responsabilité limitée was designed in the new bill as a hybrid form that 
bridged the general partnership and the joint stock company limited by shares. In the 
partnership the responsibility of its members was unlimited. Their personal assets were 
inevitably linked to the company’s destiny. Third parties and creditors, in general, had the 
right to be paid with the company’s assets as well as with the assets of the members without 
any limitations. All members had joint and several liability. Besides the burden of being in a 
company where the members were personally liable for the debts of the company, often these 
companies would dissolve upon the death of one of its members. Frequently, the heirs were 
incompetent or unknowledgeable enough to take the place of the deceased member, but still 
wanted to take advantage of the good reputation of the business. In other situations they were 
just prohibited from being tradespeople, according to the laws in force at the time, because 
they were lawyers, notaries, or officers.160 On the other hand, the société anonyme, although 
limiting the responsibility of its members, was meant to operate in larger markets where 
shares were more easily tradeable. It was mandatory that this company be formed by seven 
members, at least. Additionally, the provisions of the Law 1867 regulating the société 
anonyme were severe not only for national but also for foreign investors. Foreign investors 
intending to invest in French joint stock companies encountered several constraints. They 
would have to comply with complex and burdensome provisions for the incorporation, 
publicity, and overall functioning of the company.  
The fact was that none of the business forms already provided by the law addressed 
situations such as those where a father, feeling the burden of his contributions to the family 
venture, wished his children or closest relatives to bear part of that burden. Neither were the 
existing business forms appropriate for those situations where investors linked by kinship and 
family ties wanted to stay together in business in a longstanding fashion. The société à 
responsabilité limitée was meant to bridge this gap. It was drawn up to be a company which 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
on general powers of attorney (procura), but only with regard to the merchants and commercial companies that 
remain subject to local law and under the conditions foreseen by those laws’). 
Additionally, it is worth seeing Annexe N.º 86 (Session ord. – Séance du 20 Février 1925), Documents 
Parlementaires – Senat (discussing the report elaborated by M. Chapsal on behalf of the Commission of Trade, 
Industry, Labor and Post in charge to examine the Bill elaborated by M. Eccard regarding the regime of the 
SARL in the departments of Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and Moselle). 
160 See Documents Parlementaires – Chambre, Annexe No. 3349, Session extr. – Séance du 16 Novembre 1921, 
p. 146; and Journal Officiel de la République Française, 1925, No. (illegible), Débats Parlementaires, Séance du 
Mardi 17 Février 1925, pp. 119-120. 
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allowed its members to take the management of their interests in their own hands and to find 
solutions in order to keep third parties from entering the company. The role of jurisprudence 
in developing this form was crucial in the sense that courts adapted the Law 1867 regulating 
the joint stock company to the increasingly different and new needs of the business 
community.161 Case law pertaining to small joint stock companies would be used as a sort of 
‘precedent’ to solve new cases. For instance, jurisprudence admitted restrictions on transfer of 
shares of joint stock companies such as clauses of consent and pre-emption rights. The taming 
process of the joint stock company carried on by courts transformed it into a recycled business 
association closer to the partnership (but still not quite) than to the corporation. Consequently, 
one of the joint stock company’s main disadvantages in its recycled form was to transform a 
family business into a business with an underlying capitalist purpose. Furthermore, family 
affairs were too complex to be solved with an ill-fitting legal form. Due to its open nature, the 
joint stock company could not prevent members of the same family, who did not have the 
same life opportunities and money, from behaving differently. Additionally, it could not 
prevent, after a couple of years had passed, the 'prodigal son' from selling his shares to 
foreigners against both the company's interests and the will of the family patriarch.162 Courts 
adapted the joint stock company to smaller businesses, but did not create anything new out of 
it. Once again, this is a situation in which particular features of business association’s law are 
assembled in unexpected ways to serve the interests of market agents (both individuals and 
firms) who lobbied for these changes to happen. 
As in Portugal, and as it shall be clarified later, in Spain,163 the SARL in France came up 
has a middle-term solution. It was a hybrid with characteristics both from the partnership and 
the corporation (or societé de capital as the French termed it). The SARL shared mostly the 
same given features of PLLCs in the other selected jurisdictions: they prevented the unlimited 
liability of members’ personal assets for the company’s debts, they allowed a small number of 
people to get together to form a permanent business association, and they were useful in when 
there were too many members to jointly and directly manage the company. These companies 
were considered useful for those situations in which a commercial establishment was 
transmitted to the heirs who, though unable to manage it, nevertheless needed to keep it in the 
family. They allowed for restrictions on transfer of shares. 
                                                             
161 Here, a comparison can be made with the United States and UK’s courts regarding their role in shaping law 
and interpretation of contractual choices of parties to the contract. 
162
 Journal Officiel de la République Française, 1925, No. (illegible), Débats Parlementaires, Séance du Mardi 17 
Février 1925, pp.  119-120. 
163 See sections 1.1. and 1.4. 
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 It also was understood that these companies would be highly suitable for firms 
developing an agricultural line of business. This had been the case in Germany, and the 
French legislators followed in the steps of their German counterparts.164 For example, retailers 
would have the possibility of incorporating a SARL to jointly buy the products they sold in 
order to fight the influence of wholesale houses or multinational branches. Manufacturers, 
wishing to reorganize their equipment and buy equipment to improve their production, would 
organize themselves into a SARL. However, the SARL was not limited to agriculture. It could 
be adapted to any other line of business from transport and navigation to printing firms. 
Moreover, the scope of this new form of business association was not limited to family firms. 
It would be applicable to all business associations whose members had common interests and 
wished to implement or improve new forms of doing commerce or business in general.  
The proponents of the new bill declared they had been inspired by the experiences of 
the United States and the United Kingdom. These countries were perceived as some of the 
most industrialized nations, which happened to be using similar business forms and 
formulas.165 Even though it had to deal with German law applicable to the companies in the 
Alsace region, the French legislators as well as French doctrine attributed the creation of the 
limited liability company to England, where the form of private companies were said to have 
been introduced by a law of 1862.166 The German influence was recognized, nevertheless. The 
                                                             
164 An interesting issue was the use of this business form by insurance companies and banks. Whilst insurance 
companies could not adopt this form, there was some discussion as to their use by banks. The Chamber of 
Commerce of Strasbourg and Marseille suggested that the same interdiction for insurance companies was 
applied to banks. This was so because they considered that this legal form would not provide the necessary 
guarantees of security to individuals who did not know much about these affairs. However, the Parliamentary 
Trade Commission thought that the system of limited liability was especially convenient to banks with a 
secondary importance such as some regional banks which rendered services to small merchants pledged only 
their integrity, moral values, and to whom institutions of higher importance certainly would refuse giving any 
loans for the start-up of a small business. The final version of the law ended up excluding insurance, banking and 
saving companies from the object of the SARL. 
165 It is important to note that the PLLC would only be created in the United States in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Despite this, the fact that Portugal and now France refer to similar structures in the United 
States suggests that business associations with a similar profile may have been created in the United States 
earlier. Regarding the French case, the doctrine has openly assumed that the reason for the creation of the SARL 
was solely due to the influence of foreign law. See Journal de Sociétés, No. 5, May 1925, pp. 257 – 296 (260) 
(providing that ‘La vérité est qu’il ne faut pas chercher dans la legislation française un precedent historique des 
nouvelles sociétés à responsabilitée limitée. Ce precedent se trouve en réalité dans des legislations étrangéres…) 
(The truth is that it is not necessary to look towards the French legislation for a historical precedent of new 
limited liability companies). Also see Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats Parlementaires, 1925, 
No. (illegible), Séance du Mardi 17 Février 1925, p. 122 (where it is said by M. Chapsal that ‘Nous imiterons … 
les Anglais qui, avant d’arriver aux status de leurs companies, ont du établir toute une série d’acts. Nous devrons 
faire de meme en France’) (We will imitate … the English who, before reaching the status of their companies, 
had to establish a series of acts. We must do the same in France). 
166 I believe that the law the French legislator referred to was the Companies Act 1862. The fact is that in the 
United Kingdom the private company would only be formally implemented in 1907. However, this suggests that 
there were private companies long before that. Moreover, as it is further discussed in Chapter III, in the United 
Kingdom public and private companies traditionally were not differently treated by the legislation. It may be that 
 83 
 
role the GmbH played in the economic development of Germany was acknowledged. All in 
all, however, the French legislators considered English law more flexible.167 That the 
proponents of the bill made particular reference to the private company in the United 
Kingdom signaled their intention to follow a model of business association which could likely 
contribute to the economic development of France in the same terms.  
The promise of the SARL in France was big; the scope of its application was wide. It 
was recognized that the SARL was meant to be private and should be kept this way. The 
inclusion of restrictions on transfer of shares and alteration of ownership was an important 
step to achieve this goal. Despite the close nature of these business associations, MM. 
Maillard and Georges Bureau, the proponents of the project, thought of them as a laboratory 
for an experiment with social contours where labor and capital should be brought together. 
This experiment would be put into motion by guaranteeing that their members shared their 
profits with the company’s workers. This was perceived as a desirable social development and 
a measure of justice in as much as it would facilitate the access of all citizens to property 
ownership. It was thought that this, in and of itself, would promote higher levels of economic 
development.168 This is reminiscent of the prevailing notion in the Old Regime wherein the 
self-interests of the individual were toned down with the purpose of enhancing the general 
welfare. The partnership was depicted as epitomizing this (re)distributive goal and 
functioning as a sort of ‘merchant sociability’.169 Still, this idea was not straightforward for 
some stakeholders who were concerned that asking a company with limited liability to serve 
as an experimental platform for such a social enterprise could compromise the development of 
these business associations and delay the implementation of legal solutions for the association 
of all those who cooperate in any capacity as a business.170  
The project was voted in by the Chamber of Deputies in July 1923 after alterations were 
introduced to adapt it to different economic needs of stakeholders. The SARL was finally 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
there were indeed private companies at that moment which did not receive any particular legal treatment. 
Nevertheless, while developing my field research in the United Kingdom National Archives in Kew, I came 
across documents regarding the St. John’s Hospital for Diseases of the Skin. It was incorporated under the 
Companies Act 1862 to 1900. As per request to the Board of Trade, it was converted into a limited liability 
company in 1904. Still, this was before the formal acknowledgment of the private company in the 1907 
legislation. 
167 See Journal de Sociétés, No. 5, May 1925, pp. 257 – 296 (261-264). 
168 See Documents Parlementaires – Chambre, Annexe No. 3349, Session extr. – Séance du 16 Novembre 1921, 
p. 147. 
169 See Kessler, Amalia D., A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of 
Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century France, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 
141-161 (explaining the equation partnership and civil society in the French Old Regime). 
170 See Documents Parlementaires – Chambre, Annexe No. 3349, Session extr. – Séance du 16 Novembre 1921, 
p. 147. 
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voted in and adopted in France by the Law of 7 March 1925. I did not have access to 
documents that explained the gaps between 1921, 1923 and 1925. There was a manifest delay 
in French legislation in formally accepting the new business form compared to countries such 
as Austria, Germany, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. It took over five years (at least as of 
1919 until 1925) for French legislators to overcome deadlocks in the legislative process, and 
finally adopt the new legislation. For reasons that are not clear, French legislators were 
apparently hesitant to implement the law.171 We do know that authors such as Pierre-Henri 
Conac did not consider company law, and in particular the adoption of a German form 
thereof, the most pressing item on the agenda of the French legislator, especially after the 
First World War.172 
The SARL, however, was not adopted without criticism. How was it possible, it was 
asked, to allow an individual or a group of associated individuals to develop a commercial 
activity that could limit their responsibility? How could it be that an individual or a group of 
individuals could create a legal entity independent of themselves and with its own assets? The 
bottom line, however, was that these companies were perceived as contributing to the greater 
good of France. They increased considerably in number since their implementation, and it 
seemed that private credit was not put at stake as a result of market agents investing in these 
companies.173 The SARL became an important legal form in France, widely adopted by 
French firms. It has played an outstanding role in the French economy from the early 
twentieth century to date. The SARL has several other advantages. It allows family firms to 
opt to be levied as partnerships. Their incorporation is relatively easy and their management is 
flexible. Consequently, the SARL was, and remains, an alluring form for small and medium 
enterprises and investors who face economic difficulties (including the payment of taxes) and 
want to ensure that the size of their business is adequate to surmount these problems. 
 
  
 
                                                             
171 See Journal Officiel de la République Française, 1925, No (illegible), Debats Parlementaires, Senat, Séance 
du Mardi 17 Février 1925, pp. 118 (where the rapporteur stresses that ‘En France nour devons mettre fins à nos 
hesitations et accepter cette réforme’). 
172 I thank Pierre-Henri Conac for having taken his time to explain his point of view to me. 
173 See Girardier, R., ‘Le Dévelopment de la Notion de L’Affectation de Patrimonie Doit Conduire à La Création 
de L’Entreprise Individuelle à Responsabilité Limitée’, La Société a Responsabilité Limitée, 3me Année, N.º 1, 
1er Trimestre 1951, p. 13. (The author is a notary and suggests in this article a new idea of patrimony which 
would lead to the evolution of a new form of business). 
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ii. The legal framework of the société à responsabilité limitée: new rules out of old 
business forms and the transfer of shares (parts sociales) 
 
The Law of 7 March 1925 stated that sociétés à responsabilité limitée could be 
incorporated out of sociétés anonymes created under and subordinated to the Law 27 July 
1867. Although legislators stressed that this was a new form of business association, many of 
the legal solutions drew upon the existing provisions for the société anonyme. This was not 
quite the case, however, for the transfer of shares which in these companies, unlike in the 
société anonyme, was subject to restrictions. Article 23 of the bill provided that transfers 
could only take place with the consent of the majority of shareholders representing at least 
three-quarters of the share capital. The company would have a pre-emption right. It would be 
exercised by the administrators according with a decision taken by them.174 The Commission 
of Commerce and Industry did not see fit to retain this right of pre-emption for the company. 
On one hand, it was not considered acceptable that a company would buy its own shares. On 
the other hand, the right of pre-emption could be given to the shareholders if that would not 
cause great practical difficulties.175 Furthermore, the requirement of three-quarters was 
considered to be a sufficient guarantee against the ‘intrusion’ of third parties. Thus, the rule 
that shares could only be transferred with the consent of a majority of shareholders 
representing three-quarters of the share capital was retained in the Law of 7 March 1925.176 
                                                             
174 See Documents Parlementaires – Chambre, Annexe No. 3349, Session extr. – Séance du 16 Novembre 1921 
(where the report made on behalf of the Commission of Commerce and Industry examining the bill on limited 
liability companies was published. Article 23, of the bill provided that ‘Les cessions ne peuvent avoir lieu 
qu’avec le consentement de la majorité des associés, représentant au moins le trois quarts du capital social. 
La société a un droit de préemption. Il est exercé par les administrateurs en vertu d’une décision prise par eux’. 
175 Most articles of association ended up providing pre-emption rights to shareholders. 
176 See Journal Officiel de la République Française, 1925, No. (illegible), Séance du Mardi 17 Février 1925, p. 
120 (presenting Article 22.º of the Bill on limited liability companies where it was provided that “Les parts 
sociales ne peuvent être cedes à tiers étrangers à la société qu’avec le consentement de la majorité des associés 
représentant au moins les trois quarts du capital social’). (Shares can only be transferred to third parties foreign 
to the company with the consent of the majority of shareholders representing at least three-quarters of the share 
capital). In the discussion that led to the approval of the project it was stressed in respect to this article that in 
certain cases it would be necessary to go further and give the opportunity to the children who wish to maintain 
the family business to buy the shares of those who want to sell them. The respective provisions in the bill were 
not changed accordingly because the government did not want to delay the approval of the bill. In the literature 
see Pellerin, Pierre, and Pellerin, Jean, cit., pp. 27-28 (translating chapter VIII of the Law 7 March 1925, 
including Articles 21, 22 and 23 regarding shares, form and assignment. Article 21 of the Law 7 March 1925 
provided that: ‘The shares (parts socials) cannot be represented by negotiable certificates either registered or to 
bearer or to order; they can only be assigned in pursuance with the provisions of the following articles’. Article 
22 established that ‘The shares (parts sociales) of the company cannot be assigned to third parties outside the 
company except with the consent of the majority of the partners representing between themselves at least three-
quarters of the capital of the company”. Finally, Article 23 stated that ‘The assignements of the shares (parts 
sociales) of the company must be evidenced by a deed drawn up before a notary or by an indenture under private 
signature. They are valid as regards the company and third parties only when they have notified to the company 
or accepted by the company in a notarial deed pursuant to article 1690 of the Civil Code’).  
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This rule was mandatory. This is different from what happened in other jurisdictions where 
identical provisions were default rules. Besides the requirement of a majority of shareholders 
representing three-quarters of the share capital, other formalities were laid down. Transfers 
must be undertaken either through a notarial or a document under private signature. They, 
however, would only have effects on the company after the company had acknowledged them 
and accepted them through a notarial act. The bottom line was that the three-quarters rule was 
a mandatory rule. This was so because it involved the transfer of shares to a third party 
outside the company.  
Other important rules were those related to the management and its managers (gérants). 
I stress Article 24 of the Law where it was established that the SARL was managed by one or 
several managers who could also be shareholders. Managers were perceived by the legislator 
as mandataires or agents. They might or might not receive a salary. They were appointed by 
the shareholders either in the deed of incorporation or subsequently for a determined or 
undetermined period of time. Unless articles of association provided otherwise, managers 
were granted wide powers to act on behalf of the company in any circumstances whatsoever. 
It was also foreseen that any limitation of the powers of the managers had no effect on third 
parties. Most interestingly, according to this provision the mandate of the managers appointed, 
either by the deed of incorporation or subsequently, could only be terminated on justifiable 
grounds. This differed from the protections attributed by law to directors of the joint stock 
company. The latter could be dismissed ad nutum.  
 
iii. The legal framework of the société à responsabilité limitée: (cont.) 
 
Currently, Article L. 223-14 is now a default rule, but in respect to the majority 
requirement. It provides that ‘The shares may only be transferred to third parties outside the 
company with the consent of the majority of the shareholders holding at least half of the 
shares, unless a higher majority has been stated in the articles of association’.177 Ordinance 
No. 2004-274 of 25 March 2004 reformed the law and substituted the previous mandatory 
rule regarding transfers of shares.178 The new rule gave other non-transferring members the 
                                                             
177 See Bermann, George A., and Kirch, Pierre, French Business Law in Translation, 2nd ed., New York City, 
Huntington, 2008, p. 40 (providing a faithful translation of the several paragraphs of Article 223-14). 
178 The legal regime of the SARL was subsequently changed by Law No. 2005-882 of 2 August 2005. This law 
targeted small and medium enterprises and altered the rules of quorum and majority, and the statute of the EURL 
(enterprise unnipersonnelle à responsabilitée limitée). In particular, the threshold of three-quarters of the shares 
held by the members present or represented in the general meeting was lowered to two-thirds. The underlying 
idea was to facilitate the modification of articles of association of the SARL and to align them with the evolution 
 87 
 
right to opt out and agree otherwise in respect to the majority needed to consent to the 
transfer. This is viewed by some authors as a move of the SARL away from the partnership.179 
Additionally, it imparts a contractual flavor to the SARL which, unlike the Portuguese system 
already studied, is not based upon a purely contractarian approach due to the historical 
imposition of mandatory rules.180 
Other aspects of the current legal regime of the transfer of shares to third parties are 
relevant. For a start, I should stress that the French regime for the transfer of shares and 
alterations to the ownership structure of the company is comparatively rigid. Procedurally, if 
the company has more than one shareholder, the member who wishes to sell her shares to a 
third party must notify the company and each non-transferring member about the proposed 
transfer. The purpose of this notification is to obtain the company and other members’ consent 
to the transfer. The company’s decision is taken by means of a collective resolution of the 
members at the general meeting. The manager of the company convenes the general meeting 
to resolve on the transfer. The manager can also consult with each member in writing, if this is 
foreseen by the articles of association. Subsequently, the transferor is informed about the 
company’s decision. Unless the articles of association provide otherwise, the consent of the 
company is given through the majority vote of shareholders representing at least half of the 
shares. The company’s lethargy is sanctioned if it does not inform the transferor about its 
decision within a three-month period as of the moment the transferor notified the company 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
of the company and the new economic context. The new law also provided a legal frame for the leasing of 
shares. On this matter, see Saintourens, Bernard, ‘Les réformes du droit des sociétés par les lois du 26 juillet 
2005 pour la confiance et la modernisation de l'économie et du 2 août 2005 en faveur des petites et moyennes 
entreprises’, Revue des sociétés, 2005, p. 527 – (…). Furthermore, the law of the SARL was altered by Law No 
2011-525 of 17 May 2011. 
179 See Saintourens, Bernard, ‘L'attractivité renforcée de la SARL après l'ordonnance n° 2004-274 du 25 mars 
2004’, Revue des sociétés, 2004, p. 207- (…) (claiming that ‘L'abaissement des trois quarts à la moitié du seuil 
de représentativité constitue un assouplissement sensible des conditions d'autorisation de la cession des parts de 
la SARL à un tiers étranger à la société et pourrait être jugé comme traduisant un éloignement des SARL de la 
catégorie des sociétés de personnes. Pour autant, les statuts peuvent prévoir une majorité plus forte, ce qui doit 
permettre aux associés de renforcer, si tel est leur souhait, l'intuitus personae au sein de leur société. La 
conception que l'on peut avoir de la place de la SARL au sein des sociétés commerciales ne dépend donc plus de 
la position de la loi mais de l'usage que feront, au cas par cas, les entrepreneurs utilisant la SARL pour structurer 
juridiquement leur entreprise’) (‘Lowering the threshold of representativeness from three-quaters to half is a 
significant easing of the conditions for authorization of the sale of shares of the SARL to a third party outside the 
company and could be considered a shift away from the partnership. However, the statutes may provide for a 
greater majority which will allow the partners to strengthen, if they so wish, the intuitus personae within their 
company. The conception that one can have of the SARL within business associations no longer depends on the 
position of the law, but of the use that is made by members in each case to legally structure their business.’). 
180
 For instance, by analyzing the articles of association of SARLs I want to understand whether members 
changed their articles and decreased or increased the threshold of the majority so that consent is given to 
transfers. It is also a way to test how much use shareholders make of the contractual flexibility provided by the 
law on this matter. 
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about her project. If, at the end of this period, the company has not conveyed this information, 
the transfer is considered approved and the transferor may freely transfer her shares.  
If consent is not given by the company, shareholders must buy the shares or cause them 
to be bought, within a three-month period as of the refusal. The price is determined according 
to Article 1843-3 of the Civil Code, unless the transferor withdraws her proposal and quits 
selling her shares.181 The valuation costs should be borne by the company. The period of three 
months can be extended once by a court order, as per the manager director’s request, for no 
more than six months. The company may also decide to reduce its share capital, within the 
same period, with the consent of the transferor, by the amount of the registered par value of 
that partner’s shares and to buy back the shares at the price determined pursuant to the terms 
and condition set out above. When duly justified, a court order may extend the payment 
period up to no more than two years. The amounts due earn interest at the legal commercial 
interest rate. If the company has not acquired the shares of the transferor or cause them to be 
acquired, or depending on the circumstances, the company has not bought the shares back, at 
the end of the given period, the transferor may freely sell her shares as she had originally 
proposed. 
In principle, shares are freely transferable to other shareholders and family members of 
the transferor because it is thought that this would put at stake neither the closed nature of the 
company, nor the influence of other shareholders. Article L. 223-16 provides that shares are 
freely transferable between shareholders. If the articles of association contain a clause limiting 
the transferability, the provisions of the article L. 223-14 apply. Nevertheless, the articles of 
association may, in this case, reduce the majority or shorten the time set in that article. 
Moreover, pursuant to L. 223-17, the transfer of shares is subject to the provisions of L. 221-
14, which is applicable to partnerships. This article establishes that the transfer of shares in 
the partnership must be in writing. A transfer is not binding on a third party until these 
formalities have been completed and, in addition, after public notice of it is made through the 
commercial and companies register.182 Like restrictions on transfers to third parties, articles of 
association may determine restrictions on transfers to spouses, heirs, ascendants and 
descendants such as the consent of the company or shareholders to the transfer. These 
                                                             
181 The right of the transferor to withdraw from her proposal (droit de repéntir) was overly discussed by the 
jusridprudence and doctrine. It was acknowledged by Order of 24 June 2004. See Mortier, Renaud, ‘Contre le 
droit de repentir en droit des sociétés’, Revue des sociétés, 2009, p. 547-(…) (criticizing Article L. 228-24, al. 2 
of the Commercial Code which, after the reform introduced by Order of 24 June 2004, established the right of 
the transferor to withdraw her proposal (droit de repentir). 
182 See Raworth, Philip, The French Commercial Code in English, 2011-2012 ed., Thomson Reuters, p. 108 and 
99. 
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restrictions notwithstanding, the majority to vote resolutions on this regard must not be more 
demanding than to vote the consent to transfer to third parties outside the company. 
 
II. Actors 
 
i. Applying the SARL’s law by drafting the company’s articles of association: 
ownership and corporate control 
 
I collected a sample of 50 articles of association of French SARLs. In order to identify 
the companies I wanted to analyze, I used the Bureau van Dijk’s database Astree which is 
available to the public at the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris.183 In order to streamline the 
research I selected eight different variables. The choice of these variables was made in the 
context of the variables provided by the database and pursuant to the elements of the 
knowledge that I considered necessary to answer my main research question and the sub-
research questions listed in the comparative matrix (Table 1).184 The first variable was the 
statut juridique: actif. The search yielded 1.136.400 events. The second variable was forme 
jurifique: société à responsabilitée (SARL). It yielded 296.297 results. The third variable was 
date de creation de l’entreprise: du 01/01/2000 au 31/12/2012.185 I obtained 165.410 events. 
The fourth variable was Ville: Paris. The research yielded 1.445 results. The fifth variable 
was Description textuelle d’activité (objet et code NAF Rév. 2): UnDeCesMots (“prod*”, 
“habillement*”, “boisson*”, “pharmacie*”. The number of results decreased to 441. The 
sixth variable was Dirigeants. At this stage, I first chose the option to have dirigeants or 
managers who were also shareholders. This yielded 28 events. I then decided to select the 
option of having companies in which the reported managers were currently in office (this did 
not necessarily mean that managers were also shareholders). This yielded 401 companies. To 
decrease this number, I further narrowed down the research by including a seventh variable: 
Années de comptes disponibles: 2012. It did not provide any results. I introduced an eight 
variable: Effective salarié de l’entreprise: Toutes les enterprises avec une valeur Dernière 
année disponible. The research, then, yielded 28 results. Thus, by introducing the latter 
variables into the database, I delineated a sample with 28 companies in which managers were 
also shareholders and 28 companies in which managers were currently in office, without 
                                                             
183 This is a database of Bureau van Dijk (BvD) that provides specific information about French companies. It 
includes data regarding the business activity, accounts, management, and ownership structure. 
184 See Part I, Chapter 1. 
185 In choosing the time frame, I was limited by the availability of resources of the Center. It was not possible, 
therefore, to collect articles of association dated as of 1925 to date. 
 90 
 
specifying whether or not they were shareholders. I collected the relevant companies’ articles 
of association from the database infogreffe.fr.186 I mostly selected the original articles of 
association (statuts constitutifs) that were deposited with the Greffe du Tribunal de Paris at 
the date of incorporation of the company. Where this was not possible, I selected the updated 
version of the articles (derniers statuts a jour). All articles of association included restrictions 
on transfer. Half of them, which were of companies incorporated after 2004, opted out from 
the one-half majority rule of Article L. 223-14, and established a higher majority of 
shareholders representing three-quarters of the shares to consent the transfer. One company 
established a majority of two-thirds. The other half, comprised of companies incorporated 
before 2004 and after 2004 did not opt out from Article 223-14 either in its old or updated 
version. In the situations where companies opted out from the rule, it was difficult to learn 
whether they did so because they really wanted to opt out or because the articles of 
association were just a copy of previous ones. This hypothesis becomes more plausible when 
considering that the wording of the articles is alike, despite of the absence of any visible 
connection between the companies. On one hand, this was the case because the applicable 
rules were copied in the articles of association. On the other hand, it appears there is a 
dissemination of legal knowledge, the channels of which are difficult to identify by just the 
mere analysis of companies’ constitutional documents.  
A few words should be said about the management of the company. Database Astree, 
from which the sample of companies was collected, provided for each company a BvD 
Independence Indicator. This indicator characterizes the degree of independence of a 
company with regard to its shareholders. Putting it differently, this source labels categories of 
shareholders in so far as they are able to exert a controlling power in a company. The analysis 
of the BvD indicators for each company in the sample suggests that, in general, French 
companies present a high level of dependence on their shareholders. Unlike the United 
Kingdom case, as we shall see below,187 shareholders are often managers. Normally, the 
majority shareholder is elected manager of the company. Thus, in principle, shareholders are 
in a position to control or exert power over the ownership and governance structures of the 
company. It would appear that, in these circumstances, the separation between ownership and 
control is more trivial. Additionally, it would appear that conflicts of interests in the company 
                                                             
186 This database makes available to the public documents of French companies that are deposited with the 
offices of French Commercial Courts for purposes of register (Greffes des Tribunaux de Commerce). See 
https://www.infogreffe.fr/societes/ (last accessed 30 January 2014). 
187 See Part I, Chapter 3. 
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are more likely rooted in the relationships between minority and majority shareholders 
provoked by abusive behavior, and not so much between shareholders and managers. 
The current legal regime makes a distinction between what I call the internal and 
external relations of the managing directors. The internal relations refer to the relationships 
managing directors have with shareholders. The external relationships refer to the 
relationships established between managing directors with third parties. In this respect, Article 
L. 223-18 is relevant. I point out the fact that the powers managers enjoy in their internal 
relations are determined by the articles of association. If the articles of association make no 
mention of it, then Article L. 221-4 regulating the powers of managers in the general 
partnership is applied. In their external relations with third parties, managing directors have 
broad powers to act on behalf of the company, notwithstanding the powers that the law grants 
exclusively to shareholders. Managing directors even have the power to bind the company in 
acts not related to the business object of the company unless the company proves that the third 
party knew, or should have known considering the circumstances, that the act was beyond the 
business object of the company. The publication alone of the articles is insufficient to 
constitute that proof.188 The articles of association limiting the powers of the managing 
directors, pursuant to this Article, are not enforceable against third parties. Managers may 
decide, subject to ratification of their decision by shareholders under Article L. 223-30, to 
bring the articles of association into compliance with mandatory legal and regulatory 
provisions. 
The severity of the regime of transfer of shares in the SARL is suggested by the lack of 
negotiability of the shares, by the fact that transfers must be registered with the commercial 
registry, and by the tax costs associated with it. Moreover, the management of the company is 
undertaken by one or several managers who must necessarily be individuals and not legal 
entities. But unlike the United Kingdom where control of the company seems to belong, in 
fact, to directors, managing directors of the SARL are highly scrutinized by shareholders. 
Perhaps this is so because there is no collective body such as the board of directors that is 
required to periodically report its activity to the president of the board or to the general 
meeting of shareholders.189 Despite all this, the major flexibility of the SARL and its ability to 
                                                             
188 See Bermann, George A., and Kirch, Pierre, cit., p. IV-41. 
189 See Article L. 223-18, first paragraph. 
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be a company ‘bonne a tout faire’, that is to say, a company which can be adapted to a wide 
gamut of firms, is recognized by the literature and jurisprudence.190 
 
III. Market 
 
i. Litigation over the requirement of consent (agrément): personal relationships of trust 
and conflicts cheek by jowl in the SARL 
 
Despite the SARL’s flexibility, the fact is that in practice its legal framework does not 
emerge for their members as clear-cut. The analysis of a sample of 14 cases that were 
adjudicated by French courts and saw appeal shows precisely this: personal relationships of 
trust go hand in hand with conflicts over power and distribution of shares in the company. I 
collected these cases from the database legifrance.gouv.fr. I selected the period between 1 
January 1930 and 30 September 2012 for my research. First, I introduced in the research 
engine the words ‘cession parts sociales’. This yielded 1555 results, including decisions of the 
Cour de Cassation (1235), Cour D’Appel (319), and Tribunal de Grande Instance (1). 
Second, in an attempt to refine my research, I have followed the same scheme, this time 
introducing as key words ‘agrément’ and again ‘cessions parts sociales’. This research yielded 
approximately 130 results. I have chosen those cases where the word consent (agrément), 
SARL, and transfer of shares (cession de parts socials) were automatically highlighted in the 
summary provided by the database to match the terms of the research I initially provided. 
Again, my choices of cases were made within the number of variables provided by the 
database and included the knowledge I considered essential to accurately grasp the market, 
the bargaining complexity, and these companies' dynamics. The cases are based upon 
contentious disputes where consent to the transfer of shares was refused or an un-consented 
transfer of shares was executed. I gather the multiple legal problems deriving from there 
according to the following clusters: 
 
 
                                                             
190 See Bissara, Philippe, ‘L'inadaptation du droit français des sociétés aux besoins des entreprises et les aléas des 
solutions’, Revue des sociétés, 1991, p. 553 - (…) (referring to the SARL as an instrument more liable to be 
adapted to the needs of the firms than the société anonyme. As a matter of fact, the SARL has been, to the eyes 
of the author, ‘injustement négligée’ perhaps because some of its peculiar features could also be applied or 
adapted to the société anonyme, but they have not to the moment. For an account of the French legal regime of 
transfer of shares and ownership rights in the SARL, see Cozian, Maurice et al. Droit de Sociétés, 15th ed., Paris, 
LexisNexis, Litec, 2002. 
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1. Interpretation 
(i) Difficulties in interpreting legal provisions and contract clauses. 
(ii) Difficulty in understanding when resolutions taken at the general meetings are 
valid and enforceable. 
(iii) Obscurity regarding the moment when shares are effectively transferred, and 
the actual position of the transferee in the company’s dynamics when it comes 
to a vote in the general meetings, or take a stand on an ongoing conflict 
involving shareholders, managers and / or managers and shareholders, 
particularly if the transfer was un-consented. 
(iv) Learning whether the mere proposal of transfer binds the transferor once it is 
accepted by other non-transferring shareholders. 
(v) Doubts as to the effect of the consent given by shareholders to the transfer of 
shares. 
(vi) Lack of clarity as to whether the consent is or it is not part of the sales 
contract.191 
 
2. Functionality of restrictions on transfers 
(i) Conflicts of interests, disputes between shareholders as a result of changes in the 
balance of distribution of the shares and the power shareholders keep inside the 
company. 
 
3. Un-consented transfer of shares 
(i) Non-compliance with the law or legal provisions shareholders themselves have 
not opted out from, either because they ignore them, or because they do not 
mind circumventing them. 
(ii) Concomitant transfer of shares and the need to understand whether there is a 
fraud in the sense that the transfers are undertaken to circumvent the 
requirement of consent of the shareholders. 
 
4. Formalities 
(i) Dilatory practices developed by managers and non-transferring shareholders to 
                                                             
191 See, for instance, the ruling of the Cour de Cassation, 1 October 1996, Appeal N.º 94-20219, where the Cour 
D’Appel submitted that the resolution of the respective general meeting was a mere authorization of the transfer 
and not a recognition of that transfer. This suggests that the consent given by shareholders to the transfer is not 
part of the share sale and purchase agreement. 
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avoid the transfer being executed. 
(ii) Managers and non-transferring shareholders’ opportunism and bad faith, which 
translates into silent and apathetic behavior of both managers and non-
transferring shareholders toward reports provided by experts on the value of 
the shares to be transferred. The cases selected also demonstrate that on the 
management and non-transferring shareholders’ side there is often no real 
intention to rely on the opinion provided by such expert. 
(iii) Abusive behavior of managers and non-transferring shareholders to harm the 
transferor’s interests such as acquiring the shares at their fair value. 
(iv) Un-consented transfer of shares, especially because the managers or non-
transferring shareholders were late in complying with their legal obligation to 
repurchase the transferors’ share. 
(v) Copy of legal rules by the members into the articles of association whilst there 
is no real intention of deviating from entrenched corporate practices such as 
those related to the functioning of general meetings, and their documentation 
in the minutes’ book. 
(vi) Irregularities in the form of the notification and as to the proceedings regarding 
the general meetings in which the consent to the transfer of shares is voted. 
 
This set of cases suggests that property rights held by shareholders in their shares seem 
not to be strong enough to prevent dilatory maneuvers by managers and other shareholders. 
This is especially so because, similar to the other jurisdictions, there is no competitive market 
liable to break path-dependent behaviors of the members who strive to keep the control over 
the company, surpass the lack of liquidity of their shares, and push managers to run the extra 
mile when it comes to guarantee that the best investors will, actually, invest in the company. 
Curiously enough, members want to keep control over the company even when they do not 
hold highly liquid dividend shares based upon strong sources of profitability. Shareholders 
seem to be willing to be kings in a land without a kingdom. Many of the actions reported in 
the case law can, in extremis, lead to the ‘silent’ expropriation of the transferor’s own share 
by her cohorts. This does not necessarily make the company better off, nor does it spell its 
development in the long run. 
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1.3  ITALY 
 
I. State 
 
i. The history of the Italian private company (società a responsabilità limitata): 
legislative projects, parliamentary debates and the allure of foreign investment 
 
Italian legislation appears to have remained indifferent for over thirty years to the 
adoption in other countries of a legal framework for private business associations.192 In 1942, 
apropos the discussion regarding the reform of the Italian Civil Code, the longstanding need 
for a new type of company alongside the joint stock company was stressed. This new type of 
business association would be a limited liability company whose shares would not be freely 
transferable.193 However, that this need had already been noted and discussed way back in 
1882 – before the adoption of the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) in 
Germany, on 20 April 1892 - in the framework of the reform of the Code of Commerce. This 
code had already established the joint stock company (società anonima per azioni) and the 
joint stock company limited by shares (società anonima per quote). However, the 
complacency of Italian businessmen regarding the inclusion of these new forms of joint stock 
companies in the system of the Code of Commerce rendered these solutions sterile. 
Italians already knew of the implementation of an autonomous type of business 
association with limited liability. In the provinces of Venezia Giulia and Tridentina, which 
were formerly part of the Empire of Austria (Austro-Hungarian Empire) and annexed to the 
Kingdom of Italy after the First World War, the limited liability company had been adopted 
according to the Austrian law of 6 March 1906.194 This company was transitorily maintained 
until after the legislative unification with the Royal Decree of 4 November 1928. It was also 
reported that from 1931 to 1940, 382 companies limited by guarantee had been created in the 
District Appeal Court of Venezia Giulia. In addition, 253 of these business associations had 
been created in the circumscription of the Appeal Court of Trento, and 23 in Fiume. Certain 
                                                             
192 See Cagnasso, Oreste, Tratatto di Diritto Commerciale: La Società a Responsabilità Limitata, vol. Quinto, 
Padova, Cedam, 2007, pp. 4-12 (for an historic account of the evolution of the PLLC in Italy (società a 
responsabilità limitata); and Badaracco, G.B., ‘Innovazioni Amministrative nelle Imprese e la Società a 
Responsabilità nel Nuovo Codice, Milano, Soc.Ed. la Stampa Commerciale, 1941-XIX, pp. 19-35. 
193 See Relazione alla Maestà del Re Imperatore del Ministro Guardasigilli (Grandi), Presentata nell’udienza del 
16 Marzo 1942 – XX per l’approvazione del testo del ‘Codice Civile’. 
194 These business associations existed also in other regions such as Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol) and Istria 
(which belonged to Austria before the World War I and to Italy until World War II).  
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companies in the Kingdom of Italy, in order to take the form of limited liability companies,195 
had already learned to incorporate in Trieste, while having the seat of their business in the 
most distant regions of Italy.196 With the new Italian Civil Code of 1942, adopting the new 
form of corporation – the limited liability company (società a responsabilità limitata), all 
these previous corporate forms created in Italian provinces were subjected to the same legal 
system. 
Notwithstanding the late adoption of a legal framework for the private company, the 
introduction of a new form of business association – the società a garanzia limitata (company 
limited by guarantee) – was discussed in all projects of reform of the Code of Commerce, 
respectively in 1921, 1925, and 1940. They all promised a wide movement of research and 
debate, assembling practitioners and scholars for the creation of a new legal framework. For 
example, in the Project of the Code of Commerce of 1925 several reasons were given for the 
adoption of these companies. 
First, it was intended to extend the projected law to the Italian provinces and colonies. 
Additionally, it was thought appropriate to make adequate the system of law to the realities of 
life and to the Italian code for the African colony of Eritrea.197 The application of the law to 
provinces and colonies was made under the principle of national unity (l’unità nazionale) 
which was part of the backbone of fascist Italy.  
Second, it was perceived as important that Italian legislation bridge the gaps and close 
the loopholes in the commercial law, especially by taking into account the legal innovations in 
countries such as Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and, more recently, France.198 It is 
                                                             
195 This company was named at the time società a garanzia limitata. This is a previous form of the società a 
responsabilità limitata adopted in 1942. 
196 This is a fascinating case of regulatory arbitrage. Two questions may be asked: First, was it possible to form 
an Austrian GmBH in these Italian provinces after 1918? And second, could the GmBH be retained after 1928? 
This issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it sets the grounds to investigate the promise of jurisdictional 
competition in Europe from a historical and empirical perspective. On this, see Part III, Chapter 2. 
197 It is fair to ask whether Eritreia was used as a sort of experimental laboratory for the implementation of the 
law. 
198 See Commissione Reale per la Riforma dei Codici, Sottocommissione B, Codice di Commercio, vol. II, 
Relazione sul Progetto a cura del Presidente D’Amello, dei Commissari: Arcangeli, Asquini, Bolaffio, Bonelli, 
Jannitti A. e del Secretario Frè, Roma, Provveditorio Generale dello Stato, 1925, p. 63 (‘il legislatore italiano 
non può rimanere indifferente di fronte alla crescente tendenza verso il principio della limitazione della 
responsabilità, che caratterizza il movimento associativo dell’economia moderna e che da noi non è meno viva 
che altrove. Esaminando la situazione delle società per azione, nelle cui forme questa tendenza há finora dovuto 
trovare il suo sbocco, ognuno può avere la precisa sensazione, che un notevole numero di tali società 
corrispondono a imprese di proporzioni modeste e di stretto caratere famigliare, se non addirittura personale, le 
quali hanno dovuto assumere le forme della società per azioni, perchè la nostra legislazione non offre via per 
assicurare ai soci la limitazione di responsabilità’) (‘the Italian legislation cannot remain indifferent to the 
increasing tendency to apply the principle of limited liability which characterizes the corporate movement of the 
modern economy, and which between us is not less vivid than elsewhere. By examining the situation of the joint 
stock company, in which this trend has at the moment found its end, one gets the distinct feeling that a 
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said with respect to the improvement of Italian commercial law that ‘…parve giusto non 
mantenersi fuori da quella corrente di studi di legislazione comparata e di unificazione 
legislative internazionale, che caratteriza, nel campo del diritto pubblico e privato, la ripresa 
attività scientific del dopo guerra’.199 It was understood that Italy could not set itself apart 
from the legislative movements taking place in other European countries.  
Third, Italian legislators seemed to be committed to search for a harmonization of 
Italian commercial law. An analysis of historical sources shows numerous legislative 
references to ‘a minimum of uniform international law’, to a community of legal rules 
designed to fulfill the noble aspiration of Latin legal thinking. This seemed to be the mission 
attributed to commercial law. This discipline was considered, more than any other, likely to 
promote a common type of legal rules. Unlike the institutes of civil law, which were taken as 
the outcome of a common feeling of human coexistence and perceived as specifically 
conserving the ‘intimacy’ of the historical tradition and ethic characteristics of the ‘race’, 
rules governing commercial activities were seen as capable of naturally equating themselves 
with other rules of the same kind beyond the borders of the Motherland.  
Fourth, it was aimed at providing Italian producers with better access to the biggest 
world markets and promoting commercial relationships between Italian and foreign industries. 
Indeed, the largest industrial and financial associations, unions and professional colleges, 
banks, and organizations of merchants were heard in the context of this project of reform. It 
was accepted that the rigidity of legal formulations sacred to lawyers, commentators and 
jurisprudence had to give in once they faced the challenges of the practice and of ‘law-in-
action’. However, and despite all this, the reform was not undertaken. 
In 1935 an interesting debate was held at the Italian parliament (Camera dei 
Deputati).200 Among other topics, the compelling need to reform the Code of Commerce was 
stressed. This urgency in reform was justified with the legitimacy of the legislative process in 
accommodating new legal phenomena and establishing the line between norms and institutes 
of public and private law. Moreover, it was acknowledged that the legislation at the time did 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
significant number of these companies are businesses of modest proportions and strict family or even personal 
features which had to take the form of joint stock companies because our legislation does not allow members to 
assure the limitation of liability’). 
199 See Commissione Reale per la Riforma dei Codici, Codice di Commercio, vol. II, Relazione sul Progetto a 
cura del Presidente D’Amelio, dei Commissari: Arcangeli, Asquini, Bolaffio, Bonelli, Jannitti A. e del Secretario 
Frè, Roma Provedoria Generale dello Stato, Libreria, 1925, p. 9 (‘…it seems just not to stay out of the current 
studies of comparative law and unification of international law, which characterizes, in the fields of public and 
private law, post-war scientific activities’). 
200 See Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Legislatura XXIX, 1.ª Sessione, Discussioni, Tornata del 15 
Marzo 1935, pp. 1011 and ff. 
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not prevent the evasion of that law. Therefore, not only the implementation of criminal 
provisions regarding commercial companies was discussed, but also the role of business 
associations. As put by one of the parliamentarians  
 
…l’attività delle società commerciali nella economia moderna non riguarda soltanto quell 
numero più o meno limitato di individui che vi hanno un interesse diretto ed immediate, ma 
tocca l’economia di tutta la Nazione, alla quale in definitive appartengono I capitali che 
vengono sperperati e distolti dalla loro naturale ed essenziale funzione produttiva.201  
 
Having particularly in mind the joint stock company, and the fact that this company 
seemed no longer able to fulfill the needs of business and businessmen in general, it was 
contended that fascism had the role of moralizing all national activities and also those with an 
economic nature. Often, private companies (not yet recognized by the law at this moment)202 
were used to elegantly elude legal provisions on joint stock companies. This is not different 
from the case of the United Kingdom as it is described in Chapter 3 below. As a consequence, 
it was thought that the reform should not be limited in substance. It should be undertaken by 
formalizing the creation of a new type of corporation by means of which the doctrine and 
fundamental principles of fascist practices (e.g., the conciliation of the interests and 
subordination of private interests to the overall general interest - the ‘fascist corporate 
principle’) could be safeguarded. The parliament openly assumed an educational role on this 
matter203. Hence, the claims favorable to a reform of the legislation in force were based on 
three premises of political, social and moral nature.  
The società a responsabilità limitata would only be definitely adopted in Italy in 
1942.204 In the report to the Majesty of the King Emperor by the Minister Guardasigilli 
                                                             
201 See Atti Parlamentari, cit., p. 1015 (‘...the activity of commercial companies in the modern economy is not 
only that which concerns a more or less limited number of individuals who have a direct and immediate interest, 
but also affects the economy of the whole nation, to which definitely belong the capitals being squandered and 
diverted from their natural and essential function of production’). 
202 For example, I am referring to those that had been incorporated in former Austrian territory. 
203 See Atti Parlamentari, cit., p. 1017 (‘Le nuove norme dunque sono indispensabili per creare il nuovo costume, 
il quale del resto è già nelle coscienze dei più e dovrà penetrare in quelle di tutti attraverso l’opera educative del 
Partito e dei Sindacati Forensi’) (‘The new rules are, therefore, essential to create the new custom, which is 
already in the minds of many and will penetrate all others through the educational work of the Party and Bar 
Associations’). 
204 It is worth stressing that before the società a responsabilità limitata, there were other corporate forms which 
had been designed to fulfill more or less the same objectives. This was the case of the joint stock company by 
shares (società anonima per quote), which was totally ignored and useless. Consequently, it was abolished in 
1942 by the reform of the Italian Civil Code. The new Code also introduced two other new forms of corporation: 
the unlimited liability cooperative (cooperative a responsabilità ilimitata) and the limited liability cooperative 
(cooperative a responsabilità limitata). It is noteworthy that, although these new corporation forms were created, 
the fact that the joint stock company in its different forms was not given in Italy the same importance as in other 
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(GRANDI), presented in 1942-XX for the approval of the text of the Civil Code,205 it was 
submitted that the adoption of a new type of business association was meant to legally frame 
business associations likely to substitute the small joint stock company. The new type of 
company was not, however, created solely for this purpose. It could be used by bigger firms – 
as no maximum threshold for the share capital was established - whenever its members 
wanted to limit their responsibility and to assure that member’s activities were more closely 
linked to the business object of the company. It was also expected with this new form that 
relationships between members and between them and third parties would be driven by trust 
(fiducia) and not only determined by the amount of shares they held in the company’s share 
capital and their level of responsibility in the company. The private company in Italy was 
designed to be an ‘elastic’ concern, which could be formed by a large or small number of 
members, with a big or small amount of share capital, with manager-shareholders or, in case 
this was provided by the articles, a ‘union membership’ (collegio sindicale).206 Its main 
features were the limited liability and the division of the share capital into quote.207 
(Nevertheless, these features are not distinctive of the Italian case). 
 
ii. The default principle of free transferability of quote and the openness of the legislation 
to private autonomy in Fascist Italy 
 
The two Italian projects of the Code of Commerce of 1921 and 1925 respectively 
provided default rules establishing pre-emption rights to non-transferring shareholders in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Western capitalist countries such as the United Kingdom shows how Italian capitalism was less mature at this 
time. On this point, see Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko, Producing Culture and Capital: Family Firms in Italy, 
Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 27. 
205 Relazione alla Maestà del re Imperatore del Ministro Guardasigilli (GRANDI) presentata nell’udienza del 16 
Marzo 1942-XX per l’approvazione del testo del ‘Codice Civile’. 
206 In the Italian società a responsabilità limitata this governing body was mandatory when their share capital 
reached or was over L. 1,000,000 (one million lire). Its function was to supervise the board of directors. The 
collegio sindicale would be formed by three or five effective members, who could also be appointed among 
shareholders. See, in this context, Toso, Agostino, La Società a Responsabilità Limitata: Disciplina Legale, 
parte prima, 2.ª ed., Superstampa, Roma, 1943 (providing an overall account of the legal framework of the newly 
created corporation). 
207 The Italian limited liability company (società a responsabilità limitata) has been defined as ‘…quella in 
cui… per le obbligazzioni sociali risponde soltanto la società con il suo patrimonio, ed in cui, a differenza della 
precedente, le quote di partecipazione dei soci non possono essere rappresentate da titoli azionari, la loro 
proprietà risultando unicamente dall’atto costitutivo e dal libro dei soci’.) (‘… one in which … only the 
company’s assets are responsible for corporate debts, and in which, unlike in the previous [type of company], the 
shares of the members cannot be represented by certificates, their property resulting solely from the company’s 
articles of association and shareholders’ register’). 
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transfer.208 This was considered an intermediary measure between the German and Austrian 
laws - which established the principle of free transferability of shares, unless the articles of 
association provided otherwise – and French law requiring the consent of a majority of 
members for transfer of shares to third parties.209  
The project of the Civil Code of 1942 set as a goal the assignment of as much 
‘elasticity’ as possible to the new business form. As a result, the legislation considered 
inadequate the requirement of consent or an intermediary measure. The governance strategy 
of the company - including the terms by which shares could be transferred and the company’s 
ownership altered - should be provided by the articles of association (atto costitutivo). Only if 
nothing was established by the articles, rules provided by legislation on this subject would be 
applied. Accordingly, the legislation gave members an opportunity to opt-out from the legal 
system by providing a default rule (currently, Article 2469 of the Italian Civil Code) 
establishing the free transferability of quote. However, the Civil Code also sanctioned 
(currently, in Article 2470) that the transfer of quote only would have an effect vis-a-vis the 
company from the moment of its register into the register of members. It appeared to be a 
form to offset the free transferability of shares. It also generated problems of interpretation 
regarding the effectiveness of the transfer if it was not registered in the register of members 
despite being valid between the parties.210 It was submitted, though, that directors or 
managers of the company could not unreasonably refuse the register of the transfer without 
incurring serious liability towards the damaged party as a result of the omission.211 Article 
2470 was altered by Decree Law 29 November 2008, n. 185 and converted with amendments 
into Law 28 January 2009, n. 2. At this point, it provides that the transfer only has effects 
toward the company if the respective share sale and purchase agreement, with authenticated 
signature, were to be filed by the authenticating notary at the office of the Companies 
                                                             
208 See Commissione Reale per la Riforma dei Codici, Sottocommissione B, Codice di Commercio, vol. I, 
Progetto, Roma, Provveditorato Generale dello Stato, Libreria, 1925, p. 62 (Article 149 foresaw that ‘Salvo 
disposizioni contrarie dell’atto costitutivo, le quote sono trasferibili mediante atto publico, com diritto di 
preferenza, a parità di condizioni, a favore degli altri socii’. (Unless established otherwise in the articles of 
association, shares are transferable according to a public deed, pre-emption rights and conditions established in 
favor of the other members) This article also provided that ‘Il trasferimento delle quote ha effetto di fronte alla 
società dal momento dell’iscrizione nel libro dei soci ed è soggetto all’iscrizione nel registro del commercio…’) 
(The transfer of shares has effects on the company from the moment it is registered in the shareholders’ register 
and it is registered in the commercial registry). 
209 French legislation, as it is treated above, created the societé a responsabilité limiteé or SARL in 1925. 
Currently, German and Austrian laws require that the transfer be formalized by a notary public. In Italy the 
transfer had to be formalized through notary public until 2008, when the respective law was altered. As of that 
date transfers must be entered into by a private document to which a digital signature must be introduced. It has, 
then, to be deposited with the Commercial Registry. Additionally, the transfer must be registered in the members 
register. 
210 Such problems still happen today. See, for example, Cassazione Civile Sez. I, 23-1-97, n.º 697. 
211 See Toso, Agostino, cit., pp. 38-39 (referring to the transfer of shares). 
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Registry in which jurisdiction the registered office of the company is established. The 
reference to the register of the transfer into the register of members as a condition of 
effectiveness towards the company has been excluded. 
Unlike the partnership, the legislature did not put obstacles to quote of Italian PLLCs 
being subject to enforcement by creditors.212 This situation would be relatively easy if 
members adopted in their articles the principle of free transferability. This, however, would 
not be so easy if restrictions were established. In these circumstances, if creditors, the 
transferor/debtor and the corporation reached an agreement, all difficulties would be 
surpassed. If no agreement was reached, however, interests would have to be weighted – the 
interests of the creditor in the sale, and the interests of the company, which had demonstrated 
at the outset by including in the articles restrictions on the transferability that it would not 
want to let a third party in the company. Despite this fact, it is rather interesting that Italian 
legislators opted for enhancing members’ private autonomy, which is reflected in their wide 
freedom to contract the clauses of the company’s articles, when law at the point of its 
enactment was explicitly attributed a moralist and educational instrumental role in pursuing 
the fundamental values of the fascist state.213  
 
II. Actors 
 
i. The Italian SrL: how the ownership and governance structures fit a mold primarily 
based on private ordering 
 
A close analysis of transfer clauses of the articles of association and related documents 
of 35 Italian PLLCs incorporated as of 1946 to 2009 shows that, similar to the Portuguese 
case, members of these corporations preferred to introduce restrictions on transfer of shares 
despite that, in principle, shares could be freely sold. This is both understandable and 
surprising. On one hand, these corporations are smaller in size, and their members are bound 
by personal ties. So, it is understandable that they would wish to keep the company as it is: 
closed. On the other hand, this clearly contradicts the Italian legislature’s venture, markedly 
                                                             
212 I am not referring to the cases of bankruptcy of the company since the principle of limited liability prevailed 
in these companies. 
213 See Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko, cit., pp. 49-50 (noting that one of the legacies of Mussolini’s fascist 
government was the transformation of the Chamber of Commerce – Camara di Commercio – from a civic 
association to a state agency in order to promote and regulate commerce. The commitment of the state to steer 
the physical and mental health of the Italian population is on the same footing as its efforts to promote commerce 
and industry by increasing regulation and surveillance). 
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capitalist and liberal. One of its goals was to attract foreign investment to Italy. To that end, it 
altered the commercial legislation and created a new form of corporation.214 
The 35-item events sample was collected from the Bollettino Ufficiale delle Società per 
Azioni e delle Società a Responsabilità Limitata published between 1956 and 1996.215 This 
sample was complemented by another sample of companies collected from Bureau van Dijk’s 
database Aida provided by the Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi. To define my research 
strategy on this database, I selected 9 variables. Similar to my selection of companies in 
France, I chose variables within the number of variables provided by the database and in 
accordance with the elements I deemed necessary to answer my main research question and 
Table 1 sub-research questions.216 First, I chose the variable stato giuridico: attiva. The 
outcome was 919,033 results. Then, I selected the variable forma giuridica: SrL. I obtained 
665,891 events. The third variable I selected was data di costituzione: nel e dopo l’anno 1970 
fino a ed incluso l’anno 2012. The sample of events was reduced to 651,624 events. As a 
fourth variable, I chose Regione, provincial, commune: Firenze. The research produced 
13,136 results. The fifth variable was Descrizione dell’attività … (“prod*”, 
“abbigliamento*”, “bevande*”, “farmacia*”). The outcome was 4,134 events. The sixth 
                                                             
214 See Commissione Reale per la Riforma dei Codici, Sottocommissione B, Codice di Commercio, vol. II, 
Relazione sul progetto a cura del Presidente D’Amelio, Dei Commissari: Arcangeli – Asquini, Bolaffio, Bonelli, 
Jannitti A. e del Secretario Frè, p. 65. 
215 This official gazette is available at the National Central Library in Florence. However, only volumes from 
1958 to 1996 are available for consultation. This publication stopped being published in 1997. Therefore, I have 
selected companies whose articles were published in the Official Gazette during the decade of 1958-1968 in 
order to make a historical account based on information dated as close as possible to the date of these 
companies’ implementation in Italy - 1942. Some of the articles published are dated before 1958. They were, 
however, subsequently published.  
It is worth pointing out that the Bolletino Ufficiale delle Società per Azioni e a Responsabilità Limitata 
(BUSARL) is also held by the Camera di Commercio di Firenze. The BUSARL was adopted in the end of the 
nineteenth century. It contained the transcripts of incorporation, amendments and liquidation of companies of 
capital and cooperative companies throughout Italy. It was drawn up in files with an annual index, but the copies 
held by the Chamber of Commerce of Florence date as late as 1930s. In the mid- sixties, due to the exponential 
growth of joint-stock companies in Italy, it was decided by the competent ministry to separate the BUSARL into 
regional files, and entrust the preparation and publication to the Chamber of Commerce of the regional capital. 
Since that time, the chamber of Commerce of Florence has retained only the files within its regional jurisdiction. 
That is, it has keep files only regarding companies in Tuscany. As far as it was possible to learn, two libraries 
alone in Italy have kept until a few years ago the series of unique national BUSARL. These libraries were the 
Biblioteca del Senato della Reppublica (Library of the Senate of the Republic) in Rome and the library of the 
Camera di Commercio di Firenze. Yet, it is possible that the Commerce Chambers of the Regional Capitals have 
maintained the respective BUSARL. I was informed that it appears that the Library of the Senate dismissed its 
own publication three years ago. Thus, the Chamber of Commerce of Florence remains, at this moment, the only 
Chamber in the whole country to have BUSARL almost complete (including companies with registered office in 
Tuscany and other Italian regions). In the mid-nineties the Chamber of Commerce of Florence ceased the print 
publication of the the series of bulletins because data started to be available online. At the time that this research 
was being undertaken, in August 2013, the headquarters of the Chamber of Commerce of Florence where the 
library is located was being restructured. As a consequence of the project, the library of the chamber was closed 
and the materials were sent to a special deposit in Valdarno. Hence, those materials could only be analyzed after 
the restructuration work was completed.  
216 See Part I, Chapter 1. 
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variable I singled out was Indice di Indipendenza BvD: A+, A, A-, B +, B, B-, C+, C, D, U. 
This variable took into account all shareholder with a stake greater than 25% who were 
individuals. The seventh variable was Esponenti: Carica which included the board of 
directors, the CEO or managing director, situations in which there was a proxy of some kind, 
advisory board and committee. The results drop to 1,678. The seventh variable I chose was 
Ricavi delle vendite: tutte le società con un valore conosciuto ultimo anno disponibile. There 
was no alteration in numbers and it still yielded 1,678 results. Then, to streamline the strategy 
a bit more, I selected the eighth variable Dipendenti: tutte le società con un valore conosciuto 
ultimo anno disponibile. The research gave forth a total number of 1,667 events. Out of this 
number, I targeted 10 companies which I added to the remaining companies collected from 
Bollettino Ufficiale delle Società per Azioni e delle Società a Responsabilità Limitata. The 
articles of association of the companies tracked in Aida were made available by the Camera di 
Commercio di Firenze.  
The sample of Italian companies is indicative rather than representative. It does not spell 
out specific information regarding the dynamics of the company because, in most cases, it 
was not available.217 Nonetheless, by screening some of the certificates of incorporation of 
these companies it was curious to discover that specific relevant acts for the life of the 
company such as its dissolution would only be registered three decades thereafter.218 I 
scrutinized the articles of association (atti costitutivi) in the sample to understand if transfer 
clauses varied according to each company’s ownership and governance structures. I did not 
find a consistent variation. Most companies’ articles foresaw restrictions on transfers 
regardless of the nominal value of the shares held by the shareholders or the profile of the 
management. However, the companies whose articles of association established free 
transferability of shares had in common a high number of directors or managers and 
considerable share capital. In one of the companies the board of directors might be composed 
of up to 7 members. Furthermore, the board could appoint a technical committee which might 
have up to 14 elements.219 This hints at the notion that private companies, in practical terms, 
                                                             
217
 See Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko, cit., p. 50 and pp. 51-53 (recalling the stories of Italian firms, she collected bit 
by bit ‘Stories the State can Tell’. She also reports that there were systematic omissions in the information 
provided. These exclusions were mainly related to the involvement of relatives and non-relatives as partners and 
investors in the firm. She treats these omissions as systematic exclusions, the reason for which she ignores).  
218 This was the case of the company Astuccifio Cadorino Di A. Fanton & C. – SrL, with registered office in 
Calalzo di Cadore. This company was incorporated in 1947. It was dissolved in 1957. This fact only was 
communicated to the Commercial Registry of Belluno in 1993. 
219 I am referring in the text to the company Svemar – Società di Studi e Iniziative per lo Sviluppo Economico 
delle Marche – Società a r.l. This company was incorporated in 1960 and dissolved in 1970. Its registered office 
was in Rome. 
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were similar to public companies in that they would not impose such restrictions. Still, other 
companies’ articles foresaw the free transferability of shares when the number of board 
members was not high. Other circumstances in which shares could be freely transferred 
implied reference by the articles of association to the default rule. 
Database Aida also provided a BVD independence indicator, which I analyzed with 
respect to the 10 companies I selected on this database. All but two of these companies 
revealed a high level of dependence on their shareholders, which reportedly have a recorded 
direct ownership of over 50%. The articles of association do not deviate from this line. 
Despite attributing wide powers of direction and representation to managers or directors, they 
ensure that the supervision of the management is in the hands of the shareholders through 
their resolutions at general meetings and a supervisory board - the collegio sindicale. This 
picture is manifestly different in the United Kingdom, as we shall see below. Additionally, 
some of these companies, but not all of them, were indicated in Aida to be very large 
companies. This suggests that in a country where the motto ‘small is beautiful’ is taken 
seriously,220 Italian PLLCs are not necessarily small in terms of earnings, number of 
employees, and the respective corporate group. 
It is worth mentioning that the period between 1950 and 1970, in which part of the 
companies in my sample were incorporated, was one of great economic development in Italy. 
These two decades have been considered the ‘golden age’ or ‘miracle years’. This period is 
comparable to the Wirtschaftswunder in Germany and to the Trente Glorieuses in France.221 
Moreover, during this period, most small competitive firms, operating in the textile, clothing 
and consumer goods industries, in general were incorporated in North and Central Italy. This 
justifies the collection of articles within this timeframe and the selection of companies whose 
registered offices were geographically located in these regions. 
                                                             
220 Italy is known for its luxury goods and family owned firms such as Gucci, Salvatore Ferragamo, Benetton, 
and Fiat to name a few. All of them started as small businesses which grew bigger due to the art of designing and 
craftsmanship conveyed by older to younger generations of entrepreneurs. 
221 See Castagnoli, Adriana, ‘Piccoli e Grandi Imprenditori’, in Cardini, Antonio (ed.), Il Miracolo Italiano 
(1958-1963), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006, pp. 69-85 (84) (claiming that ‘…fu la miriade di imprenditori a capo di 
piccole e medie imprese che contribuì diffusamente alla crescita del paese. E l’attuale capitalismo italiano, di cui 
sono emblema le medie aziende, a proprietà e controllo familiare, divenute talora leader mondiali in alcuni 
prodotti altamente specializzatti e in particolari, importanti segmenti produttivi, ha tratto per molti aspetti origine 
e linfa dall’universo impreditoriale del miracolo’) (‘it has been the number of entrepreneurs at the head of small 
and business enterprises that has widely contributed to the growth of the country. And the current Italian 
capitalism, whose midsized businesses of property and family control are emblematic and which have become 
world leaders in some highly specialized products and in particular production segments, has been created and 
nourished in the universe of entrepreneurship of the miracle’). Also see Cohen, Jon, and Federico, Giovanni, The 
Growth of the Italian Economy 1820-1960, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; and Battilani, 
Patrizia, and Fauri, Francesca, Mezzo Secolo di Economia Italiana 1945-2008, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008. 
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Most articles of association of the companies selected provided restrictions on transfer 
of shares. Those restrictions consisted of clauses requiring the consent of other shareholders 
to the transfer (clausole di gradimento), clauses granting shareholders pre-emption rights or 
rights of first refusal in the transfer (clausole di prelazione), clauses prohibiting the pledge of 
shares and their usufruct (clausole impeditive e limitative del pegno e che limitano il 
godimento), and in limine clauses absolutely prohibiting any kind of transfer (clausole di 
intrasferibilità assoluta).222 In some cases and similar to the articles of association of Spanish 
companies as it will be apparent below, the requirement of consent incorporated the exercise 
of pre-emption rights. In other words, obtaining consent to a transfer would depend on a 
choice of other non-transferring shareholders to exercise their pre-emption rights or not. 
Additionally, I created a sample of 16 contentious disputes regarding transfer of shares 
of PLLCs adjudicated by Italian courts between 1988 and 2011. These cases were collected 
from the Italian database De Jure. They suggest that the introduction of restrictions on 
transfers in the companies’ articles of association continues today.  
 
III. Market 
 
i. Bargaining failures in the middle of a back-and-forth movement towards regeneration 
and preservation of the status quo in the company 
 
The case law selected can essentially be divided into (i) an interpretation cluster and (ii) 
an un-consented transfer of shares cluster. Court decisions show that shareholders seem not to 
understand or want to abide by the rules they have introduced in the articles of the company. 
At a certain moment in time, these rules seem not to operate according to their expectations. 
As in the Portuguese and French cases, this too leaves in doubt the effects of un-consented 
transfers and shareholders’ property rights.223 This state of affairs begs two questions. First, 
                                                             
222 See Alberti, Alberto Maffei, Commentario Breve al Diritto delle Società, 2.ª ed., Padova, CEDAM, 2011, pp. 
1191-1195; and Giovagnoli, Roberto, Codice Civile: Annotato con la Jurisprudenza, Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 
2010, pp. 3301-3303 (providing an account of the type and nature of restrictions introduced in the articles of the 
società a responsabilità limitata). 
223 See Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko, cit., p. 141 (reporting the frequent process of sloughing off of relatives as a 
form of betrayal and consolidation of the ownership and control of the company in the hands of lineal 
descendants of the owner. She describes this phenomenon in the context of the conflicts and struggles among 
subcontractors. However, she equates these conflicts with negotiations and struggles over ownership and control, 
concentration and dispersion of capital involving members of family companies in the upper echelon of Como’s 
bourgeoisie. The focus of the struggles, however, is different. Whilst as to subcontractors - the lower portions of 
the bourgeoisie - conflicts refer to the control of technical knowledge and labour, in the upper-echelon firms of 
Como’s bourgeoisie focus is put on the accumulation and dispersion of financial capital. I reckon that often these 
situations are neither public, nor do they turn into contentious disputes adjudicated by the courts. They are settled 
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why is it that shareholders feel the need to introduce restrictions on transfers at the outset? 
Second, how much autonomy do shareholders really need?  
Yanagisako in her anthropological study about family firms in Italy submits that in the 
early years of a firm’s development, sentiments of trust and solidarity made possible the 
pooling of labor, greater flexibility in its organization and the deferral of compensation which, 
therefore, enhanced a firm’s competitiveness. Conversely, as the firm and its legal structure 
matured and members from the second generation were recruited, limits to firm growth came 
to be viewed with distrust and suspicion. These sentiments provoked antithetical movements 
such as the division of the firm, the diffusion of technology, and the destruction of families. 
Yanagisako, interestingly, presents trust and betrayal as inherent aspects of the struggle over 
production and of the power to exclude others from a company. Moreover, this seemed to fuel 
the creation of new companies by members who had left. Trust and betrayal are seen by her as 
forms of regenerating family capitalism.224 Although based on an anthropological view of the 
family firm, this argument may provide a clue as to how much autonomy shareholders need. 
This regenerating effect could indicate that the existence of no restrictions on transfers 
represents a better alternative.225 The argument, however, that betrayal and trust drove 
production and reproduction in Italian family capitalism, although intriguing and possibly 
true, does not explain why restrictions on transfer of shares were and still are introduced in the 
Italian società a responsabilità limitata. 
First, although many companies in my sample were family companies, not all of them 
were family companies. Second, capital contributions could be in kind or consist of the supply 
of specialized work by the shareholder. For someone who has lived in Italy and is acquainted 
with the saying piccolo è bello, this is easy to understand. Also, the management was 
frequently attributed to shareholders. Hence, imposing restrictions would work as a form to 
preserve human capital. Third, self-financing may be one of the answers explaining the need 
members have to impose restrictions on transfers at an early stage of the company. This may 
not be the case once they have steadily established their business in the market, and their 
ownership rights are well defined. Then, it is understandable that shareholders might want to 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
privately, and defeated parties in family wars grieve in silence their loss of property and control. Going to court 
would mean breaking apart the family venture). 
224 See Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko, cit., pp. 114-115 and 143-144. Also see James, Harold, Family Capitalism: 
Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental European Model, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. 
225 This idea of a regenerating system is explored throughout the dissertation, in particular in Part III. 
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plan other forms of outsourcing their financial needs and the company’s development.226227 
The point in question is how the credit system and schemes of corporate finance within the 
context of a country adopting liberal economic measures, but with a civil society tending to 
promote the ‘insiders’ rather than the ‘outsiders’, influence the way members of the società a 
responsabilità limitata transferred their shares and altered the ownership structure of their 
company. While analyzing the articles of these business associations (atto costitutivo) and the 
companies’ by laws (statuti) presented to the notary public for the incorporation of the 
company, and subsequently published in the Official Gazette (Bolletino Ufficiale) or 
deposited at the Court of Florence (Cancelleria del Tribunale di Firenze), I often found 
receipts or proofs of payment of the initial share capital.228 These were additionally published 
together with a Decree (Decreto) showing the order of the court (normally with jurisdiction 
over the city where the company had been incorporated) determining the articles be 
published.229 From the analysis of these documents it was not possible to learn the source of 
finance of the start-up company. I assume that most of them were self-financed. However, this 
assumption and its relationship with the introduction of restrictions in the articles have yet to 
be tested.230 Fourth, the reason for restrictions on transfers may be found in the diffusion of 
technical knowledge of lawyers. Often, as in the Portuguese and French cases, transfer clauses 
introduced in the articles of association were structured in the same way and featured a similar 
wording.  
 
                                                             
226 See the United Kingdom case below and the practices surrounding the issue of preference shares and 
debentures by private companies. Additionally, see Jefferys, James B., Business Organisation in Great Britain 
1856-1914, New York, Arno Press, 1977, pp. 213-292 (referring to the issue of preference shares, the use of 
debentures by public and, in particular, private companies, to raise capital, and founder shares. Many of these 
practices were not regulated, at least not until 1907). Also see The Economist, Italian Business, ‘Brave the 
World: Backs to the Wall, Italian Companies are Turning to the Markets’, 4 January 2014 available at URL: 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21592657-backs-wall-italian-companies-are-turning-markets-brave-
old-world (accessed on 24 April 2014) (recently reporting that 
‘Old-style family businesses dealt with local banks and thought in terms of doing business within their region. 
Now entrepreneurs think more globally from the start. Their age and vision leads to their interest in accessing 
capital markets and their ability to do so’). 
227 I am referring to the period of the ‘golden age’ or the ‘miracle years’ with reference to which the sample of 
articles of association was created. On this see Castagnoli, Adriana, cit., p. 83 (noting that the Italian credit 
system was historically extremely politicized and rested on an extensive and closed network of local, social, and 
political relationships. Those closer to the political party of the government and well connected in the Catholic 
world were more likely to move upwards in Italian society. In her opinion, this helps to explain that the spread of 
small and medium-size enterprises has remained a long-standing pattern of the development of Italy). 
228 Most likely, the company would only be registered if the promoters showed that the share capital had been 
paid up. 
229 Other times, only information as to the deposit of the articles with the court and their register with the 
Companies Registry was provided. 
230 A possible assumption is that founders could have borrowed the money. An interesting point to explore is 
whether creditors would prefer to lend money to the individuals or directly to the company. 
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1.4 SPAIN 
 
I. State 
 
i. The creation of the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada: from outlaw enterprise to 
legal business association boosted by jurisprudence, notarial practice, and the political 
values of franquismo 
 
Spanish legislation took even longer than its Italian counterpart to create a legal 
framework for the PLLC – the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada. A Bill on the Legal 
Regime of Private Limited Liability Companies (Proyecto de Ley sobre él Régimen Juridico 
de las Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada) (the ‘Bill’) was published in 1952.231 As it is 
mentioned therein, the PLLC had been to that point entirely subject to private autonomy. The 
adoption of the Law 17 July 1951 regulating publicly held companies was an incentive for the 
creation of the legal regime of the PLLC which had been demanded by the business 
community and scholars for some time.  
The abandonment of the PLLC by the Spanish legislature devoted this business 
association to the uncertainty of its nature and character and, therefore, to the uncertainty of 
the legal regime applicable. The adjudication of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) and 
the work of notaries based on the dictates of the Directorate General of Registries (Dirección 
General de los Registros) developed the PLLC from the bottom to variant degrees.232 I 
analyzed documents issued by notary publics and articles of association of private companies 
incorporated in Madrid between 1871 and 1887, long before the PLLC would be formally 
adopted in Spain almost one century later. These documents were provided by the Archivo 
Historico de Protocolos de Madrid. Clearly, notaries played an important role in defining the 
legal nature of these companies. Their legal form was different then, but their nature was that 
of private companies with limitation of responsibility of their members. Nevertheless, because 
there existed at that time no legal form to fit private firms in Spain, the jurisprudence and 
notaries were often compelled to apply the rules of public limited companies and partnerships. 
This echoes the French case. Even upon their incorporation, PLLCs were often designed as 
                                                             
231 See Boletin Oficial de las Cortes Españolas, 29 de Diciembre de 1952, n.º 415, p. 7796. 
232 I tabulated information contained in five deeds of incorporations of private companies in the ‘community of 
Madrid’ as of 1871 to 1887, that is, before the LSRL was adopted in 1953. Notaries played an important role in 
defining the legal nature of these companies. They were different, but their nature was that of private companies 
with limitation of responsibility of their members to variant degrees. 
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public limited companies, partnerships with limitation of responsibility, or as a combination 
of different legal forms. All of them were ill-fitting. Despite their dexterity, lawyers, 
jurisprudence and notaries were regulating in the dark. The adoption of the legal regime of the 
PLLC was meant to plug up a hole. The legislative process was triggered by the 
implementation of a legal framework for publicly held companies with the Law of 17 July 
1951.233 
According to the Bill, the conception of the PLLC should be based on principles of 
great elasticity to allow their members to bargain as much as they wanted or needed to, 
provided that that would not violate the basic principles of the new corporate form. Spanish 
legislators were not so interested in getting drawn into the discussion frequently dividing legal 
scholarship regarding whether the PLLC was a personalistic or capital company. While 
defining the PLLC’s legal form, these legislators were driven by principles of greater 
flexibility than those in which the publicly held company was laying down. It was intended to 
introduce into Spanish law a new corporate form that, on one hand, limited the responsibility 
of its members and, on the other hand, was an efficient tool which small and medium 
enterprises could easily use without having necessarily to choose an ill-fitting form.  
The PLLC was created in 1953 with the Law of 17 Julio 1953.234 However, the riddle is: 
What took Spain so long? Susana Martínez-Rodríguez explains that the Srl had been used 
successfully since 1919, due to the passage of the Regulation of the Commercial Registry 
determining the registration of these companies. This success might have been related to the 
post-World War I economic boom. She also submits that the lack of regulation of the Srl in 
Spain, a country with a strong civil law tradition, was exceptional. She finds the explanation 
for this in the Spanish Commercial Code of 1885 which despite providing for three types of 
business associations – the partnership, the limited partnership and the corporation – allowed 
members to create forms that suited them best. She argues that this ‘odd’ behavior created a 
platform for legal innovation through practice and experience similar to what happens in 
countries with common law.235 In other words, she bases the development of the Srl upon a 
principle of numerus apertus which led lawyers and other stakeholders to create the Srl. My 
research shows, however, that this phenomenon is not exclusive to Spain. Even in France, 
                                                             
233 For an excursion into the historical development of the Srl in Spain see Martínez-Rodríguez, Susana, ‘¿Sin 
Ley y Dentro de la Legalidad?, DT-AEHE N.º 1304, Asociación Española de História Económica, March 2013. 
Before Susana published this article, which she sent to me directly, I had the opportunity to discuss with her my 
views on my topic, including the Spanish case.  
234 As it will become apparent below, this law was altered by two major pieces of legislation: Law 2/1995, 23 
March, and the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010, 2 July, which approves the consolidated legal regime of 
Spanish companies of capital (Ley de Sociedades de Capital). 
235 See Martínez-Rodríguez, Susana, ‘¿Sin Ley y Dentro de la Legalidad?. 
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where Martínez-Rodríguez says the Commercial Code adopted a principle of numerus clausus 
of business associations, lawyers, jurisprudence and notaries bypassed legal loopholes and 
helped create the PLLC from below. The fact that Martínez-Rodríguez does not evaluate the 
Srl from a contractual perspective and that she makes no reference to manifestations of 
political and economic path-dependence may explain why she does not go as far as explaining 
why the law by itself was not enough to consolidate the new business form for almost an 
entire century. 
In my view, for the Spanish legislator, creating a law for the PLLC was a question of 
timing. After the Law of 17 Julio 1951, a reform of the legal regime of public companies was 
implemented, and adopting a legal framework for the PLLC appeared the right thing to do. In 
terms of context, the analysis of several documents, namely regulations (circulares), issued by 
the Ministry of Industry (Ministerio de Indústria) and the General Directorate of Industry 
(Direcção Geral de Indústria) between 1942 and 1958 showed that the number of requests for 
the creation of new industries (nuevas empresas) increased dramatically. Matters discussed in 
these letters, regulations and documents, in general, were especially administrative in nature. 
Despite having not been possible to relate this with the adoption or increase of limited liability 
companies in Spain, it was still possible to learn that often requests for the authorization to 
create new industries were denied by the General Directorate of Industry. Several arguments 
were presented to justify the denials. One was that there were too many family firms in the 
country. Considering that in these companies regulations, especially those pertaining to labor, 
administration and taxes were easily breached, the government decided that an overload of 
family companies would create a true economic disequilibrium. It was submitted that the 
reduction of the industry to small firms would render them invisible to the public eye and thus 
to surveillance of their legal compliance as well as of their syndical and social obligations.236 I 
discovered that not infrequently, a request for the creation of a new industry would encounter 
massive opposition from private interests, such as those of other entrepreneurs running similar 
businesses. This opposition was also evident when stakeholders were members or wanted to 
become members of national or provincial syndicates.237 Members of these syndicates were 
also entrepreneurs operating in the same industries, and they erected all manner of obstacles 
to competition. This was, therefore, a scenario wherein creating a scheme favoring the 
                                                             
236 This information was collected from the Archivo General de la Administración, by analysing records of the 
High Council of Industry (Consejo Superior de Industria), box 71/6324. 
237 Syndicates were essential organisms in the economic organization of the state which should have objective 
information to help the state to decide. It seems that neither the Industrial Delegations nor the Dirección Geral 
were fully fledged independent organisms. 
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incorporation of more firms was generally out of the picture.238 The analysis of documents 
collected at the Archivo General de la Administración suggests that there was an expansion of 
national industries, at least in the decade of the 1950s. This augment of new firms would 
likely put at stake the position of older firms, which, without competition, benefited from a 
situation of monopoly on the supply side. 
The PLLC was mentioned for the first time in Article 108 of the Commercial Registry 
Regulation (Reglamento del Registro Mercantil) adopted on 20 September 1919. It was then 
referred to in the Profit Contribution Act (Ley sobre Contribución de Utilidades) of 19 April 
1920. At this point, the admissibility of this kind of company as well as its legality was being 
debated. Those advocating its lawfulness based their arguments on the predicaments of Article 
122 of the Code of Commerce of 1885, which established a principle of freedom of types and 
forms of companies. Those against it, including the Academy of Legislation and 
Jurisprudence of Barcelona (Academia de Legislación y Jurisprudencia de Barcelona) which 
dedicated a closed session to the topic in 1905, maintained that the absence of a legal 
framework rendered dangerous the constitution of the PLLC. Back in 1909 the Chambers of 
Commerce (Cámaras de Comercio) asked the government in a meeting taking place in 
Valencia to cover the legislative gap and provide for a regime for the PLLC. In 1914 the 
Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence of Barcelona drafted the basis for a bill. In 1918 
the Minister of Justice, Roig y Bergadá, developed a bill on the PLLC which was disregarded 
due to a political crisis in the government. In 1926 the Bill on the Code of Commerce 
provided rules regulating the PLLC, but they were withdrawn.239 
In sum, the Bill was created to fill in an obvious legal hole to which the state was 
indifferent for more than fifty years. There is in the speech of the Ministry of justice delivered 
to the Justice Commission in which he presented the Bill a manifest intention to associate the 
program of economic development of the Francoist Movement to the law.240 It is reminiscent 
of the Italian case. In fact, corporate legal forms were adapted to the social and economic 
realities at the time. Looking back at the evolution of business associations in Spain, the 
Minister conveyed the following information. Partnerships were being created in increasingly 
fewer numbers. The tendency was to create forms that limited the responsibility of members. 
Between 1947 and 1951, 1,237 partnerships had been created with a total share capital of 
691.2 million pesetas, against 3,521 PLLCs with a total share capital of 1,200 pesetas, and 
                                                             
238
 This information was collected from the Archivo General de la Administración, box 71/6324. 
239 See Boletin Oficial de las Cortes Españolas, Sesión del dia 13 de Julio de 1953, No. 434 p. 8156. 
240 See Boletin Oficial de las Cortes Españolas, Sesión del dia 13 de Julio de 1953, No. 434 p. 8162.  
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3,880 public companies with a total share capital of 12,049 million pesetas. Small and 
medium enterprises tended to adopt the form of the PLLC. In the words of the Minister, 
approving this Bill would promote the principle of legal certainty, as it was proclaimed in the 
Fuero de los Españoles (art. 17)241, and the principle of justice as an informing principle of 
the Spanish system of law. Like the Italian context, which has been historically the stage for 
corporativism and fascism, it is interesting to see that in Spain legislators opted for a legal 
regime based on private autonomy and great flexibility of legal solutions for the PLLC, even 
if in a political context of dictatorship.242    
The Spanish PLLC was built by jurisprudence, but mostly by notaries. Again, law came 
afterward, as a byproduct. I am, thus, interested in the eclectic nature of the PLLC, which can 
be grasped by the clauses of their articles of association. These were the concrete sources of 
inspiration for the legal solutions, despite the political values informing the reform. I have 
collected a sample of fifty-five articles of association which have been selected from a 
number of articles that were sent to me by the Commercial Registry of Madrid.243 Articles 
were also collected from the Archivo Regional de Madrid. In both cases, I have requested 
articles of association which had been adopted not only under the Law of 17 July 1953, but 
also under the subsequent Law 2/1995, 23 March, and the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010, 2 
July. A scrutiny of the articles in this sample suggests that most articles of association display 
restrictions on transfer of shares. Moreover, they are drafted in a very similar way. As we shall 
see in more detail below, this fact has distinct similarities with the Portuguese, French and 
Italian cases.  
 
 
                                                             
241 See Boletin Oficial del Estado, No. 199, 18 July, 1945, pp. 358-360. This law guaranteed fundamental 
freedoms to the Spanish people. Nevertheless, it was seen by many as a political cloak with which to hide the 
true intentions of the regime. 
242 In this sense it is relevant to read article 16 of the Fuero de los Españoles. It establishes that ‘Los españoles 
podrán reunirse y asociarse libremente para fines lícitos y de acuerdo con lo establecido por las Leyes. El Estado 
podrá crear y mantener las organizaciones que estime necesarias para el cumplimiento de sus fines. Las normas 
fundacionales, que revestirán forma de Ley, coordinarán el ejercicio de este derecho con el reconocido en el 
párrafo anterior’. 
(‘The Spanish people may freely assemble and associate for lawful purposes and in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. The State may establish and maintain organizations that it considers necessary for the 
fulfillment of its purposes. The ground rules, which will take the form of law, coordinate the exercise of this 
right recognized in the previous paragraph’). 
243 I thank Don Manuel Casero and his assistant Alicia Martin for having met with me at the Commercial 
Registry of Madrid in May 2012, and for having sent to me articles of association of sociedades de 
responsabilidad limitada, which otherwise would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. 
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ii. The PLLC out of the dark: Flashbacks from the legal regime of transfer of shares and 
its reforms 
 
Article 20 of the Bill established a preemption right in favor of the non-transferring 
members and the company. The transfer of shares was viewed as dualistic in nature – 
individual and collective. That is to say, it affected not only the individual sphere of the 
transferor, but also affected the company and non-transferring members. There was the overall 
understanding, which was disclosed by the Ministry of Justice in his communication, that 
there were two extreme positions incompatible with the legal nature of the PLLC. One was 
absolute prohibition. The other was free transmissibility without any restrictions. The first 
position coincided with the model of the partnership. The second position was that of the 
publicly held company. Spanish legislators adopted an in-between position. This becomes 
apparent in a review of the relevant legal provisions on this matter.  
Article 20 of the Law of 17 Julio 1953, pretty similar to its version in the bill, foresaw 
pre-emption rights for shareholders and for the company if shareholders did not wish to 
exercise them. In particular, the first paragraph of the article provided that shareholders 
wishing to transfer their shares to a person foreign to the company should inform in writing 
the members of the Board of Directors so that, within the deadline determined by the law, 
they could inform other shareholders about the transfer. The purpose of this communication 
was to give the chance to non-transferring shareholders to exercise their rights to pre-empt. If, 
once the deadline was passed, neither the company, nor shareholders had exercised their pre-
emption rights, the transferor would be free to sell her shares in the form and matter she 
deemed appropriate. Notwithstanding this possibility, the fact is that this was a default rule. 
Article 20 also established that the deed of incorporation of the company could determine 
other agreements and conditions for the transfer of shares. However, the law said that in no 
circumstances the pact absolutely prohibiting transfers of shares would be valid. Moreover, 
transfers to people foreign to the company which did not adjust to the provisions of the public 
deed of transfer, or to the provisions of the law would be void. 
This Article was altered by Article 29 of the Law 2/1995, 23 March. This Article 
established that unless otherwise provided in the articles of association, the voluntary transfer 
of shares inter vivos would be free between shareholders as well as transfers to spouses, 
ascendants or descendants of the shareholder or to the companies belonging to the same group 
as the transferor. In other cases, the transfer would be subject to the rules and limitations 
established by the articles of association and, by default, the legal provisions. Besides free 
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transferability, this rule combined a default regime with a statutory one. The clause of consent 
teams up with the provision of pre-emption rights of shareholders.244 In other words, the 
company, if it denied its consent, would need to propose a buyer for the share, and 
shareholders would have the right to pre-empt. The transferor would be allowed to transfer 
her shares on the same conditions reported to the company when three months had elapsed 
since she had made known her intentions to sell the shares without the company having 
released the identity of the purchaser or purchasers. As to the effects of transfers in breach of 
the law and the provisions of the articles of association, Article 34 of Law 2/1995 established 
that transfers of shares which were not adjusted to the law or to the provisions of the articles 
of association had no effect vis-a-vis the company. This is different from Article 20 of the 
Law of 17 Julio 1953 that determined voidness in these circumstances. 
The Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010 2 July revoked Law 2/1995 and is the most recent 
historical event of Spanish corporate law.245 Finally, for the first time in history, legal 
provisions regarding publicly held companies (sociedades anónimas) and PLLCs (sociedades 
de responsabilidad limitada) were consolidated into a single law. Moreover, this was an 
exercise of coordination by which legislators tried to fill in lacunae, and to perfect rules which 
had been the object of doctrinal debate and jurisprudential dissent to that point. These were 
some of the reasons underlying the request of the Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) 
made to the government to consolidate the Law of Companies of Capital into one piece of 
legislation. In addition, Section 4 of Title I of Book II of the Code of Commerce of 1985 on 
limited partnerships and the Securities Market law were added to the new law.  
At this moment, despite the longstanding debate about the nature of the PLLC (i.e., was 
it capitalistic or personalistic?), Spanish legislation took a position in that debate by 
determining the PLLC to be a business association with a capitalistic nature.246 Interestingly, 
there is a stark normative generalization of legal solutions which had been originally 
conceived for the PLLC. A case in point is the competence of the general meeting and, in 
                                                             
244 The Spanish literature does not define the clause of consent established by default by the law as a pure clause 
of consent. Like the French law, the refusal of consent by the company depends on the company finding buyers – 
shareholders or third parties – for the shares. See Albert Albert, Pablo et al., Comentarios a la Ley 2/1995 de 
Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, Madrid, Ed. de Derecho Reunidas, 1995, p. 130 (dwelling on this 
matter). 
245 In July 2010 I was a Visiting Researcher at the Department of Commercial Law of the Faculty of Law of the 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, and had the opportunity to discuss the implementation of the new law with 
António B. Perdices Huetos. He had had an active participation as an academic in the process conducing to the 
adoption of the new law. 
246 Limited partnerships, publicly held companies and private limited liability companies are defined in Spanish 
law as companies of capital as opposed to partnerships which are indisputably considered companies delectus 
personae.  
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particular, those rules referring to the dissolution and liquidation of companies of capital. 
These rules were much more developed for the PLLC than for publicly held companies. The 
fact that Spanish legislators made this choice is based on the understanding that the PLLC, 
which is also in Spain the business association chosen by most market agents, has assumed 
for itself a profile that is closer to a capitalistic company than a partnership. This is the 
opposite view assumed by the French legislature which, as we have seen above, perceived the 
company with limited liability to be more akin to an enlarged partnership than a narrow 
corporation. 
The fact, however, is that even if from the outside the PLLC in Spain looks like a 
capitalistic company (despite the lack of requirements for investment in these companies),247 
on the inside it still works as a partnership. Moreover, their regime is fleshed out by a thick 
secrecy which is difficult to penetrate. This is in line with the alterations introduced by Law 
19/1989, 25 July that suppressed the need for registration of transfer of shares with the 
Commercial Registry.248 Transfers are executed through a public document and then 
registered in the register of members. Only if this register is executed can the transferee 
expect to exercise any shareholder’s rights in the company. Other than this private control, 
there is no sort of public inside look at the changes of ownership in Spanish PLLCs. 
Furthermore, Article 28 of Law 1/2010, which is very straightforwardly titled ‘Private 
Autonomy’, specifies that founding shareholders may include in the public deed of 
incorporation of the company as well as in its articles of association all agreements and 
conditions they deem appropriate to establish. Most of these agreements and conditions are 
only known to shareholders themselves. The allure of this narrative rests on the idea that the 
flexibility and pro-market nature of legal provisions enabled the Spanish PLLC to develop 
capitalist features closer to the publicly held company. However, from the inside it developed 
personalistic features similar to the partnership. (As we will see below, the way clauses of 
transfer of shares mirror this evolutionary phenomenon is surprising and interesting). 
Additionally, this becomes apparent with the new wording and legislative options taken by 
Law 1/2010, wherein were blended general and specific parts of the law, and only the 
particularities of each business organization were left exposed to the eye of the interpreter.  
Article 107 of the Law 1/2010 provides the regimen of voluntary transmission of shares 
inter vivos in PLLCs. This provision is basically the same as Article 34 of Law 2/1995. Article 
                                                             
247 Currently, the minimum amount of PLLCs’ share capital is 3,005.06 € which corresponds roughly to 3,842.65 
US dollars, and to 2,406.12 British pounds. 
248 Law 19/1989, 25 July partially reformed and adapted the Spanish commercial legislation in accordance with 
the European Directives of the European Economic Community (EEC) in respect to corporations. 
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112 establishes the effects of un-consented transfers of shares and, like Article 34 of Law 
2/1995, also determines that transfers which are not adjusted to the legal provisions or to the 
provisions of the articles of association have no effects toward the company. 
 
II. Actors 
 
i. Transfer clauses in the articles of association and the multiple designs of restrictions 
on transfers 
 
Like the Portuguese case, rules on transfer of shares of Spanish PLLCs were based on 
the current practice of members of these business organizations, lawyers and notaries. In 
practice, restrictions on transfers were frequently introduced because of the mutual trust 
members had in each other and because of the family nature of the companies. This is a trend 
that continues today. I collected a sample of 55 articles of association of Spanish SRLs with 
registered offices in Madrid. These articles were part of documents issued by notary publics 
and filed with the Commercial Registry of Madrid. Some of them also were filed with the 
Industrial Registry,249 and I was able to find them in the portfolio of documents of the 
Regional Archive of the Community of Madrid. The dates of the articles range from 1951 to 
2012. This sample covers not only articles of association adopted under the Law of 17 Julio 
1953, but also those adopted under the subsequent legal alterations introduced to the regime 
of the SRL by Law 2/1995, 23 March; Law 19/1989, 25 July, Law 7/2003, 1 April, Royal 
Legislative Decree 1564/1989, 22 December, and Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010, 2 July.  
All articles of association establish restrictions on transfer of shares. Most of them are 
verbatim duplications of the legal provisions.250 The type of restrictions included in the 
articles range from the consent of the company given by a resolution of the company’s 
shareholders, pre-emption rights or rights of first refusal, post-sale purchase rights 
                                                             
249 Companies which have a line of business in the industrial sector must register with the Industrial Registry the 
incorporation of new businesses as well as their alteration, extension, ownership changes, modifications in the 
registry data, and revisions. 
250 See Albert Albert, Pablo et al., Comentarios a la Ley 2/1995 de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada, cit., 
p. 120 (stating that: “Hasta hoy, son raros los estatutos, de S.A. o S.L. donde faltan cláusulas estatutarias 
limitativas de la transmisión. En general, há podido decirse que los socios apenas han hecho uso en los estatutos 
sociales de las posibilidades que el legislador les concede para configurar cada sociedad, com un amplio margen 
de la autonomia de la voluntad, de modo que los estatutos pactados vienen a ser simples transcripciones de 
preceptos legales”) (To this day, articles of association lacking clauses restricting transfer of shares are rare. In 
general, it may be said that shareholders have only in a limited manner made use of the possibilities that 
legislation has given to them in the articles of association to configure each company, with broad private 
autonomy, so that the articles of association agreed upon are mere transcriptions of legal provisions). 
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(implemented through a scheme of notifications), option rights or resgate251 in favor of 
shareholders, the company and third parties, a combination of clauses (e.g., the articles may 
require that the buyer has certain objective characteristics or qualities; they may submit the 
transfer of some shares to the rules of the articles of association and leave others under the 
default regulation of the law; they may establish a system of deferred payment for the 
transferor).252  
The PLLC in Spain was legally conceived from an early stage as a closed business 
association. In Spain the SRL is clearly a byproduct of a longstanding practice of market 
agents using this form to accommodate their business interests. Being a closed business 
association is in the PLLC’s 'DNA'.253 The clauses of the articles of association on transfer of 
shares illustrate this in their multiple designs. Nevertheless, the fact that the SRL is at the 
same time perceived by legislation as a capitalist company creates an interesting dynamic 
regarding the private autonomy shareholders enjoy to design their own company, which is 
often adverse to unnecessary protectionist measures. This dynamic is suggested by a number 
of case laws. They are treated in the next section. 
 
III. Market 
 
i. Zooming-in on the effects of the un-consented transfer of shares: disputes over 
transfers and changes in the ownership and governance structure of PLLCs 
 
Having a corporate law structure and trying to deviate from it leads to litigation. This is 
precisely what happens with the un-consented transfer of shares. This can be illustrated by a 
sample of seventeen cases adjudicated by the highest Spanish courts as of 1983 to 2012 and 
four administrative cases decided by the Dirección General de Registros y del Notariado as of 
1995 to 2012. I collected case law from the database Westlaw Spain.254 I selected the cases by 
introducing into the search engine the keywords transmission de participaciones sociales 
(transfer of shares). Using this set of keywords yielded 3,746 results of which not all were 
related to the breach of restrictions on transfer of shares in PLLCs. Considering that only a 
                                                             
251 Where there is a resgate the beneficiary may buy, under certain circumstances, the shares of the transferor. 
252 In this sample there are no mandatory buy-sell agreements, which are also a form of restricting transfers. 
Mandatory buy-sell agreements are included in the American LLC agreements, as we shall see below. 
253 For instance, Article 30 of the Law 2/1995, 23 March stated that “Serán nulas las cláusulas estatutarias que 
hagan prácticamente libre la transmission voluntaria de las partcipaciones sociales por actos inter vivos. (Clauses 
of articles of association which make practically free the voluntary transfer of shares inter vivos will be void).  
254 This is an electronic database containing Spanish legal information provided by Aranzadi. This database 
provides the full text of Spanish legislation and case law of the highest courts. It also provides case law of the 
European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. 
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small part of disputes are actually dealt with at court,255 I have not randomly chosen these 
cases. Cases were selected depending on whether their description referred to transfer of 
shares inter-vivos and whether it referred to restrictions on transfers in general, or to the 
consent of the company to the transfer or to pre-emption rights as a pre-requisite for the 
execution of the transfer, in particular. The contentious disputes were based on legal issues 
that I categorized into clusters. 
 
1. Interpretation 
(i) Problems of interpretation of the law and the provisions of the articles of 
association, in particular during a transitional period of the law. These problems 
also occur in the situations where the articles of association are incomplete and 
refer to a default rule in the law. Frequently, shareholders do not understand the 
rules and, in particular, they are not aware of the implications of the imposition 
of restrictions such as pre-emption rights. 
(ii) Problems in understanding how legal default rules work (i.e., how pre-emption 
rights should be exercised and consent of the company be given). Shareholders 
do not understand the relationship between clauses of consent and pre-emption 
rights. They also have difficulty following the rules and comprehending how 
they should be integrated in the articles of association for which they have 
bargained.256  
(iii) The validity of the transfer, the effects of the sales contract as well as the 
moment when one becomes a shareholder or loses this quality as a result of the 
transfer of ownership rights in their share.257  
(iv) The definition of default and mandatory rules and how this analytic task 
conditions the negative effects associated with an un-consented transfer.258  
                                                             
255 See Priest, George L., and Benjamin Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, The Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 13, No. 1, 1984, pp. 1-55 (2) (arguing that ‘It is well known…that only a very small fraction of 
disputes comes to trial and an even smaller fraction is appealed’). Also see Shavell, Steven, ‘Any Frequency of 
Plaintiff Victory is Possible’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 25, No. 2, 1996, pp. 493-501; Cooter, Robert D. 
and Rubinfeld, Daniel L., ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 27, No. 3, 1989, pp. 1067-1097; Klerman, Daniel, ‘The Selection of 13th-Century Disputes for 
Litigation’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, vol. 9, Issue 2, 2012, pp. 320-346. 
256 See Cheves Aguilar, Nazira, El Derecho de Adquisición Preferente como Cláusula Restrictiva a la 
Transmisibilidad de las Acciones y de las Participaciones Sociales, Madrid, Mcgraw Hill, 1999. 
257 Jurisprudence associates this debate with the nature of consent and the shares in these companies. 
Furthermore, this debate must be understood within the context conveyed by the Dirección General de Registros 
y del Notariado that articles of association have an erga omnes effect. The contractual and organizational aspects 
of the company are clearly related to the property rights shareholders have in their shares.  
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(v) Interpretation of contractual clauses. For example, the question as to the 
deadline to exercise pre-emption rights due to the chain of notifications 
foreseen by the company’s articles was recurrent. This question, if not properly 
answered, spurs not only litigation but also many other implications, especially 
in respect to the company and the liquidity of other shareholders’ shares.  
(vi) To know when the share sale and purchase contract was concluded, namely if 
the articles of association impose a chain of notifications to comply with 
restrictions on transfers. 
 
2. Functionality of restrictions on transfers 
(i) Problems in combining the freedom of contracting their own articles of 
association with the particular closed nature of the PLLC and mandatory rules 
which determine that the regime adopted by shareholders for the transfers 
cannot make them practically free.259  
(ii) Problems of shareholders ignoring the law or the clauses of their own 
company’s articles of association providing restrictions on transfers. 
(iii) The imposition of restrictions on transfers which boil down to clauses obliging 
shareholders to remain in the company for a long period. 
 
3. Un-consented transfers 
(i) The un-consented transfer of shares, that is, the transfer of shares executed 
without the consent of the company, or without the knowledge of other 
shareholders, and its effects (is it void; is it likely to be avoided by the parties to 
the sales contract; is it unenforceable toward the company whilst still binding 
the parties?). In general, courts hold that the un-consented transfer is valid 
between the parties and is likely to be avoided.260 Arguments span from a legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
258 See, for example, paragraph 4 of Article 20 of LSRL 1953 that established that the un-consented transfer of 
shares should be void. This was changed afterwards by Law 2/1995, 23 March where it was established that 
transfers in breach of the articles of association and legal provisions did not have any effects vis-a-vis the 
company. This is still the rule today, as established in Article 112 of the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010, 2 July. 
259 Article 108 of the Royal Legislative Decree foresees that clauses of the articles of association which make 
practically free the voluntary transmission of shares inter vivos are void. 
260 This has also been the understanding in the literature. See Uría, Rodrigo et al (eds.), Comentario al Régimen 
Legal de las Sociedades Mercantiles: Régimen de las Participaciones Sociales en la Sociedad de 
Responsabilidad Limitada (Artículos 26 a 34 de la Ley de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada)(Artículos 
35 a 42 de la Ley de Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada), Tomo XIV, vol. 1.º B, Madrid, Civitas, 1999, 
pp. 192-193 (claiming that ‘La ausencia de efectos transmisores de las participaciones sociales y su 
fundamentación no tiene por qué afectar a la validez del negocio realizado entre las partes. La ausencia de poder 
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to a social perspective. For example, the court of appeal in case AP Madrid 
(Sección 9), sentencia núm. 375/2011, 6 Julio (AC 2011\1500) determined that 
a shareholder who had not obtained the consent of the company was not entitled 
to use the fact that the transfer did not have any effects toward the company to 
breach the contractual obligations he had assumed with the buyer.261 There are 
other cases where courts discuss the effects of the un-consented transfer of 
shares in the external and internal relationships of the parties to the sales 
contract of shares. One case in point is the discussion courts undertake as to 
whether the lack of consent determines the inexistence of the essential element 
for undertaking the transmission of property rights in shares. This essential 
element would be the transferor’s own capacity to dispose of his shares. Some 
courts in the sample have submitted that if the consent of the company was not 
obtained, the transferor had an innate incapacity to sell her property rights. 
However, the causal contract, or in other words, the contract from which 
contractual obligations derive, is considered valid and enforceable. As a 
consequence, the transferor would be contractually liable.262 It must be 
underscored that jurisprudence has not always provided a clear answer and 
unanimous understanding about this matter. In general, there is the tendency for 
courts to say that the un-consented transfer is not absolutely void. They often 
consider that the sales contract has effects on the parties to it and, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
de disposición en el transmitente no es óbice para ello, estando presente en el mismo todos los requisitos 
necesarios para su validez (art. 1.261 CC’) (The absence of the transmissive effects of the shares and the grounds 
for that absence should not affect the validity of the contract entered into between the parties. The absence of the 
power of the transferor to dispose does not constitute an obstacle to it [the contract], being present in it all the 
necessary requirements for its validity’). 
261 See Uría, Rodrigo et al (eds.), Comentario al Régimen Legal de las Sociedades Mercantiles: Régimen de las 
Participaciones Sociales en la Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (Artículos 26 a 34 de la Ley de 
Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada)(Artículos 35 a 42 de la Ley de Sociedades de Responsabilidad 
Limitada), Tomo XIV, vol. 1.º B, Madrid, Civitas, 1999, p. 188 (saying that legal doctrine and jurisprudence 
have put aside the effects of an absolute voidness when it comes to the un-consented transfer because that would 
endorse abusive behavior of the parties who take advantage of the absolute voidness and do not comply with the 
contractual obligations they themselves have assumed). 
262 This understanding is inspired in the principles of abstraction and separation that are prevalent in German 
contract law. See Horn, Norbert et. al., German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction (translated by 
Tony Weir), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 69-70 at p. 69 (explaining that ‘The principle of abstraction, 
which has been known to cause problems even to German students, lays down that, while contract and transfer 
are connected in the sense that the latter is a performance of the former and that the former constitutes a 
justification or causa for the latter, they are nevertheless to be treated as separate or abstract, even though they 
often constitute a single unit in legal reality’). This principle contrasts with the principle of consensualism found 
in Portugal, Italy and France where ownership is transferred by mere effect of the contract. The United Kingdom 
with the Sale of Goods Act and the United States with the Uniform Commercial Code have adopted similar 
principles. In both jurisdictions it is understood that ownership is transferred in accordance with the agreement 
entered into by the seller and the buyer. Both laws, however, accept by default that ownership is transferred 
when the seller delivers to the buyer the object of the sales contract.  
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could only be avoided by them through a legal action, and not by an officious 
declaration of the court.263 There are cases referring to the validity of 
resolutions taken at the companies’ general meetings. For example, courts 
adjudicated cases in which a director, who was simultaneously a shareholder, 
purposefully changed the articles of association providing pre-emption rights to 
other non-transferring shareholders, so that the transfer could be executed 
without any limitations. 
(ii) Problems in combining the exercise of political rights, on one hand, and 
economic rights on the other, as a result of an un-consented transfer of shares 
and uncertainty as to who should exercise shareholders’ rights. 
 
4. Formalities 
(i) Coalitions made within the voting process of the general meetings so that a 
resolution proposed by a director or the majority shareholder is passed. In one 
of the cases scrutinized, a shareholder became a majority shareholder after 
having bought shares in the company without the consent of the company or the 
knowledge of other shareholders, and tried to dictate his interests in the 
company’s business. 
(ii) Cases of fraud in which the parties to the sale contract determine a shammed 
price to prevent other shareholders from exercising their pre-emption rights.264 
(iii) The transfer of shares executed in disregard of third parties interests. For 
instance, registration requirements with the Commercial Registry were often 
not complied with.265 
 
In addition to the case law brought up to the highest Spanish courts, I have also 
collected disputes which were dealt with by the Dirección General de Registros y del 
Notariado. Some of the cases tackle the following legal problems, which I also frame into the 
same clusters. 
 
 
                                                             
263 The court decision AP Alicante (Sección 8.ª), sentencia núm. 303/2011, 14 Julio (JUR 2011\330807) is an 
excellent example.  
264 See Fernández del Pozo, Luis, El Precio en las Cláusulas Restrictivas de la Libre Transmisibilidad de 
Acciones o Participaciones, Civitas, 1994. 
265 This, however, did not jeopardize the validity of the transfer between the parties to the sales contract.  
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1. Interpretation 
 
[…] 
 
2. Functionality of restrictions on transfers 
(i) The conflict between the protection of individual rights of shareholders against 
the majority, and private autonomy. In these circumstances the opinions of the 
Dirección General de Registros y del Notariado were given in the sense that 
the provisions of the articles of association should prevail. Put another way, 
when it comes to evaluate provisions in the articles of association the 
important thing is not the protection of individual rights, but the private 
autonomy and freedom of contract members enjoy.266  
 
3. Un-consented transfers 
 
[…] 
 
4. Formalities 
(i) The inclusion of clauses in the articles of association in which the payment of 
the price of the shares to the transferor is postponed. 
(ii) The alteration of articles of association as to the system of evaluation of shares. 
This is particularly relevant when the evaluation of the shares is purposefully 
made below their real value to prevent the transferor from receiving the 
reasonable value for her shares. This has been viewed by the Dirección 
General de Registros y del Notariado as a form to jeopardize the rights of 
shareholders to transfer their shares and objectively obtain a real value for 
them. This is the case when the price agreed upon is notoriously below the 
market price.267  
 
                                                             
266 Here, a comparison can be made with the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the importance 
courts give to contracts. They tend to make the parties to the contract accountable for their choices much more 
than in the other jurisdictions. 
267 The value of the shares should not be taken by the accounting value which results from the balance sheet. The 
Dirección General de Registros y del Notariado, however, recognizes that an extreme application of this 
principle may create problems of liquidity of the holders of pre-emption rights, which is precisely what the 
imposition of restrictions on transfers tries to avoid. 
 123 
 
These clusters of legal issues within the competence of the Dirección General de 
Registros y del Notariado are grained with administrative and registry-related questions which 
did not go to court. Perhaps, this is the reason that the interpretation and un-consented transfer 
of share clusters are not completed: they are more related to the substantive aspects involving 
the share sale and purchase agreement and the clauses of the articles of association of the 
company. However, these administrative cases also illustrate the contentious framework 
wherein corporate constituencies, especially shareholders, bargained. Both sets of cases reveal 
the sort of environment in which the relationships between corporate constituencies in the 
PLLC may evolve. 
 
2. Conclusions 
 
The historical excursion to the Portuguese, French, Italian and Spanish cases was meant 
to tell three stories: (i) a story of interest groups interfering with the outcomes of legislative 
policies; (ii) a story of how law is a byproduct of private ordering manifestations; and (iii) a 
story of the legal evolution of business organizations. Each story is informed by a parameter 
which is constant in the historical narrative. The first story is informed by the parameter 
‘state’ which is linked to the role of legislatures and courts in downloading and designing the 
new corporate form. The second story is shaped by the parameter ‘actors’. This parameter 
can, to a certain extent, be equated with the external influence of society in shaping patterns 
of normative conduct. I focus on the interesting phenomenon that consists of drafting the 
articles of association based on crossover of legal solutions likely to affect the ownership and 
management structures of these companies. The third story comes into being through the 
parameter ‘market’. It can be coupled with economy in a broad sense because it entails an 
array of choices made by market agents in face of the limited nature of resources in the PLLC. 
Many of these choices spur bargaining failures that deter development and investment in these 
companies.  
These three stories about the PLLC are told at three levels. There is the level where 
legislatures and courts operate. There is the level where there seems to be a sort of social 
commitment led by lawyers and notaries regarding the proliferation of rules for these business 
organizations, namely through the respective articles of association. There is the level where 
market agents exchange. These narratives are told differently, yet identically in the four 
selected jurisdictions.  
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At the first level, legislatures in Portugal construed the PLLC as an intermediate form 
between partnerships and the so-called joint stock companies. In France, it was perceived as 
an enlarged partnership. In Italy, the PLLC was also historically conceived as an intermediate 
form between the partnership and the joint stock company. It was, moreover, designed to be 
sufficiently flexible so as to serve the interests of investors wanting to incorporate either small 
or big companies. In Spain, the PLLC was also drafted as an intermediary between the 
partnership and the joint stock company. However, unlike French legislation, Spanish 
legislation framed the PLLC as a narrow joint stock company or corporation. Still at the first 
level, rules on transfer of shares are legally designed as defaults in Portugal, Italy and Spain. 
Here, transfer of shares requires the consent of the company, unless it is otherwise established 
in the articles of association. The French case is different. Transfer of shares requires the 
consent of the company and/or compliance with other restrictions in the articles of 
association. This was historically designed as a mandatory rule. However, the majority of 
shareholders required to consent to the transfer may be opted out and the articles of 
association may, therefore, provide for a less strict majority.  
At the second level, it was interesting to track a phenomenon in which legal solutions 
crossed over in the relevant jurisdiction, as well as a situation of interstate crossover of legal 
provisions. This process was advanced by the adoption and drafting of articles of association. 
The development of interstate crossover was especially evident between Portugal and France, 
where contracts with a temporal lapse of almost a full century were similarly drafted. 
Crossover occurred in all selected jurisdictions. It happened in Portugal where legislators 
decided to mimic the market and substitute the law determining a principle of free 
transferability for a law providing a default rule establishing restrictions on transfer of shares. 
The French case shows that legal solutions were adopted as a matter of opportunity. 
Importantly, legal solutions, once adopted, were an adaptation, that is to say, a byproduct of 
previous practices and customary actions which were, at a certain point, unavoidably 
recognized by legislation. The SARL was based upon an existent mold of business association 
– the societé anonyme, which for a long time served (even if inadequately) the goals of all 
types of firms in France. The adjustment was undertaken by jurisprudence, lawyers and 
notaries on the sidelines. In other words, they acted as gatekeepers where the initiative of 
legislators fell short. Nevertheless, there is something unique about the French case. The 
SARL was subject to mandatory rules which prevented it from enjoying much of the 
flexibility of the partnership, and of PLLCs in the other selected jurisdictions. The Italian case 
is an interesting example of how contractual choices of market agents, that is, the introduction 
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of restrictions on transfers, are framed by the institutional environment. In Italy, the motto 
‘piccolo è bello’ has been taken seriously to the point the PLLC became a fundamental unit of 
economic growth in this country. This is a country where manifestations of social and 
institutional embeddedness are pervasive, and they should be taken into account in the study 
of small businesses in Italy. Besides, regarding the microstructure of companies, other factors 
like labor practices undertaken by the governing bodies of the company, and how the payment 
of corporate taxes was perceived by the company’s members need to be investigated.268 This 
will enable a full understanding of the dynamics of the SrL and the reasons restrictions on 
transfers were established and changes in the governance and ownership structures are 
difficult to operate. Also in Spain the PLLC was ‘downloaded’ by legislators. Rules regarding 
these companies were created and developed by experimentation at the lower level, well 
before legislators decided to adopt them. When the law was finally enacted, research shows 
that members of these companies did not take full advantage of the flexibility provided to 
them by legislation to draft the articles of association their own way. On the contrary, 
members preferred to transcribe or refer directly to default rules which filled their incomplete 
articles of association in. Law appears here, once again, as a byproduct and the fact that 
members chose to use these defaults helped them to maintain a certain status quo, despite the 
shadow of litigation. 
At the third level, it was striking to find that the default rules that parties to the articles 
of association did not contract around did not prevent their defection by the members. This 
also happened in France where legislatures have taken a statutory approach to transfer of 
shares. Even more striking was the Italian case in which a principle of free transferability 
prevails and, in spite of that, shareholders still introduce restrictions on transfers, only to 
breach them at a later stage. In many situations, but not all of them, bargaining failures derive 
from an attempt to maintain a prevailing status quo. In the Portuguese case, opposite 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the role and importance of the respective default rule: 
either this norm is very efficient and, as a consequence, shareholders while drafting the 
company’s articles of association simply comply with the default rule; or this norm is very 
                                                             
268 The text is pointing in the direction of what is called ‘lavoro nero’ (unreported labor), which is part of the 
economia sommersa (underground economy) in Italy. Additionally, see Curami, G., ‘Contribuente e Fisco Oggi 
in Italia’ in Assorel [Associazione Nazionale tra Società a Responsabilità Limitata e Accomandita Semplice], 
Bolletino Mensile D’Informazione, Anno I, Novembre 1966, N.º 2, pp. 19-21 (In this article Curami stresses the 
overall distrust of Italian taxpayers of the state and makes reference to small businesses or private companies as 
forms used to circumvent tax law). 
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inefficient because it raises transaction costs considerably and has created a lock-in effect.269 
The sample of case law suggests that costs resulting from compliance with this rule are not so 
much associated with measures taken to prevent the respective transaction as with the 
transaction costs and the costs of disputes such that the rule is enforced.  
In sum, these three stories, each of which is informed by its specific parameter, tells a 
larger story of how the existence of default rules has influenced the historical development of 
business organization law in the selected jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
269 As we shall see in Part III, Chapter 1, a lock-in effect can be efficient ex-ante by raising incentives for 
members to work hard(er) for the success of the firm.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
DISCLOSING THE PLLC’S LEGAL REGIME THROUGH A HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: 
THE CASES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Our primary thesis is that the English approach to law is 
more formal and the American more substantive. As will 
have been apparent from our insistence that all legal systems 
rely heavily on both formal and substantive reasons, we are 
anxious to avoid exaggeration or caricature. 
 
Atyah, P. S., and Summers, R. S., Form and Substance in 
Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study in Legal 
Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions, New York, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p. 32. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses two systems on the two sides of the Pond – the United Kingdom 
and the United States. It continues to scrutinize PLLCs – the UK’s private company and the 
US’s limited liability company (LLC) – to understand their principles and their ownership and 
governance structures. This chapter presents a historical narrative of these business 
organizations in two common-law countries. The investigation is based on parliamentary 
debates, articles of newspapers, and literature that reflect the reality of business in the second 
half of the nineteenth and the twentieth century. In respect to the empirical data, I have 
analyzed the articles, memoranda of association and other documents of the corporations 
deposited with the Companies House, United Kingdom dated as of 1888 to 2008. I have 
studied operating agreements of US LLCs dated as of 2001 and 2012.270 The analysis of these 
documents was complemented, where data were available, by information collected from the 
                                                             
270 Due to the fact that LLC agreements are not archived in any organized way and to resource constraints, I 
limited the spread of the sample to the decade of the 2000s. 
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Bureau van Dijk’s databases Amadeus271 and Fame.272 Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, I 
have analyzed manuscripts and assorted documents such as board of directors’ minute books, 
general meetings’ minute books and shareholders’ registers, reports, private letters, court 
records not available in databases and stored in historical archives, share certificates, letters 
sent by companies to the Board of Trade (UK)273, and communications from solicitors and 
accountants. The case studies I present regarding the Hay’s Wharf Cartage Company Limited, 
the use of the private company and the one-man company for tax avoidance, the irregular 
transfer of shares in the British Stone Marble Company, and the Directors’ Private Minute 
Book of the Forest Hill Brewery Company, Limited shed light on the profile of the private 
company in the United Kingdom and the social, economic and political aspects of this type of 
company. Again, the veil hiding the private sphere of the PLLC is lifted at several stages in 
this chapter. More interestingly, it hints there was a flux of law not only from the United 
States to Europe as the Portuguese and French cases suggest,274 but also from Europe to the 
United States.  
This chapter continues the three stories I introduced in the previous chapter. It tells of 
interests groups influencing the legislative process and of how law is a byproduct of private 
ordering manifestations. In this context, it highlights the dynamics between private ordering 
and legislative outcomes. Further, it tells of the legal evolution of business organizations. This 
chapter continues to address each story from three parameters: (i) state, (ii) actors, and (iii) 
market. It is structured as follows. Section 1 treats the case of the United Kingdom. It analyses 
parliamentary debates, the constitutional documents of the company and explains the 
importance of private ordering to the unleashing of the British private company. In addition, it 
treats the case study of Hay’s Warf Cartage Company, Limited. It explores the use for tax 
avoidance of the private company form and the one-man company form. It explores the case 
of the super-tax and the Finance Act 1927, c. 10. It treats the case of irregular transfer of 
shares in the British Stone Marble Company, Limited. It scrutinizes the private minutes’ book 
of directors of the company Forest Hill Brewery Company, Limited. In addition, this section 
dwells on the types of restrictions established in the articles of association of UK’s private 
                                                             
271 This is a pan-European database which provides financial and business data on the biggest 520,000 
companies, by assets, in 38 European countries. Amadeus includes information about standardised annual 
accounts (consolidated and unconsolidated), financial ratios, sectoral activities and ownership.  
272 Fame is a United Kingdom and Irish database wherein seven million companies are listed. This database 
provides access to information about business associations such as accounts, shareholders, and directors. 
Searches can be designed according to the industry, location or financial information. 
273 The Board of Trade was later known as ‘Department of Trade’ and afterward it received the designation of 
‘Department of Trade and Industry’ (DTI). 
274 See Part I, Chapter 2 above. 
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companies and the bargaining failures regarding transfer of shares that are the root of 
contentious disputes adjudicated by UK courts. Section 2 treats the case of the United States. 
It examines the reasons that led to the breakthrough of the LLC in the United States. It screens 
the statutory provisions of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and the New York 
Limited Liability Company Law. It looks at the fashion in which members' interests are 
regulated in LLC agreements. Additionally, this section reviews some case law regarding the 
transfer of membership interests in LLCs. Section three concludes. 
 
1. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
I. State 
 
i. Parliamentary debates, the constitutional documents of the company, private 
governance and the unleashing of the private limited company 
 
In 1907, the PLLC (or simply ‘private limited company’ as it is termed in UK 
legislation) was created, or, more precisely, legally accepted, in the United Kingdom.275 I refer 
to 'acceptance' because seven years before, in 1900, while the discussion of the Companies 
Bill was held in the parliament, frequent references to ‘small trading companies’ or ‘private 
companies’ were made, even though their respective legal form had not yet been created. In 
the period between 1862 and 1907,276 the political debate about private limited companies 
was a second-rate one. It was mostly driven by considerations about publicity and 
transparency made apropos public limited companies, the advantages of promoting combined 
actions of shareholders through general meetings (particularly in situations where their 
interests had been defrauded), and the benefits of codification of the numerous ‘Companies 
Acts’ that had been thus far separated. In the late nineteenth century, the political debate about 
the private limited company was triggered by the discussion about the abuses of limited 
liability involving the public company.277 There were several scandals relating to public 
limited companies, and what some considered their destructive effects on trade, commerce, 
                                                             
275 One can discuss if whatever the United Kingdom had at the time could be qualified as a distinctive form of 
company. In fact the United Kingdom's private and public companies were hardly distinctive from each other 
until the implementation of EU Directives in the 1980s. See Edwards, Vanessa, EC Company Law, New York, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999. 
276 I chose this timeframe because 1862 was the year in which the Companies Act, 1862 c. 89 was enacted, and 
1907 is the year in which the Companies Act 1907, c. 50 was enacted. 
277 This is reminiscent of the Spanish case where the law on private limited liability companies was anticipated 
by the public debate and enactment of the law regulating public companies. 
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and commercial morality. These scandals were related with secret payments made by 
companies to vendors and promoters, the constant practice of underwriting shares, the 
mortgage of the company’s assets which investors and creditors could only be acquainted with 
after the winding up of the company, and the plundering of investors by means of company 
arrangements made on the side. These were some of the ‘evils’, as the parliamentarians called 
them, deeply associated with limited liability companies and which impregnated the business 
environment at the time with uncertainty and notorious distrust.278  
Law was approached, perhaps unintentionally, with an evolutionary standard. There was 
this perception, at least, conveyed by some members of the parliament that facilities given by 
the law for investment had constituted until that moment a means of attracting investment to 
the United Kingdom. Some thought that if it had not been for the law, hundreds of millions of 
dollars in capital would have been invested elsewhere.279 Hence, in order to preserve those 
facilities provided by the law, the debate on the importance of setting rules regulating the 
issue of prospectuses, ‘statutory meetings’ or general meetings, the qualifications of directors 
and the information to be given as to their position and their fees and commissions, the 
minimum amount of share capital to incorporate a business, as well as the registration of any 
mortgages, debentures or other charges was, at times, passionately held.280 The vivacity of the 
arguments was even more notorious when it came to decide whether requirements upholding 
publicity and transparency in order to prevent the abuses of limited liability aforementioned 
also should be applicable to private limited companies. It was submitted by some 
parliamentarians that many of the problems with the public company were due to reckless 
management and remissness of directors that inevitably caused the winding up of the 
companies.281 However, when considering the case of private limited companies, the views of 
parliament members diverged. Some took a step back and submitted that private companies 
should be exempted from tight scrutiny.282 Others disagreed because they considered that 
                                                             
278 See, for example, HC Deb 24 July vol. 86 cc1065-160, available at URL: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jul/24/companies-bill (accessed on 16 January 2012). 
279 This idea is interesting as it creates a bridge with Part III and the role of law in trigerring patterns of 
competition between states. 
280 See HC Deb 26 June 1900 vol. 84 cc1139-86, available at URL: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jun/26/companies-bill (accessed on 16 January 2012). 
281 See, for example, the intervention of the parliamentarian, Mr. Charles McArthur (Liverpool, Exchange) at HC 
Deb 26 June 1900 vol. 84 cc1139-86 at URL: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jun/26/companies-bill (accessed on 16 January 2012) 
(exhorting the members of the parliament to take measures to prevent managers from evading their 
responsabilities). 
282 See the several interventions of the members of the parliament at HC Deb 26 June 1900 vol. 84 cc1139-86 at 
URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jun/26/companies-bill (accessed on 16 January 2012). 
In addition, see Denoon, D.J.N., ‘'Capitalist Influence' and the Transvaal Government during the Crown Colony 
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some of the worst scandals surrounding not only British companies, but also South African 
companies, foreign companies and colonial companies in general were related to companies 
that did not issue prospectuses and did not make an appeal to the public. It was said that 
companies, including private companies, strategically collected money from the public and 
then went into speedy liquidation.283 As a consequence, for these parliamentarians not only 
public companies, but also private companies should make the substantive elements of the 
firm public.284  
The fact is that private and public companies were frequently treated as if they were part 
of a single genre, with no need for further distinctions. Private companies were understood as 
companies that did not issue prospectuses and did not make an appeal to the public. They 
were characterized as ‘limited liability companies which divided the capital amongst the 
partners of the concerns’. They were pictured as companies which had prohibitions upon the 
sale of their shares outside the particular family interested in the business and in regard to 
which no cash payment took place. They were viewed as companies which did not have a 
market for their shares and, therefore, there was no need to turn their ‘family affairs’ public. 
In this sense, it could be that the political debate was revolving around business organizations 
with an equivalent form to the closely held corporation in the United States and not always 
around the PLLC, of which the American equivalent is the limited liability company. United 
Kingdom law did not establish at this point any definition of private company that could help 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Period, 1900-1906’, The Historical Journal, vol. 11, No. 2 (1968), pp. 301-331. Denoon underscores the 
intricate relationships between political power and private enterprises of the mining industry. At the backdrop 
references to the old and declining Barnat Group are made. In general terms, it is mentioned that the fortunes of 
many political leaders were based on the institutions of private ownership or private enterprise. This fact would 
explain – some commentators argue – the hostility of some mining companies, among which Barnato’s, to the 
influence of larger companies. There was also the assumption (p. 302) that ‘... international capitalism -often 
personified as Hoggen- heimer-was a single, malignant, powerful, subtle and unscrupulous force, bending events 
and individuals to its own selfish advantage, and exercising undue influence over the Crown Colony 
administration...’. 
283 See the speech of the parliamentarian Mr. Butcher (York) at HC Deb 26 June 1900 vol. 84 cc1139-86 at 
URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jun/26/companies-bill (accessed on 16 January 2012). 
It is not clear who was benefiting from these fraudulent practices, but promoters and other persons who intended 
to profit from them were the most likely candidates. 
For other opinions pro and con the introduction of restrictions to incorporation and functioning of private 
companies, namely the issuance of a prospectus by these companies as demanded to public companies for the 
purpose of transparency, and as to the need to bring up a distinction between public and private companies, see 
the member of the parliament, Sir Thomas Lea (Londonderry, S.) at HC Deb 24 July 1900 vol. 86 cc1065-160 at 
URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jul/24/companies-bill (accessed on 16 January 2012) 
(claiming that ‘A very large proportion of the manufacturing trade of this country was done by private limited 
companies who did not appeal to the public at all. The hon. Member who had just spoken asked why private 
companies should not come under a section of this sort. Where were they to draw the line? The result would be 
that private limited companies would come under the whole of the provisions of the Bill and it would be against 
the trade of the country and detriment to the manufacturing and industrial interests’). 
284 See the opinion of the parliamentarian Mr. Marks (Tower Hamlets, St. George's) at HC Deb 26 June 1900 vol. 
84 cc1139-86 at URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jun/26/companies-bill (accessed on 
16 January 2012). 
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in the categorization of business organizations and private companies, in particular.285 Such a 
definition was only provided by the Companies Act, 1907. Even after 1907, the private-public 
divide was not clear in United Kingdom’s corporate law.286 Consequently, the debate about 
the private company was rooted in this ambiguity. Another point is that members of these 
companies did not have to go to the companies’ registry to register the opening of their 
business. This means there was no sort of public control of the contractual forms taken by 
these companies or of any other agreements entered into between their members. All things 
were kept private. This only would not be the case when their members, creditors and third 
parties ended up together in court to solve disputes among them. In sum, at this moment in 
history (1862-1907), I would venture to say it was fairly difficult to look directly in the face 
of private companies. Information about them, their shareholders and any other agreements 
between them, and between them and third parties were scattered and held private. There was 
a shared conviction that those agreements did not have to be disclosed. Forms of legal evasion 
were, consequently, difficult to detect due to the thin line drawn between companies’ forms.287  
                                                             
285 See Harris, Ron, ‘The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862-1907’, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 33, No. 2 (2013), pp. 339-378. Harris presents research similar to mine. I became acquantainted 
with this author’s work when I met Naomi Lamoureaux at the Department of History of Yale University, in 
February 2013. Ron Harris argues that the private company was formally introduced in 1907, but, in fact, it 
evolved informally from below after 1862 and was privately ordered by shrewd lawyers. First, this was not 
exclusive to the United Kingdom. The research for this dissertation shows that the same phenomenon happened 
in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France. Furthermore, it may be that the private company evolved even before 1862. 
Given that United Kingdom legislation did not distinguish between private and public companies, at least until 
1907, Harris fails to clarify whether he is addressing the evolution of small corporations, similar to closely held 
corporations in the United States, or whether he is addressing the evolution of PLLCs equivalent to the American 
LLC. In this sense, the reference to the ‘uncorporation’ referring to LLCs, partnerships, and limited partnerships, 
and which was popularized by Larry Ribstein in the United States, is useful because it excludes corporations 
(closely held or publicly held) from the outset. One of the ways to sort this out is by learning if articles of 
association establish restrictions on transfers and, if so, what kinds of restrictions. This work should be coupled 
with an assessment of the ownership and governance structures and the structure of the market wherein 
companies develop their business object. Other important elements that help to distinguish between public and 
private companies and between private companies themselves are the total of the balance sheet, turnover, and the 
number of employees. See Edwards, Vanessa, cit., pp. 125-127. 
Harris uses the Salomon case (Salomon v. Salomon and C. Ltd. [1897] AC 22) for it represents a range of new 
responses to the emergence of the private company. He refers to the existence of a wide social-economic 
phenomenon underpinning the adoption of the private company caused by the introduction of general limited 
liability, following the adoption of the 1855-56 Companies Acts, and caused by freedom of incorporation, 
pursuant to the General Incorporation Act 1844. This phenomenon illustrates practices regarding the 
transformation of one-man firms into partnership-like firms. This change of organizational forms was motivated 
by kinship, family ties, the need to renovate the decision-making process in the company and with the will of the 
patriarchs of first generation to leave the company to the second generation of owners. I aver that the private 
company may have evolved in the United Kingdom even before this time frame. 
286 See one of the interventions of the parliamentarian, Mr. Bousfield (Hackney, N.) at HC Deb 24 July 1900 vol. 
86 cc1065-160 at URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jul/24/companies-bill (accessed on 
16 January 2012) (saying that ‘There was no distinction. Every company was in the eye of the law a public 
company, even though it was what was commonly called a private company’). 
287 I tried to get the sense of what I discuss in the text by analysing private documents related to private limited 
companies which somehow were given to the archives of British libraries by their members. 
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The political debate, additionally, focused on the enforcement of rules. For example, it 
was argued that it would be desirable that legislation tracked acts of misconduct connected to 
the formation and functioning of companies. There was an assumed thrust of putting more 
power into the hands of courts, especially the Courts of Equity, to patch loopholes in the law. 
The task of strengthening the law in its general principles so that they could be convincingly 
used by courts was left to legislators. ‘It is better to lay down principles and to trust to the 
Courts to carry them out’, in the words of one parliamentarian.288 The common perception 
was that the legislator would steer the ship of law, and it was widely accepted that the 
legislative process had a word to say as to the evolution of these institutions.289 When the 
private limited company was finally legally accepted, the Companies Act, 1907 defined it as 
‘a company which limits the number of its members to thirty and restricts the right to transfer 
its shares and is prohibited by its regulations from issuing any invitation to the public to 
subscribe for its shares or debentures’. This definition was altered by the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act, 1908.290 It still provided restrictions on the transfer of shares, the limit to 
the number of shareholders (now to fifty), and the general prohibition of any invitation to the 
                                                             
288 See the intervention of Mr Bryce (Aberdeen, S.), at HC Deb 26 June 1900 vol. 84 cc1139-86 at URL: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1900/jun/26/companies-bill (accessed on 16 January 2012). 
289 See Harris, Ron, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720 – 1844, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000 (explaining how the transformation of the legal framework of the 
business association led to the development and increase in numbers of the joint-stock company). 
290 See Report from the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and the House of Commons on the 
Companies Consolidation Bill [H.L.] together with the Proceedings of the Committee, and the Minutes of 
Evidence, London, 1908. It is interesting to see in this report how the deliberative process took place, as well as 
the nature of the considerations made by the members of the committees. Those considerations show that what 
the members considered the ‘present law’ was based upon several non-legal elements. Additionally, arguments 
in some instances were far away from being purely legal arguments. For example, besides the consolidation and 
uniformity purpose all members shared (e.g., the execution of legislation by reference to other Acts, 
transplantation within legal systems is dealt with, and model articles of association are proposed), importance 
was given to the ‘likes and dislikes’ of the Colonial Office. Reference was also made to the stakeholders, and 
who had already commented on the law (the name of Lord Justice Buckley is mentioned several times). It was 
openly said that the language of this Bill was ‘different’ when colonial matters were discussed. Parliamentarians 
decided to assign to the courts the task of solving doubts or questions arising under the law, which they decided 
not to solve by themselves, even though they had the opportunity to do so. Parliamentarians did not solve the 
questions the law posed, and they deliberately decided to maintain a certain status quo. There were confusing 
clauses, as parliamentarians themselves recognized, but they preferred to leave them as they stood. Also, the 
existence of different jurisdictions inside the United Kingdom was considered and kept in mind during the task 
of consolidation. There was a notorious preoccupation that members of the committees did not preclude their 
self-imposed rules, especially when evaluating whether any actions would result in an alteration of the law or 
merely in an addition of explanatory clauses. The political process and the respective deliberations were made 
while taking into account the decisions of courts. No alterations were introduced if a particular matter had 
already been settled in court. Law was altered to give the effect of court decisions. Likewise, if a previous 
decision taken by the political power was put in jeopardy by the task of consolidation, they preferred to keep it. 
The introduction of amendments to the law was more consistent with the need to keep up with existing laws, and 
not so much with social practices that would suggest different legal solutions. In sum, the general power to make 
rules was designed by factors and/or elements outside the legislative process. This renders law a matter of 
perspective. 
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public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of the company as the main features of the 
private company.291 
I understand the ‘story’ of the private company in the United Kingdom as an interesting 
example, among many others, of how parties to a contract do not need the law to come up 
with their own system of rules. For instance, the existence of unincorporated business 
organizations is even acknowledged by some companies’ memoranda and articles of 
association which include them in their definition of ‘company’ along with any partnerships 
or other bodies of persons, whether incorporated or not and whether formed, incorporated, 
domiciled or resident in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.292 The private company is a good 
example of a spontaneous system of rules embedded in social practices of businessmen, 
which filled in the lack of legislation.293 Law came afterward as a byproduct of this 
spontaneous system of rules.  
 
II. Actors 
 
i. The private limited company as a third way: some historical empirical evidence  
 
The private limited company exemplifies how it is possible to overcome the dichotomy 
between pure considerations of legal autonomy and the functionalism of legal systems. In this 
                                                             
291 The Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 defined private limited company as it follows: ‘Meaning of 
"Private Company." 
121.— (1) For the purposes of this Act the expression -' private company " means a company which by its 
articles— 
(a) restricts the right to transfer its shares; and 
(b) limits the number of its members (exclusive of persons who are in the employment of the company) to 
fifty and 
(c) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of the company. 
(2) A private company may, subject to anything contained in the memorandum or articles, by passing a 
special resolution and by filing with the registrar of companies such a statement in lieu of prospectus as 
the company, if a public company, would have had to file before allotting any of its shares or debentures, 
together with such a statutory declaration as the company, if a public company, would have had to file 
before commencing business, turn itself into a public company. 
(3) Where two or more persons hold one or more shares in a company jointly they shall, for the purposes 
of this section, be treated as a single member’. 
292 See, for example, the memorandum of association of Henry Bath & Son, Limited, drafted pursuant to the 
Companies Acts 1908 and 1913, 1948 to 1980 and 1985 and 1989. Also see the memorandum and articles of 
association of Coca-Cola & Schweppes Beverages Limited, incorporated in accordance with the Companies Acts 
1862 to 1886 and the Companies Act 1985. 
293 See Maitland, F.W., ‘The Unincorporate Body’ in Runciman, David and Ryan, Magnus (eds.), Maitland: 
State, Trust and Corporation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 9-31, and 52- 61 (p. 59)( 
stating the following: ‘…we came by our English Anstalt or Stiftung without troubling the State to concede or 
deny the mysterious boon of personality. That was not an inconsiderable feat of jurisprudence. But a greater than 
that was performed. In truth and in deed we made corporations without troubling king or parliament though 
perhaps we said that we were doing nothing of the kind’). 
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sense, the private company represents an alternative path for institutional evolution. This 
alternative yields a dynamic approach to law and overcomes claims of static functionalism of 
law in which rules are designed to stand in immutable relation to the events of life they are 
supposed to regulate. This cries out for an explanation.  
The private company was not foreseen by the law before 1907, but yet it managed to 
flourish in Great Britain’s business environment, in particular during the second half of the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century.294 Moreover, this business organization, at least in 
its origin, seems to prove wrong those framing the development of legal institutions 
exclusively through the lens of functional arguments. This is so because its growth in numbers 
until it became the most-used form of business association in the United Kingdom was not 
consistently accompanied by reforms in company law. Furthermore, the incorporation of these 
companies before their legal regime was adopted was not registered, at least not in any 
consistent manner. The Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies 
Act 1844 only applied to joint stock companies. The Act provides a definition of joint stock 
company which does not include the private company. At most, it would be applied to 
partnerships consisting of more than 25 members. Given that public and private companies 
were not differentiated by the law, it is difficult to establish any reliable general link between 
their existence and patterns of economic development. Time and again, private companies 
were looked at with suspicion by judges and legislators. They were viewed as promoting ways 
of hiding information and deceiving the investor. Hence, their existence was hindered 
whenever disputes and fraudulent cases involving members, creditors and investors were 
taken to court. 295 
                                                             
294 It is possible to find in the literature reference to ‘private businesses converted into companies’. See, for 
instance, Jefferys, James B., Business Organisation in Great Britain 1856-1914, New York, Arno Press, 1977 
(referring to trends of financial structure and investment mechanisms in business organizations – including 
private and public companies – in Great Britain between 1856 and 1914). In this context, the analysis of a license 
issued by the Board of Trade pursuant to Section 23 of the Companies Act 1867 following a request of the St. 
John’s Hospital for Diseases of the Skin, incorporated under the Companies Act 1862 to 1900, suggests that 
business entities and non-profit associations often struggled to find other legal forms to fit their businesses than 
those provided by the law. In this particular case, St. John’s Hospital, similar to many other institutions, wished 
to be registered as a limited liability company. This having been done, the Hospital proposed that an application 
be made to the Board of Trade under the provisions of Section 23 of the Act of 1867 for a License to dispense 
with the use of the word ‘Limited’ in the company’s name. The hospital was concerned that the word ‘Limited’ 
would misrepresent its philanthropic nature, although it wanted to benefit from the limited liability attributable to 
companies. In other words, St. John’s Hospital was not an association created to make profit. No portion thereof 
should be paid or transferred, directly or indirectly, by way of dividend or bonus to its members. Adjusting, 
however, its profile to the legal forms of business associations at the time and subjecting this to the discretionary 
power of the Board of Trade shows that there were legal loopholes in the law regarding principles of association. 
These loopholes were institutionally addressed on a case-by-case basis, whether private or public associations 
were involved.  
295 See Jefferys, James B., cit., pp. 241-292 (considering the use of the debenture and the problems resulting 
from it, especially in private limited companies). 
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The importance, however, of the legal acceptance of private companies for the creation 
of consistent company law and for economic development by providing suitable investment 
infrastructures is undeniable. This can be better illustrated by some historical empirical 
evidence based on the analysis of business records of these business organizations in the 
United Kingdom at the beginning of the twentieth century. Additionally, an analysis of these 
records yields the sense that these companies have a peculiar internal dynamic mostly fuelled 
by close ties binding their members. The power and control creditors have over the company’s 
management, especially when the company enters into negotiations likely to lead to the 
alteration of its ownership structure, as well as the political character with which the internal 
affairs of these companies are dealt with are worth mentioning. These aspects can affect the 
governance choices made by members of the company such as the inclusion of restrictions on 
transfer of shares to safeguard certain corporate constituencies’ positions. I illustrate this with 
the following case studies. 
 
a. Hay’s Wharf Cartage Company Limited 
 
(i) Assessment of the company’s constitutional documents 
 
The example of Hay’s Wharf Cartage Company Limited - a private limited company 
incorporated on 11 January 1913 – helps to point up my arguments. I have reviewed this 
company's minute book and register of members. The minute book contained minutes of the 
general meetings of its members and meetings of the board of directors, as of 29 December 
1916 to May 1935. Furthermore, I have examined share certificates as of 1948. The company 
had a recorded number of 21 preference shareholders and 5 ordinary shareholders. It had 12 
directors. Its share capital was £ 2,221,008, divided into 138,292 preference shares of one 
pound each and 2,082,716 ordinary shares of one pound each. The nominal share capital was 
initially £25,000, divided into 25,000 shares. This is a private company of considerable size, 
and records demonstrate that it became bigger over time. 
 
(ii) Distribution of dividends 
 
In a private letter sent by the accountants of the firm - Gray, Stainforth, Newton & Co, 
Chartered Accountants – on 8 February 1913, it was explained that, according to the register, 
two ordinary shareholders - Mr. John Edward Humphrey and Mr. John A. Humphrey – both 
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held 20 shares each. The cheque for the dividend on 40 shares, however, was made payable 
only to Mr. John Edward Humphrey and Mr. John A. Humphrey’s name was omitted. Judging 
by the names, both shareholders had a family tie. 
 
(iii)Restrictions on transfer of shares and creditor protection 
 
At an extraordinary general meeting, held at Hay’s Wharf registered office, on Monday 
14 June 1920 it was proposed that the articles of association be altered so that restrictions on 
the transfer of shares could be included. Specifically, it was proposed that articles be altered 
so that the board could decline to register any transfer of shares not made to another member 
of the company. It was, however, proposed that sanctions to any transfer of preference shares 
should not be unreasonably withheld. It was also proposed at this general meeting that another 
company, which was Hay’s creditor, – Carter Paterson & Co Limited – so long as it should 
hold at least 20,000 preference shares of the company, should have the right to nominate and 
appoint one director of the company from time to time, and to remove any director so 
nominated and appointed. Carter Paterson also had the right to nominate and appoint the 
successor of a director who ceased to hold office irrespective of the cause. The resolution was 
also passed in the company’s general meeting that any nomination or removal of a director 
made under the articles of association should be effected by a notice in writing under the seal 
of Carter, Paterson & Co. Limited. If at any time Carter Paterson & Co Limited should cease 
to hold at least 20,000 preference shares of the company the director nominated by it should at 
once cease to be a director of Hay’s Wharf. 
 
(iv) Membership and corporate governance  
 
Through the analysis of the register of members and the share ledger, it was possible to 
learn that shareholders stayed in this company for long periods of time. In fact, this was also 
the case for other companies in respect to which a period of almost 30 years of membership 
was recorded. The analysis of the register of members suggested that transfers were mostly 
made to family members or to transferees with whom the transferor had close ties. By reading 
the minutes of the general meetings, it was also possible to see that one shareholder, always 
seconded by another, proposed that the companies’ accounts be approved. Furthermore, the 
same proceedings were used to propose and agree on the payment of dividends. I did not have 
access to information as to how the company was bound vis-à-vis third parties, nor regarding 
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the voting procedure in the company’s general meetings and board of directors. For instance, 
in one of the minutes there was an assignment of debt, sealed and signed by one of the 
shareholders. It was difficult to say whether this shareholder was also a director of the 
company. These comments regarding the authority to bind the company in general, are 
equally valid when at stake were banking arrangements, mortgages and debentures, insurance 
arrangements, review of the organization of the company, or simply the need to endorse 
cheques on behalf of the company. It is clear that there were at least one or a few shareholders 
whose presence in the general meetings and decision-making power in the company was 
obvious.  
 
(v) Other corporate constituencies: customers and employees 
 
I took simultaneously into consideration the role of corporate constituencies other than 
shareholders and directors such as customers. For example, in one of the minutes of Whay’s 
board of directors it is reported that the general manager was asked to prepare, after 
consultation of the ‘proprietors’ of Whay’s Wharf Ltd., a report showing the effect which 
recent changes in the arrangements of that company with its customers had had on the volume 
and remuneration of services supplies by Hay’s Wharf Ltd. There were also reports of the 
company dealing with trade unions, and decisions being taken as to the attribution of 
temporary pensions and gratuities to directors, and the increase of salaries of members of the 
staff.296 
 
(vi) Taxation and new legislation 
 
Minutes of meetings of the company’s board of directors show how costs resulting from 
increased taxation and recent legislation were a matter of concern for the management of the 
company.297 In one of those meetings, held on 11 December 1934, the general manager was 
asked to prepare an estimate of the effects increased taxation and recently approved 
legislation regulating driver’s hours of work and the maximum loads to be carried had had on 
                                                             
296 The workers are a central concern of the managers. It is recognised by the latter that in particular and 
important moments for the companies’ business development the labour force is restless. In some cases, it is 
possible to register an open-ended commitment of directors towards their workers in alleviating any hardship 
they go through by granting them ‘dearness allowances’ or trying to control the prices of the company’s products 
in the market. In other cases inducements are offered to employees working in the firm to improve their output. 
Notwithstanding these measures, labour is admittedly considered a constant source of anxiety within the firm. 
297 Costs of business included costs of acquiring new equipment, expenses of transferring household effects from 
vendors’ depository to company’s premises, taxes, etc.  
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each department of the company. Claims of efficiency and economy were frequently made in 
the context of operation of a company’s specific department.298  
 
b. The use of the private limited company and the one-man company for tax avoidance: 
the case of super-tax and the Finance Act 1927, c. 10 
 
I learned by analyzing private letters of businessmen and other communications of the 
Inland Revenue as of 1920s that there was a problem with tax evasion and the operation of 
legislation dealing with the avoidance of taxes such as the super-tax. The private company 
and the one-man company were used as tools to that end. It was understood that legislation 
could only come into operation where it was shown that there was an avoidance of super-tax 
by the unreasonable withholding of profits from distribution after debts had been paid and 
necessary or advisable payments for the maintenance and development of the business had 
been made. The need for legislation arose from the fact that the super-tax was chargeable on 
the total income of individuals and it was not chargeable upon companies as such. This state 
of affairs led to a practice under which individuals turned over their businesses to companies 
in which they held all shares and then proceeded to distribute little or nothing in the way of 
dividends (in some cases they took their profits from the companies in the form of loans, 
which were capital receipts, and did not fall to be included in a statement of total income for 
taxation purposes). The ordinary Income Tax was, of course, paid on the full profits of the 
business, but the proprietor was only charged with super-tax on such portion of those profits 
as he might choose to take by way of salary and dividends. By this means, an increasing 
number of rich people sought to evade the full measure of taxation which they should have 
borne in respect to their real financial position.299  
                                                             
298 The concerns members and directors shared about the effect of taxation and legislation on the development of 
their business and lock-in of capital are not isolated ones. For example, at the ordinary general meeting of The 
Mysore Gold Mining Co., Ltd., held on 1 August 1945 the chairman in his speech referring to the long-term 
policy of the company stated the following: ‘Our expectation was that, even though we mined a lower grade of 
ore, the higher price we should get for our gold would enable us [the company] not only to pay a modest 
dividend, but also to provide funds for capital expenditure. But these plans, unfortunately, went awry. There are 
two main causes for this; firstly, the immensely increased burden of taxation both in Mysore and in this country, 
and secondly, the increasing difficulty of obtaining essential supplies and replacements both in India and from 
this country (...)’. He reiterates that ‘Increased taxation, of course, is the inevitable result of a world war, but the 
imposition of the Mysore gold duty in March, 1940, came as an unexpected blow’. 
299 Heavy taxation has long been a problem for companies. Interestingly, in a meeting held on 28 February 1910, 
the chairman of The Forest Hill Brewery Company, Ltd, as it was written in the company’s Minutes Book of the 
General Meetings, stated that ‘in the present conditions of taxation the state was practically a partner in the 
Brewing Trade, without liability, as for years the state had taken in duties over 60% of the company’s total 
earnings’. See box LMA/ 4453/ M/ 01/ 002 at the London Metropolitan Archives. 
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With regard to the so-called one-man company, the documents I have scrutinized reveal 
that members would take care of their matters personally. They had private talks with the 
members of the Board of Inland Revenue, in the course of which they complained about the 
application to their companies of the ‘One-Man Company Legislation. Their point was that 
the profits not being distributed were essential for the proper development of the business, and 
for keeping up-to-date the equipment of the works. Moreover, members of private companies 
argued that the procedure which was being followed in the application of the terms of the 
Finance Act 1927, c. 10 to the assessment for income tax of the profits of PLCs would 
prejudice the maintenance of adequate financial resources within the company for future 
business development.300 Members of private companies contested that the Finance Act 1927 
was being used to bring pressure to bear upon such firms as was to distribute a larger 
proportion of their profits than was desirable. 
It was a fact that companies, private companies included, were exposed to fierce 
competition not only from inside the United Kingdom but also from the United States and 
from Germany, as there were no taxes of any kind against the importation of competing 
goods. Furthermore, the level of internalization of some of these companies is noteworthy. 
They held businesses in Russia, the United States and in Africa. Many competing concerns 
were carried on either with loss or very inadequate profits. In many cases these 
unsatisfactorily results had been due to failure to conserve the liquid assets of the respective 
companies with the result that they had found themselves with insufficient funds. Despite of 
the avoidance of super-tax, there were still private companies whose directors stated openly 
that their financial policy was kept uninfluenced by considerations regarding the super-tax. As 
a matter of fact, their directors recognized that it was not hard to trace the beginnings of the 
trouble in the insufficient restraint exercised by companies in the distribution of profits with a 
consequent inability to finance themselves in times of exceptional stress such as the years 
after the First World War. Nevertheless, private companies, when faced with a proposal to 
become public companies, which might have resulted in an improvement of their directors’ 
personal financial position, for some reason would refuse and go on as private.301 
 
                                                             
300 As described in the preamble of the Finance Act 1927, c. 10 this was an act to grant certain duties of customs 
and Inland Revenue (including Excise) to alter other duties and to amend the law relating to customs and Inland 
Revenue (including Excise) and the National Debt, and to make further provision in connection with finance. 
Article 31 (Provisions relating to super-tax) is germane to this narrative. 
301 Chancellor of the Exchequer's Office: Miscellaneous papers, Finance Act, 1927; Avoidance of Supertax, 
1928-1929, T 172/1645, TNA-Kew. 
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c. Irregular transfer of shares in the British Stone Marble Company, Limited 
 
I have also analyzed a complaint as to irregularities regarding a transfer of shares 
committed by the director of the company British Stone Marble Company, Limited. This 
complaint was filed with the Board of Trade in November 1908. This was a peculiar case 
where the question upon which the Board was called to decide was narrower than the case 
itself: Should the Board of Trade prosecute or not?  
I analyzed a letter from the Inland Revenue, dated as of 10 November 1908, letters as of 
1909 exchanged between the solicitors’ department of the Inland Revenue, a letter sent by the 
Secretary of the Inland Revenue, dated as of 17 March 1909 to the company, a letter sent by 
the Board of Trade requesting instructions to advise on the case involving the company and its 
director T. M. Thom, according to the Companies Act, 1862 to 1907, the opinion of Mr. Chas 
H. Sargant, solicitor of the Board of Trade, dated as of 10 February 1909, a reply to this 
opinion from Mr. R. Ellis Cunliffe, dated as of 11 February 1909, a reply to this opinion from 
Mr. Sargant dated as of 13 February 1909, a reply to the reply from Mr. Cunliffe, dated as of 
15 February 1909.  
The case goes as follows. The attention of the Board of Trade was called to the fact that 
a number of irregularities involving transfer of shares in the company British Stone Marble 
Company, Limited had occurred. Mr. Thom – the company’s director – according to a return 
of allotments made on 20 March 1903 had been allotted 6,076 shares, as of 4 to 18 February 
of that year. The shares had been personally allotted to Mr. Thom (as part of 40,000 shares) 
regarding a contract dated as of 4 February 1903. They were registered in his name. Yet, 
between this date and a return made on 19 July 1906, his holding was reduced to 3,247, while 
his returns from time to time showed that of the difference only about 870 shares had been, in 
fact, transferred. 
An informant to the Board of Trade on this matter explained that when applications for 
the company’s shares were submitted, Mr. Thom took the opportunity to substitute his own 
shares. He, thus, dispensed with a transfer in order to conceal that a director was transferring 
his shares. The Secretary of the Company gave a different explanation. He said that Mr. Thom 
did not know that shares had been allotted to him, and that he had agreed with the Secretary 
that certain allotments be made to his nominees.302  
                                                             
302 Nominee shareholders are not the legal owners of the shares. They hold the shares on behalf of the beneficial 
owner. This resonates with the French case in which, at least until Law 66.537 of 24 July 1966 (Loi sur les 
Sociétés Commerciales), managers held a very strong position in the company, almost unremoveable. 
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The Board’s view was that the agreement said nothing about allotments to nominees of 
the director and that it was clear to the Board that Mr. Thom’s explanation was untrue. The 
Board added that there were no doubts that he had become the owner of the shares and, 
therefore, he had to be registered as such. The Board of Trade also pointed out that it could 
not be questioned that he knew he was a member for he had been a director for the whole 
time. The board also understood that with Mr. Thom’s knowledge, although he never legally 
ceased to be a member, other people were returned as members in respect of some of these 
shares while he himself was returned as not the owner of them. The Board of Trade claimed 
that the loss to the Revenue of the stamp duty properly payable on the transfers was obvious, 
and investigated whether an offence had been committed under the applicable provisions of 
the Companies Act, 1862.  
 
d. Directors’ Private Minute Book of the Forest Hill Brewery Company, Limited: What 
happens when a director is hired without the authority of shareholders? 
 
The Directors’ Private Minute Book of the Forest Hill Brewery Company, Limited is a 
book where minutes of the meetings of the company’s board of directors were recorded as of 
1888 to 1919. The meetings of the board of directors were recorded privately. In other words, 
arrangements among directors were not made official.303  
A fund of the company was created where the directors should pay the sum of £500 to 
remain on deposit at call bearing interest at the rate of 5% per annum, subject to withdrawal 
either in part or in full by consent of the Board only, except in the event of the decease, 
resignation, or retirement from the Board from any cause of any director when under any such 
circumstances such director is resigning or retiring from the board, or in the event of the 
decease of any director the executors or administrators of such director should be at liberty to 
withdraw the said sum of £500 with interest, as aforesaid, made up to take by giving two 
months notice to the Board in writing.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Nowadays, unless the articles of association provide otherwise, managers are appointed for the duration of the 
the company (Article 223-18, 3rd paragraph of the French Commercial Code). However, back in those days, the 
law made a distinction between managers holding majority shares and managers holding minority shares, 
whether by themselves or by nominees. Managers with majority shares were viewed as independent traders with 
respect to the need to comply with fiscal and social security obligations. Managers with minority shares, on the 
contrary were perceived as employees of the company. Tax and company law rules were more favorable to 
employees than to traders. Consequently, it came out as appealing for some managers to appear to be minority 
shareholders by creating schemes by which her shares were held by others on her behalf. See Le Gall, Jean-
Pierre, and Morel, Paul, French Company Law, 2nd ed., London, Longman 1992, p. 49 (explaining this). 
303 London Metropolitan Archives, LMA/4453/M/01/003. 
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At the board meeting held on 14 May 1889304 a proposal for purchase of shares of one 
of the members of the Board of Directors was made. The purchaser tried to show to the Board 
his capabilities to effectively manage the Forest Hill Brewery Company. The potential vendor 
explained that in the extent of the arrangement being carried out he would be prepared to 
resign from his position of managing, but retaining that of chairman at a remuneration of say 
£150 or £200 per annum. That would imply affecting a saving to the company of about £450 
per annum. It was, however, resolved by a majority of the Board not to entertain the proposal 
as it was thought by the majority to be dangerous to, in any event, interfere with the 
management of the Brewing department which was being so satisfactorily carried on. This 
episode illustrates the importance of power, struggle and politics inside a private company. 
What is interesting is that these agreements are hidden from shareholders, discussed and 
recorded privately. 
Additionally, the reading of the minutes of the Board suggests that discussions were 
held privately and plans were drawn up on how to convince shareholders to vote for a 
particular member of the board of directors. Plus, it was agreed that whenever the three 
members of the Board were present, one of them should always abstain from voting. In the 
case of an equality of votes the chairman would have the casting vote. It was further agreed in 
consideration of the chairman and the chairman consenting to the re-appointment of a Board 
member, that in the event of a vacancy occurring on the Board, the directors would appoint, 
recommend and support the election of a particular person to fill such vacancy should it be so 
desired by the chairman. Records of the minutes show that rarely, if ever, did the Board 
consider whether undertaking these measures would be to the benefit of the shareholders of 
the company. In this case the Board of Directors acts as an organic institution inside the 
company, but with no connection to the shareholders. 
The case of Hay’s Wharf Cartage Company Limited, the usage of the private company 
to avoid taxation, the irregular transfer of shares of the British Stone Marble Company, 
Limited, and the private board meetings of the Forest Hill Brewery Company, Limited show 
that the perception of the business environment changes dramatically when the focus is rather 
put on the internal micro-sphere of the private company. Looking at this micro-sphere it 
allows us to understand that the decision-making process in these companies did not always 
follow the protocol established in the articles of association, especially if more interests than 
                                                             
304 At this point, the private limited company had not yet been accepted by legislators. Data show, however, that 
in the late nineteenth century, despite the inexistence of a legal regime, members of private companies would 
define them as such. 
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those of the members are involved. It also suggests that the private company can act like a 
player creating effective chains of communication with distinct sectors of the society. The 
series of narratives given above makes apparent the ability of members of private companies, 
especially directors, to closely deal with the political and administrative powers. Matters 
regarding labor, long-term policies of the firm, taxes, and even the healthcare of the 
community were openly discussed and praise was publicly offered to members of political 
and administrative bodies who collaborated with the firms and helped them to achieve their 
goals in business.  
I have referred to the private limited company as a ‘third way’ because it constitutes the 
historical evidence that imaginative skills of lawyers and businessmen have the ability to 
advance new organizational forms that go beyond legal forms made available by 
legislators.305 The novelty of this finding lies in the fact that it is more than a method where 
files of companies are analyzed. It is a new method in legal research where social and 
economic facts are analyzed through the lens of legal knowledge. It involves the realization of 
a legal ‘due diligence’ by which businesses are evaluated systematically and in context. This 
is something for which lawyers are particularly ‘vocationed’ and I tend to think that they 
already were so in the nineteenth century. Private companies are also an example of how 
spontaneous forms of combining action are still capable of surpassing lengthy court 
procedures and bargaining failures. Members just create their own practical schemes and try 
to evade doubtful legal rules to the benefit of their interests in the business they run. (There is 
a thin line between this and the emergence of agency problems). 
The overall social costs, however, and the role this kind of private governance plays in 
the evolution of legal institutions are reportedly not satisfactory. The political and economic 
environment as well as cyclical periods of war and peace spiced these business associations 
up to the point that games of political influence inside and outside the company were essential 
for the execution of relevant contracting businesses and, consequently, for these companies’ 
survival. This was so particularly in times of economic hardship.306 The many forms of 
                                                             
305 See Macaulay, Stewart, ‘Non-contractual relationships in business: A preliminary study’, American 
Sociological Review, vol. 28, n.º1, 1963, pp. 55-67 (arguing that, according to his empirical findings, contract 
and contract law are not always needed. Faced with this preliminary finding, and by providing an answer to the 
question when contract is then needed, Macaulay attributes to contract a governance nature and explains how it 
can enable communication intra and inter firms). 
306 Records show that private companies were often able to obtain from some government departments loans at 
relatively cheaper rates. In many instances, the roles of the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Transport were 
important. There was the perception that the plans of the government for dealing with the appalling problem of 
unemployment could only be met with success if the schemes of financial support and economic development 
and unemployment relief put forward by local authorities were assisted by the united efforts of all. For a picture 
of the instrumental use of private companies for the development of infrastructures and the attribution of loans at 
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private ordering and the context in which they were developed were not always adequate, 
especially when these companies’ legal framework was not based on laws promoting 
enforcement, strong property rights, and efficient allocation of resources.  
Considering the evolutionary pattern framing this research, the question, then, is 
whether the third way I have mentioned (the yield capacity private limited companies have to 
accommodate the interests of corporate constituencies regardless of static legal solutions and 
functional concerns related to the operation of the legal systems) can be better developed by 
company law alone or if this field will need to be backed up by contract law, property law and 
policy considerations favoring jurisdictional competition.  
This line of argumentation, however, implies more than a normative argument. Law has 
the great ability of enabling institutional evolution. Law, however, is as it goes. Therefore, in 
order to answer the question of the previous paragraph, we need to know first whether we 
need more or less law, and if it is the case that we need more law than less, how we (or should 
we) get there. I treat this at a later stage.307 I now turn to the legal features of the private 
limited company and to the transferability of its shares. 
 
ii. Restriction clauses on transfer of shares established in the articles of association of 
United Kingdom private limited companies 
 
The United Kingdom has been widely recognized as one of the first countries to provide 
rules for business associations.308 Crucial reforms in United Kingdom company law in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
cheaper rates, see the newspaper article ‘Cheap River Trips for Everyone. Fast Water Buses for London: Plans to 
Build a Hundred for Use Next Year. Richmond to Woolwich’, Thursday, The Daily Chronicle, February 27, 
1930, The National Archives BT 56/15. Private companies, in the context of the financial support provided by 
the state, were created to operate the services needed to put the projects for which governmental support was 
asked on the go. The companies were supposed to be prepared to limit their profits and agree to any reasonable 
official conditions which might be proposed. Since these projects were supposed to provide employment and 
economic development overall it was hoped that help would be given by the government under the Development 
(Loans and Guarantee Grants) Act 1929. The private company was perceived as an instrumental vehicle for 
sound industrial development and employment. Moreover, creating a private company was considered a way to 
avoid the type of ‘City of Finance’ which was solely interested in personal gain by methods which had produced 
the main financial disasters during the last few years. Only businessmen of the right type should be appointed as 
directors and that the chairman should be appointed pursuant to the financial interests supporting the respective 
schemes of development. The decade of the 1920s was a period of deflation in which many stockholders lost 
thousands of pounds. Many of them had not made war profits to meet those losses. Private companies were used 
as instruments of public investment to foster employment in areas such as public transportation (e.g., 
construction of aerodromes, railways, hydro-electric development of rivers for the supply of electric energy, 
development of water power resources, and the possibility of using those resources and electricity for 
agricultural purposes and rural industries). 
307 See Parts II and III. 
308 See Maitland, F.W., ‘Trust and Corporation’, in Runciman, David, and Ryan, Magnus (eds.), cit., pp. 75-130 
(97) (claiming in one of the passages of his essay that ‘...the liberty of action and experimentation that has been 
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nineteenth century were set into motion with the enactment of landmark legislation such as 
the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, the Registration Act 1944, the Limited Liability Act 
1855, the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, and the Companies Act 1862 on which United 
Kingdom companies relied on for most of the nineteenth century. This Act was consolidated 
by Companies Act 1929, Companies Act 1948, Companies Act 1985, and Companies Act 
1989. In the twentieth century, I point out hallmark legislation such as the Companies Act 
1907, formally acknowledging the private company. This Act was consolidated by the 
Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908. In addition, the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 
implementing in the United Kingdom the legal framework of limited partnerships was 
especially significant.309  
Today, this engagement of United Kingdom legislators in establishing rules for the 
operation of companies continues to play a major role. The Companies Act 2006 is yet 
another example. Private companies are defined therein in Section 4 (1) as ‘…any company 
that is not a public company’. Section 4 (4) provides that this provision must be read together 
with the provisions of Part 20 for further distinctions between private and public companies. 
According to Section 755, a private company must not offer any of its shares to the public. 
Section 756 provides the meaning of ‘offer to the public’.310 Regarding the nature of shares, 
Section 541 of Companies Act 2006 establishes that ‘The shares or other interest of a member 
in a company are personal property (or, in Scotland, moveable property) and are not in the 
nature of real estate (or heritage)’. Section 544 (1) of the Companies Act 2006 provides that 
‘The shares or other interest of any member in a company are transferable in accordance with 
the company’s articles’. This is not so different from Section 22 of the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 1908 which yielded that ‘The shares or other interest of any member in a 
company shall be personal estate, transferable in manner provided by the articles of the 
company and shall not be of the nature of real estate’. Apropos the definition of company 
member, Section 112 of the Companies Act 2006 spells out that  
 
(1) The subscribers of a company’s memorandum are deemed to have agreed to become 
members of the company, and on its registration become members and must be entered as such 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
secured to us by the Trust is best seen in the freedom with which from a remote time until the present day 
Anstalten [institutions] and Stiftungen [foundations] of all sorts and kinds had been created by Englishmen’). 
309 See Butler, Henry N., ‘General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law 
and Legislative Processes’, International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 6, 1986, pp. 169-187, and Harris, 
Ron, ‘The Private Origins of the Private Company’, cit., pp. 339-378. 
310 See Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed., London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008, pp. 13-16 (for a distinction between public and private companies in the United Kingdom). 
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in its register of members. (2) Every other person who agrees to become a member of a 
company, and whose name is entered in its register of members, is a member of the company’.  
 
This section basically maintains the same wording as previous Section 24 of the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 1908. 
I focus on the companies’ articles agreed or chosen by their members. They consist of 
the ‘constitutional’ charter of the company311 by which its members regulate their business. In 
the United Kingdom literature, articles of association are drawn as a contract with statutory 
nature which links the company to its members and binds the company’s members to each 
other.312 At present, as it has been historically the case, the ‘constitutional rules’ of United 
Kingdom companies are spread over their memoranda and articles of association. Hence, 
technically the company’s ownership structure, the distribution of power between their 
members and directors, and the composition of the management body should be possible to 
grasp by reading both documents. The difference between memoranda and articles is that 
memoranda are documents which constitute clear evidence of the terms in which members 
subscribing them wished to incorporate.313 Moreover, if the company is limited by shares the 
memorandum also provides a description of the number of shares and nominal value each 
member is subscribing. 
I have collected a sample of memoranda and articles of association of 29 United 
Kingdom companies. Dates of their incorporation range as of 1888 to 2008. By creating this 
sample, my main purpose was to learn the type of restrictions on transfers of shares members 
introduced in the companies’ articles.314 Moreover, as research developed and I had access to 
                                                             
311 In Parts II and III, I develop the term ‘contract for the governance opportunity’ to describe the articles of 
association. 
312 US courts have yielded a similar understanding. For example, see KANSAS HEART HOSPITAL, L.L.C. v. 
IDBEIS 184 P.3d 866 (Kan. 2008) (where the court held that ‘The bylaws of a corporation are self-imposed rules 
resulting from an agreement or contract between the corporation and its members to conduct the corporate 
business in a particular way, and consequently bylaws are interpreted in the same manner as other contracts’). In 
the American literature, see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy’, University of 
Illinois Law Review, vol. 2009, 1, 2009, pp. 131-166 (133) (presenting similar arguments regarding the 
uncorporation in the United States, that is, limited partnerships (LPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs). 
Ribstein argues that ‘Uncorporate business forms rely on specific contractual devices to provide incentives and 
managerial discipline, reducing their need to rely on monitoring devices such as owner voting, independent 
directors, fiduciary duties, and derivative litigation. The parties, therefore, can tailor their contracts to their 
needs, and courts do not need to develop fiduciary duties to deal with a multitude of situations’). 
313 Normally, the following formulation is presented in memoranda: ‘We the several persons of whose names 
and addresses are subscribed are desirous of being formed into a company in pursuance of this memorandum of 
association, and we respectively agree to take the number of shares in the capital of the company set opposite our 
respective names’. 
314 It is equally interesting to learn how often they do it. However, since this is a qualitative analysis, it only 
provides information that enables the reader to glimpse the content of these clauses. It does not provide 
quantitative information as a source of statistical analysis. 
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new data, I became interested in understanding who in these companies has the power to 
influence the design of rules, and how interests of members and directors can affect the way 
rules are designed. I created a sample of companies to analyze their memoranda and articles 
of association through Bureau van Dijk’s database Fame. At a first stage, I designed my own 
research by selecting on Fame the variables such as country (England and Wales) and type of 
companies (private limited companies). Subsequently, I streamlined the terms of my search by 
including other variables such as the company’s name, the registered number, latest accounts 
dates, latest operating revenue (turnover), number of shareholders, number of employees, 
number of directors, the company’s status, legal form, date of incorporation, trade and 
business line description, and BvD independence indicator.315 I selected 15 companies out of 
this sample. At a second stage, in order to simplify the search even more, I substituted the 
variable ‘country’ for the variable ‘city’. I kept all other variables. I singled out 14 companies 
with registered offices in London. I compared the information I gathered from Fame with the 
information provided by Amadeus, given that the latter is a pan-European database. Once I 
sampled these 29 companies, I collected their memoranda and articles of association from 
Companies House’s records.316 Information was listed according with the name of the 
companies, date of incorporation, registered office, number of shareholders, number of 
current directors, status, employees, BvD independence indicator, share capital, business 
object and history of the company, and transfer clause. These elements were systematically 
listed as they were drawn in the constitutional documents of the company at the date of its 
incorporation. I made an integrated analysis by trying to signal relevant changes to the 
‘constitutional’ documents of the companies according with the applicable Companies Acts – 
Companies Act 1862, Companies Act 1948, Companies Act 1985, Companies Act 1989, and 
Companies Act 2006. According to the sample above, I clustered transfer restrictions inserted 
in the articles of association irrespective of whether these restrictions had a procedural nature 
(e.g., the way consent must be obtained or the terms in which the transfer must be executed) 
or simply a substantive nature (e.g., the requirement of the unanimous consent of other 
members). These restrictions, therefore, took several different forms. They can be typified 
according to the following clusters. It may be the case that 
                                                             
315 The BvD independence indicator indicates the level of independence of companies with regard to their 
shareholders. A relevant question as to the BvD Independence indicator is whether these indicators can be split 
into different categories.  
316 Documents of private companies such as memoranda and articles of association are publicly available at the 
Companies House webcheck: URL: http://wck2.companieshouse.gov.uk//wcframe?name=accessCompanyInfo 
(last accessed on 19 March 2014). 
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1. The board is entitled to refuse, in its absolute discretion, to register a transfer of any 
share to any person whom it shall not approve as a transferee, without regard to the 
share being fully paid up or not;317 
2. Any member may transfer her shares subject to the restrictions of the articles; 
3. The instrument of transfer of share shall be executed by or on behalf of the transferor 
and the transferor shall be deemed to remain the holder of the share until the name of 
the transferee is entered in the register. In the case of a partly paid share the 
instrument of transfer must also be executed by or on behalf of the transferee; 
4. The instrument of transfer shall be executed by or on behalf of the transferor who 
must sell her share against the payment of a fair value. This value must be fixed 
between the intending transferor and the directors by agreement, or failing that 
agreement, the sum will be determined by a chartered accountant (who may be an 
auditor appointed by the directors); 
5. Shares may only be transferred with the unanimous consent of all other holders of 
ordinary shares; 
6. Any share may be at any time transferred by a member to a company which is a 
member of the same group as the transferor, provided that if the transferee ceases to 
be a member of the same group as the transferor, it shall forthwith transfer all of the 
shares held by it to the transferor from whom it acquired them or to another member 
of the same group as the transferor; 
7. The articles recognize that the creation or permission to subsist any pledge, lien or 
charge over, or the grant of any option or sale, transfer or otherwise disposition of 
any share (or any interest in the share held by the intending transferor) or if those 
acts will result in any breach of any of the provisions of any contract the company 
has entered into (e.g. a loan agreement) they must be forbidden; 
                                                             
317 Prior to the Companies Act 2006, directors could discretionarily refuse to register a transfer. It was, however, 
well established that a transferee right to be registered as a member remained until and unless the directors 
actively refused to register the transfer. Moreover, the right of directors to refuse must be exercised without an 
undue delay. Under normal circumstances this would mean a two-month delay. Now s. 771(2) of the Companies 
Act provides that ‘If the company refuses to register the transfer, it must provide the transferee with such further 
information about the reasons for the refusal, as the transferee may reasonably request. This does not include 
copies of minutes of meetings of directors. This, however, does not diminish the scope of the fiduciary duty of 
directors acting in good faith (bona fide). Also relevant is s. 994 regulating the petition by a company member 
for an order of the court for instance on the ground that ‘the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted 
in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members 
(including at least himself); or that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or 
omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. 
 150 
 
8. No share may be transferred or disposed of, and the directors shall not register the 
transfer of any share unless that transfer and disposal is made in accordance with the 
terms of any relevant agreement (e.g. between the intending transferor and the 
directors); 
9. Directors must approve the terms and conditions of the transfer in general; 
10. The transferor remains the holder of a share until the transferee’s name is entered 
into the register of members as a holder of it. 
 
First, from the data I collected I learned that most companies in my sample are qualified 
in Fame and Amadeus under the variable ‘peer group name’ as very large companies (VL). 
This sample shows that the features of the organizational form do not necessarily coincide 
with the size. These companies, although private, are not small. This is manifestly different 
from the reality of Southern European peripheries – Portugal, Spain and Italy – and France. 
This distinctive trait of United Kingdom private companies is interesting. Often, this group of 
United Kingdom companies does business beyond the national market’s borders. They have a 
remarkable presence overseas and are certainly not afraid to show their ‘made-in-the-UK’ 
logo stamped in the products they export. Additionally, their number of recorded employees 
ranges from 10 to 6,345 employees. The number of directors associated with the companies 
is, according with Fame, very high. The highest number of recorded directors of a company in 
the sample is 166. The number of current directors varies, however, between 3 and 11. The 
number of shareholders goes from 1 to 3. Moreover, their share capital is generally high, 
divided into shares of 1£ each. 
Second, it became apparent that companies present a low level of independence vis-a-
vis their shareholders. The share capital is not widely dispersed due to the low number of 
shareholders. This is, for the most part, obvious in respect to closed companies. The 
interesting aspect is that control of the company, at least with regard to the ownership 
structure and how it can be altered through the transfer of shares, lies with the directors.318 In 
this sample, most directors are individuals who are not shareholders, nor do they have any 
kind of membership interest in the company.319 All these companies have centralized 
management. This is rather outstanding because normally private companies are recognized 
                                                             
318 The articles of association of the company Selfridges Holding Limited included in the sample of United 
Kingdom private companies provide that shares are under control of directors. By control the articles mean the 
power to ‘…allot and dispose of or grant options over the same to such persons, on such terms and in such 
manner as they think fit’. 
319 The company Total Global Steel Ltd. included in the sample of United Kingdom private companies is one 
exception given that, according to the articles of association, the director also is a member. 
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for featuring strong control of shareholders, namely by them taking part of the management of 
the company. This is the case of Italy, for example, where, as we have seen, PLLCs are 
strongly dependent on their shareholders and they effectively exert control over the company. 
The separation of ownership rights and effective control of the companies suggested by 
the sample of United Kingdom companies is liable to frame the occurrence of conflicts of 
interests at the micro-level and agency problems. This is not a new story since Berle and 
Means.320 However, they addressed this problem regarding the publicly held company. This 
scenario in the private company can potentially affect the governance and internal 
relationships between shareholders and managers in an unexpected way.321  
 
III. Market 
 
i. Challenges to property rights of members and their transfer 
 
The internal dynamics of the company and ultimate decision-making power in the 
United Kingdom private company are emulated by bargaining failures in these companies that 
fuel contentious disputes. I created a taxonomy based upon 14 cases adjudicated by courts in 
the United Kingdom regarding restrictions on transfer of shares. Disputes are closely related 
to the inherently contractual nature of the company’s internal rules. In fact, this contractual 
approach to the company’s articles is promoted by the Companies Act 2006, and enjoys a 
longstanding tradition in United Kingdom company law. The Companies Act provides a 
considerable number of default rules and model articles – Table A or also called ‘optional 
model constitution’ of the company - which leave much room to members of the company to 
settle the terms of its internal governance. Most companies, for which memoranda and articles 
of association were tracked, adopted Table A insofar as it was not altered or excluded by the 
company’s articles of association. This suggests two things. On one hand, it shows the 
                                                             
320
 See Berle, Adolf. A, and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., 
New York, Harcourt, 1967. Also see Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H. ‘Theory of the firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, 
vol. 3, No 4, pp. 305-360 (This paper focuses on the behavioral implications of property rights specified in 
contracts between owners and managers of the firm. It does not work out, however, its application to the very 
large modern corporation whose owners own little or no equity. Additionally, although this paper refers 
predominantly to the publicly held corporation, it is of interest to note the contractual approach to agency costs 
taken by Jensen and Meckling).  
321 I address this issue from a normative point of view, in Part II, Chapter 3, where I refer to the need to pierce 
the ownership veil to understand who effectively controls the company. 
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contractual nature of the undertaking. On the other hand, it shows that law can actually have a 
nudging effect.322 
The case law I selected covers cases in which the company, its members and directors 
(in these circumstances often also members of the company) have to face possible changes in 
the company’s ownership structure. These changes are liable to be brought forth through the 
transfer of shares in the relevant concerns. Disputes, therefore, are mainly related to the 
imposition of restrictions on transfers. The nature of such restrictions is signaled by the type 
of conflicts involving the transferor or intending transferor, other members, directors, and the 
company. The perception other constituencies such as employees and managers have of the 
conflict is additionally brought to the fore. These constituencies, like shareholders, also make 
investments in the company or hold particular interests in it.323 The cases cover a range of 
situations where shareholders’ property rights and their transfer are challenged mainly by 
contractual frameworks and procedural devices set in the companies’ articles. The legal issues 
United Kingdom courts had to deal with can be arranged in the same clusters I have used in 
the previous chapter to treat the market parameter in Portugal, France, Italy and Spain.  
 
1. Interpretation 
(i) Cases entailing problems of corporate constituencies, namely members, in 
interpreting the clause of the articles of association imposing restrictions on 
transfers of shares. 
 
2. Functionality of restrictions on transfers 
(i) Cases dealing with compulsory transfers; 
(ii) Cases dealing with oppression of minority shareholders; 
(iii) Cases dealing with claims of breach of fiduciary duties by members of the 
board of directors 
 
3. Un-consented transfer on shares 
(i) Cases dealing with transfer of shares without compliance of the restrictions 
imposed by the articles of association. 
                                                             
322 This can be compared with the statutory law regulating the LLC in the states of Delaware and New York, 
which is mostly facilitative. The LLC in the United States, particularly in these two states, is treated below. 
323 This is in line with contemporary stakeholder theory which tries to analyze how shareholders and other 
groups in the firm can be residual claimants. See Gelter, Martin, ‘Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light’, NYU Journal of Law & Business, vol. 7, 2011, pp. 
641-730. 
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4. Formalities 
(i) Cases dealing with offers to purchase the shares of the petitioner for a fair 
value in accordance with pre-emption clauses; 
(ii) Cases dealing with the refusal by the directors to register the transfer in the 
register of members. 
 
It is apparent that parties in a dispute do not know or do not understand the clauses 
provided by the company’s articles. Parties, or at least one of the parties, happen to ignore the 
provisions of the articles of association they adopted. For example, directors may disregard 
the respective rules of the articles of association and delay for an unreasonable amount of time 
the board meeting to decide on whether to accept or refuse a transfer of shares. In these 
situations courts have stressed the general principle that a transfer duly lodged should be 
brought before the board of directors within a reasonable time after it was lodged where the 
articles of association contained a restriction on transfer.324 The fact that parties do not 
understand or ignore the rules of the articles of association is rather surprising since members 
were the ones who, at the very outset, established the internal rules of the company. Cases 
collected are anecdotal since they stand for only a small part of the overflowing case law on 
this matter. Yet, the sample shows how courts have to deal with problems of interpretation. 
Their standing is clear on this matter.325 Courts are not supposed to substitute parties in their 
pleadings. They are not supposed to assume a paternalistic position with regard to the 
obligations binding the parties as a result of a contract they entered between themselves. 
Parties, and not the court, are the best judges of their own interests. If that is not so, the court 
still cannot relieve them of what would be an expectable scenario following the deterioration 
of their contractual relationships.326 
There is, however, a point at which the court’s standing gives way to a more 
interventionist response. That is the point at which public interest is at stake. This may be the 
case, for example, when a private company doing business in the securities market 
                                                             
324 See Re Swaledale Cleaners, Ltd. [1968] 1 All ER 1132, [1968] 1 WLR 432; and Re Inverdeck Ltd [1998] 2 
BCLC 242, [1998] BCC 256. 
325 See Davies, Paul L., cit., pp. 942-945. 
326 See Cheffins, Brian R., ‘Does law matter? The separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 
The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 30, No 2, 2001, pp. 459-484 (468-472) (explaining that the English system did 
not qualify as a protective jurisdiction for outside investors. Prior to the middle of the 20th century, a ‘hands-off’ 
approach prevailed in company law. Therefore, neither companies’ legislation, nor relevant common-law 
principles afforded explicit protection to minority shareholders. Moreover, courts were accused of failing to 
provide effective protection to minority shareholders against the oppression of majority shareholders).  
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purposefully hides information from investors as to the fact that shares they were buying 
could not be traded freely. Courts are likely to intervene if there is evidence of asymmetries of 
information as to how property rights can be transferred and if there is a deceitful ‘marketing 
of shares’. It is more difficult to achieve action of the court when the petition refers to private 
companies where apparently there is not a risk for the public. In these circumstances, it is 
important, therefore, that records show clearly to whom the shares in any particular 
certificates belong. So, in these cases it seems that the burden is put on the transferor’s side. 
She is the one who must ensure, especially if the investment is unusual or speculative, that the 
contents of her sale documents are not misleading, either as to the nature of her interest as a 
member, or as to the absence of any restrictions affecting the shares, or as to her connection to 
the company or otherwise.327 In this context, however, how property rights in a share are 
effectively transferred is questionable.328 A transfer of a share in breach of the company’s 
articles of association is not void to the extent that it confers no interest on the plaintiff. 
Depending on the articles, the transfer between the parties may be complete and effective to 
confer a beneficial interest in the transferee, even though it will only make the transferee the 
legal owner of the shares once it is registered. Moreover, ownership of the shares depends on 
who has the right to be registered as a member.329 To the extent property rights are put in 
doubt by the effects of un-consented transfer of shares, this echoes the Portuguese, Spanish, 
Italian, and French cases.330 Nonetheless, registration appears in the United Kingdom as the 
distinctive feature of the United Kingdom legal system of transfer of certified shares. This is 
treated further on.331 For now, I am interested in drawing a preliminary conclusion as to who 
holds the ultimate control in a company and, consequently, who has the ultimate power to 
affect the design of rules regulating the company’s internal affairs and ownership structure. 
Although shareholders are residual claimants and are parties to the articles of the 
company, directors have the ultimate power to affect the rules by deciding whether or not to 
allow a register of the transfer. They provide the framework in which shares can be transferred 
and ownership altered. However, the reported breach of fiduciary duties and conflict of 
interests triggered by their position as directors and also as members of the company does not 
ease the terms in which my conclusions are taken. For example, the company’s articles 
establish formulas to determine the fair value of the shares. They are applied whenever a 
                                                             
327 See Re Walter L Jacob & Co Ltd. 
328 See Davies, Paul L., cit., pp. 939-942. 
329 See Davies, Paul L., cit., p. 940. 
330 See Part I, Chapter 2. 
331 See Part II, Chapters 2 and 3. 
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shareholder wants to leave or when she, whilst being simultaneously a director, is removed 
from her office. Somehow, this can be used to oppress minority shareholders who are pushed 
to accept a value which is much lower than the actual value of the share. On the other hand, 
when minority shareholders do not accept the terms in which that value was determined and, 
therefore, delegate this task to the court, within the very width of its jurisdiction, this too can 
become a means of oppression. The threat of this proceeding by a dissident and possibly a 
legally aided shareholder in a small company can be used to bring pressure on the majority to 
accept the price she demands for her shares.  
All cases collected show that the imposition of restrictions on transfer of shares of 
private companies is a random measure. Often, reference to the respective provision in the 
articles is made by the court. Conversely, cases suggest that the correct interpretation of such 
provisions is a hard task not only for the judge, but in particular for the members. It might be 
that members only have to deal with those provisions once they have a dispute. Frequently, 
model articles are adopted, and shareholders negotiate particulars of the company and their 
relationships. Yet, if articles are not carefully drafted and are liable, therefore, to drag along 
intricate questions of interpretation, then provisions establishing restrictions on transferability 
are likely to fail to achieve their goal.  
Furthermore, these cases illustrate that members anyway ignore the restrictions and 
transfer their shares. Other times, the negotiation process leading to the resignation of the 
member is as difficult as it is lengthy. This is due to the deterioration of the relationships 
between members and to the lack of understanding as to the fairness of share values. This 
makes members simply want to cease investing and leave as quickly as possible. They accept, 
for example, that the terms of the transfer are dictated by the transferee or a third party. This 
leaves considerable uncertainty about the effect of the un-registered, or, broadly speaking, un-
consented transfer, and thus leaves in doubt the parties’ property rights. It is quite so, 
especially if clauses are difficult to interpret, if rules operate against parties’ expectations, and 
there are notorious bargaining failures which must be borne by the parties alone. This implies 
understanding how freedom of contract is perceived by UK courts, especially in the field of 
corporate law. UK courts, for the most part similar to US courts, tend to take an objective 
approach to contracts. They read the disputed facts in light of the terms of the contract. If it is 
the case that solutions to the contentious dispute cannot be found within the contract, rarely is 
the case that the court will be a surrogate for the parties’ will expressed in the contract, unless 
it is warranted by a statutory authority that it does so. Re Castleburn Ltd, a case adjudicated 
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by the Chancery Division, constitutes one good example of the objectivity of UK courts.332 In 
this case, the court held that 
 
…having regard to the articles [of association] the petitioner could have had no legitimate 
expectation that in the event of a breakdown of relations between himself and the team they 
would not be relied on to require him to sell his shares at fair value. To hold the contrary would 
not be to superimpose equitable considerations on his rights under the articles but to relieve him 
from a bargain that he made. 
 
It also is important to understand the degree of autonomy members have in light of the 
shares they own and the organizational design of the company. Knowing who is truly at the 
helm, and how this is likely to influence the development of the company is critical 
information that rests on defining the nature of shares and the rights that inhere to them.333  
 
2. THE UNITED STATES  
 
I now turn to US business organizations and, in particular, to the limited liability 
company (LLC) - the American counterpart of the PLLC in Europe. The emergence and 
development of the LLC is generally associated with the Wyoming LLC Act, and the relevant 
tax issues around which the Act emerged. Frequently, LLCs are defined as business 
organizations which “…provide a corporate-styled liability shield with pass-through tax 
benefits of a partnership”.334 This section, however, goes beyond this tax frame, and tries to 
                                                             
332 [1989] BCC 652, (Transcript: Counsell & Co).  
333 These issues are addressed in Part II, Chapters 2 and 3. 
334
 See White v. Longley, 358 Mont. 268, 244 P.3d 753, 760 (2010). In the literature see Macey, Jonathan R., 
‘The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law’, Washington University Law Quartely, vol. 73, 
1995, pp. 433-454 (433) (defining the LLC as ‘… a noncorporate entity that provides its owners with protection 
against liability for enterprise obligations, as well as the pass-through tax treatment traditionally associated with 
partnerships and Subchapter S corporations. At the same time, the limited liability company form allows 
investors to remain actively involved in the management of the enterprise’); see Bainbridge, Stephen M., 
Agency, Partnerships & LLCs, New York, New York, Foundation Press, 2004, p. 7 (defining LLC with 
reference to tax considerations. In his words the LLC is ‘… an unincorporated business organization providing 
its members with pass through tax treatment, limited liability and the ability to actively participate in firm 
management’). But see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company’, The Business 
Lawyer, vol. 51, 1, 1995, pp. 1-49 (5) (stressing that it is important to keep in mind, however, that LLCs and 
other types of business associations are not just appendages of tax law’). See Hansmann, Henry et al., ‘Law and 
the Rise of the Firm’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 119, No. 5, 2006, pp. 1333-1403 (advocating that ‘entity 
shielding’, that is, the protection of the firm’s assets from the shareholders’ personal creditors, is economically 
and historically more important than limited liability. For them, entity shielding and not so much limited liability 
has been historically and economically crucial for the development of business organizations not only in the 
United States, but also elsewhere (Italy and England). Also see Guinanne, Timothy et. al.,‘Ownership and 
Control in the Entrepreneurial Firm: An International History of Private Limited Companies’, Yale University 
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understand what motivated the creation of the LLC in the United States. Was it inspired by the 
European limited liability company, which was historically imported by Latin American 
countries such as Panama, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico? Or does the LLC solely derive 
from existing domestic laws?335 Furthermore, this section tries to unveil the appealing 
elements of the PLLC which, besides the tax issue, are likely to make investors opt for this 
type of business organization and not for a closely held corporation, for example. Most 
importantly, I try to understand what it took, and what sort of ‘mutations’336 happened in the 
American legal system such that these companies finally came into the spectrum of business 
organizations in the United States.337 
 
I. State 
 
i. The LLC breakthrough: state experimentation and legal engineering 
 
The history of the PLLC and the story of its breakthrough in the US legal system have 
been told elsewhere.338 Hence, what I present here, on this regard, is more of a summary. The 
novelty of this narrative, however, is that the story is not over yet and, judging by its youth, it 
seems the best is yet to come for the LLC. 
There were early attempts to implement the PLLC in the United States. Reportedly, in 
1874 the state of Pennsylvania enacted a statute creating a partnership association whose 
tradable shares and whose capital would alone be liable for the debts of the partnership 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 959, December 2007, accessed at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp959.pdf  (6 February 2013), p. 8, note 7 (largely setting tax issues 
aside). 
335 See ‘British Forming Shoe Agency’, Wall Street Journal (1889-1922) [New York, N.Y] 01 Oct. 1919: 10. 
(noticing, in early nineteenth century, that the American Chamber of Commerce in London understands that the 
shoe industry of Great Britain is forming a National Export Selling Agency as a limited liability company to 
develop the foreign trade of its members). Additionally, see the following article about English joint stock 
companies published by an American journal. ‘Joint Stock Companies in England’, Wall Street Journal (1889-
1922) [New York, N.Y] 01 Oct. 1919: 10 (‘Under the head, "Fifty Years of Joint Stock Enterprise," the London 
Financial News of July 17 publishes an exhaustive account of the various laws enacted by Parliament governing 
joint stock companies, with especial reference to the Act of 1855, granting limited liability for certain 
companies, and the various amendments passed up to the present time. It was this law that gave to the 
commercial world the word "limited" as used in connection with any company claiming to be more than a mere 
partnership’). Many of these joint stock companies were American firms. 
336 By mutation, which is a term used in biology, I mean abrupt transitions. 
337 See Ribstein, Larry E., cit, p. 120 (mentioning that ‘This LLC revolution occurred despite the reluctance of 
courts, state lawmakers, and federal tax authorities to sanction a new business form. It resulted from several 
factors that had been brewing change prior to 1988 beneath a seemingly placid status quo’.). 
338
 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Evolution of the Modern Uncorporation’, in idem, The Rise of the 
Uncorporation, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 119-135; Carney, William J., ‘Limited Liability 
Companies: Origins and Antecedents, University of Colorado Law Review, vol. 66, 4, 1995, pp. 855-880; 
Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company’, cit., pp. 3-6. 
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association.339 Virginia also passed a similar statute. However, it was repealed in 1918. 
Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio adopted similar laws in 1877, 1880, 1881 respectively.340 In 
the cases of Portugal and France treated above, the respective legislators referred to the 
business forms with limited liability in the most industrialized nations in the world, including 
the United States. This hints at a phenomenon of legal transplantation going on both sides. 
Like in the United Kingdom, courts were oftentimes skeptical as to the new forms of 
business association, and frequently their judgments reduced the likelihood that partnership 
associations would assert themselves as solid alternatives to the ‘normal’ partnership. The fact 
is that in the second half of the nineteenth century anything businessmen wanted to do could 
be done through the corporation.341 Historically, Portugal, France, Italy, and Spain have had 
distinct laws for the corporation and the partnership which somehow preceded the adoption of 
the PLLC in these jurisdictions. The United Kingdom is a particular case because it was not 
until 1907 that the distinction between private and public companies was made in the law. 
Still, today, the law does not provide for a clear distinction. There certainly are sections of the 
Companies Act 2006 that exclusively apply to public companies. However, there is a lot of 
overlap, more so than in most other countries. The evolution of the LLC in the United States 
was different. The LLC and the corporation can be very similar, and it seems, at times, that it 
                                                             
339 I thank Naomi Lamoreaux for her insights on this subject. Naturally, all mistakes and omissions are mine. In 
1873, there was a State Constitutional Convention in Pennsylvania in which corporations were discussed. For the 
most part, this is what happens in state conventions. Some people held up Great Britain as the model to follow. 
Pennsylvanian law was restrictive. The year after the Constitutional Convention, the Pennsyvanian legislator met 
up with other stakeholders and spent time discussing a new corporation law. It was still very restrictive. 
Following this debate and the ongoing discussion about the corporate form, legislators passed, with almost no 
discussion, the law of the partnership association. It is interesting that after the law of the partnership association 
was passed, only four states followed suit. Until this day, it is difficult to explain why only four states passed 
similar laws and there was not a major diffusion of the new business form. My evolutionary argument tries to 
shed light on this question. 
340 See Guinanne, Timothy et al. ‘Ownership and Control in the Entrepreneurial Firm’, cit. pp. 35-36 (providing 
the results of their own research on this matter). 
341 See ‘Nature of the Stock Company’, Wall Street Journal (1889-1922) [New York, N.Y] 11 Oct. 1907: 3 
(noting that ‘Limited liability was recognized by the New York Constitution of 1846 in respect to banks issuing 
notes. It was not until the English Companies Act of 1862 that limited liability became a well recognized part of 
general law. This Act was followed in many respects by the French Act of 1867 and by acts of the various state 
legislators in America’). Also see note 335 above referring to the recognition by the American Chamber of 
Commerce of the British National Export Selling Agency as a limited liability company. This suggests that 
American legislators were pretty much aware of what was being done in Europe, and that they may not have 
imported the LLC from Latin American as it is normally explained in textbooks. In fact, Americans have never 
been alienated from what happened in Europe. There were numerous attempts to codify law in the nineteenth 
century. A notorious example is the work developed by the American lawyer David Dudley Field II in civil 
procedure law. The scholarship of Savigny on historical jurisprudence greatly influenced ‘Langdellian’ 
American legal thought. Realists were also inspired by German academics of the so-called ‘school of free law’. 
The Uniform Commercial Code, that had Karl Llewellyn as one of the drafters, was influenced by German law. 
Naturally, legislators of the state of Wyoming might not be aware of these aspects. See Kennedy, Duncan, ‘A 
Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law’, in Brownsword, Roger et al. (eds.), The 
Foundations of European Private Law, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2011, pp. 185-220 
(explaining further differences between the United States and Europe). 
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all comes down to the rule of ticking the box for tax purposes. However, in the United States, 
LLCS are generally seen as a type of partnership. Back in the nineteenth century and even 
before, partnership associations, and before them, mere partnerships giving form to small 
companies always brewed in the United States.342 Figures dated as of 1898 show new 
‘industrial’ companies formed as ‘limited liability corporations’. They suggest that the 
principle of limited liability had been applied in late nineteenth century to a range of firms 
during the industrial boom.343 
Despite the documented variation in corporate forms,344 it was not before the second 
half of the twentieth century that the LLC was implemented in the United States. There were 
first attempts to pass legislation adopting the LLC in Alaska in 1975 and 1976 respectively, 
but these attempts were not successful. Wyoming passed the first US state LLC statute in 
1977, which triggered a ‘LLC revolution’ in the United States.345 This revolution, however, 
was not immediate. The Hamilton Brothers Oil Company with registered office in Denver, a 
company familiar with Panamanian corporations with limited liability (also referred to in the 
literature as limitadas), lobbied with the legislator of the state of Wyoming for the creation of 
                                                             
342 Two good examples are the Carnegie Steel Company Ltd., a partnership association, and the R. Hoe & Co.’s 
Establishment, a partnership. Regarding the Carnegie Steel Company Ltd., see Guinnane, Timothy et al., 
‘Ownership and Control in the Entrepreneurship Firm: An International History of Private Limited Companies’, 
Economic Growth Center Yale University, cit., pp. 1-63; Livesay, Harold C. in Oscar Handlin (ed.), Andrew 
Carnegie and the Rise of Big Business, Longman Publishing Group, 2000; Livesay, Harold C., American Made: 
Shapers of the American Economy, 3rd ed., Upper Saddle River, N.J: Pearson Education, 2012; and Chandler, 
Alfred D., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, 1977, Cambridge, 
Massaschussets, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
As to R. Hoe & Co, see ‘R. Hoe & Co.’s Establishment, A Day among Machinery’, New York Daily Times, vol. 
5, N.º 1275, New York, Friday, October 19, 1855 (noting that R. Hoe & Co was a successful printing business. 
Its rapid development spoke for the progress of the American industry back in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The work force of this company comprised four hundred employees. This company was fairly large and 
used several facilities to develop what was considered a thriving business. It was, however, a family company, a 
partnership at a time in which there was as yet no glimpse of the LLC. Robert Hoe came to New York City in 
1805, when he was eighteen years old. Considered a genius by many, he managed to foster an important range of 
businesses in the city of New York by taking up the manufacture of printing presses in 1819, and taking as a 
partner Peter Smith, his brother-in-law and inventor of the Smith Press. The company clearly had an 
international profile and it significantly contributed to the extension of the American presses. In 1833, Robert 
Hoe retired and put the company’s business into the hands of his son, Richard M. Hoe. The latter, together with 
two others, Sereno Newton and Matthew Smith, were in charge of the operation of the firm. The business grew 
steadily, and it was lucrative. In 1855 the members of the company were Richard M. Hoe, Robert Hoe, and Peter 
Smith Hoe. The superintendent of the works was Alfred S. Bowen, who had been connected with the company 
for twenty-five years. The surnames of the members make explicit the family links among them. The size of the 
company illustrates how big business in the United States often started out small. It was, as pointed out at the 
time, ‘…a place worth studying, in all its departments, as an excellent example of what may be accomplished 
through the channels of American Industry”). 
343 ‘The Industrial Boom’, Wall Street Journal (1889-1922) [New York, N.Y] 07 Dec. 1898: 1. 
344 A more thorough investigation would have to be made to understand the relationship between the form of 
these companies and their size. Possibly, learning about their business object would also be helpful to understand 
the market wherein they do their business.  
345 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Evolution of the Modern Uncorporation’, cit., pp. 119-123 (referring to the LLC 
revolution). 
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the same type of business organizations in this state. (This case illustrates how the geographic, 
economic and political proximity of the United States to Latin America may have facilitated 
the indirect influence of European trends in American corporate law.) 346 The aim of the 
Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, by pushing forward the enactment of a law that would 
create the LLC in Wyoming, was to use it as a business form to develop Hamilton Brothers’ 
oil and gas business activities. Reportedly, this idea was welcomed by the legislature of 
Wyoming which wanted to attract market agents to invest in oil and gas in the state.347 As 
attested by Carney, who was a professor of business law in Wyoming at the time, the law was 
enacted without great deal of publicity. He, as a professor, only happened to know about it 
after the law was passed. Carney’s view was that the original Wyoming LLC Act was drawn 
upon domestic sources such as the Wyoming Business Corporation Act, the Uniform 
Partnership Act, and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.348 Moreover, he argued that the 
new Act left more questions unanswered than it solved, and for that reason alone it did not 
constitute a viable alternative for most enterprises. Plus, drafting solutions for the matters 
which were not covered by the provisions of the Act would be costly. 
The lobbying efforts of the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, surprisingly, did not go a 
long way. They did not unleash the competitive advantage of the LLC. After passage of the 
law very few LLCs were created even in Wyoming. Additionally, Florida, which was an 
exception among all other states, only passed its LLC Act in 1982. This was most likely due 
to the fact some businessmen there were familiar with Latin American limited liability 
companies or limitadas. 349 The enactment of the Wyoming LLC Act did not constitute a 
mutation of the US legal system that market agents thought should be preserved, at least at 
that moment in time. As a matter of fact, this reluctance to assimilate a mutation also 
                                                             
346
 See Spamann, Holger, ‘Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) 
Law, Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 2009, 6, 2009, pp. 1813-1878 (1840-1844 ) (stressing that 
Latin American law, including corporate law, was for the most part influenced, at least until the second half of 
the twentieth century, by French, Spanish, Portuguese, and German laws. Transplantation of legal solutions 
occurred not only through legal doctrine, but also legal policy. Notwithstanding, countries of Latin America 
managed to keep a legal speech and solutions of their own. This was the case of Argentina, for example, whose 
legislation has been copied by other Latin American countries). 
347 See Bainbridge, Stephen M., Agency, Partnerships & LLCs, New York, New York, Foundation Press, 2004, 
pp. 179-180 (briefly telling the story). 
348 See Carney, William J., ‘Close Corporations and the Wyoming Business Corporation Act: Time for a 
Change’, University of Wyoming Land and Water Law Review, vol. 12, 1977, pp. 537-583 (581). While I was a 
Visiting Research Fellow at Fordham University Law School during the fall semester in 2012, I audited the 
course Partnerships and LLCs taught, at the time, by Roger Goebel. He thought that the American LLC was 
based upon the same type of business organization that existed in Costa Rica. 
349 The legislators of the several American states always had an eye on Europe and on the legal developments 
happening there. They would mostly look at developments in England but also in France and Germany. It is 
curious that it took so long for the law to be adopted in the United States. It might have been the case that, unlike 
other countries, in the United States the corporation was so entrenched, that its predominance froze out the LLC. 
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happened in the other jurisdictions. There was always a subsequent point in which a selective 
sweep occurred and change broke through.350 A similar phenomenon happened in the United 
Kingdom with the takeover bid.351  
In the United States change was apparently triggered by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) Revenue Ruling dated as of 2 September 1988 (IRS Revenue Ruling 88-76).352 It 
addressed the issue that was to know ‘Whether a Wyoming LLC, none of whose members or 
designated managers are personally liable for any debts of the company, is classified for 
federal tax purposes as an association and or as a partnership’. In this ruling the IRS provided 
that a Wyoming LLC could be classified as an association or a partnership for federal tax 
purposes if it had no more than two of the distinctive characteristics of a corporation - 
continuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free transferability of 
interests’. This set of rules is known as the ‘Kinter regulations’ from the case United States v 
Kinter.
353 These regulations were developed to aid in classifying business organizations that 
were not incorporated under state incorporation statutes but had certain characteristics 
common to corporations and were, therefore, subject to taxation as corporations under the 
federal tax code.354 In addition, following the tax reform of 1986 corporate taxes had become 
higher and transfer of stock no longer earned an advantageous tax treatment.355 Thus, after the 
                                                             
350 See Sgard, Jérôme, ‘Do Legal Origins Matter? The Case of Bankruptcy Laws in Europe, European Review of 
Economic History, 10, 2006, pp. 389-419 (411) (Even if not analogizing as I do in the text, he explains how the 
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351 See Cheffins, Brian R. ‘Does law matter?’, cit., p. 479 (explaining how the evolution of the takeover bid, in 
the United Kingdom indicates that increased regulation of disclosure may have influenced the development of 
features normally associated with the Berle-Means corporation, and how new rules on disclosure together with 
the erosion of family ownership in United Kingdom publicly held companies may have determined the spread of 
takeover bids). 
352 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 
Washington University Law Quaterly, vol. 73, No 2, 1995, pp.369 - 432 (407, note 143) in which he points out 
the importance of understanding the reason why the IRS passed this rulling at this point. In his mind, it was not 
clear whether there had been an onslaught of requests for rulings or whether LLCs had given rise to a large 
number of revenue rulings and private letter rulings. Ribstein’s view was that the IRS might have wanted to 
protect its bureaucratic power by ensuring that the process would be under its control. As a matter of fact, the 
IRS had extended the scope of the Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. Normally, such expansion would 
be the prerogative of the Congress. 
353 See the case United States v Kinter, 216 F.2D 418 (9TH Circ. 1954). 
354 See Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007) (clarifying this aspect). In the literature see 
Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms, cit. pp. 384-388. 
355 See ‘Reagan’s Tax Plan: Rise for Companies despite cut in Top Rate: a Simpler System: White House’s 
Summary of Plan’, New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast) [New York, N.Y] 29 May 1985: A.21. Also see 
Maidenberg, H. J, ‘Devising Strategies; Investors face Myriad Choices under New Law, New York Times , Late 
Edition (East Coast) [New York, N.Y] 06 Mar. 1988: A.19 (commenting on the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 on business organizations, and in particular on 
partnerships). 
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IRS ruling, the incentives for businessmen to explore the alternatives of creating a LLC, a 
hybrid which enabled them to benefit from some of the distinctive features of the corporation 
and the partnership simultaneously, without having to necessarily adopt any of them, and still 
gain from the opportunity to be levied as a partnership, all of the sudden loomed larger. We 
are left with some questions on this matter: If investors could now adopt a hybrid business 
form and be taxed as a partnership, why did not they just incorporate as partnerships? Why 
was there the eagerness to incorporate in the form of a LLC? It was said that partnerships 
‘…bore the brunt of the 1987 tax revision damage’. It was also stated that ‘Traded 
partnerships, with certain exceptions, will be taxable as corporations in the future, a move that 
snares so-called master limited partnerships. Partnerships traded or designed to trade before 
Dec. 17, 1987 are ''grandfathered'' and escape corporate treatment through 1997’.356 
Considering the new rules of corporate taxation at the time, lobbying for the enactment of 
LLC legislation seemed to serve the purposes of those who were conscious of the need to 
implement new investment strategies. On the other hand, following the 1986 tax reform, for 
the first time the top individual rate dropped below the corporate rate. Many tax attorneys 
were advising their small-business clients to reorganize their businesses. Attorneys advised 
their clients to convert from a corporation to an ‘S corporation’ to benefit from the lower 
individual rate. An S corporation, regulated in the tax corporate code, is a form of business 
organization that combines the tax advantages of the partnership and the limited liability 
features of the corporation. With an S corporation the business itself is not taxed. Instead, all 
income, deductions, and credits are passed through to the shareholders. Consequently, the S 
corporation was sold as a way for small businesses to take advantage of the lower individual 
rates and avoid the much heavier corporate minimum tax of the new law. Furthermore, 
switching to an S corporation might also be a way to avoid a double tax on the liquidation of 
corporations when they were sold.357 
Several other states passed statutes regarding the LLC, and this caused a great deal of 
state tinkering based upon these statutes’ provisions. However, the Kinter regulations proved 
to be inadequate to cover new business entities such as the LLC which had developed under 
the statutes of several states. Not only the LLC, but also other unincorporated business entities 
such as limited liability partnerships shared characteristics of both the corporation and the 
partnership. They combined limited liability with flexibility of management; they combined 
                                                             
356 Maidenberg, H.J, ‘Devising Strategies; Investors face Myriad Choices under the Law’, New York Times , 
Late Edition (East Coast) [New York, N.Y] 06 Mar. 1988: A.19. 
357 This was submitted by Klott, Gary, Special to the New York Times, New York Times, Late Edition (East 
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their delectus personae purpose with restrictions on the transferability of shares by default. 
On one hand, the uncorporation, in particular the LLC, was molded upon the kinter 
regulations by smart and skillful lawyers who were able to assure members could take 
advantage of whatever classifications were more advantageous for them. On the other hand, 
this lead to a case-by-case analysis by the IRS which had to come up with solutions for the tax 
issues regarding the LLC. There was not a common ground whereupon to bring about a 
uniform definition of LLC. 
In 1996, regulations 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3, frequently referred to as 
‘check-the-box regulations’, were promulgated.358 They became effective on 1 January 1997. 
These regulations replaced the Kinter regulations and were meant to simplify the 
classification of hybrid business associations such as the LLC for federal tax purposes. In 
practice, by checking-the-box, the taxpayer could elect to be treated as a corporation, or in the 
absence of such election, to be treated as a partnership for tax purposes (if the company had 
multiple members), or as a sole proprietorship (if the company had one single member).359 
The LLC was defined upon whether or not its members would check-the-box. Wyoming, for 
example, foresaw a change in federal tax law, and enacted flexible statutes. They allowed the 
LLC to be freely drawn on corporations’ characteristics with no major limitations, without 
becoming a fully-fledged corporation, and still be taxed as a partnership by not checking-the-
box.360 
The fact was that the absence of guidelines such as those provided for by the kinter 
regulations, and the work of lawyers which was tailored to the needs of their clients and 
corporate law consumers, made it difficult to lay down a common understanding of what an 
LLC really was. Consequently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated in 1994 the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(ULLCA), which was approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 
                                                             
358 See Littriello v. United States (where the plaintiff-appellant contested the validity of the Treasury 
Department’s so-called ‘check-the-box’ regulations). 
359 See Littriello v United States (explaining that ‘What was avoided by the resulting “check-the-box” provisions 
was the necessity of forcing those hybrids to jump through the Kintner regulation “hoops” in order to achieve a 
desired-and perfectly legal-classification for federal tax purposes’). 
360 Currently, in the United States, corporate income is subject to double taxation – at the corporate level 
according to I.R.C. § 11 (a) and at the individual-shareholder level pursuant to I.R.C. § 61 (a)(7). By way of 
contrast, partnership income is taxed just once. It is not taxed at the corporate level, but only when it passes 
through the individual partners and it is taxed as an income to them, given I.R.C. §§ 701-777. Sole 
proprietorships are also taxed only once. 
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1996.361 At the point the ULLCA came into force, several states had already promulgated 
their own LLC statutes, and the introduction of the check-the-box rule made some of them 
amend their laws.362 The NCCUSL passed the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act in 2006 (RULLCA). The purpose of this Act was to permit the formation of LLCs which 
provided the members with the advantages of limited liability of the corporation and the tax 
treatment of the partnership. Despite of the ULLCA and the RULLCA, there still were 
noteworthy differences among LLC states’ laws.  
The LLC is a hybrid, as it features characteristics of the corporation such as limited 
liability, and those of the partnership such as the taxation benefits or restrictions on transfer of 
ownership interests. In this sense, its hybridity is not different from the Portuguese, Spanish, 
Italian and French cases.363 In addition, in the United States like the other legal systems, the 
close corporation was initially used to accommodate the interests of small and medium firms 
which were not sufficiently safeguarded by the legal form of the corporation. Other 
alternatives were not available and the corporation was ill-fitting for this purpose.364 As noted 
by Larry Ribstein, using the form of the corporation whilst restricting the free transferability 
of shares and providing no right of dissolution at will compelled courts and legislatures to 
adopt rather awkward and ad hoc oppression remedies in order to provide a right of exit to 
their members.365 The LLC was viewed as a panacea in the sense that it was expected to make 
all these actions undertaken by courts and legislatures unnecessary. In light of the experience 
of the other selected jurisdictions, it was not a surprise to learn about the success and 
acceptance of the LLC in the United States. Market agents, as soon as they were convinced of 
the benefits of adopting this form of business association, started to use it in droves, and this 
trend continues today.366  
                                                             
361 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act’, Stetson Law Review, vol. 
25, pp. 311-388. See Brian L. Schorr, Limited Liability Companies: Features and Uses, 62 CPA J [Issue 12] 26 
[Dec. 1992], pp. 26-33, reprinted in 805 PLI/Corp 191,193. 
362 See Kobayashi, Bruce H., and Ribstein, Larry E. ‘Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the 
Evolution of the Limited Liability Company’, Economic Inquiry, vol. 34, 3, 1996, pp. 464-483 (referring to the 
tendency of LLC statutes to becoming spontaneously uniform). 
363 In the United Kingdom the distinction between privately and publicly held companies is less clear. This 
makes it more difficult to dissect the distinctive elements of each of these business forms and readily learn which 
of those elements are preponderant in the private limited company.   
364 See Carney, William J., ‘Close Corporations and the Wyoming Business Corporation Act’, cit., pp. 537-583 
(pointing out some specific difficulties attorneys would have dealing with the Wyoming statute at that time 
regarding the closely held corporation, and comparing other statutory approaches to those particular problems). 
365 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms’, cit., p. 431. 
366 See Part I, Chapter 1 providing statistical information provided by the European Commerce Registers’s 
Forum Report, 2013 regarding the number of LLCs created in the United States. The number amounts to almost 
900,000 LLCs, based on 2012 data. 
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Changes in tax law really had a stake in the development of the LLC. There is, however, 
something intriguing in this whole story. If LLCs can be taxed as partnerships or S 
corporations by ticking the box, why would anyone care about the LLC?367 Why was there a 
move to the LLC? Perhaps, there was a 'mutation' when market agents felt it was 
advantageous enough to alter the ‘genetic’ frequency or the evolution of the law. 
 
II. Actors 
 
i. The LLC is not just a matter of checking-the-box: Statutory provisions and regulation 
of the transfer of member interests in the companies’ operating agreements 
 
(i) Types of transfer restrictions 
 
As explained in the section above, there is no uniformity in the statutes or LLC laws of 
the American states. The United States is formed by fifty-one jurisdictions. Studying the 
statutes of all these jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I have chosen to 
concentrate on the ULLCA and RULLCA, and also on the New York Limited Liability 
Company Law (hereinafter ‘NYLLCL’) and the Delaware LLC Act (hereinafter ‘Delaware 
Act’). I have a threefold purpose in selecting these two statutes.368 
First, the state of New York has always been considered the ‘progressive capital of the 
Nation’. This is indeed true in many aspects, and also in respect to corporate law.369 New 
                                                             
367 S corporations are corporations which are usually ‘small business corporations’ with fewer than 100 
shareholders who are all individuals. They may elect to be taxed at the federal level through their shareholders. 
This allows them to avoid being double-taxed on their corporate income. 
26 US Code §1361 (a) (1) defines S corporation. According with this provision, ‘For purposes of this title, the 
term “S Corporation” means, with respect to any taxable year, a small business corporation for which an election 
under § 1362 (a) is in effect for such year’. Section 1362 (a) (1) establishes that ‘… a small business corporation 
may elect, in accordance with the provisions of this section, to be an S corporation’. Pursuant to § 1363 (a) 
‘Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an S corporation shall not be subject to the taxes imposed by 
this chapter’. § 1363 (b) states that ‘The taxable income of an S corporation shall be computed in the same 
manner as in the case of an individual…’. 
368 An additional reason to select the LLC law of the state of New York is that while I was writing this 
dissertation, I was a Visiting Research Fellow at Fordham Law School, in New York City. 
369 See Stephen, Labaton, ‘Business and the Law; New York Court’s Significant Cases’, New York Times , Late 
Edition (East Coast) [New York, N.Y] 29 May 1989: 1.32 (referring to the Court of Albany, New York ‘The 
court is both confident in its ability and that of the lower courts to handle sophisticated commercial disputes and 
it sees its mission as a very important contribution to the state's economy’, said Oscar Chase, a civil procedure 
professor at the New York University Law School. But he added that the court had also in some instances 
sharply limited its role. 
‘It reflects the court's sense of what's important and what courts are best able to do’, Professor Chase said. 
‘Personally, I also think it reflects a political outlook’. 
In their view, the judges in Albany said, the state had a ‘recognized interest in maintaining and fostering its 
undisputed status as the pre-eminent commercial nerve center of the nation and the world’). On a different tone, 
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York together with the state of Massachusetts was the first state to pass general incorporation 
laws in 1811. Massachusetts enacted it slightly before, in 1809. In comparison, the United 
Kingdom enacted for the first time legislation establishing general incorporation in 1844.370  
Second, in general, statutes can be opted out by the members if they so desire. Statutes 
provide a number of ‘off the rack’ provisions that consumers of corporate law can use to 
avoid transaction costs or bargaining failures. This is the case for the NYLLCL and for the 
Delaware Act. The latter, however, takes freedom of contract to another level, as it creates 
incentives for the use of well-drafted, detailed and almost litigation-proof operating 
agreements. In the words of Chandler in R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley 
Farms, LLC ‘For Shakespeare, it may have been the play, but for a Delaware limited liability 
company, the contract's the thing.371 372 This puts the burden of bargaining for the best rules 
on the side of LLC members. In contrast, the NYLLCL provides more detailed default 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
see Blackman, Peter, Corporate Update, ‘Move over Delaware! Making New York Incorporation Friendly’, New 
York Law Journal, December 16, 1993, at 5, col 2 [statement of Richard R. Howe] (in which a corporate lawyer 
states that ‘[t]here are many cases where a lawyer who uses New York as the state of incorporation without 
discussing it in advance with his client is probably guilty of malpractice because of the many disadvantageous 
aspects of New York law’). Additionally, see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Rise of the LLC’ at URL: 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/06/17/the-rise-of-the-llc/ (17 June 2010) (accessed on 21 April 2013) 
(referring to Peter A. Mahter’s statistical demonstration that New York was lagging in the LLC Revolution. 
Ribstein, given the NY courts’ reading of fiduciary duties upon incorporation of LLCs has even advised avoiding 
the state of New York for this purpose ).  
370 See The Joint Stock Act 1844. 
371 R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 
2008). In this context, see in the literature Ribstein, Larry E, and Lipshaw, Jeffrey M., Unincorporated Business 
Entities, 4th ed., Newark, LexisNexis, 2009, pp. 416 and 422-425 (defining operating agreements as the heart (or 
at least it should be) of the LLC). In fact, operating agreements control all rights and obligations of the members, 
economic interests’ owners and managers. According to Unif.Ltd.Liability Co.Act § 101, ‘An operating 
agreement means the agreement under § 103 concerning the relations among the members, managers, and 
limited liability company. The term includes amendments to the agreement’. I return to this below. Equally 
important are what in certain agreements are defined as ‘charter documents’ with respect to the formation or 
other governing documents, including but not limited to the certificate or articles of incorporation, by-laws, 
certificate of articles of organization or formation, operating agreement, limited liability company agreement, 
certificate of limited partnership, certificate of formation and partnership agreement. 
372 Other Acts such as the New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act also provide ‘off-the-rack’ rules. See 
Philip Rabinowitz, Debtor. Podvey Meanor Catenacci Hildner Cocoziello & Chattman, P.C., Plaintiff, v. 
Benjamin Stanziale, Jr. et al., Defendants, and Hank Luwisch, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff, v. Whitehall 
Development, LLC et al., Third-Party Defendants, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5131 (saying that ‘…the Act is liberally 
construed to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
operating agreements”). Delaware courts, however, more than other courts, have always revealed their 
remarkable expertise in interpreting corporate law rules. See, for example, Achaian v Leemon, 25 A.3d 800; 
2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, note 54 (quoting the Commodores, Three Times a Lady, on Natural High (Motown 
Records 1978) (‘you’re once, twice, three times a lady, and I love you…’). 
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rules.373 Also New York’s court decisions tend to be more prescriptive than their Delaware 
counterparts.374  
Third, comparing and contrasting both statutes is helpful to understand the underlying 
policies developed by the legislators in each state. In other words, for the purpose of policy 
considerations I ask: Had the legislature thought about a particular situation, would it have 
passed this law? For instance, Delaware’s legislation is manifestly contractarian.375 
Consequently, freedom of contract trumps all, and this certainly is shown by the way 
operating agreements are drafted and legal advice is given by attorneys to their clients.  
The best way to set up the grounds of comparison is to look at the operating agreements 
structuring the relationships between members and other corporate constituencies, especially 
when it comes to the transfer of ownership interests and the governance of the company. 
Operating agreements control which interests a member is permitted to transfer.376 They differ 
from the certificate of formation.377 This certificate is filed in the Office of the Secretary of 
State and sets forth, among other things, the name of the LLC and the address of the 
registered office. A LLC is formed at the time of the filling of the certificate of formation in 
the office of the Secretary of State or at any other date as established in the certificate of 
formation. Unlike the operating agreement, the certificate of formation is a public document. I 
have examined a sample of 34 operating agreements. I collected some of them from 
WestlawNext. However, LLC agreements are not widely disseminated through Westlawnext. 
Thus, I have additionally collected these documents through public companies and US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings that are provided by EDGAR (Electronic 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system). Public companies, for reasons that have to 
do with capital market transactions such as an offer to exchange or mergers and acquisitions, 
will often file together with a prospectus a large  number of LLC agreements for subsidiaries. 
These larger companies which must file specific forms with the SEC amend their operating 
agreements significantly. Consequently, where possible, I tried to gather all the respective 
                                                             
373 Still, New York law is not as clear as a mountain lake. It can be pretty muddy. See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Pre-
formation Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Another NY Problem’ at URL: 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/06/21/pre-formation-fiduciary-duties-in-llcs-another-ny-problem/ (accessed on 
21 April 2013).  
374 See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 NY 112 (1945) (where the court rather assumes a prescriptive position 
and enforces statutory law. This is often the case with disputes regarding dissolution and liquidation of the 
company). 
375 See DLLCA §18-1101 (b) providing that ‘It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability companies agreements’. 
376 See Ault v Brady, 37 F. Appx. 222 (8th Circ. 2002) and Achaian, Inc., on behalf of itself and derivatively on 
behalf of Omniglow, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Leemon Family LLC, and Ira Leemon, Defendants, and Omniglow, LLC, 
Nominal Defendant, 25 A.3d 800; 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118. 
377 See DLLCA §18-201. 
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interactions of the respective LLC agreement.378 Those collected from Westlawnext in their 
amended and restated versions often contain an ‘entire agreement’ clause. Hence, I used them 
as events of my sample. In respect to the companies whose LLC agreements I found through 
SEC filings it was interesting to note that in spite of the frequency with which companies filed 
a considerable number of LLC agreements for subsidiaries, the operating agreements were 
only a small part that normally acquired the form of an exhibit.379 
In order to refine my search on WestlawNext, I introduced into the research engine the 
words ‘transfer of shares’ and ‘Limited Liability Company’. These terms alone yielded 
around 10,000 results. I then culled the agreements wherein it was expressly stated they were 
LLC operating agreements. This selection was not done in a random manner. In order to 
analyze the LLC agreements, I used the same method I used for studying the articles of 
association of PLLCs of other selected jurisdictions. I have broken down my analysis to 
twelve variables: the company’s business name, date of the operating agreement, governing 
law or consent to a specific jurisdiction, the office of the Secretary of State in which the 
company’s certificate of formation was filed with, the parties to the agreement, the number of 
shareholders or members of the company, the number of members of the managing board, 
share capital or capital contributions, business object of the company, transfer clauses, and 
other relevant clauses including allocation of profits and losses, distributions, ownership and 
taxation. This information was augmented with data provided by Bureau van Dijk’s database 
Orbis 380 regarding size and group information, key financial and employees, controlling 
shareholders, BvD independence indicator, and legal and account information. 
The operating agreements I have scrutinized are extremely detailed, lengthy, and drafted 
in a way that reflects the awareness that all relevant issues which, if not carefully regulated by 
contract, may be earnest sources of contentious disputes. § 18-702 of the Delaware LLC Act 
and § 603 of the NYLLCL provide that a LLC interest is assignable in whole or in part except 
as provided in the LLC operating agreement.381 Both NYLLCL and the Delaware LLC Act 
                                                             
378 This was the case of the Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement of the 
Chrysler Group LLC included in the sample of American companies. 
379 This was the case of Huntsman International LLC, which filed annual, quarterly and other reports with the 
SEC jointly with its ‘parent’ company Huntsman Corporation within an offer to exchange. I analysed the 
prospectus, which was composed of 795 pages. For more on this, see Part I, Chapter 1. 
380 This database provides worldwide information about private companies. It is available at the Arthur W. 
Diamond Law Library of Columbia Law School. 
381 §18-702 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (Assignment of a limited liability company interest) 
provides the following: 
(a) A limited liability company interest is assignable in whole or in part except as provided in a limited liability 
company agreement. The assignee of a member's limited liability company interest shall have no right to 
participate in the management of the business and affairs of a limited liability company except as provided in a 
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are ‘default’ statutes.382 As a consequence, if members do not agree on a certain matter in 
their operating agreements, then the respective default provision of the LLC laws will apply. 
All LLC agreements in the sample set forth restrictions on transfers. This is the case because 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
limited liability company agreement or, unless otherwise provided in the limited liability company agreement, 
upon the affirmative vote or written consent of all of the members of the limited liability company. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement: 
(1) An assignment of a limited liability company interest does not entitle the assignee to become or to exercise 
any rights or powers of a member; 
(2) An assignment of a limited liability company interest entitles the assignee to share in such profits and losses, 
to receive such distribution or distributions, and to receive such allocation of income, gain, loss, deduction, or 
credit or similar item to which the assignor was entitled, to the extent assigned; and 
(3) A member ceases to be a member and to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member upon 
assignment of all of the member's limited liability company interest. Unless otherwise provided in a limited 
liability company agreement, the pledge of, or granting of a security interest, lien or other encumbrance in or 
against, any or all of the limited liability company interest of a member shall not cause the member to cease to be 
a member or to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member. 
(c) Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, a member's interest in a limited liability 
company may be evidenced by a certificate of limited liability company interest issued by the limited liability 
company. A limited liability company agreement may provide for the assignment or transfer of any limited 
liability company interest represented by such a certificate and make other provisions with respect to such 
certificates. A limited liability company shall not have the power to issue a certificate of limited liability 
company interest in bearer form. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement and except to the extent assumed by 
agreement, until an assignee of a limited liability company interest becomes a member, the assignee shall have 
no liability as a member solely as a result of the assignment. 
(e) Unless otherwise provided in the limited liability company agreement, a limited liability company may 
acquire, by purchase, redemption or otherwise, any limited liability company interest or other interest of a 
member or manager in the limited liability company. Unless otherwise provided in the limited liability company 
agreement, any such interest so acquired by the limited liability company shall be deemed canceled. 
 
 § 603 of NYLLCL (Assignment of membership interest) states as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in the operating agreement, 
(1) a membership interest is assignable in whole or in part; 
(2) an assignment of a membership interest does not dissolve a limited liability company or entitle the assignee 
to participate in the management and affairs of the limited liability company or to become or to exercise any 
rights or powers of a member; 
(3) the only effect of an assignment of a membership interest is to entitle the assignee to receive, to the extent 
assigned, the distributions and allocations of profits and losses to which the assignor would be entitled; and 
(4) a member ceases to be a member and to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member upon 
assignment of all of his or her membership interest. Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, the 
pledge of, or the granting of a security interest, lien or other encumbrance in or against, any or all of the 
membership interest of a member shall not cause the member to cease to be a member or to cease to have the 
power to exercise any rights or powers of a member. 
(b) The operating agreement may provide that a member's interest may be evidenced by a certificate issued by 
the limited liability company and may also provide for the assignment or transfer of any of the interest 
represented by such a certificate. A member's interest may be a certificated security or an uncertificated security 
within the meaning of section 8-102 of the uniform commercial code if the requirements of section 8-103(c) are 
met, and if the requirements are not met such interest shall, for purposes of the uniform commercial code, be 
deemed to be a general intangible asset. The existence of the restrictions on the sale or transfer of a membership 
interest, as contained in this chapter and, if applicable, in the operating agreement, shall be noted conspicuously 
on the face or back of every certificate representing a membership interest issued by a limited liability company. 
Any sale or transfer in violation of such restrictions shall be void. 
(c) Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement and except to the extent assumed by agreement, until 
the time, if any, that an assignee of a membership interest becomes a member, the assignee shall have no liability 
as a member solely as a result of the assignment. 
382 These statutes are enabling statutes, and they first and foremost provide the tools to fill gaps in a LLC 
operating agreement. 
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LLCs, like their European counterparts, have a closed nature. Moreover, in view of the fact 
that many companies in the sample are private equity funds, real estate investment funds, 
investment management companies, and special purpose vehicles (SPVs) their units are not 
supposed to be freely transferred to third-party investors outside the company, unless 
members agree otherwise.383 In general, restrictions on transfers provided by the LLC 
agreements may be clustered according with the following categories:  
(i) Pre-emption rights or rights of first refusal (which may include a right of first 
offer), tag-along rights,384 rights of co-sale, sale purchase rights or ‘compelled 
sales’, buy-sell agreements, put-rights, and similar rights provided to the company 
and the other non-transferring members upon a member’s expressed intention to 
sell her share. 
(ii) The prior written consent of all other non-transferring members, the granting or 
denying of which consent shall be in their sole and absolute discretion. 
(iii) The consent of the majority shareholder or managing-member which must be 
obtained for the transfer of shares to third parties outside the company. This consent 
may be withheld in the sole and uncontrolled discretion of the majority shareholder 
or managing-member and may comprise not only transfers of managing, but also 
economic rights. 
(iv) Clauses listing prohibited transfers. 
(v) Limitations regarding the transfer of certain types of units or series of units. 
(vi) Vesting requirements, forfeiture provisions, minimum retained ownership 
requirements or other similar provisions with respect to any interests in the 
                                                             
383 See Schwartz, Phyllis A. and Breslow, Stephanie R., ‘Terms of Private Equity Funds’, Private Equity Funds: 
Formation and Operation, ch. 2, 2012, pp. 2-1 – 2-134. 
384 For example clause 9.5 (a) of the Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of Exco/HGI 
GP, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, which is included in the sample of American companies 
establishes the following: 
‘If any Member proposes to Transfer all or any portion of its Units to any Person other than through a Permitted 
Transfer, Bona Fide Pledge or Foreclosure (a “Tag-Along Sale”), such Member (the “Initiating Holder”) shall 
provide to each Founder Member Group holding the same class of Equity Interests of the Company that are 
subject to the Tag-Along Sale (except, if the Initiating Holder is a member of one of the Founder Member 
Groups, its own Founder Member Group) notice of the terms and conditions of such proposed Transfer (the 
“Tag-Along Notice”) (which notice may also be given concurrent with any Seller’s Notice) and offer such other 
Founder Member Groups the opportunity to participate in such Transfer with respect to their Units of the same 
class of Units that are subject to the Tag-Along Sale in accordance with this Section 9.5 (each such electing 
Founder Member Group, a “Tagging Holder”) by including in the proposed Transfer a number of the Tagging 
Holder’s Units not to exceed the Tagging Holder’s pro rata portion (based on the Percentage Interest of Units 
that are subject to the Tag-Along Sale) of the Units being Transferred in the Tag-Along Sale. No Tagging Holder 
may (i) Transfer a greater percentage of its Units than the Initiating Holder is Transferring or (ii) Transfer a class 
of Equity Interests of the Company different than the Initiating Holder’. 
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company which are outstanding as of the date the Agreement was entered into and 
were created thereafter. (These requirements need not be uniform among holders of 
interests in the company, and may be waived or released by the managing member 
in its sole discretion with respect to all or a portion of interests in the company 
owned by any one or more members at any time and from time to time).  
(vii) Non-transferable provisions by means of which the rights and obligations spelled 
out in the relevant agreement, and referring specifically to any founder member or 
founder member group will be personal to such founder member or founder 
member group or member of a founder member group, and may not be transferred 
without the written consent of the founder member, the founder member group or 
of the member of the founder member group. 
(viii) The approval of a super-majority of the management. 
(ix) The consent to the transfer given by a majority-in-interest of a certain class of unit 
holders, such consent to be not unreasonably withheld. 
(x) Clauses limiting the possibility to transfer shares to competitors. 
(xi) Lock-up provisions.385  
(xii) Clauses establishing regulatory prohibitions by means of which no member shall 
take or permit any action to be taken with respect to itself (including without 
limitation, any change in its shareholders, members or partners) that would cause: 
(i) transfer or administrative fees be paid in connection with a transfer or 
assignment; (ii) that advance notice of a transfer or assignment is not given and 
documentation evidencing such transfer is not executed (including documentation 
setting forth representations from either or both the transferor or transferee as to 
compliance with any restriction or requirement established in the agreement or 
other company’s governing documents); (iii) that the company be regulated under 
                                                             
385 Lock-up provisions bind certain shareholders to sell their shares to a designated party. For instance, clause 
7.7. (called ‘Lock-up’) of the Third Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of VIsalus 
Holdings, LLC included in the sample of American companies foresees the following: 
‘Each Member that is not also a party to the Registration Rights Agreement agrees, severally and not jointly, 
that, if requested by the Company and an underwriter of Common Units (or other securities) of the Company, 
not to sell or otherwise transfer or dispose of any Common Units (or other securities) of the Company held by 
such Member (other than those included in the registration, if applicable) during a period not to exceed one 
hundred and eighty (180) days from the effective date of the first registration statement of the Company’s 
securities; and to enter into an agreement to such effect regardless of whether such Member is participating in 
the offering to which the registration statement relates; provided, however, that all executive officers of the 
Company, directors of the Company, and Members holding one percent (1%) or more of the Common Units (or 
other securities) of the Company on a Fully Diluted Basis who are subject to this Section 7.7 must enter into 
similar lock-up agreement as well. The Company may impose stop-transfer instructions with respect to the Units 
(or securities) subject to the foregoing restriction until the end of said period’. 
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the Investment Company Act 1940,386 the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 or the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the US Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986,387 or (iv) the transfer either result in the termination or 
reclassification of the company for Federal or state tax purposes or in the breach of 
any state or Federal statute, regulation, court order, judicial decree, or rule of law.388 
(xiii) Clauses determining administrative procedures which establish an effective date, or 
an event such as the completion of the offering, prior to which a transfer will not be 
effective. 
(xiv) Any other limitations on transfers which are not created by the issuer of the units.389 
 
Besides these restrictions, there are other important contractual aspects drawn in the 
LLC agreements in respect to transfers. The share sale and purchase agreement is often 
viewed as a formal contract. Therefore, it shall be in writing. It may be foreseen that the 
transferee must assume and agree to perform all the agreements and obligations to which the 
transferor is bound. On the other hand, the transferor may also be required, as a condition of 
any transfer to which members, the majority member or managing-member consents, to bear 
all the costs incurred by the company in connection with the transfer. It may be stipulated that 
each member remains responsible for the performance of the respective agreement by each 
permitted transferee390 of such member to which membership units were transferred. 
Furthermore, it may be established that no transferee of the whole or a portion of a member’s 
LLC interest shall have the right to become a substituted member in place of its transferor 
unless and until all of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) the transferor and transferee 
have executed and acknowledged such instruments as the manager may reasonably deem 
necessary or desirable to effect such transfer; (ii) a duly executed and acknowledged written 
                                                             
386 This law applies to investment companies which are considered to be affected with a national public interest. 
387 In general, the companies analyzed do not permit any investment by benefit plan investors in order to avoid 
becoming fiduciaries of those investors. By imposing restrictions on transfers, members find a way to monitor 
investments made by benefit plan investors and avoid the fiduciary and prohibitive rules of ERISA and the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
388 Generally, equity funds adopt the legal form of limited partnerships, LLCs or offshore companies which are 
not taxed as entities for the purpose of US federal income taxes. Consequently, LLC operating agreements are 
drafted by taking this into account so that there is not an alteration of the company’s tax status. 
389 The prohibition of withdrawal is not among these limitations. It is safe to say that in most agreements it is 
agreed that the mere withdrawal of a member will not cause the dissolution of the company. So, unlike what 
happens in partnerships, dissolution at will seems not to be a credible threat, unless it is established in the LLC 
agrement. 
390 A permitted transferee is often described in the agreements as an affiliate of a member or any third party(ies) 
to which members may transfer all or a portion of its membership interests as permitted by the operating 
agreement. 
 
 173 
 
instrument of transfer has been filed with the company setting forth the intention of the 
transferor that the transferee become a substituted member in its place; (iii) the transferee 
accepts and agrees to be bound by all the provisions of the agreement by executing and 
delivering a counterpart signature page to the agreement; (iv) the transfer would not 
materially and adversely affect the treatment of the company for tax purposes under the code 
or the tax laws of any state in which the company does business; (v) the transferee 
demonstrates and agrees, to the satisfaction of the manager determined in its sole and absolute 
discretion, that it has complied and shall comply with certain provisions such as those of the 
USA Patriot Act. 
In particular situations, members may sell their shares to each other, for instance, once a 
certain transaction is entered into or an investment is made by the company. Operating 
agreements often present clauses, which work very much as contractual guarantees, by means 
of which members acknowledge that no public market exists for the membership units and 
that it is uncertain whether a public market will ever exist for the membership units. In 
addition, members represent and warrant that they are capable of evaluating the merits and 
economic risks of their investment in the membership units; that they are able to bear the 
economic risks of its investment in the membership units and that they are an accredited 
investor, for purposes of Rule 501 under the Securities Act of 1933. In some agreements, 
members are dispensed to obtain other members’ consent to the transfer if they only intend to 
transfer economic interests.  
There are situations in which no restrictions on transfers are introduced. For instance, 
members may agree that: (i) a member's entire interest in the Company is transferable either 
voluntarily or by operation of law. The member may sell, assign, convey, exchange, 
mortgage, pledge, grant, hypothecate or transfer all or a portion of such membership’s 
interest. In the event of the transfer of less than all of such member's membership interest, the 
transferee shall become a member of the Company on such terms and conditions as such 
member, the applicable member and the Company shall agree upon. In the event of the 
transfer of the member's entire membership interest, the transferee shall succeed to all of the 
member's rights under the agreement. Upon the transfer of the member's membership interest, 
the transferee shall become a member of the Company upon the completion of the transfer 
without further action. (ii) Without limiting any of the foregoing, upon the sale, transfer or 
other disposition of any member's entire membership interest pursuant to any pledge thereof 
to any lender (or any agent, trustee or other representative for any lender or group of lenders), 
the transferee of such membership interest shall become a member of the company and shall 
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acquire all right, title and interest of the member in the company, including all rights under 
the agreement, and the member should be withdrawn as a member of the company thereunder, 
and shall have no further right, title or interest in the company or under the agreement.  
In principle, the following transfers are permitted in the agreements: (a) transfers by a 
particular member of all or part of its LLC interests (normally the majority shareholder); (b) 
transfers by a member of all or any part of its LLC interests to: (i) an affiliate or member of 
such member so long as such affiliate or member is an accredited investor; (ii) a trust for the 
benefit of the transferor or a trust for the benefit of a member of the transferor’s family, or 
(iii) a particular organization; provided that such transfer does not breach the provision of any 
loan documents to which the company (or its subsidiaries) are bound. Formally, it is usually 
agreed that the non-transferring members be provided in advance with a notice of the 
proposed transfer, which notice shall identify the transferee and the interests to be transferred 
to the transferee and at all times the maximum number of investors holding units in the 
company shall not exceed a number established in the LLC agreement. 
Clauses in the LLC agreements are extensive and complex. Often agreements are 
drafted to ensure that if a transfer is permitted pursuant to the agreement, the transferee that 
acquires the LLC interest of a member shall not be recognized by the company as a member 
and shall only receive economic interests to which the transferor of such units would 
otherwise been entitled, except upon compliance with the terms of the agreement providing 
the rules regarding permitted transfers. Additionally, it is frequently agreed that a member 
who transfers all of her LLC interests to a permitted transferee (other than other member) in 
accordance with the provisions of the agreement shall, nevertheless, remain a member of the 
company subject to all the duties and obligations imposed on her under the agreement until 
such time as the transferee of such LLC interest is admitted to the company as a substitute 
member. Upon any permitted assignment of an LLC interest, the transferor and transferee 
shall file with the company an executed or authenticated copy of the written instrument of 
assignment or transfer. 
Additional restrictions are frequently mentioned. The LLC agreement may establish that 
LLC interests are not registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or under the securities laws 
of any jurisdiction. Consequently, and in addition to any and all other restrictions on 
transferability set forth in the respective agreements, the LLC interests may not be sold, 
assigned, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise disposed of or transferred, except in accordance 
with the provisions of the 1933 Act and State Acts. On the contrary, there are situations in 
which no restrictions are imposed. If the company is terminated as a result of the transfer, 
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members often agree that the transferring member should indemnify the non-transferring 
member and 'save it harmless' on an after-tax basis for any increase in taxes to the non-
transferring / non-terminating-member caused by the termination of the company. However, 
at times, members expressly agree that damages at law would be an inadequate remedy for a 
breach or threatened breach of the restrictions set forth in respect of transfers of units in the 
company. In some agreements it is specifically stated that the transfer of shares is included in 
the limitation of liability operated by the agreement if it is a transfer or attempted transfer of 
all or a portion of a membership interest within a prohibited transfer. Finally, there are LLC 
agreements foreseeing that shares can only be transferred through the delivery of the LLC 
certificate, which evidences the ownership of the units.  
All these aspects of the operating agreements show how relative rights, privileges, 
powers, preferences, limitations, duties and obligations of holders of units in the companies of 
the sample are designed carefully, and shareholders are called to warrant and represent the 
type of investment they make. Restrictions on transfers are safety valves that help assure the 
integrity of the company, the control over the investment, and high(er) returns which, in many 
cases, can only be achieved by locking up investors’ capital for long(er) periods. 
 
(ii) The effects of un-consented transfers 
 
Operating agreements often refer to the effects of breaching a clause providing for 
restrictions on transfers. In some cases, the LLC agreement establishes that any attempt to 
make any sale of, or create, incur or assume any encumbrance with respect to any 
membership units will be null and void and ineffectual and shall not be binding upon the 
managing member, if there is one, or the company. Non-transferring members will have all 
rights and remedies available under the agreements. Additionally, it is sometimes submitted 
that the purported transferee will have no rights or privileges in or with respect to the 
company, and the company will not give any effect in the company’s records to that 
attempted sale or encumbrance. Alternatively, there are operating agreements in which it is 
established that in case shares are transferred against the provisions of the agreement they 
should be redeemed. Furthermore, in some cases it is also agreed that any transfer, 
assignment, encumbrance, pledge, hypothecation or transfer which shall result in the 
termination of the relevant company for federal income tax purposes will be null and void ab 
initio and of no legal force or effect whatsoever. Other contractual clauses stipulate, in 
addition, that after a transfer of any part of a membership interest is executed the membership 
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interests transferred shall continue to be subject to the terms and provisions of the relevant 
agreement and any further transfers are required to comply with all the terms and provisions 
of the agreement.391 At times, it is also set forth that a transfer of any units in the company 
entitles the transferee of such units to receive only the economic interests. The transferee 
obtains no right to vote or participate in the management of the business and affairs of the 
company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a transferee shall be included within the term 
‘member’ for the respective purposes of the agreement, except for purposes of the rights of a 
member to purchase units of other members. The transferor remains a member of the 
company with all rights to vote and manage unless and until non-transferring members 
owning a majority of the outstanding units in the Company (other than the units held by the 
transferor or the transferee) consent, in their sole discretion, which can be unreasonably 
withheld, to make the transferee a member.  
The contractual profile of these clauses is diverse and can certainly vary depending on 
the purposes of the company and the protections investors may or may not be individually 
searching for. There is, however, a common denominator to these clauses when it comes to 
regulate the un-consented transfer. First, agreements are more elaborated than the default 
provisions of the NYLLCL and the Delaware LLC Act. Members and their attorneys do not 
just stick to the wording of the defaults and draft the contracts with the necessary safety nets 
and protections. Second, these agreements do not bring along the same kind of issues 
regarding the relative unenforceability of the un-consented transfer of shares as we have seen 
in the cases of Portugal, Italy and France, where courts have been discussing whether an un-
consented transfer is valid between the parties even if unenforceable toward the company.392 
With the assignment or transfer of shares in a LLC, economic rights which are related to a 
membership interest can be exclusively transferred to the transferee. This gives members of 
the company flexibility. Management rights, however, are influenced by property-rights 
principles. Therefore, the free transfer of managing rights is restricted pursuant to the way the 
concept of transfer is tailored in the agreement. The agreements, in general, adopt a broad 
concept of transfer. For example, transfer means ‘sell, assign, convey, contribute, distribute, 
give, or otherwise transfer, whether directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily, by 
                                                             
391 Instead of shares, LLC agreements refer to units or membership interests. According with some of these LLC 
agreements, membership interests may be defined as ‘…a Member's entire interest in the Company including the 
Member's Economic Interest, the right to vote on or participate in the management, and the right to receive 
information concerning the business and affairs of the Company’. 
392 See Vicente, Lécia, ‘Un-consented Transfers of Shares: A Comparative Perspective’, European Company 
Law Journal, December 2012, vol. 9, 6, pp. 300-304. In the case of the United Kingdom, the registration gives 
effect to the transaction. So, it seems that, while it is not registered in the register of members, the transaction 
produces effects between the parties, but not toward the company. 
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operation of law or otherwise, or any act of the foregoing, including any transfer upon 
foreclosure of any pledge, encumbrance, hypothecation or mortgage. The terms ‘transferee’, 
‘transferor’, ‘transferred’, ‘transferring member’, ‘transferor member’ and other forms of the 
word ‘transfer’ shall have the correlative meanings’.393 The reason why restrictions on 
transfers and members rights are so detailed in the agreements has largely to do with this 
broad concept which encompasses several forms of bargaining. Members enjoy management 
rights and economic rights which they have to account for each and every time they transfer 
their units. The effects of the un-consented transfer of shares determined in the agreements 
echo this dual structure of the shares (units).394 Besides, they are reflective of the multiple 
layers of bargaining covered by the concept of transfer. 
 
(iii) The contractual governance of the companies 
 
The restrictions mentioned above delineate, in the words of the agreements, the rights, 
powers, preferences, limitations, duties, liabilities and obligations of the holders of the units in 
the respective companies. Additionally, they specify the outstanding role played by the 
management in its diverse forms (board of directors, board of representatives, board of 
managers, management board, or management committee). Many of the companies whose 
LLC agreements I analyzed are equity funds. All of them have identical contractual structures, 
and are drafted in similar ways. Being equity funds is not what makes these companies 
interesting. Their intriguing aspect rests on the fact that their members are relatively passive, 
and rely heavily on the management to make investments and generate liquidity. If seen the 
other way around, the managers are quite active, and sometimes even have the right to act 
discretionarily. However, the managers’ actions may be subject to the oversight of a 
management committee or any other sort of collective board.  
There are other examples in which the management and operation of the company and 
the determination of its policies are vested exclusively in the respective sponsor or managing 
member. They are authorized and empowered to carry out and implement any and all of the 
objectives and purposes of the firm. However, depending on the agreement, members may 
hold the power to unilaterally take any and all actions regarding major transformations of the 
company such as capitalization, mergers and acquisitions, consolidation, liquidation or 
                                                             
393 This definition is provided for in the Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of PBF 
Energy Company LLC, dated and effective as of 12 December 2012. 
394 See Part II, Chapter 2 for a definition of share. 
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dissolution of the company, admission of new members, and changes in the membership 
percentages. The power to manage and operate the company as well as to determine its 
policies regarding strategic operations including mergers and acquisitions and capital 
structure may be exclusively held by a sponsor or managing member. They are authorized and 
empowered to carry out and implement any and all of the objectives and purposes of the firm. 
Still, their actions are subject to investors’ oversight. In certain circumstances, the sponsor 
shall not have the authority to act without the consent of investors holding a certain 
percentage of units. 
The management of these companies resembles in many instances the board of directors 
of corporations, and substantially functions like a corporation. They may be composed of 
officers,395 (who are directly dependent upon the management)396, chief executive officers 
(who are subject to the control of the manager and to the restrictions that the manager may 
impose, may have general supervision, direction, and control of the business and affairs of the 
company), vice presidents (who can substitute chief executive officers), secretaries (who keep 
or cause to be kept at the principal business office of the company, or such other place the 
manager may order, a book of minutes of all proceedings of the members and the manager), 
assistant secretaries, treasurers, assistant treasurers, and chief compliance officers. This may 
be different for standard LLCs which do not give legal form to equity funds, for example, and 
thus do not foresee the figure of the sponsor with all the powers to direct and control the 
business it implies. In these LLCs managers may be more limited on their powers and, 
therefore, shall have no authority to take actions on behalf of the company without obtaining 
the written consent of all the members. Among such actions may be the sale, financing, 
conveyance, assignment, transfer, disposing or refinancing of all or a substantial portion of 
the assets of the company; merger or consolidation of the company; change of the name of the 
company or location of its principle office; amending or cancelling the certificate of formation 
of the company or change the state of organization of the company; admit a new member or 
add an additional manager; incur any lease (as lessee) conveyance, mortgage or other 
indebtedness not included in any budget approved by the members; make loans on behalf of 
the company, except in the terms determined in the LLC agreement; incur or enter into any 
lease, conveyance, mortgage or other agreement or indebtedness on behalf of the company 
                                                             
395 The power of the officers may be set forth not only in the respective operating agreement, but also in side 
agreements (e.g., employment agreements or even memoranda of understanding (MOU)). In some of the 
selected operating agreements, officers as well as managers are expressly identified as agents of the company for 
the purpose of the company’s business and the actions of the officers taken in accordance with such powers shall 
bind the company. 
396 Sometimes managers additionally delegate their authority to a board of trustees. 
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which requires the personal guarantee of any member or any affiliate of any member; settle 
any claims or lawsuits against the company or commence or overtly threaten any law suit or 
other action on behalf of the company against a third party; contravene the LLC agreement or 
any other agreement to which the company is a party; act in a way that would render it 
impossible to carry on the business and affairs of the company; do any action that would 
cause the company to be treated as a corporation for federal income purposes; or take any 
action that would cause the dissolution of the company but as determined in the agreement. 
When the management is drawn as such it almost resembles the way management is designed 
in French PLLCs without prejudice of the specificities of the American LLC.  
The manner in which LLCs are contractually governed is interesting and complex. The 
agreements show that managers are often elected by one of the members. This is different 
from those situations in which members are vested with managerial authority in proportion to 
the shares they hold in the share capital. Also curious are the confidentiality clauses in these 
agreements establishing, for instance, that the identity of any person with whom the company 
may be holding discussions with respect to any investment, acquisition, disposition or other 
transaction, and all other business, financial or other information relating directly to the 
conduct of the business and affairs of the company or the relative or absolute rights or 
interests of any of the members is confidential and proprietary information of the company. I 
have not had access to any original side letter agreements, due diligence executive summaries, 
nor to correspondence with or among the investors of the companies in the sample. Most of 
these documents are kept private. However, it is often the case that in such ‘side letter’ 
agreements the management and investors agree on specific terms, conditions, protections, 
and special consents on the transfer of these investors’ shares.   
The LLC is indisputably a very flexible form of business organization. It is used as a 
business vehicle and as a contractual instrument to design the rights and obligations of the 
members and the governance of the company pursuant to its business purpose, its members’ 
interests and the protections they expect to come along with their investment. Hence, these 
companies’ profile is contractually asymmetric in the sense that on one hand members’ rights 
and obligations, the managers’ role and all other sorts of specifications as to distributions, 
allocations of profits and losses, and so on are all set out in the operating agreements. On the 
other hand, many issues in need of bargaining are not included in the LLC agreement. There 
are clauses of some LLC agreements that exhort members not to file a particular action with a 
court since that would likely tear apart the business enterprise (this means that disputes are 
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settled aside the LLC agreement).397 Besides, the LLC itself lies on a contractual web whose 
lines connect side agreements and several bargaining layers (not all of them comprising 
matters dealt with by the LLC agreement). In these circumstances, transfer restrictions work 
as guarantees of contractual integrity and companies’ governance. 
 
III. Market 
 
i. The LLC at the crossroads: The case of contentious disputes over membership 
interests in the LLC 
 
The way restrictions work as guarantees of contractual integrity and governance is not 
crystal clear. The analysis of 14 cases adjudicated by US courts regarding assignments or 
transfer of shares illustrates this idea. Courts decided on legal problems which are clustered as 
follows. 
 
1. Interpretation 
(i) Problems of the parties interpreting the respective operating agreement, and in 
particular, the transfer clause establishing the restrictions on transfers (it is 
often the case that this clause is the heart of the contentious dispute);398 
(ii) Doubts as to which interests were transferred with the execution of the share 
sale and purchase agreement;399  
(iii) Problems understanding the validity and effectiveness of ‘handshake 
agreements’ freeing particular transfers such as those made to spouses and 
children of members from any restrictions, particularly after the company was 
transformed into a LLC.400 
                                                             
397 The LLC agreement of the Delaware company Inland Diversified Dayville Killingly Member, LLC dated as 
of 3 October 2012 sets forth that ‘The members agree that irreparable damage would be done to the good will 
and reputation of the company if any member should bring an action in court to dissolve the company’. 
398 See Richard Van Loon et al. v Winchester-Wesselink, LLC et al. 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 9200; MARK 
ROWE, Appellee, v. VOYAGER HOSPICECARE HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellant 231 P.3d 1085; 2010 Kan. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 452; and ACHAIAN, INC. et al. v LEEMON FAMILY LLC et al. 25 A.3d 800; 2011 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 118. 
399 See EUREKA VIII v. NIAGARA FALLS HOLDINGS Del.Ch., 899 A.2d 95 (2006); MILFORD POWER 
COMPANY, LLC et al. v. PDC MILFORD POWER, LLC 866 A.2d 738; 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189; and Frank 
R. Zokaites, appellant v. Pittsburgh Irish Pubs, LLC and Colm McWilliams, Appellees 2008 PA Super 281; 962 
A.2d 1220; 2008 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4287. 
400 See Richard Van Loon et al., Plantiffs and Appellants v Winchester-Wesselink, LLC et al, Defendants and 
Respondents 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 9200. Also see The Huntington National Bank v Big Sky 
Development Flint, LLC et al. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 641116. 
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(iv) Problems understanding how to frame and interpret the transfer clause which 
was drafted whilst the company was still a partnership and not yet a LLC. 
Furthermore, parties dispute whether the scope of the clause encompasses the 
situations in which there is a change in control of one of the companies, which 
are in turn partners of the LLC.401 
(v) Members, as they admit in the judicial proceedings, are not familiar with the 
mechanisms of transferring membership interests, but are only aware of the big 
picture. 
(vi) Difficulties in distinguishing management and economic rights, and 
clarification of the circumstances in which members are entitled to exercise 
one or the others in the context of the assignment of membership interests of 
the bankrupt minority member to the majority member.402 
(vii) Problems in understanding on which grounds a transfer was un-consented or 
not, considering that not only the LLC agreement was entered into, but also 
several other agreements of distribution, property management, purchase 
agreements, loan agreements, license agreements and so forth were entered 
into. (Courts tend to adopt an objective approach to contracts and interpret and 
apply their terms just as they are included in such contract).403 
 
2. Functionality of restrictions on transfers 
(i) Situations of deadlock in 50-50 LLC when the LLC agreement has no 
‘reasonable exit mechanism’ or other way to break the deadlock.404 
(ii) Buck-passing and violation of fiduciary duties under the respective operating 
agreement. 
(iii) Predatory practices inside the firm against certain shareholders, especially if 
they also are employees of the company. The imposition of restrictions on 
transfers may indirectly serve this purpose.405 
                                                             
401 See W.R. Huff asset Management Co., l.l.c et al. v The William Soroka 1989 Trust et al. 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17940; and EIG GLOBAL ENERGY PARTNERS, LLC V. TCW ASSET MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, ET AL2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171412. 
402 See MILFORD POWER COMPANY, LLC et al. v. PDC MILFORD POWER, LLC 866 A.2d 738; 2004 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 189; and Frank R. Zokaites, Appellant v Pittsburgh Irish Pubs, LLC and Colm McWilliams, 
Appellees 2008 PA Super 281; 962 A.2d 1220; 2008 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4287. 
403 See MARK ROWE, Appellee, v. VOYAGER HOSPICECARE HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellant. 231 P.3d 
1085; 2010 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 452. 
404 ACHAIAN, INC. et al. v LEEMON FAMILY LLC et al. 25 A.3d 800; 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118. Also see 
EUREKA VIII v. NIAGARA FALLS HOLDINGS Del.Ch., 899 A.2d 95 (2006). 
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(iv) Oppression of minority shareholders by majority shareholders. (One of the 
ways minority shareholders have to defend themselves is to file a motion so 
that courts intervene to enforce their rights of first refusal or first offer over the 
sale of shares to non-members of the LLC).406 
(v) Opportunism of the members. They are supposed to know what needs to be 
done if they want to change the company’s ownership. They just do not do it, 
or they do it in a deceiving way.407 
 
3. Un-consented transfer of shares 
(i) Breach of the relevant operating agreement. In other words, parties do not 
follow the rules they themselves have established in the operating 
agreement.408  
(ii) Claims made by the transferee against non-transferring members and their 
attorney accusing them of tortious interference with contracts and civil 
conspiracy for having sold part of the membership interests the transferee was 
assigned through an un-consented transfer.409 
 
4. Formalities 
(i) The existence of intricacies within the LLC which are closely linked to its 
closed nature or with the fact it is a family-owned company. As a result, at 
times, formalities and queries are omitted. For example, requests for the 
change of the company’s ownership structure are liable to not be taken 
seriously in these circumstances, and instead to be taken as mere 
administrative requests to change the payee’s name or the name of the 
beneficiary of the company’s contributions. At first blush, these requests to 
change the ownership structure are not viewed by the non-transferring 
shareholders as formal transfer proposals, neither are they treated as such. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
405 See Glenn Ault, Jr., Appellant v. William B. Brady et al. 37 Fed. Appx. 222; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11684. 
406 See Louis GIULIANO & another v. Gary PIONTKOWSKI & others62 Mass.App.Ct. 932. 
407 See The Huntington National Bank v Big Sky Development Flint, LLC et al. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 641116. 
408 See Elizabeth CONDO, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Thomas J. CONNERS, George Roberts, and Wendell 
Porterfield, Defendants–Appellees 271 P.3d 524; and The Huntington National Bank v Big Sky Development 
Flint, LLC et al. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 641116; EUREKA VIII v. NIAGARA FALLS HOLDINGS Del.Ch., 
899 A.2d 95 (2006); and The Huntington National Bank v Big Sky Development Flint, LLC et al. 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 641116. 
409 See See Elizabeth CONDO, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Thomas J. CONNERS, George Roberts, and Wendell 
Porterfield, Defendants–Appellees 271 P.3d 524. 
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Additionally, due to the family nature of the company, the understanding that 
due diligences are not needed prevents a clear perception of what transfer 
requests/proposals are all about in these companies.410 
(ii) The calculation of the fair value of membership interests upon withdrawal of a 
member or termination of the LLC agreement.411 
The contractual basis of the LLC as well as the contractual web involving its dynamics, 
given the number of agreements members enter into and between themselves and third 
parties, make it difficult, in some cases, for restrictions on transfers to accomplish the purpose 
for which they are generally drafted. This is, perhaps, the case because the LLC is at the 
crossroads of rights and obligations arising from different contracts and unwritten 
compromises. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
This chapter draws upon the three stories that have been leading this historical 
excursion: (i) the story about interest groups interfering with legislative outcomes and 
policies; (ii) the story of law as a byproduct of private ordering; and (iii) the story of legal 
evolution of the PLLC in the United Kingdom and the United States. As in the previous 
chapter, these narratives are clothed in three parameters – state, actors, and market.  
In respect to the first parameter, the private company was legally accepted in the United 
Kingdom in 1907. This process of legal acceptance, however, is not exclusive to the United 
Kingdom. It happened in Portugal, France, Italy, and Spain as described in Chapter II. The 
narratives I relate here suggest that the formation of these companies went hand in hand with 
market structures, even when they were not formally acknowledged by legislators. This 
explains their steep increase every time they are accepted by law. They are no longer 
underground. This also affects statistical results given that these companies are included into 
statistical surveys after their legal recognition.412 Naturally, the statistical treatment yields 
results which could not be reached by making an account of their evolution at a time when 
they were looked at, but not really seen. Because private and public companies were not 
traditionally differentiated by legislatures in the United Kingdom, it is difficult to establish a 
                                                             
410 See RICHARD VAN LOON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. WINCHESTER-WESSELINK, LLC et al., 
Defendants and Respondents 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9200. Also see The Huntington National Bank v 
Big Sky Development Flint, LLC et al. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 641116. 
411 See Glenn Ault, Jr., Appellant v. William B. Brady et al. 37 Fed. Appx. 222; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11684. 
412 Statistics and state-organised surveys may have been, in fact, one of the most efficient state-driven 
promotions of the new business form.  
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solid date such as 1844, 1855-56 or 1862 as of which the private company started to blossom 
in the United Kingdom.413 This takes us to the second parameter, the actors. The distinctive 
features of these companies cannot be grasped without an examination of these companies’ 
constitutional documents, their governance and ownership structures, and the web of 
transactions the companies as well as their members entered into at a lower level. The way 
market agents interact at the lower level affects the evolution of these business organizations. 
The market parameter reveals the numerous circumstances fleshing out bargaining in these 
companies. The starting point in the Companies Act 2006 is that shares are freely transferable, 
unless articles of association say otherwise. Historically, there have been no major legislative 
changes to this rule. However, given their contractual purpose, restrictions on transfer of 
shares have been widely accepted by United Kingdom courts. In fact, judgments of 
contentious disputes over transfers are not an exception to the positive contractual approach of 
United Kingdom courts. Courts are sensitive to the market’s structure and put the 
responsibility of the contractual choices on the shoulders of the parties. Judges will look at 
restrictions, and will not make any particular judgments because such restrictions are an 
encroachment of the principle that shares are freely transferable. Additionally, the provision 
of a considerable number of default rules and Table A from which parties can opt out reveals 
the contractualist approach taken by UK legislatures. Freedom of contract has been the 
dominant approach in UK corporate law, which pinpoints crucial points such as careful 
drafting. Nevertheless, default rules and Table A are great safety nets. Considering the 
dimension of these companies, the question is whether there are any public interests 
legislatures should call back. This is an increasingly topical debate in the United Kingdom. 
In the United Kingdom, private companies were historically ‘downloaded’ by 
legislatures, and restrictions on transfer played a special role in defining their form. It was 
assumed that those who ‘owned’ and managed the company were capable of doing it 
underground. The United Kingdom case shows that where the line between private and public 
was blurred, contractual flexibility served different purposes. It also suggests that contractual 
flexibility has been used to this day to strengthen the control of directors over private 
companies. According to the memoranda and articles of association analyzed, as well as case 
law, this corporate constituency seems to be in a privileged position to affect the design of 
rules governing the private company and its enforcement. 
                                                             
413 In the United Kingdom the moto ‘think small first’ always was taken seriously. However, this motto makes 
most sense in the legislative history of UK company law, given that reforms were mainly directed at private 
companies. 
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In the United States, the LLC is relatively young, and it has been looked upon as a 
panacea. It shares the same advantages of flexibility and adaptability to small and medium 
enterprises which made it a success in the other selected jurisdictions. Additionally, adopting 
a LLC may be a smart way to avoiding double taxation, which comes along with being taxed 
as a corporation.414 However, when we have a look at the first parameter, historically, the 
United States lagged behind when it came to enact its first LLC law. This was so even when, 
in practice, business people counseled by their attorneys would likely tailor by contract their 
firms so that they fit their interests and guarantee the kind of protections they were seeking by 
investing in that business.415 However, traces of path-dependence were blatant to the point 
that it had to be a legal decision altering the rules on corporate taxation, and finally defining 
the LLC status for tax purposes to make the new business form break through.  
At the level of the second parameter, an assessment of LLC agreements clarifies that 
drafting a contract in particular a LLC agreement implies taking chances and making multiple 
choices. This encapsulates the economic problem inherent in the LLC. The LLC agreement 
tries to tackle it either through complex clauses regarding the status of the company for tax 
purposes, through clauses that specify the ownership and governance structure of the 
company, and in particular through clauses restricting the transfer of shares.  
Regarding the third parameter, the case law I collected showcases scarcity and 
asymmetries of information, transaction costs, ‘ramifications of bounded rationality’ and 
opportunism of members and weak(er) property rights of certain members clashing with what 
was supposed to be a durable investment in the company. Stronger property rights and 
adequate and contractually well-defined governance mechanisms are in order.416 But I 
envision something bridging the property rights and the transaction costs literatures.417 Not 
only are strong(er) property rights crucial to overcoming the lack of incentives to invest and 
                                                             
414
 Tax rates in the United States are one of the highest in the world. 
415 See Blair, Margaret M., ‘Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century’, 51 UCLA L. Review, 2003-04, pp. 387-455 (presenting an historical account of the 
development of the corporation in the United States in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). 
416 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs, Stanford Law 
Review, vol. 38, N.º 2, 1986, pp. 271-301 (287) (stating that ‘Ordinarily, if the number of contracting parties is 
small enough and property rights are well specified, the parties will dicker to the optimal solution no matter what 
the legal rule may be’). 
417 In Part II Chapter 1, I present a model of legal policy with three levels. L1 is the level of society. L2 is the 
level of legislatures. L3 is the level of the market. I suggest that optimal law is created through the interplay of 
L2 and L3. This is so because rules of property rights are insufficient per se to overcome bargaining failures. On 
the other hand, private ordering at L3 is not sufficiently apt to overcome bargaining failures either. So, there 
must be an intermediate way by which governance of contracts by giving strength to property rights and 
facilitating their enforcement is more efficient. Getting this right will help overcome bargaining failures, and 
inevitably have welfare effects on L1, the society. It is also a way to work out the relationship between legal 
rules and private property. 
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safeguard the investment in the companies, but also contract governance mechanisms are key 
for this purpose.418 In other words, not only mechanisms to overcome ex-ante contractual 
inefficiencies matter, at the level of contractual regulation, but so do mechanisms to surpass 
ex-post inefficiencies at the level of implementation. 
Still, there are situations in which legislators, courts, and most importantly law 
consumers prefer to cut off their noses despite their face and opt to keep a legal status quo, or 
to accommodate their contracts to the legal fixity and doctrinal path-dependence which 
characterize many of the solutions already entrenched in the law.419 I think that the 
evolutionary process of the law can be responsive to competition, for market agents, by 
competing and cooperating at the lower level, force legal change. The balance between 
competition and cooperation is, however, delicate. It is a dynamic. The PLLC, not only in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, but also in the other selected jurisdictions is an 
illustrative instance. I believe that competition challenges claims of legal gradualism and the 
sanctity of protectionist devises that become embedded in the law for years, decades, and 
even centuries. This is where my middle position comes in.420 I explore this in the 
forthcoming chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
418 See Sund, Lars-Göran, and Bjuggren, Per-Olof, ‘Family-Owned, Limited Close Corporations and Protection 
of Ownership’, European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 23, 2007, pp. 273-283 (273) (arguing that ‘The 
incentives to make long term investments are strengthened if ownership rights are protected and freedom of 
contracts is a basic element in the process of efficient allocation of scarce resources’). 
419 Guinanne, Lamoureaux, Harris and Rosenthal (GLHR) in their work do not seem to take the road of doctrinal 
and political economy path-dependence. They explain how it was that the partnership prevailed in Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States even at a time when general incorporation laws had been 
enacted and the corporation had been made available for all and not just for a few. It is true that businessmen, 
especially in Germany and France, avoided the corporation because there were other business forms that better 
satisfied their needs. However, it is also true that change is not immediate and that people, even businessmen, 
tend to stick to what they know. All things being equal, they tend to use the legal forms with which they are 
familiar. There must be an incentive that drives them to break with the status quo and adopt something new. The 
fact is that the PLLC was adopted with success in all six jurisdictions. This is most likely due to its contractual 
nature and fewer regulatory handcuffs that were enough to trigger a 'mutation' in the respective legal systems. 
Guinanne et al.’s argument is valid for the United Kingdom where, despite the legal acceptance of the private 
limited company, the partnership was still used in high numbers. The reason for this may be that there is not a 
straightforward structural distinction between private limited companies and public limited companies in the 
United Kingdom, and partnerships, which are basically tailored by contract, still provide fewer regulatory 
burdens than the other two. 
420 See Williamson, Oliver E., ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 595-613 (explaining the main differences between the property-rights 
and transaction-cost economics literatures). 
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PART I OVERVIEW 
 
The historical approach is, in fact, a storytelling of a number of events. It tells a story of 
interest groups interfering with legislative policies; a story of law as a byproduct; and a story 
of the evolution of business associations in six countries: Portugal, France, Italy, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Each story is contextualized by three parameters – 
state, actors and market. Together, the stories address two points: why some countries lag 
behind others when it comes to introducing legislative innovations, and what has been the role 
of state policies in affirming these business organizations, in particular private limited liability 
companies. Moreover, the cross-country historical and legal overview and empirical evidence 
gathered throughout these pages helped disclose PLLCs’ legal regime in the selected 
jurisdictions and shed light on the micro-sphere of these companies.  
As to the reasons for countries lagging behind others, my findings reveal that the three 
southern peripheral countries – Portugal, Spain and Italy – and France were influenced by 
exogenous factors which compelled their legislatures to adopt a new corporate form. Such 
exogenous factors are as diverse as the challenges offered by colonial enterprises, by the 
demands of businessmen and trade associations, and the missionary and moralizing 
commitments assumed by the political movements in force at the time. With respect to the 
United Kingdom, endogenous factors rooted in the business environment such as customary 
practices of businessmen contributed to the legal acceptance of the private limited company. 
The United States constitutes an intermediate case, wherein endogenous and exogenous 
elements are coupled. Its specificity lies in the fact that this is a geographically big country, a 
federal country with fifty-one jurisdictions and a country not only driven by inter-state 
competition, but also driven by a market in which the individual and not so much the state 
takes matters into her own hands by lobbying with legislators whenever she feels that her 
business needs more and better laws. This was the case with the Wyoming LLC Act.  
Despite of the influence of exogenous or endogenous elements, in all six jurisdictions 
legislatures and courts (state parameter) played a decisive role as to the creation and 
implementation of the new business form. Moreover, the above narratives show that the 
passage of laws depends more on the popularity of the issue that is being lobbied (position 
and resolve of politicians and legislators) than on the resources available (lobby power). The 
need for new forms of business organizations was mostly felt in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Lawyers, notaries and courts helped disseminate the PLLC in different 
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degrees, and turn it into a popular business form in the selected jurisdictions, even if not 
legally consecrated yet. Companies and individuals also lobbied to get alterations 
implemented (actors parameter).  
For instance, data show that Portugal was quicker than the rest of the countries in 
adopting the PLLC. The Portuguese legislature imported the GmbH, which had been created 
by the German legislature slightly before. This peripheral European country is far from being 
an economic leader. In the United Kingdom, the number of contentious disputes (some of 
them emblematic) and political strategies paved the way for the acknowledgement of the 
existence of these companies. The reluctance to take legal notice of their existence seems to 
be linked to the great value placed on freedom of contract in the United Kingdom and to the 
idea that parties are the owners of the contract.421 Chronologically, the vogue of reform started 
in the United Kingdom in 1844 when the Parliament passed legislation establishing general 
incorporation without limited liability. In 1855-56, legislation was passed providing for 
limited liability. The Companies Act 1862 consolidated existing legislation. This is not 
surprising considering that, at that time, the United Kingdom was the world stage for the 
Industrial Revolution. However, the private limited company had not been acknowledged by 
the United Kingdom legislator yet. The Companies Act 1907 and, subsequently, the 
Companies Act 1908 consolidated the legal framework of the private company. In Italy the 
concept of limited liability company appeared for the first time in the Commerce Code of 
1882. This code provided for the joint stock company and the joint stock company with 
shares. The latter did not flourish due to the unsatisfactory regulation of the Commerce Code. 
Attempts of legal reform finally came, following the annexation of Venezia Giulia and 
Tridentina where there were plenty of limited liability companies which had been 
incorporated under Austrian law. The Spanish case is similar to the Portuguese and the Italian. 
The PLLC informally existed in this country for a long time. Business people would create 
private companies by contract totally outside the legislator’s reach. This was acknowledged 
by doctrine and legislators, but it was only in 1953 that the SRL was created following the 
implementation of the legal regime for the publicly held company, and the aims of the 
prevailing political regime at the time. The Spanish law, like that of the United Kingdom, 
stresses the contractual nature of the SRL. Its legal framework is mostly constructed out of 
default rules.422 However, unlike the United Kingdom and, again, similar to Portugal and 
                                                             
421 This expression portrays the contract itself as the object of ownership rights. 
422 It is interesting to note that in this regard the United Kingdom is more similar to Spain, Italy and Portugal in 
the sense that most of the rules regulating the private company are default rules and, therefore, freedom of 
 189 
 
Italy, the differences between the SRL and the publicly held company are defined in Spanish 
law. This distinction has not traditionally been made in the United Kingdom and, currently, 
the Companies Act 2006 does not present a clear-cut differentiation in the regime of the 
private limited company and the public limited company. This particular aspect, which is 
highly related to the fact this difference has never historically gained much ground, explains, I 
believe, the ownership structure in the United Kingdom private company, the role of directors, 
and their relationship with the members of the company. As to France, French legislators 
decided to implement the SARL in the post-war period, after Alsace-Lorraine reverted to the 
French territory.423 Still, French legislators wanted to ensure that the SARL was a business 
form of its own with singular features that would not owe much to the German GmbH 
adopted in 1892 and to the United Kingdom private limited company adopted in 1907. Its 
ownership and governance structures are more rigid than the PLLCs of other selected 
jurisdictions due to the unanimity and majority requirements for which the law has 
historically provided. Lawyers, notaries and for the most part jurisprudence, which was less 
conservative and skeptical than in the selected common- law countries, had a big stake in 
downloading the new form. Yet again, the SARL has the stamp of flexibility in its form and 
versatility in its legal framework ranging from corporate to tax law. Finally, the United States 
formally welcomed the LLC in the second half of the twentieth century. At first blush, one 
might say it is the laggard jurisdiction among all selected. To a certain extent it is. It is also 
true that the rapid development of the LLC calls for a better definition of the property rights 
that members hold in their shares (this is the reason I claim that for the LLC the best is yet to 
come)424. However, the LLC carries with it the heritage of different business forms which, 
legally consecrated or not, have sustained and boosted American industry for centuries.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
contract is exercised in this way. French law is more rigid, as the default rule only demands majority consent to 
the transfer.The LLC agreements are long, complex and often refer to tax rules, regulations, guidelines 
developed and adopted by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the Securities Act of 1933, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and so on. In fact, even 
though the United Kingdom has a common-law system, it is viewed as a less-regulated jurisdiction than the 
United States. It is important to keep this in mind: The two markets are very different. This may help explain 
why there is more mandatory law in the United States than in the United Kingdom. 
423 Post-war periods are historically times of great economic development in many fields and sectors of civil 
society. According to a French legislator, ‘The insufficiencies of business forms were essentially felt as of the 
second half of the nineteeth century due to the iminente changes resulting from the commercial and industrial 
methods’. See Journal Officel de Republique Française, 1925, No. 1, Senat – Séance du 17 Fevrier 1925, p. 117. 
Furthermore, it was said that the limited liability company was a truly international institution, meant to satisfy 
the identical economic needs in all countries that had reached an advanced state of commercial and industrial 
development. 
424 From the evolutionary point of view it would be fair to ask: is law still evolving? Many legal solutions not 
only in the field of corporate law, but also in other fields of law, have altered the way private ordering is 
manifested. However, for the most part, these private ordering manifestations constitute the 'DNA' which is 
entrenched in the law, and even the legislators, whilst coming up with new rules have to deal with it. 
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The analysis of historical data showed that some countries are more likely than others to 
take up opportunities to legislate. Cultural nuances showcased by the law, the prior existence 
of other business forms, the importance of the banking system and bankruptcy law in these 
countries are all possible explanations.425 Had there been an open market for law would these 
jurisdictions have created the PLLC earlier? It is difficult to say.426 All six cases suggest, 
however, that legislators and courts are liable to respond to incentives to change their policy. 
The responses are highly contingent upon the availability of the 'right' incentives. This is so 
possibly because markets were less mature, or they did not feel the need to adopt new 
business forms.427 In this context, the role of lawyers and legal practitioners has been crucial. 
They have a privileged sense of the market and helped 'download' these organizational forms.  
As to the micro-sphere of these companies, if we closely look at their historical profiles 
and to the relationships between corporate constituencies we are likely to discover that they 
are the product of an open-ended process of bargaining and disputes (market parameter). 
Many of them are kept silent, either because it does not pay off to go to court (courts move 
extremely slowly and are cost-intensive, as in Italy, Portugal, and Spain),428 or because 
turning conflicts in the company into contentious disputes would just break the commercial 
enterprise apart. This helps us understand how each constituency views itself and others in 
this process of construction, deconstruction and regeneration of the company.  
Looking at the micro-sphere of these companies also made it possible to discern the 
several traits of their ownership and governance structures and the interaction of their 
                                                             
425 See Part I, Chapter 1 where I refer to this apropos measures and policies that could be implemented in 
different countries, but legislatures opted not to do it. At that point, I called the attention of the reader to how this 
can actually affect the availability of data concerning these business organizations. 
426 The ‘law market’ is a debate that is beyond the scope of this work. See O’Hara, Erin A., and Ribstein, Larry 
E., The Law Market, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
427 In respect to the German case, see Eckert, Georg, and Kalss, Susanne, Zentrale Fragen des GmbH-Rechts: 
Entwicklung, Perspektiven, Materialien, Wien, Linde Verlag, 2005, p. 48 (stating that ʽGeschichte und 
Entwicklung des GmbH-Rechts sind völlig anders als die des Aktienrechts, Sie ist kürzer, überschaubarer und 
mit klaren Markierungspunkten zu verorten. Während das Aktienrecht aus verschiedensten Quellen mehrerer 
Länder Schritt für Schritt zu einer eigenständigen Gesellschaftsform verschmolz, beruht das GmbH-Recht auf 
analytischer Mangelerhebung, rechtspolitisch-konzeptionellen Vorüberlegungen und bedarfsorientierter 
wirtschaftspolitischer Argumente; umfangreiche Enquenten und Bedarfserhebungen sowie mehrere private 
Entwürfe veranlassten den Gesetzgeber zu konkreten legistischen Maβnahmenʼ ) (‘History and Development of 
the (limited liability company) law are completely different from the stock market exchange law. It [the 
development] is shorter, easier to follow and can be traced to clear (stages) of development. Whereas stock 
exchange law emerged out of very different sources from different countries step by step into an independent 
(form of company/law), the limited liability company law result from an analysis of (the lacks in the then current 
legal order), political-conceptual considerations and economic necessity. Detailed surveys and analyses of 
necessity, as well as several private draft versions, lead the legislator to make the concrete law’). 
428
 The analysis of the sample of court decisions revealed that the lapse between the moment a petition is filed in 
a Delaware court and the moment it is decided may be up to one month. This is radically different from the 
decision on timing in Portuguese, French, Italy, Spanish and even United Kingdom courts. In the Southern 
countries it may take years to arrive at a court decision as of the moment the petition is filed. 
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elements through the contractual design of their articles of association. The analysis of case 
law complemented the endeavor of historically profiling these companies. It allowed a close 
look at the behavior of their members and managers and an understanding of the different 
layers of bargaining which are not necessarily comprised within the ‘four corners’ of the 
company’s articles of association. Bargaining, however, even if not comprised in the ‘four 
corners’ of the companies’ articles was liable to affect the structure of property rights of 
shareholders in their shares. The several layers of bargaining to which one is exposed also hint 
at a paradox which in private companies is not always obvious. Dependence of the company 
on its members is high, but managers and directors are contractually empowered. Where the 
line separating ownership from control is typically murkier, often articles of association were 
designed to empower managers or directors (United Kingdom and United States). If it was not 
the case that articles of association were designed this way, in practice, managers and 
directors succeeded in capturing such power, especially if they were majority shareholders 
(Portugal, France, Italy and Spain). This was clearer to see through the ‘doctrinal clusters’ of 
legal issues that courts in these countries had to decide on. The four clusters – interpretation, 
functionality of restrictions on transfer, un-consented transfer of shares and formalities 
exposed governance problems in PLLCs that require instances of ‘diagnosis’. They result 
from the mutual or reciprocal action or influence of corporate, contract, and property rights 
laws framed by the political, and socio-economic contexts in which these companies evolve.  
Trying to 'download' the PLLC through this parallel historical research makes apparent 
how law is a byproduct of normative solutions or, in biological terms, an extended 
phenotype.429 The political process, cycles of economic development of the countries, cultural 
patterns of behavior, gender and the law matter for shaping standards of investment, 
compromise and liability. The biggest challenge for law, however, is to keep up with this 
open-ended process of bargaining and struggles within companies and to provide incentives 
for reciprocity and for an enduring system of exchanges to take place. Nevertheless, law itself, 
as is more clearly revealed by the parliamentary debates and related documents, is subject to 
struggles and negotiations which manifestly determine the contents of legal provisions. Law 
itself is contingent upon and vulnerable to decisions to maintain the status quo. Consequently, 
while law as a byproduct is not certain to affect the many forms taken by these business 
associations, it is definitely liable to do so. History shows that state policies have a facilitative 
role, and this is the crux of this matter.  
                                                             
429 Another good example of law being a byproduct is the legal consecration of the right of members of 
American LLCs to bring derivative suits. This right was first created by courts and later adopted by legislatures. 
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The dovetailing of the three parameters (state, actors, and market) translated, in practice, 
into the yoking of state policies, multiple forms of private ordering, and the economy. Indeed, 
law operates in a very organic way.430 Its development is strikingly similar to that of a living 
organism, and this fact establishes the grounds upon which the analogy between legal 
evolution and evolutionary biology can be set forth. I offer an analogy with the gene-selection 
view presented by Dawkins. He defines a gene as: ‘…any portion of chromosomal material 
which potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of material selection’.431 As 
he puts it, ‘The gene is the basic unit of selfishness’.432 This is so because genes compete 
directly with their alleles, that is to say, other genes, for survival. Their alleles in the gene-
pool are rivals for their slot on the chromosomes of future generations. Any gene that behaves 
in this way (i.e., selfishly) in order to increase its chance of survival at the expense of its 
alleles will tend to survive. 
This explains how genes depend upon the environment which is also formed by other 
genes. The environment is the climate or background, modifying and influencing the effects 
of any particular gene.433 My analogy can be set in the following terms. Legislators are part of 
this 'environment' and have the ability to shape it by artificially selecting from within it 
certain elements. This is different from the process of 'natural selection', which in this context 
operates on what market agents do in the wild. Other legal stakeholders like judges, lawyers, 
and notaries are potential occupants of the same slot along the legislative process. This is 
made possible either through the formation of interest groups which lobby for the enactment 
of legislation, or through a creative process of adjudication in the case of more activist judges, 
or even through the adoption of certain customary practices by lawyers and notaries which 
end up prevailing over inefficient legal provisions. Hence, legislating efficiently to build up a 
coherent and efficient body of rules is tantamount to creating a solid law that will survive in 
                                                             
430 See Smith, Stephen A., Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 
p. 21 (noting that one general feature of the historical development of the law is its organic development. He 
points out the legal education of judges in common law which is based in practice and inherited craftsmanship. 
Judges previously were successful practicing lawyers. He also points out that until very recently judges and 
lawyers alike did not receive any academic training in law nor did they take advantage of the scientific literature. 
I t was not until the late nineteenth century that the common law was first taught in the universities. It appears 
this picture is very similar in the United States). 
431 See Dawkins, Richard, The Selfish Gene, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 30  
432 See Dawkins, Richard, cit., p. 39. 
433 See Dawkins, Richard, cit., p. 64 (stating that ‘Genes are the primary policy-makers; brains are the 
executives. But as brains became more highly developed, they took over more and more of the actual policy 
decisions, using tricks like learning and simulation in doing so. The logical conclusion to this trend, not yet 
reached in any species, would be for the genes to give the survival machine a single overall policy instruction: do 
whatever you think best to keep us alive’). 
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the future.434 The environment in which rules develop is important, for it can create the 
conditions for legislators and other stakeholders to come together and cooperate. Genetically 
speaking, private ordering manifestations are part of the law’s DNA. Contractual solutions are 
achieved through natural selection which is fueled by competition. Competition can bring 
legislators and legal stakeholders together for mutual compatibility. There may be, of course, 
inherently bad genes, or in other words, genes that are not able to collaborate well with others 
in the same gene-pool. This makes it difficult for legislators to keep up with the genetic 
predisposition of some legal solutions, which, at the end of the day, she must necessarily deal 
with.  
As I intend to explain why law is how it is, I concentrate on private ordering and on 
how it influences legislative policies and the design of legal rules. At this level, the analogy 
can be further extended to describe how law can play a role in adapting to new circumstances. 
Natural selection operates in the sense that each gene is naturally chosen for its capacity to 
cooperate with its environment composed of other genes. The cornerstone of Dawkin’s 
argument is based upon the idea that genes are ‘immortal’.435 This assumption, in turn, rests 
upon two facts: the cross-over of genes and individual mortality. As to the first fact (i.e., 
cross-over of genes), history shows there is a tendency in legal systems for crossing-over and 
mutual engagement.436 This is what market agents do. They facilitate the crossover and 
engagement of legal systems. According to their needs and contractual practices, they lobby 
with legislators so that specific legislation is passed. Thus, there is this tendency for the 
reproduction of legal solutions which take bits and bytes of existing rules (pleiotropy). The 
narratives I have told in this chapter illustrate this and show how, in some cases, legislators 
and other stakeholders are liable to behave in the making of the law. As to the second fact 
(i.e., individual mortality), natural selection will favor genes which have the effect of 
postponing the operation of other lethal genes,437 and will also favor genes which have the 
effect of preserving the effects of good genes. It is in this context that law and the artificial 
                                                             
434 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘The Evolution of the Modern Uncorporation’, cit. p. 124 (suggesting that, pursuant to 
the historical evolution of the LLC, ‘…business law is more a product of firms’ business and general legal 
environment than a constraint’. Also See, Black, Bernard S, ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and 
Economic Analysis, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 84, 2, 1990, pp. 542-597 (asking first and 
foremost if law matters, and, if so, why). 
435 I am putting aside the hypothesis that no organism with a specific gene survives. 
436 See Ribstein, Larry E., The Rise of the Uncorporation, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 9 
(stating that ‘There is reason to believe that a similar process involving tension between regulated and flexible 
business forms is occurring throughout the world’). 
437 Lethal genes or alleles are genes that prevent the reproduction of an organism because they cause its death. 
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selection done by legislators are not irrelevant.438 Legislators, working as selective agents 
through the laws they enact, have the potential to cause a change in gene frequency. This is 
why law should not be seen as static: it has a considerable margin of evolution.439 The 
question is to know how law will deal with all this genetic complexity which makes the 
interactions between genes and environment extremely important. In fact, some would say 
that the difference between genetics and environment is the different time scale at which they 
operate. It is certain that there is a relationship between genes and environment, but how the 
environment influences genes and how social information is transferred is an open question.  
Law as an aggregate of genetic manifestations of private ordering on one hand, and as a 
catalyst of change on the other, begs the following question. Structurally, what comes before 
the gene? In biological parlance, the gene is like a recipe in a book on making protein. 
Proteins build up the human body. The words of this book are the codons. Codons specify the 
aminoacids which form the protein. The nucleotides, which form the basic constituent of 
DNA, are the letters. This is what comes structurally before the gene. The recipe of this book 
can be altered provided there are mutations that have the potential to be preserved by natural 
selection. The analogy with law boils down to the fact that legislators and other stakeholders 
have the ability to favor genetic changes and in this way affect the evolution of bodies of law 
and the development of rules and legal institutions. Survival of rules is an important argument 
in favor of efficiency as a normative standard in assessing the quality of law. In other words, a 
rule which is not avoidable is likely to be efficient because grossly inefficient rules will not 
survive.440 I am considering a scenario of natural selection that is contingent upon cooperation 
                                                             
438 See Davydenko, Sergei A.; and Franks, Julian R., ‘ Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in 
France, Germany, and the U.K., The Journal of Finance, vol. 63, No. 2, 2008, pp. 565-608 (disclosing that their 
research unveiled that banks significantly adjust their lending and reorganization practices in response to the 
respective country’s bankruptcy code. They also note that the referred adjustments mitigate, but do not eliminate 
the effect of bankruptcy codes on defaults. Another finding is that differences in practices across countries do not 
always conform to expectations. Parenthetically, this idea goes hand in hand with my idea that legal institutes 
from different fields are genetically linked in unexpected ways. They also emphasize the importance of 
understanding broader institutional considerations in the task of perceiving the effects of bankruptcy law). Also 
see Sgard, Jérôme, ‘Do Legal Origins Matter? The Case of Bankruptcy Laws in Europe, European Review of 
Economic History, 10, 2006, pp. 389-419 (392) (arguing that ‘Perhaps evolutions observed across countries are 
less reflective of past institutional legacies than of the explicit attempts by lawmakers to affect microeconomics 
behaviours’).  
439 See, however, Cheffins, Brian R. ‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United 
Kingdom’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 30, No. 2, 2001, pp. 459-484 (482) (arguing that ‘…the UK’s legal 
system did not have a pivotal influence on the evolution of the country’s corporate governance patterns’. Instead 
development of such patterns as well as the Berle-Means corporation, where the principle of separation of 
ownership and control prevails, was very much pushed by the London Stock Exchange during the later half of 
the twentieth century. The LSE was a private institution without any formal proxy from the British government. 
Cheffins notes that self-regulation was much more important in the United Kingdom than the law). 
440 For example, the minimum share capital requirement survived in many European countries for a long period 
until it no longer was a requirement due to jurisdictional competition. Because it did not ultimately survive, some 
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of legal genes in the same gene pool (I am metaphorically speaking of market agents in a 
given legal system)441, and competition. This is where economics, biology and law come 
together.  
There is a process of progressive evolution that echoes in two ways what seems to have 
happened in the selected jurisdictions in respect to the adoption of PLLCs laws. First, market 
agents enter into transactions by their own merit. Nevertheless, their actions and what they 
can really do is evaluated against the background of the ‘evolutionarily stable set’ – the gene 
pool – they are in. The interaction between legislators of different legal systems is something 
that we can see. This is relevant, but not exclusively so. Most significant interactions within a 
legal system, that is to say, interactions in the microsystem between market agents, 
legislatures, judges, lawyers, notaries and other stakeholders of that particular legal system, 
are frequently invisible to the public eye. I tried to capture a sense of this by following 
Duncan Kennedy on the creation of ‘doctrinal clusters’ of legal issues disputed in the courts 
of the six jurisdictions.442 In the field of biology, it can be difficult to establish a correlation 
between genes and proteins, even though this correlation, in fact, exists. Similarly, the 
evolutionary path of law is not always easy to trace. Some changes in law are not made in the 
public eye. This was reportedly the case with the passage of the Wyoming LLC Act in the 
United States. Second, the analogy with evolutionary biology underscores the idea that when 
change finally comes and a mutation occurs, this change is sudden and unpredictable. 
Mutations break through when they are advantageous or, in other words, they favor survival 
and cross-over or reproduction.443 Nevertheless, mutations do not only occur when they are 
advantageous. They may happen by chance, irrespective of potential for advantage or 
detriment. Disadvantageous mutations, however, are eliminated from the population – the 
gene pool – because in these circumstances genes carrying such mutations do not survive or 
they do not reproduce. This is inherent to the process of natural selection. It can also happen 
that a mutation is not advantageous, but neutral (it is not good or bad) and there can still be a 
genetic drift.444 In these circumstances, change moves from one generation to the other 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
could fairly argue that such requirement was inefficient. However, I do not rest my argument on jurisdictional 
competition. My argument is broader than that. 
441 The gene pool in the text stands for the legal system. 
442 See Kennedy, Duncan, ‘A Semiotics of Legal Argument’, Syracuse Law Review, pp. 75-116 (90-97). 
443 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms’, cit., p. 391 (saying that ‘…legislators may 
resist adopting LLC or other statutory provisions that are consistent with the public interest criteria…because 
such provisions would reduce their expected rents from future laws relating to closely held firms…’). 
444 A genetic drift is the arbitrary fluctuation of the frequencies of two forms of a gene (that is to say, the 
fluctuation of a normal form and a mutant form or neutral). To be precise, neutral mutations are subject to 
genetic drift. 
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depending on whether or not variations are extended efficiently. This idea may provide the 
grounds to explain why legal systems took so long until they adopted their respective PLLC 
laws. They gathered momentum once favorable conditions for the adoption of the law were 
met.  
However, there are situations in which mutations are subject to limitations and change 
does not happen or, when it does occur, does not go a long way. Nature works with prime 
matter (materia prima). This means that there are physical limitations to evolution. For 
example, as useful as it could be, humans could never have evolved to float in the air because 
gravity would drag them down. Furthermore, in the course of evolution all intermediary forms 
must be advantageous. It is not possible to go from point A to point B if, along the way, point 
AB is not functional. Take the example of an aircraft propeller. The inventor can quit the 
project of a propeller and start the new project from scratch. Evolution works differently: to 
create a jet plane using the principles of evolutionary biology, one would have to take the 
propeller of an airplane and progressively introduce minor alterations to it, bit by bit, step by 
step, and screw by screw until it became a jet airplane. The problem is that all minor 
alterations would have to improve the ability of the airplane to fly, or there would be no 
evolution at all.  
Legislators face similar difficulties. As much as legal evolution may be desired, the fact 
is that legislators can only go from point A to point B if the intervening manifestations of 
doctrinal and socio-economic path dependence are pulling in that direction.445 Even if 
alterations to the law are introduced to reflect what in practice notaries, lawyers and courts are 
doing (this includes the creation of new business forms), the narratives I have told suggest 
that not all of them are efficient. Not all of these alterations are liable to improve the 
efficiency of the law. However, if there are some limitations that are insurmountable (for 
instance, there are no animals with wheels instead of legs because that is simply impossible) 
there are others which can be overcome.446 The riddle is: why is that some limitations to 
                                                             
445 Path-dependence has not only been discussed in biology and law, but also in economics and economic 
history. See David, Paul A., ‘Clio and the economics of QWERTY’, The American Economic Review, vol. 75, 
No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 
1985, pp. 332-337 (333) (exploring the Qwerty world and explaining the Qwerty became historically locked-in 
as the dominant keyboard arrangement, despite other offers in the market. In an enlightening passage of his 
paper he affirms that ‘…while they [the agents engaged in production and purchase decision in today’s keyboard 
market] are, as we now say, perfectly “free to choose”, their behavior nevertheless is held fast in the grips of 
events long forgotten and shaped by circumstances in which neither they nor their interests figured”.. ). 
446 Flying animals are one of the best examples that limitations to evolution can be overcome. Flying is difficult. 
Therefore, flying animals are rare. They appeared only four times in history – insects, pterosaurs, birds and bats. 
Insects are also interesting examples of physical limitations. Given their proportion, they could not be much 
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evolution are transposable and others are not? The answer does not necessarily derive from a 
genetic point of view. Sometimes, it is just a question of engineering, that is to say, a question 
of finding the right model to solve design problems in the law. The theory of corporate default 
rules proposed by this dissertation rests upon this understanding.447 This being said, the 
overall measure of success in legal evolution remains an open question. In nature, success is 
measured by reproductive outcome. (Some things may not develop because the costs would 
not be justified by the possible benefits in terms of reproductive capacity). In my view, 
success in legal evolution should be assured by the degree to which market agents accept the 
implementation of a new law and do not feel a desire to deviate from it because it is 
advantageous to do so. In this case, the benefits of adopting the law are higher than the costs. 
Hence, because it is considered advantageous, if market agents deviate from the law they did 
not contract around (e.g., default rules), there will be a subsequent counter-movement pushing 
for its implementation (e.g., market agents will not ignore the rule; rather, they will strive for 
its best interpretation). Every time there is a deviation forcing the reestablishment of efficient 
legal solutions or legal reform, a bit of legal evolution happens. Ultimately, the measure of 
success will be the survival of the fittest PLLCs and their growth in numbers due to the legal 
infrastructure.448  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
bigger because their exoskeleton would be too heavy for them to just walk (apparently, weight increases with 
size). 
447 See Ribstein, Larry E. ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms’, cit., 391 (arguing that ‘Even statutory 
default rules can impact legislators’ power. Complex and detailed default provisions increase legislators’ 
opportunities to change existing contracts by changing default rules. This in turn invites contracting parties to 
pay rents to legislators rather than investing in private renegotiation of contracts. Elaborate formal requirements 
for changing statutory defaults, such as detailed amendment and merger procedures similarly lend themselves to 
legislative manipulation’). 
448 There are other economic factors in the survival of firms. The ultimate one might be the ability to make profit. 
If the firm does not make non-negative profit in the long-run, it cannot stay in the market. Profit means returns 
that are above zero-risk return. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF RESTRICTIONS 
ON TRANSFER OF SHARES: 
TAMING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SHARES AND THE SILVER FOX
449
 
 
 
‘…when we compare the dray-horse and race-horse, the dromedary 
and camel, the various breeds of sheep fitted either for cultivated 
land or mountain pasture, with the wool of one breed good for one 
purpose, and that of another breed for another purpose; when we 
compare the many breeds of dogs, each good for man in different 
ways; when we compare the game-cock, so pertinacious in battle, 
with other breeds so little quarrelsome, with ‘everlasting layers’ 
which never desire to sit, and with the bantam so small and 
elegant; when we compare the host of agricultural, culinary, 
orchard, and flower- garden races of plants, most useful to man at 
different seasons and for different purposes, or so beautiful in his 
eyes, we must, I think, look further than to mere variability’. 
 
Darwin, Charles, ‘Variation under Domestication’, The Origin of 
Species by means of Natural Selection, ch. I, Chicago, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1996, pp. 9-23 (18). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Part I, I concluded that law is a byproduct of normative solutions, or a sort of 
extended phenotype. Facing the emergence of new forms of business organizations, 
legislators have created systems of property rights in order to ensure equilibrium not only 
within the corporate structure, but also among the interests and protections each corporate 
constituency claims for itself.450 One of the ways to facilitate this equilibrium is by providing 
                                                             
449 This chapter was presented in the Visiting Scholars and Visiting Research Fellows Seminars Series at 
Fordham University School of Law, on 27 February 2013. It was presented at the 30th conference of the 
European Association of Law and Economics on 26 September 2013 in Warsaw. I generally thank the 
participants for the comments I received and the questions I was asked. I am particularly thankful for the 
comments I received from Christophe J. Godlewski while discussing the paper. This chapter was also presented 
at the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law 15th Conference on 4-5 April 2014 at the University of Illinois 
College of Law. I thank the participants for their comments. 
450 By equilibrium I mean a balance between influences that enables the maintenance of a stable system. 
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default rules that restrict transfer of shares or give leeway to company members to introduce 
such restrictions in the articles of association.  
Thus, in this chapter, I look, from a bottom-up perspective, at markets, their dynamics 
and evolution, and compare them to evolution in nature by looking at the environment within 
which this evolution occurs. It has long been claimed that evolution in nature is different from 
institutional evolution.451 However, I look at law as providing tools for institutional 
engineering just as biology supplies the scientist with the necessary cognitive equipment to 
undertake her experiments based upon the artificial selection of species. The output of this 
comparison should be one that, normatively speaking, enables legislators, regulators, and 
courts, in particular those in common-law jurisdictions,452 to create optimal legal solutions 
that are able to break engrained status quo and manifestations of socio-economic and doctrinal 
path-dependence, or situations of pleiotropy in the law, if necessary.  
Using transfer restrictions as a ground for experimentation, the first section tries to 
unveil the legal and economic purposes of setting such restrictions.453 There, I present a three-
level model that provides legislators, regulators and courts with methodological tools for 
implementing optimal legal solutions. In addition, I expose the contractual features of the 
articles of association by defining them as a ‘contract for the governance opportunity’ 
provided by the law.454 I give an overview of the most important possible restrictions within a 
comparative perspective. I also look at combinations of these restrictions. This is, I believe, a 
first in the literature. In the second section, I put forward an explanation for the effects 
restrictions may have on the configuration of property rights in shares, similar to the effects of 
the taming process on the silver fox. I not only advance a thesis of path-dependence of legal 
solutions, but also develop the idea of pleiotropy in law. In the third section, I inquire into the 
normative justification of restrictions considering the relational element prevailing in the 
PLLC. I conclude by disclosing my view of corporate and contractual evolution through an 
                                                             
451 See Pratt, John W., and Zeckhauser, Richard J., ‘Principal and Agents: An Overview’, in idem (eds.), 
Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1985, pp. 1-35 (35) 
(saying that ‘…the evolutionary processes for institutional structures are quite different from those for species. 
Desirable contracts are impossible to draw. Human environments change swiftly. Hence, there is no assurance 
that the institutions we observe are best’). 
452 In common-law systems, law is based on case law developed by courts. Courts are, thus, more likely to adopt 
an activist role than in civil law systems. 
453 See Sund, Lars-Göran and Bjuggren, Per-Olof, ‘Family-owned, limited close corporations and protection of 
ownership’, p. 274 (asking ‘Why should we impose restrictions on transfers?’). 
454 When I first presented an early draft of this chapter at Fordham University Law School, I intuitively came up 
with the concept of ‘organizational contract’. I, however, dropped the concept. I believe that referring to the 
articles of association as contracts for the governance opportunity illustrates better the possibility of governing 
PLLCs and the relationships between corporate constituencies through contract. It also alludes to a particular 
view of default rules, by which legislators give an opportunity to members to govern their company’s articles of 
association. On this, see Part III, Chapter 1. 
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equivalent principle of artificial selection similar to that which took place with the selective 
breeding of the silver fox. My view is that legislators have the ability to shape market agents’ 
behavior. They can do it in a dynamic way, by providing efficient default rules that are liable 
to change social phenomena of path-dependence. This implies legal engineering and 
experimentation at different levels. It also implies a new theory of defaults that sees default 
rules as commodities that can be used to achieve the best contractual solutions within an 
evolutionary framework. 
 
1. The law and economics of restrictions on transfer of shares: uncertainty and legal 
policy 
 
Articles of association, contracts that they are, are necessarily incomplete: They cannot 
encompass all possible situations that shareholders, as ‘residual claimants,’ will have to 
manage throughout the life of the firm. Hence, uncertainty and incomplete information in 
these circumstances are basic elements informing the so-called ‘theory of incomplete 
contracts’.455 Uncertainty is effected by several phenomena such as incomplete information, 
asymmetries of information, and opportunism in its different expressions.456 Uncertainty is an 
essential variable that must be used and the implications of which understood in order to 
explain the purpose of market agents’ behavior, especially when it comes to apply or to make 
good law. I view the market as a system where the Darwinian principle of natural selection 
can be analogously applied, like in biological evolution.457 This approach is based upon a 
model of legislative policy which is intended to overcome the limitations of uncertainty in 
bargaining, markedly when what is at stake is the negotiation of property rights. Ultimately, 
this model should carry within it the potential to favor the development of the firm, and 
strengthen the property rights of members in situations of weakness. I distinguish between 
                                                             
455 This is almost intuitive in respect to the corporation which in most cases is based on a long-term contract. See 
Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Close Corporation Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm’, Western New 
England Law Review, vol. 33, 2011, pp. 531 – 565 (548) (claiming that ‘No statute or agreement can cover all 
the contingencies involved in a complex and open-ended contract like a business association’). 
456 For a definition of uncertainty, see Alchian, Armen A., ‘Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory’, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 58, n.º 3, 1950, p. 212, f. 5 (saying that uncertainty is ‘… the phenomenon 
that produces overlapping distributions of potential outcomes’). 
457 I will not draw here on the definition of market, much less in particular on the definition of European Internal 
Market. However, it is easy to find in the literature conceptual references to 'market'. For example, see Berle, 
Adolf. A, and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., New York, 
Harcourt, 1967, p. 313 (mentioning an economic organism typified by the corporation).On this see, Part III, 
Chapter 2. 
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three levels of the legal system. The first level is that of the society. The second level is the 
level of the legislator, the regulator, and the courts. The third level is the level of the market. 
Level 1 is characterized by a degree of ‘social embeddedness’ caused by traditions, 
customs and culture that is difficult to cut through.458 It has, nevertheless, a pervasive effect 
on the economics of law. Therefore, the welfare effects of legal solutions must be considered. 
Level 2 – the level Oliver Williamson would probably call the ‘institutional environment’ -459 
features legislatures, courts, regulators and politicians.460 They act as selective agents with the 
ability to shape the environment wherein rules shall apply. Level 3 is filled with ‘impersonal 
market forces’.461 This model emphasizes the interwoven nature of the second and third 
levels. It also shows how their interaction can affect the first level. It illustrates my perception 
of the often-discussed bottom-up approach to law, and sustains a springboard for legal 
policy.462 
Designing articles of association by including restrictions on the transfer of shares of 
company members is one way for lawyers to avoid the uncertainty that accompanies the 
inclusion of a third party in the company’s business. A distinction should be made at the 
outset between restrictions imposed by default rules provided by the legislature, and particular 
restrictions agreed by the members and settled in the articles of association or operating 
agreements. The distinction is important because default rules established by a legislator fall 
within her work of selective agent (level 2).463 On the other hand, rules established by 
members in the articles of association are manifestations of private ordering which are subject 
to natural selection (level 3).464 This is a metaphor, a sort of analogy that I use throughout the 
                                                             
458 See Williamson, Oliver E., ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 38, N.º 3, pp. 595-613 (596-598). 
459 See Williamson, Oliver E.., ‘The New Institutional Economics’, cit, pp. 598 -599. 
460 Courts are more interventive in common-law countries than in civil-law countries when there are lacunae in 
the law. 
461
 See Alchian, Armen A., ‘Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory’, cit., p. 213. 
462 This evolutionary approach is simultaneously very Ribsteinian. See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Close Corporation 
Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm’, Western New England Law Review, vol. 33, 2011, pp. 
531- 565 (560) (arguing while discussing the potential of judicial dissolution that ‘Legislatures should reject 
close-corporation-type language such as that found at the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 
701 (a) (5), which provides for judicial dissolution based on ‘illegal’, ‘fraudulent’, or ‘oppressive’, without a 
clear reference to the agreement’. This is clearly a call for legal policy that is able to take ‘contractual technology 
seriously’ and for legislatures to ‘…invite the courts to bring those contracts to bear …’). 
463 The selective agent is an environment agent which can influence the process of natural selection. It 
determines the desirable features to be inherited. In biology, some examples can be mentioned such as the 
selective breeding of pigeons, cows, horses and dogs theorized by Darwin in the Origin of the Species. 
464 I must clarify that I am aware that claims that human behavior is genetically determined tend to be extremely 
controversial. A case in point is the field of evolutionary psychology and the debates about it. Similar concerns 
appeared among anthropologists and others in respect to the research work developed by Napoleon Chagnon 
among the tribe Yanomani. In this case, accusations were highly inflamed and were not limited to genetic 
determinism. See URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/magazine/napoleon-chagnon-americas-most-
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dissertation to illustrate that law, like nature, is the result of complex relationships that evolve 
over time and space. I suggest that there is a genetic component (e.g., market elements) which 
legislators have necessarily to deal with. Market agents tend to agree upon rules with the 
genetic predilection to survive, and this should be relevant for matters of legal policy.465  
This chapter demonstrates that even though historically most articles of association 
introduce restrictions on transfer (even when the law adopts a liberal principle of free 
transferability) the fact is that there is a status quo shareholders prefer to maintain regarding 
the company’s ownership and governance structure. This holds true even when it may not be 
in the economic interests of the company and may in fact harm its competitive position. Case 
law and empirical data showcase shareholders often ignoring restrictions they have set up and 
frequently not understanding the law and rules they themselves have included in the articles 
of the company. Why, then, do members set up restrictions on transfers in the first place? 
Uncertainty, as I stressed above, is the key answer. Members adopt restrictions as a 
safety balloon for naturally incomplete contracts. One might think that if contracts are kept 
unchanged it means that they are somehow beneficial for market agents and, therefore, 
efficient. In principle, there should be no uncertainty here. One might think that the 
competitive purpose of markets always causes agents to make optimal choices, and this 
behavior is, for the most part, what nurtures market evolution. Nevertheless, this is not quite 
the case. Despite the principle of natural selection, there are circumstances where mutations 
(or economically speaking, innovations) are subject to limitations. Change is unlikely to come 
about, and, if it does come, it is not consistent. First, there are physical limitations to 
evolution. Second, as I have explained in Part I, Overview, in the course of evolution all 
intermediary forms must be advantageous. It is not possible to go from point A to point B if, 
along the way, point AB is not functional. Legislators face similar difficulties. As much as 
evolution is desired, the fact is that legislators can only go from point A to point B if the 
intervening manifestations of doctrinal and socio-economic path dependence are pulling in 
that direction.466  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
controversial-anthropologist.html (accessed on 25 May 2013). I am not suggesting in my research any sort of 
genetic determinism of human behavior. 
465 The term selective breeding is used by Darwin in reference to the farmer selecting the horses that are used for 
breeding. Level 2 is an allusion to the idea of the farmer selecting the animals. Level 3 is an allusion to the 
process of natural selection. 
466 Path-dependency has not only been discussed in biology and law, but also in economics and economic 
history. Apropos see David, Paul A., ‘Clio and the economics of QWERTY’, The American Economic Review, 
vol. 75, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association, 1985, pp. 332-337 (333) (exploring the Qwerty world and explaining the Qwerty became 
historically locked-in as the dominant keyboard arrangement, despite other offers in the market. In an 
enlightening passage of his paper he affirms that ‘…while they [the agents engaged in production and purchase 
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I now return to the model. Even if alterations to the law are introduced to reflect what is 
being undertaken at level 3 of the market, not all of them are efficient.467 Some phenomena 
survive at level 3, despite the enactment of new legislation. One example worth mentioning is 
the persistence of insider trading in American corporations even after it was banned in 1961 
by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).468 It was only in the wake of new 
technological developments by which computers began to be used to track these unlawful 
practices that firms became available to police the application of the rule banning insider 
trading. This was so because costs of enforcement decreased due to technological 
developments.469 Yet, not all limitations are insurmountable. Some can be overcome. The fact 
that some limitations to evolution are transposable and others are not is a puzzle that most 
likely can only be solved through legal engineering. Given that survival does not always occur 
for optimal reasons, there is a window of opportunity for legislators who, through cognitive 
awareness, imagination and some courage to break with manifestations of path-dependence in 
both levels 2 and 3, have the possibility to create efficient laws. Legal engineering is, in this 
way, deeply rooted in the market’s dynamics. This is where level 2 and level 3 meet.  
The scheme I present here may be more obvious to economists who, in the face of 
uncertainty, are trained to make assumptions and create models that, with mathematical and 
economic tools postulate certainty.470 However, I think that legislators can also take up the 
position of ‘outside observer’ and cause a change into the legal system when and where it is 
needed. Additionally, it is a scheme that reconciles the ‘institutional environment’ with 
‘governance structures’ established in the market. It reconciles property-rights literature and 
transaction-costs economics. It does this by setting out a middle ground. Here, legislators can 
create property rights to overcome contractual inefficiencies ex-ante and facilitate the creation 
of governance mechanisms to resolve contractual inefficiencies ex-post. 
The type of restrictions included in the articles of association, either by literal 
transcription of the default rule or designed by their members and lawyers, varies depending 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
decision in today’s keyboard market] are, as we now say, perfectly “free to choose”, their behavior nevertheless 
is held fast in the grips of events long forgotten and shaped by circumstances in which neither they nor their 
interests figured”…).  
467
 There are limitations to selective breeding. Zebras, for example, have never been domesticated. Several 
factors play a role in determining the feasibility of selective breeding. The social structure is one of them. 
468
 See Easterbrook, Frank H., ‘Insider Trading as an Agency Problem’, in Pratt, John W., and Zeckhauser, 
Richard (eds.), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1985, 
pp. 81-100 (90-95). 
469
 See Easterbrook, Frank H., ‘Insider Trading as an Agency Problem’, cit., pp. 81-100 (90-95).  
470 Some lawyers and some economists may think this is a misunderstanding of the function of mathematical 
models. 
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on the approach taken by legislators to the transfer of shares,471 and on the size of the 
company, governance, business purpose and other factors which might be germane to the 
regulation and operation of the company. I listed in the three chapters of Part I the sort of 
transfer restrictions contained in the articles of association and LLC agreements. It helped me 
understand legislators’ approaches toward transfer of shares. The restriction to which I am 
referring is the requirement of consent of all shareholders, directors, or of one particular 
member (in principle, the majority member). Resolutions at the companies’ general meetings 
providing for the consent of the company are either taken by majority or unanimous consent 
of the members. Other restrictions that articles of association in all six jurisdictions provide 
for can be mentioned, without prejudice of their own specificities.472 They are pre-emption 
rights and rights of first refusal, clauses prohibiting the pledge of shares, liens or any charges 
over the shares, and their usufruct, formulas determining the price of sale of shares, which are 
especially associated with the exercise of pre-emption rights by the company and the 
members, and administrative corporate procedures prior to which a transfer will not be 
effective.473 The LLC agreements, which are considerably longer than the constitutional 
documents of companies in all other six jurisdictions, also establish tag-along rights, rights of 
co-sale, sale purchase rights or ‘compelled sales’, buy-sell agreements, put-rights, and similar 
rights.474 Similar to the UK private companies, management boards or managing-members of 
US LLCs have wide powers to discretionarily or reasonably consent or refuse the transfer. 
There are, however, situations in which transfer, especially of managing rights and the 
admission of new members, depends on the consent of the members. Vesting requirements, 
forfeiture provisions, minimum retained ownership requirements or other similar provisions, 
clauses limiting transfers to competitors, and lock-up prohibitions are other kind of 
restrictions that can be found in the companies’ articles. The analysis of these types of transfer 
restrictions backs up a broad concept of consent (consent lato sensu). It basically spells out 
the idea that transfers or changes in ownership require some sort of acceptance or approval. 
                                                             
471 Legislators may take a contractualist or statutory approach to the transfer of shares. This is illustrated by the 
historical evolution of the PLLC and the respective legislation. See Part I. 
472 Clauses foreseeing pre-emption rights can be very specific. The clauses of the articles of association of the 
Spanish Srl are a case in point. Moreover, triggering factors of restrictions (e.g., pre-emption rights or rights of 
first refusal) vary pursuant to the size of the company (i.e. the number of members, governance structure, and 
business purpose of the company (i.e. equity funds are different from traditional family firms). 
473 Indeed, corporate law doctrine has come a long way since the old debate about the validity of restrictions on 
stock that is defined as personal property. On this, see Painter, William H., ‘Stock Transfer Restrictions: 
Continuing Uncertainties and a Legislative Proposal, Villanova Law Review, vol. 6, 1, 1961, pp. 48-68. 
474 All these terms can be found by reading the clauses of the respective agreements.  
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Additionally, I adopt a restricted concept of consent (consent stricto sensu) which refers to the 
variety of restrictions embodied in the companies’ articles and LLC agreements.475 
In general, restrictions established in the articles of association of the companies of all 
six jurisdictions are very similar. One might think in this situation of a phenomenon of 
crossover of legal solutions. This is certainly true in the case of legal transplants.476 In the 
particular case of restrictions on transfers, there is, at least, some of it. Some restrictions 
established in the law cross over jurisdictions. In other words, these restrictions share the 
same genetic material, despite of the distance between the jurisdictions, their legal institutions 
and stakeholders. They share the same historical origin as opposed to a later transplant. The 
fact is that the more closely related the two jurisdictions are, the more they will share. For 
example, companies in the same legal family or with the same legal origin share ‘genetic’ 
material by virtue of their shared ‘ancestry’. (In this context, one can question whether there is 
a clear-cut way of distinguishing between a shared genetic origin and convergent evolution. 
For example, both insects and birds have wings).  
This shared genetic material results in recombinant legal formulas.477 Rather than 
innovation or exchange of new policies, legal solutions are inherited. There can be, however, 
mismatched alignments of policies, or unbalanced recombination of legal rules. If this is the 
case, there will most likely be a genetic rearrangement of legal solutions from one country to 
another, a translocation of legal solutions from one body of law to the other (e.g., from 
corporate law to securities law) or an inversion of legal solutions.478 This idea, I think, 
surmounts the scarcity of explanations provided by specialized literature for the timing in 
                                                             
475 See Brownsword, Roger, ‘Contract, Consent, and Civil Society: Private Governance and Public Imposition’ 
in Odell, Peter and Willett, Chris (eds.), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, vol. 3: Civil Society, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2008, pp. 5-37 (presenting the concept of ‘originating consent’. It 
means the agreement parties give to the application of a rule-set to govern the deal they are making). 
476 See Legrand, Pierre, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants’”, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law vol. 4, 2, 1997, pp. 111-124. 
477 This is a metaphor alluding to chromosomal crossover which is an exchange of genetic material between 
homologous chromosomes. 
478 See Hansmann, Henry, and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, Georgetown Law 
Journal, vol. 89, 2001, pp. 439-468 (advocating the convergence of corporate law into a uniform standard model 
– evolutionary convergence). Those that propose the idea of convergence think that global competition will 
determine an overall change in companies worldwide. There is the inherent assumption that states can change the 
law when they please, without limitations. I challenge this understanding with the idea of path-dependence and 
that mutations do not always occur in the same way. See Roe, Mark, Political Determinants of Corporate 
Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003 (arguing that there still are significant differences between 
the corporate governance in different jurisdictions, caused by differences in their political orientation. He shows 
there is a correlation between a social democratic form of government and certain corporate governance 
patterns). There are other arguments in favor of path-dependence closely linked with politics, economics, 
culture, social and commercial norms, and legal doctrines. I advance an argument of path-dependence based on 
an analogy with biology. Additionally, I look at the ways legal systems have historically responded to change, 
and this is something that neither side of the argument (pro-convergence v path-dependence) clarifies. 
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which a follower country adopts law coming from a leader country.479480 This sort of 
inheritance suggests that there are some genetic traits in the law likely to cross over 
jurisdictions and generations of legal rules. Change occurs when there is a mutation. As we 
have seen in Part I, mutations occur when market agents feel that it is advantageous to alter 
the genetic frequency or the evolution of the law, and that mutation is favored by natural 
selection.481 
The following sections develop these issues. They particularly focus on the role of 
legislators as selective agents. The experiment of selective breeding of the silver fox fits here. 
They also point out the many ramifications of uncertainty of contractual relations within the 
firm. They do that by establishing a link to situations of equilibrium or stable strategies in the 
company, and to the relational element prevalent in these business organizations. Before 
moving on, however, some words should be offered as to the features of the articles of 
association. They are genetically contractual and a good showcase of private ordering (level 
3). 
 
                                                             
479 See Spamann, Holger, ‘Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate 
Law), Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 2009, 6, 2009, pp. 1813-1878 (1871) (saying that ‘Allowing 
a considerable lag between adoption in the leader country and adoption in the follower country is to recognize 
that other, complimentary forces affect the timing of adoption in the follower country. Such modesty, however, 
is a feature shared by all theories attempting to explain differences between legal families, which are obviously 
just a fraction of the variance between countries around the world. For example, the almost universal adoption of 
insider trading laws in the first half of the 1990s in both common and civil law countries cannot be explained by 
any theory focused on differences between common and civil law countries. What might be explained by such 
theories, however, is why the details of the laws adopted differ between common law and civil law countries’). 
480 This idea, expressed in the text, also tries to overcome the limitedness of criteria used by La Porta, Lopes-de-
Sinales, Shleifer and Vishny (informally known as LLSV) in explaining their legal origins theory, especially 
because I understand that legal systems cannot be understood as ahistorical, exogenous, immutable variables. 
One could say that in their theory ‘legal origins’ is the gene. However, the gene does not always express itself in 
the same way in each organism (each country) because there are different environmental factors. Some civil law 
countries may still have better investor protection than some common law countries. This can be related to the 
nature v nurture debate. See Sgard, Jérôme, ‘Do Legal Origins Matter? The Case of Bankruptcy Laws in Europe, 
European Review of Economic History, 10, 2006, pp. 389-419 (411) (saying that ‘ʽLegal Origins’ are a proxy for 
a social entity whose shape, structure, and quality remain elusive’). Also see La Porta, Rafael et al., ‘The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 46, 2, 2008, pp. 285-332. 
481 Di Martino, Paolo, ‘Lobbying, Institutional Inertia, and the Efficiency Issue in State Regulation: Evidence 
from the Evolution of Bankruptcy Laws and Procedures in Italy, England, and the United States (c. 1870-1939)’ 
in Battilossi, Stefano, and Reis, Jaime (eds.), State and Financial Systems in Europe and the USA: Historical 
Perspectives on Regulation and Supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Farnham Surrey, 
England; Burlington, USA, 2010, pp. 41-54, p. 42 (noting that the persistence of sub-optimal legal institutions 
remains a puzzle. Referring to the adoption of new bankruptcy laws, he says that ‘Despite the general 
phenomenon of convergence towards similar principles and instruments, this evolution was not uniform across 
countries. Diversity did not necessarily manifest itself in the formal characteristics of the various laws, but more 
often either in the use of specific counterbalances, or in the timing of the introduction of various pieces of 
legislation. In terms of the efficiency of various bankruptcy systems, these differences were not neutral. In fact, 
specific procedures or norms failed to be adopted, or were introduced with a substantial lag, even when 
substantial agreement among contemporaries existed on their superior level of efficiency’). 
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i. The articles of association as ‘contracts for the governance opportunity’  
 
Corporate legal theory has been dominated by a powerful contractarian view for more 
than three decades, since the publication of the seminal article of Jensen and Meckling.482 
There are several reasons for this. First, commentators who have significantly influenced the 
field have embraced this view. Second, the contractarian view espoused with the 
methodological approach of law and economics has created a strong platform, particularly in 
the United States, where traditional legal views have been debated, contested and 
reformulated in line with welfare considerations. Third, contractarianism had the ability to 
reconcile conservative and liberal views of the market, in particular following the movement 
of deregulation of the 1970s in the United States, and establish the foundations for superior 
normative constructions tackling the relationship between corporate constituencies.483 Europe 
is developing its own system of law and economics even though the gap between the two 
sides of the Pond has still to be filled.484 Perhaps, this has not happened yet because there still 
has not been a selective sweep by which change broke through.  
I too adopt a contractarian view of corporate law. However, my contractarian view is 
mitigated by the opinion that property rights have an important (and often underestimated) 
role to play in the development of corporate law and its foundational principles.485 Therefore, 
I try to avoid any sort of contractual determinism to provide a normative account of articles of 
association which is able to accommodate the introduction of contractual clauses establishing 
restrictions on transfers. I call the company’s articles a 'contract for the governance 
                                                             
482 Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H. ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, vol. 3, No 4, pp. 305-360. Also see 
Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, 1991; and Cheffins, Brian R., Company Law: 
Theory, Structure, and Operation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. 
483 See Joskow, Paul L., ‘Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power Sector’, in Peltzman, 
Sam, and Winston, Clifford (eds.), Deregulation of Network Industries: What’s Next?, Massachusetts, 
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000, pp. 113-154 (118) (referring to the rapid expansion of 
wholesale electricity markets in the United States in 1970s). 
484 See Garoupa, Nuno, ‘Ronald Coase and Law and Economics in Europe’, International Review of Economics, 
vol. 59, 2, pp. 223-229. 
485 For an opposition to the contractarian theory, see Miller, Sandra K., ‘Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory 
Core Duties to Protect the Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties’, American Business Law Journal, 
vol. 46, 2, pp. 243-278 (271) (showing herself against the ‘nexus of contracts approach’, and advancing a Theory 
of Mandatory Core Duties’. With this theory she stresses the importance of fiduciary duties to overcome the 
limitations of the contractarian theory. She recommends a vision of the ‘…LLC as a social entity that must be 
subject to mandatory fiduciary duties in the interest of public policy’). Additionally, see Armour, John and 
Whincop, Michael J., ‘The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 27, 
3, 2007, pp. 429-465 (stating clearly the importance of property law in complementing the economic theory of 
the firm). 
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opportunity' (hereinafter also referred to as the company’s contract).486 I use this expression to 
escape from the determinism of the ‘nexus-of-contracts’ theory. The articles of association of 
a private limited company are not just a contract or a bundle of contracts. The ‘nexus-of-
contracts’ theory should be mitigated with an adequate theory of property rights. The term 
‘contract for the governance opportunity’ is a reference to contract governance or, in 
Williamson’s words, ‘governance of contractual relations’. There is, however, one peculiarity. 
I try to reconcile transaction-costs economics (TCE) and the property-rights literature by 
creating mechanisms to solve contractual inefficiencies ex-ante and contractual inefficiencies 
ex-post. TCE views the transaction as a ‘basic unit of study’.487 Assuming that contracts are 
incomplete due to transaction costs, private ordering is seen as an essential element to 
overcome ex-post contractual inefficiencies. Property-rights literature centers on creating 
incentives such as ‘residual rights of control’ to overcome ex-ante contractual 
inefficiencies.488 Therefore, I assume a middle position in the transaction-costs v property-
rights debate. The term ‘opportunity’ in this context is related to the purpose of default rules. 
By providing a default rule, legislators and courts, where they are allowed to by law, give 
market agents the opportunity to contract around a default rule. One can fairly ask whether 
this cannot be said of almost any contract. This question has to be answered in the affirmative. 
The problem is that when default rules are not provided by legislators or courts, lawyers tend 
to use their imagination to draft the contract. When default rules are provided, the tendency is 
to use them and not to contract around them, unless the client really wants something 
different. The point is: when default rules are provided, members and their respective lawyers 
should seriously take the opportunity to govern their relationships either by keeping the 
default rule or by adopting some different legal framework as long as it is Pareto efficient. In 
this sense, the definition of ‘contract for the governance opportunity’ is broader than 
‘organizational contract’ because it implies a theory of defaults as commodities that can be 
used to steer contractual relations within an evolutionary framework. This means that defaults 
become tools for the regeneration of contractual relations. In this context, not only property 
rights are relevant ex-ante, but also their governance by contract is important ex-post.489490 
                                                             
486
 See Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Corporate Contract’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 89, 
N.º7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 1989, pp. 1416-1448 (1416) (referring to the corporate charter as 
‘contract of adhesion’). In French law and doctrine, articles of association are referred to as the contrat de 
société. This nomenclature also is used in French-based legal systems. 
487 See Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, The Free Press, 1985. 
488 On this, see Part III, Chapter 1. 
489 See Part III, Chapter 1. 
490 See Hart, Oliver, and Moore, John, ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 98, 6, pp. 1119-1158 (1122) (arguing that ‘First, the incompleteness of contracts means that the 
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I tend to look at principles of corporate law through the lens of contract.491 This is 
consistent with the idea of law as a byproduct of private ordering manifestations or extended 
phenotype presented in Part I. I concede, however, that there are basic principles of corporate 
law theory which cannot be developed by contract. Cases in point are limited liability, capital 
lock-in and even fiduciary duties.492 These core features of business associations are not 
contractual in their essence. They are conceived to protect the investors and third parties (i.e., 
creditors, the tax administration, or any other persons to whom the payment of compensat ion 
is due). This is why they are regulated by organizational law.493 Furthermore, contractual 
freedom is, paradoxically, liable to create deadlocks, problems of interpretation, asymmetries 
of information and difficulties in combining action. (This is not to demonize freedom of 
contract, which I praise, but simply to point out the paradox.)494 These problems are 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
future return on an individual’s current action will depend on his “marketability” or bargaining position 
tomorrow in ways that cannot be controlled via the original contract. Second, the existence of asset specificity 
means that an agent’s marketability or bargaining position will depend on which assets he has access to and 
hence will be sensitive to the allocation of asset ownership). Also see Rajan, Raghuram G., and Zingales, Luigi, 
‘Power in a Theory of the Firm’, The Quaterly Journal of Economics, vol. 113, 2, 1998, pp. 387-432 (refining 
Grossman, Hart and Moore's work on property rights by providing a framework that promotes the ability to 
retain power in a firm or organization as a form to create ex-ante incentives to investment. The ability to retain 
power is particularly important in a scenario of contract incompleteness). 
491 Larry Ribstein, who has provided a considerable contribution to the normative understanding of the 
‘uncorporation’ in the United States, stands out in the literature as a contractarian. In the jurisprudence see, for 
instance, Fisk v Segal, Civil Action No. 3017 – CC, 2008 Del. Ch. Lexis 158 (Del., 7 May 2008) (where in the 
context of a dispute on breach of fiduciary duties and of the relevant LLC agreement, the court held that limited 
liability companies are creatures not of state but of contract). Furthermore, this is in line with the ideas promoted 
by advocates of transaction-costs economics. On this, see Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, New York, The Free Press, 1985, p. 398 (stating that 
contract is a unifying concept of organization that illuminates areas such as antitrust, regulation, corporate 
governance, and labor). 
492 I reckon my statement regarding fiduciary duties is disputable. I refer to them, however, because of duties 
directors owe to creditors if the company becomes insolvent, for example. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 
N.V. v. Pathe Communication. Also see Fleischer, Holger, ‘The Responsibility of the Management and of the 
Board and its Enforcement’ in Ferrarini, Guido et. all (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 393 – 396 (discussing whether directors owe fiduciary duties to 
creditors). Also see West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd and another, Court of Appeal, Civil Division, 
[1988] BCLC 250, [1988 BCC 30, 19 November 1987. 
493 See Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’, The Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 110, No 3 (Dec. 2000), pp. 387-440 (presenting several arguments explaining the distinctive 
features of business associations and organizational law, which cannot be otherwise adequately covered by 
property law, contract law and agency law). Also see Blair, Margaret M. ‘Locking in Capital: What Corporate 
Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century’, UCLA Law Review, vol. 51, N.º 2,200,3 pp. 
387-455 (providing a historical account of the development of organizational law in the United States). 
494 This paradox may echo another paradox heeded by Polanyi: the existence of self-regulated markets and the 
opposite move towards needed state intervention. It also may resound another debate regarding state intervention 
in building and shaping the market through the idea of ‘embedded autonomy’ treated by Peter Evans. See 
Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation, Boston, Beacon Press, (1985) 1994; and Evans, Peter B, Embbedded 
Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 1995. By using the 
micro-organizational structure of the firm as a springboard for the main argument of this dissertation, I am not 
here advocating such interference of the state.  
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particularly enhanced when property rights are weak or poorly defined ex ante.495 
Additionally, the exercise of freedom of contract is not able to undo per se bilateral 
monopoly-like situations or hold-ups in the company (in particular companies with fifty-fifty 
partners) and to overcome the challenges often created by inefficient laws.496 
Consequently, for the above-noted reasons, my commitment to contractarianism is more 
normative than positive.497 The paradigm of the company as a ‘nexus of contracts’ is 
frequently presented in its positive feature in the sense that it does not give theoretical insights 
as to the type of rules corporate law (or the standard contract Easterbrook and Fischel refer to) 
should provide for the development of business associations.498 It does not provide a 
                                                             
495 See Scott, Kenneth E. ‘Agency Costs and Corporate Governance’, in Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, New York, Palgrave, 2002, p. 26 (asking ‘Why are shareholders’ property 
rights so poorly defined?’ His argument then runs like this: ‘The usual answer is that the stockholders’ essential 
function necessitates that condition. They are the bearers of the residual risk of the firm, enabling debtholders 
and others to contract with it on more definite terms; their claims come last, after all the other various 
contingencies and claims are satisfied, and hence it is impractical to try to spell them out in detail under all states 
of the world. The status of stockholders provides a paradigm of the (highly) incomplete contract’). See 
Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’, cit., p. 440 (claiming 
that the contractual functions of organizational law such as default rules or even mandatory rules protecting the 
interests of the parties who would otherwise be disadvantaged in the contracting process are undoubtedly useful. 
They are not, however, essential ‘...in the sense that modern firms could not feasibly be constructed if 
organizational law did not perform them. A far more important function of organizational law is to define the 
property rights over which participants in a firm can contract’). Also see Whincop, Michael J., ‘Painting the 
Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 
19, 1999, pp. 19-50 (referring to the improvement of the contractarian theory by supplementation with a richer 
theory of entitlements and property rights); and Nicita, Antonio and Rizzolli, Matteo, ‘Hold-up and externality: 
The firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?’, International Law Review of Economics, vol. 59, 2012, pp. 157-174 
(159) (suggesting that ‘the missing step in the Coasean legacy is a theory of the firm as a transaction cost – 
minimizing institution with reference both to incomplete contracts and to incomplete property rights’). 
496 See Libecap, Gary D., ‘Property Rights in Economic History: Implications for Research’, Explorations in 
Economic History, vol. 23, 1986, pp. 227-252 (244) (saying apropos private contracting to limit oil production 
that the investigation undertaken by Libecap and Wiggins in the field of unitization in Oklahoma and Texas from 
1926 to 1935 showed that ‘private agreements were uncommon. Examination of bargaining on seven fields in 
Texas reveals that agreement took from 4 to 8 years, with contracts completed only late in field life after most 
common pool losses had been inflicted’. He goes on saying that ‘These findings temper the optimistic belief of 
some economists that private solutions will emerge to prevent serious efficiency losses’). 
497 See Mayden, Grant M., and Bodie, Matthew T., ‘The Uncorporation and the Unravelling of ‘Nexus of 
Contracts’ Theory’, Michigan Law Review, vol. 109, 2011, pp. 1127-1144 (1134) (stating ‘To be sure, Ribstein 
is committed to nexus of contracts theory in its normative instantiation; he believes that individual participants in 
a business organization should be left free to construct that organization as they see fit’). Also see Butler, Henry 
N. and Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians’, 65 Wash. L. 
Rev. 1 (1990), pp. 1-72. For a positive account of the company as a ‘nexus of contracts’, see Jensen, Michael C., 
and Meckling, William H. ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, vol. 3, No 4, pp. 305-360; Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, 
Daniel R., ‘The Corporate Contract’ in idem, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 1-39; and Macey, Jonathan R., ‘Fiduciary 
Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm 
Perspective’, Cornell Law Review, vol. 84, 1999, pp. 1266-1281. 
498 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, cit., p. 34 (enquiring ‘...why law? Why not just abolish 
corporate law and let people negotiate whatever contracts they please? The short but not entirely satisfactory 
answer is that corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can 
save the cost of contracting’). 
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normative account as to the role each corporate constituency has or should have in the 
development of the corporation.499  
I do not think that corporate law is an extension of contract law.500501 However, 
corporate law should enable interrelationships between corporate constituencies in the most 
efficient way. (This idea includes creating the most efficient tools to prevent the occurrence of 
agency problems and hold-ups). For instance, the case of the United Kingdom explored in 
Part I shows that, historically, shareholders’ primacy in terms of influence in the company is a 
myth. Often, decisions are taken by directors even though the level of dependence of the 
corporation on its shareholders is high.502  
                                                             
499 To be fair, I am not sure whether law will necessarily provide information as to the role each constituency 
must have in the development of the company. Legal rules, however, should be designed to bear out the 
evolutionary paradigm of the sort I assert throughout this dissertation. 
500 The PLLC in the selected jurisdictions is more ‘contractarian’ than the publicly held corporation. The fact that 
the Spanish Companies Law (Ley de Sociedades de Capital) specifically foresees in its Article 28 the principle 
of freedom of contract is noteworthy. It states that ‘En la escritura y en los estatutos se podrán incluir, además, 
todos los pactos y condiciones que los socios fundadores juzguen conveniente establecer, siempre que no se 
opongan a las leyes ni contradigan los principios configuradores del tipo social elegido’ (‘All the agreements and 
conditions which the founding shareholders deem necessary to establish may be included in the deed of 
incorporation and articles of association, if they are not contrary to the law and they do not contradict the 
principles of the type of business association selected [by the shareholders]’). However, it is important to stress 
the differences between countries regarding the evolution of these business organizations and the extent of 
influence of the state. For example, whilst in the United Kingdom the private company derived from a sort of 
‘license’ granted by the state, in the United States, the LLC developed from partnership law.  
501 Differently, in the Portuguese literature see Almeida, Carlos Ferreira de, Contratos I: Conceitos, Fontes, 
Formação, 3.ª ed. Coimbra, Almedina, 2005, p. 28 (This commentator adopts a broad concept of contract. He 
considers, therefore, that articles of association of business associations are indeed contracts). Also in the United 
Kingdom case the explanatory notes referring to the Companies Act 2006 (c.46) explain that the articles of 
association ‘form a statutory contract between the company and its members, and between each of the members 
in their capacity as members, and are an integral part of a company’s constitution’. This idea is captured by s. 33 
of the Companies Act 2006 stating that ‘the provisions of the company’s constitution bind the company and its 
members to the same extent as if there were covenants on the part of the company and of each member to 
observe it’. Additionally, see Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed., 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, pp. 65-76 (considering that the articles constitute a rather particular form of 
contract. He calls them a ‘multi-party contract’). Also interestingly, see Penner, J.E. ‘Voluntary Obligations and 
the Scope of the Law of Contract’, Legal Theory, 2, 1996, pp. 325-357 at 344 (arguing that ‘...examples from 
English law show that it may be important to find a ‘doctrinal home’ for some kinds of agreement or 
relationships that are, at present, rather ill-suited to their present accommodation’. I quote this passage because I 
consider it can be used for the articles of association of a company.  
As to the Italian case see, for instance, Caringella, Francesco, and De Marzo, Giuseppe (eds.), Codice Civile 
Annotato con la Giurisprudenza, 7 ed. Roma, Simone, 2004, p. 2681 where in the comments to Article 2247 
(contrato di società) articles of association have been defined as a genre of plurilateral associative agreements 
(contratti plurilaterali di tipo associativo). This designation translates the idea that the scope of the corporation 
does not end in a general purpose of revenue; it also consists of the distribution of dividends among 
shareholders. 
502 This is interesting because, in general terms, corporations in Europe display a higher level of shareholders’ 
autonomy and control vis-à-vis the company. This is not the case, for instance, in the United States where boards 
of directors are quite strong. They are known for their insulation vis-à-vis shareholders and other non-
shareholders constituencies. I concede, however, that it is important to distinguish private from public 
companies, and understand the kind of influence shareholders are liable to have in the former. See Gelter, 
Martin, ‘The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in 
Comparative Corporate Governance’, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 50, No. 1, 2009, pp. 129-194, p. 
147 (distinguishing explicit from implicit shareholders’ influence in public companies. The comparison, I 
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Therefore, I use the rhetoric of contract to understand how, in fact, corporate 
constituencies interrelate, and how this interrelation may contribute to better corporate law 
rules. I use this kind of rhetoric to express the significance of contractual aspects of the 
company without wanting to be understood as conveying the message that the company is a 
contract. It is not. Consequently, the expression ‘contract for the governance opportunity’ in 
the title of this section tries to capture the importance of both shareholders and non-
shareholders in the company. It also attempts to avoid ‘one size fits all’ type of answers as to 
the nature of the articles. Above all, the reference to ‘contract for the governance opportunity’ 
illustrates my view of the articles as instruments reconciling the interests of the corporate 
constituencies in accordance with the organizational structure of the company.503504  
The use of this rhetoric does not imply that the company is based on a cluster of arms-
length contracts. Instead, it means that the company is the background for never-ending 
processes of negotiations and bargaining. Often, such processes are related to the adoption of 
institutional solutions and compromises or related to the decision-making process as it takes 
place at the company’s general meetings or board of directors meetings, or even related to the 
ex-post definition of property rights. Although this discussion about the contractual nature of 
the company has lost much of its glow regarding the publicly held company, it makes 
complete sense with regard to the private company or uncorporation.505 In fact, the premises 
listed in the comparative matrix designed in Part I, and which as I said therein are the thread 
that pulls together the pieces of this comparative research, are tackled from this contractual 
perspective of corporate law theory. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
believe, may be made with private companies provided considerations as to the nature of these companies are 
duly made. The key is the high level of ownership concentration in private companies). 
503 I take into consideration aspects such as limited liability, the number of shareholders, directors and 
employees, the terms in which the decision-making process of the company is organized, the allocation of shares 
and division of the share capital, the number of votes each shareholder has, the quorum needed for resolutions at 
the company’s general meetings be validly taken, etc. 
504 See Treitel, G.H., The Law of Contract, 11th ed., London, Thomson / Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p. 586 
(explaining that ‘Under the Companies Act the memorandum and articles of association of a company bind the 
company and its members as if they had been signed and sealed by each member and contained covenants by 
each member to observe the provisions of the memorandum and articles’. In addition, Treitel defines the 
memorandum and articles as a ‘statutory contract’).   
505 See Part I, Chapter 1 for a distinction between public and private companies and the 'uncorporation'. 
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ii. The many purposes of setting forth consent stricto sensu in the articles of association 
of the company 
 
In principle, people enter into contracts that they deem to be optimal. For some 
members of PLLCs, restrictions on transfer of shares are optimal. Perhaps, they hold a 
common social capital that cannot be produced or enforced by law if they cooperate with 
outsiders. Part I, however, disclosed bargaining failures with regard to transfer of shares of 
PLLCs where there existed this common social capital. Interestingly, bargaining failures 
adjudicated by the courts in the selected jurisdictions were similar. This gave me enough 
leeway to organize the problems at issue into four clusters: (i) interpretation; (ii) functionality 
of restrictions on transfers; (iii) un-consented transfers and (iv) formalities.506 The reader may 
legitimately ask: if there are bargaining failures where there is a social capital, what is the 
purpose of these restrictions? As I explained above, there are different restrictions and they 
are perceived differently in each country. Restrictions on transfer of shares have many 
purposes, but in general they are set forth in the articles of association to 
 
1. Guarantee the quality of human capital and that contractual commitments in this 
regard are complied with.  
2. Protect the day-to-day operations of the company.  
3. ‘Tame’ property rights of shareholders by internalizing through contract the risks 
inherent to owning property rights in shares. Shareholders in these companies do not 
want to take major risks. If they had, they would have gone public.507  
4. Guarantee tax obligations are met and the company status for tax purposes is kept, that 
is, it is not taxed as a corporation.508 
5. Ensure that the company’s members can operate anonymously. 
6. Avoid regulatory restrictions. 
                                                             
506
 See Part I. 
507
 This suggests basic principles, such as the principle of tipicity in property, should be revisited. 
508 See Macey, Jonathan R., ‘The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law’, Washington 
University Law Quaterly, vol. 73, 1995, pp. 433-454 (437), note 21 states that ‘The desire to protect the tax 
status  of limited liability companies explains why every state’s enabling statute authorizing the formation of 
such companies restricts, without exception, the transferability of interests’. Also see in this regard, Robert R. 
Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, The Business Lawyear, vol. 47, 
2, 1992, pp. 375-460, and Kleinberger, Daniel S., ‘Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax 
Rationalization through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity’, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, 
vol. 14, 2008, pp. 445-471. 
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7. Combine the PLLC structure with the closed nature of the company, and in this way 
enable the respective members to insulate themselves from passive investors acquiring 
control over their investments. 
8. Prevent the ‘introduction of a stranger into the contracting parties’ relationships and to 
assure the performance by the original contracting parties. In some business 
relationships the continued personal involvement of an original contracting party is a 
material premise of the contract itself. In such cases any assignment is problematic. In 
other cases, the parties fear the assignee will perform inadequately, in which case what 
is problematic is not the assignment per se but the identity of the assignee’.509 
9. Preserve the identity of the company or managers who exercise ultimate control over 
the business partners.510 
10. Prevent the transfer of a controlling interest in a partner entity because such 
transaction effectively transfers a partner interest to the party acquiring the controlling 
interest of the partner entity. 
11. To define members’ contractual rights and limit the authority of courts to redo their 
deals.511 
12.  Preclude a third party from assuming, at least, those parts of the contract granting 
special rights and particular obligations to the member. This is so because the 
operating agreement is viewed as an executory contract that makes the member a key 
element of the company and also of its management on a going-forward basis (to use 
an expression widespread in the jurisprudence).512 
13. Facilitate the succession of the business to future generations, considering that most 
investors do not take during the lifetime of the company the necessary steps to initiate, 
plan and carry out the succession in due time.513 
                                                             
509 See EIG Global Energy Partners, LLC v. TCW Asset Management Company, et al. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
171412. 
510
 See Re Zinotty Properties Ltd. [1984] 3 All ER 754, [1984] 1 WLR 1249, [1984] BCLC 375, [1983-85] BCC 
99,139.  
511 See Re Swaledale Cleaners [1968] 1 All ER 1132, [1968] 1 WLR 432. This case was adjudicated by United 
Kingdom courts. In respect to the definition of members’ rights this case is interesting because it stresses the 
general principle that a transfer duly lodged should be brought before the board within a reasonable time after it 
was lodged where the articles of association contains a restriction on transfer. If it is not the case directors lose 
the right to refuse the transfer which was attributed to them by the articles of association and Table A which, in 
this case, was adopted even if with some alterations. 
512 See Milford Power Company, LLC v PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738; 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189.  
513 See Bjuggren, Per-Olof, and Sund, Lars-Göran, ‘Strategic Decision Making in Intergenerational Successions 
of Small – and Medium-Size Family Owned Businesses’, Family Business Review, vol. 14, 1, 2001, pp. 11-24. 
Also see Sund, Lars-Göran, and Bjuggren, Per-Olof, ‘Ownership Restrictions, Risk and Team Considerations in 
Family-Owned Businesses’, European Business Law Review, vol. 22, 1, 2011, pp. 93-105. 
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14. Facilitate the transmission of ‘idiosyncratic knowledge’ created within the family. 
This knowledge can be most easily given to the next generation within a family.514 
15. Control minority shareholders. 'Poison pills' which are normally used as defensive 
measures can also operate as restrictions. This comes along with oppression of 
minority shareholders.515 
16. Keep the special competitive advantages (e.g., idiosyncrasies) of the family business, 
especially when the firm is a family business.516 
17. Protect the family ties of the business to allow members to be part of a ‘transaction 
cost reducing social network’.517 
18. Avoid the complexities arising from the death of the owner of the shares either she is a 
single owner, a majority or a minority owner.518 
19. To create an ‘internal market’ among shareholders that aims at circumventing the lack 
of liquidity as a result of the inexistence of an external market for the shares of the 
PLLC.519  
20. Prevent a successful business team from being changed in an unwanted way. 
21. Reduce transaction costs.520 
22. Set up a corporate governance strategy for the company. 
23. Guarantee that those who manage are compatible managers.521 
                                                             
514 See Bjuggren, Per-Olof, and Sund, Lars-Göran, ‘Strategic Decision Making in Intergenerational Successions 
of Small – and Medium-Size Family Owned Businesses’, cit. pp. 11-24. 
515 See Ebay Domestic Holding, Inc. v Newmark. In this case the board of directors of Craigslist, Inc approved a 
rights plan (poison pill). Craigslist, Inc is a close corporation with a control group formed by the following 
shareholders: Craig Newmark, James Buckmaster and Ebay Holdings, Inc. Both Newmark and Buckmaster 
served as two of the three members of the board of directors. Ebay brought an action claiming that the effects of 
the rights plan restricted Ebay from purchasing Craigslist’s shares and it prevented Ebay from freely selling the 
shares it owned in Craigslist to third parties. 
516 See Bjuggren, Per-Olof, and Sund, Lars-Göran, ‘Strategic Decision Making in Intergenerational Successions 
of Small – and Medium-Size Family Owned Businesses. 
517 See Bjuggren, Per-Olof, and Sund, Lars-Göran, ‘A Transaction Cost Rationale for Transition of the Firm 
within the Family’, Small Business Economics, vol. 19, 2, 2002, pp. 123-133 (130). 
518 See Bjuggren, Per-Olof, and Sund, Lars-Göran, ‘Strategic Decision Making in Intergenerational Successions 
of Small – and Medium-Size Family Owned Businesses’. 
519 See Sund, Lars-Göran, and Bjuggren, Per-Olof, ‘Protection of Ownership in Family Firms: Post-Sale 
Purchase Clauses and Management Perspective’, European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 33, 2012, pp. 
359-370. For instance, buy-sell clauses as those inserted in the articles of association of Spanish SRLs and in the 
operating agreements of American are good examples. 
520 See Perdices Huetos, Antonio B., Clausulas Restrictivas de la Transmision de Acciones y Participaciones, 
Madrid, Editorial Civitas, 1997, p. 26 (stating that ‘La verdadera causa de la existencia de restricciones a la 
transmisión de las participaciones sociales se encuentra, a nuestro juicio, en el marco del problema general de 
reducción de los costes de transacción, y en concreto, en los costes de aseguramiento del cumplimiento de las 
obligaciones asumidas en un contrato de colaboración duradera como el de sociedad’) (The reason for 
restrictions on transfer of shares rests, in my opinion, on the general problem of reduction of transaction costs 
and, in particular, the costs to assure the compliance with the obligations accepted from a long-term contract of 
collaboration such as that of a corporation).  
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24. To achieve a balance between managers and shareholders’ power so as to turn the 
company into a shared enterprise.522 
25. To exclude investors who may ‘upset the apple cart’ either because they have 
conflicting interests such as a stake in a competitor firm, or different investment goals, 
or are just difficult to do business with.523  
26. To control who becomes a fellow member in the company, especially if it is a 50%-
50% company and one of the members invested a large amount of money in a risky, 
long-term project.524 
27. To avoid registration of units of American LLCs under the Securities Act 1933 or 
other stringent federal or state securities or blue sky law.525 
 
The variety of reasons for establishing restrictions on transfers suggests a strong 
presence of a relational element in these companies and ever-changing needs of the business 
environment.526 The fact is that it is difficult for legislators to keep up with this. I have 
submitted that not only legislators, but also courts, lawyers and other stakeholders are liable to 
shape the environment in which rules are potentially applied. However, agreements change 
much faster than do legislators. This is particularly true given the fact that the relational 
element is prevalent in these business associations. So, why do legislators create default rules 
restricting transfers (level 2 of the model)? Legislators are in a position to ‘choreograph’ 
through default rules those events which can potentially destabilize the development of the 
company. The selection of the events that should be protected by the law and the creation of 
rules for that purpose are liable to trigger fundamental changes in legal solutions and rules 
already embedded in the legal system. By setting forth defaults restricting transfer of shares, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
521 See Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs’, Stanford Law 
Review, vol. 38, No 2, pp. 271-301, p. 273. 
522
 See Bruner, Christopher M., ‘The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law’, Alabama Law Review, 59, pp. 
1385-1449 (1422-1423) (focusing on the ambivalence of what he calls power constituencies, stresses that 
Delaware courts have achieved a balance between board and shareholders’ power in publicly held companies 
through takeover jurisprudence similarly to what they did in respect to other transactions such as mergers). 
523 See Dent, George W., Jr., ‘Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects’, The Business Lawyer, vol. 64, N.º 2, 
2009, pp. 279-328 (305). 
524 See the case adjudicated by the Court of Chancery of Delware Eureka VIII v. Niagara Falls Holdings Del.Ch., 
899 A.2d 95 (2006). 
525 This was included in the transfer clause of one of the companies in my sample of American LLCs - Ellington 
Financial Operating Partnership LLC. This company was incorporated on 1 January 2013 in Delaware.  
526 See Hansmann, Henry, ‘Corporation and Contract’, American Law and Economics Review, vol. 8, 1, 2006, 
pp. 1-19 (10) (claiming that ‘…the relations within a corporation are also long-term relational contracts…’). 
Additionally, see Scott, Robert E., ‘A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts’, The 
Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 19, 2, The Law and Economics of Risk, 1990, pp. 597-616. 
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the legislator is taming property rights in shares.527 This way it keeps the closed nature of the 
company, assures that transfers or changes in the companies’ ownership structures are 
approached from an entitlements (property rights) perspective, and affects the behavior of 
market agents as to their perception of the investment they have made in the company, and the 
relationships of power between members and managers or directors of the corporation. 
However, it is important to note that artificial selection is not always successful. It may find 
resistance at the level of social structures (level 1 of the model) and market structures (level 3 
of the model).528 I deal with this process of artificial selection by the legislator below, and 
suggest an explanation for the effects that restrictions may have on the configuration of 
property rights in shares. Again, we may return to the taming of the silver fox. 
 
2. The domestication of property rights and the silver fox 
 
The Russian geneticist Dmitry K. Belyaev kicked off, in the late fifties, what became a 
long standing set of experiments based upon the domestication of the silver fox. His 
hypothesis was that changes in the physics and morphology of dogs and other domesticated 
animals could be the result of the selection for friendliness towards human beings.529 Putting 
it more straightforwardly, the action of taming dogs would directly affect the way they looked 
and the structure of their bodies. This was also true of the silver fox. According to Belyaev, 
domestication would determine that silver foxes behave in the same manner as dogs and 
develop similar morphological and physical traits such as the color of the fur, the shape of the 
teeth, the size of the ears, skull, legs and tails, barking, and submission as opposed to their 
wild forebears. In fact, silver foxes develop a pattern (white) spot in the forehead not only like 
dogs, but also like cats and horses. This is a sign of domestication. One may wonder if a 
similar evolutionary pattern can be found in law. The crossover of legal solutions mentioned 
above regarding the introduction of restrictions on transfer of shares, which was spelled out 
by almost 200 articles of association of companies included in my samples, suggest that there 
is a similar evolutionary pattern in respect to the configuration of property rights in shares. 
                                                             
527 I use the word ‘taming’ to refer to domestication. Domestication is undertaken through selective breeding or 
artificial selection. This is a process by which desirable characteristics in a living organism are selected to be 
inherited by future generations. Artificial selection determines a change in the phenotype of the characteristics of 
an organism such as morphologic and physiologic traits, and behavior. In my analogy, the legislator may be 
compared to the farmer selecting animals for breeding which Darwin talked about in The Origin of Species. 
528 Similarly, in nature, not all animals can be domesticated. 
529 See Trut, N., Lyudmila, ‘Early Canid Domestication: The Farm-Fox Experiment’, American Scientist, 87, 2, 
pp. 160-169. 
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The story of the silver fox is not new. Darwin in his acclaimed Origin of Species, while 
discussing the probable origin of domestic pigeons, stressed that there are differences between 
several races of pigeons. There are differences that have been accumulated for many 
successive generations. Variations in pigeons are the result of selection. Darwin wrote that 
‘The key is man’s power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man 
adds them in certain directions useful to him. In this sense, he may be said to have made for 
himself useful breeds’.530 As Darwin suggested, this principle of selection is not a modern 
discovery. ‘Works of high antiquity’ have acknowledged the importance of the principle.  
By setting up this analogy, I am dressing law in hand-me-down principles of other fields 
such as biology to explain its evolution, which in many instances takes place in a very organic 
way. Hence, the story of the silver fox illustrates how legal institutions and fields are 
connected in an unexpected fashion. It tries to show the unintended consequences of this 
interconnection. The way market agents behave is liable to be regulated by reaching a balance 
between endogenous elements, which are engrained in the market and which transmit signals 
from a market’s sensitive area to targeted agents. These endogenous elements also transmit 
the signals or messages sent by certain market agents which will have an effect on other 
market agents. The way the signals of the market are conveyed can be controlled by the law.  
The analogy rests on the fact that the introduction in the articles of association of 
restrictions on transfer of property rights in shares has far-reaching effects. The related 
biological term is ‘pleiotropy’. 531 It not only determines property rights in shares be analyzed 
differently from intellectual property rights or property rights in real estate for example, but 
also means that corporate law, due to its specificity, tames property rights, and their features 
such as the right owners hold to determine the use of their own assets, the return from those 
assets, and to freely transfer their assets so that they are adapted to the nature and purpose of 
the business form. Corporate law, contract law and property law are linked in an unexpected 
way.532 In the PLLC context this can be illustrated with an example. Let us think of a case 
where PX sells 5 shares in the company to her mother MX. In her turn, MX transfers the 
shares to her daughter MMX. As a consequence, the company files a suit against MMX 
claiming the invalidity of the transfer. However, the articles of the company foresee that 
                                                             
530 See Darwin, Charles, ‘Variation under Domestication’, The Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, 
ch. 2, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1996, p. 18. 
531Pleiotropy happens when one gene affects several phenotypic traits. In the silver fox, the genetic unexpected 
connection between physical and behavioral characteristics is a manifestation of pleiotropy. 
532 This explains why restrictions on transfer of property rights in shares are generally valid, even though shares 
are frequently defined as personal property. See Painter, William H., ‘Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing 
Uncertainties and a Legislative Proposal’, Villanova Law Review, vol. 6, 1961, pp. 48-68 (dwelling on this 
issue). 
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transfers are free between ascendants and descendants. Hence, the court considered that the 
transfer of shares of PX to her mother MX and, subsequently, the transfer by the latter to her 
other daughter MMX were lawfully executed. The company claims that these transactions 
were a fraud since their ultimate goal was to circumvent the transfer clause established in the 
articles of association. Still, the court held that the concomitance of two transfers was not 
enough to define these transfers as fraudulent, or to determine that the transferors were acting 
in a deceitful fashion. Therefore, it would be unjustified not to consider MX a shareholder 
with the right to transfer her share to her daughter MMX. The company appeals to a higher 
court. The court of appeal validates the decision of the lower court, but not without explaining 
that if there had been evidence that the concomitant transfer of shares entered into and 
between MMX and her mother MX did not have any affectio societatis,533 and did not have as 
a sole objective to allow the transfer of shares to MMX, but rather to subsequently transfer 
them to third parties outside the company, and by doing so avoid the articles of association, 
then the lower court’s decision would not have been justified.534 This is an example among 
several others that shows how the exercise of property rights (property law) can be limited by 
a previous agreement entered into by the members of a business organization (contract law), 
and by what is defined as the affectio societatis of the company (corporate law). This shows 
how there can be manifestations of pleiotropy also in law for, in this case, property rights in 
shares are differently configured in their physiology and morphology due to the restrictions 
imposed on their transfer.  
Moreover, there are manifestations of path-dependence in the development of the 
relevant legal provisions in each field. Nothing new is created. This is something certainly 
true in the biological context. For example, the organs of certain mammals were retooled 
when they developed. This was the case of whales and dolphins whose limbs were reshaped 
into fins. The analogy in comparative law is doctrinal path-dependence. The analogy in the 
PLLC is organizational path-dependence.535 Changes overlap with previous solutions. There 
is no real mutation or genetic drift. This is what the metaphor of the silver fox is all about.536 
                                                             
533 Affectio societatis is a fundamental principle of French corporate law. It has been adopted in corporate laws of 
other civil law countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Affectio societatis is the members desire to associate 
in the form of a business organization. This desire is legally informed by the articles of association or company’s 
contract.  
534 For a similar case, see Appeal 94-19016, Cour de Cassation / Chambre Commercial, Financiere et 
Economique, Public audience 21 January 1997. 
535 See Sydow, Jörg; et al., ‘Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the Black Box’, Academy of Management 
Review, vol. 34, 4, 2009, 689-709. 
536 Darwin pointed out the importance of breeding for the inheritance of good and bad qualities. This connection 
between breeding, adaptation and heritance is obvious to him. See Darwin, Charles, ‘Variation under 
Domestication’, cit., p. 21 ( stating that ‘On the view given of the important part which selection by man has 
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The holder of property rights in shares of a PLLC is vested with management rights and 
economic rights which they cannot transfer freely if restrictions are set forth.537 The case law 
collected shows that in many instances, this is not an ex-post efficient solution.538 However, 
even in these instances members seem not to have incentives to change the regulatory 
framework of their agreement. Still, change in the way corporate defaults are provided, even 
slight ones, will inevitably affect the channels of communication among market agents and 
between them, the legislator and other stakeholders.539 This means that members would be 
more likely to change the regulatory framework of their agreement as well as be more active 
in respect to its implementation if an adequate model policy of default rules is implemented. 
 
3. The relational element in PLLCs and the concept of equilibrium: an enquiry 
about the normative justification of restrictions 
 
The analysis of the overall amount of almost one hundred Portuguese, French, Italian, 
Spanish, United Kingdom and United States court decisions regarding transfer of shares, 
revealed several problems worth mentioning. These problems were clustered into four groups 
strategically titled (i) interpretation, (ii) functionality of restrictions on transfers, (ii) un-
consented transfers, and (iv) formalities. These clusters suggest that shareholders have 
problems combining their actions (this is rather surprising considering the strong contractual 
basis of these companies). There is an inherent status quo shareholders want to keep in 
PLLCs.540 They, therefore, do not contract around those defaults, even when it would be 
desirable to do so. One of the reasons for this status quo bias is the fact that shareholders, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
played, it becomes at once obvious, how it is that our domestic races show adaptation in their structure or in their 
habits to man’s wants or fancies’). No mistakes, however, should be made. Changes introduced by this selection 
are gradual, slow, varying and insensible, to use Darwin’s words).  
537
 See Re Copal Varnish Co. Ltd. [1917] 2 Ch. 349 where the United Kingdom court quoted Lord Cozens-Hardy 
M.R. in In re Bede Steam Shipping Co. (submitting that a shareholder has ‘a property in his shares, a property 
which he is at liberty to dispose of, subject only to any express restriction which may be found in the articles of 
association of the company’). This is different in US law, as we shall see, where there is a dual concept of the 
share or units, and economic rights may be transferred separately and freely. 
538 Yet, it could have been ex-ante efficient because parties enter into contracts they find optimal. 
539 On the possible ways to force change in legal policies, see Part III of the dissertation. 
540 See Korobkin, Russell, ‘The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules’, Cornell Law Review, vol., 83, 3, 
pp. 608-687; and Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99, No. 1, 1989, pp. 87-130 (proposing ‘penalty default rules’ to 
induce the disclosure of information in a context of strategic behavior of one of the parties to the contract). Also 
see Romano, Roberta, ‘Regulating in the Dark’, in Coglianese, Cary (ed.), Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of 
Confidence in U.S. Regulation, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, pp. 86-117 (referring to the 
stickiness of the status quo in the US political system which renders it difficult to revise). 
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often managers, are too risk-averse.541 In line with arguments of behavioral economists, 
people tend to more heavily weigh changes that will likely make things worse than changes 
that will most likely make things better, even if taking both decisions has the same expected 
economic value.542 This, in part, may explain why members of these business associations 
restrict transfers. 
This returns us to the question of uncertainty. However, these members often do not 
understand or do not know the rule-set they have chosen (probably because they were badly 
advised).543 They often transfer their shares in breach of the articles of association, including 
the defaults they have selected. Default rules are weakly enforceable and members do not 
have strong or well-defined property rights. Defaults demonstrate weak enforceability because 
sanctions foreseen therein are not sufficient to deter shareholders from transferring. For 
example, in the Portuguese case, by default, un-consented transfers of shares are valid 
between the parties, but have no effect towards the company. Surprisingly, this problem has 
not been thoroughly discussed in this country’s literature.544 The problem of relative 
unenforceability has been discussed in Spanish and French literature and jurisprudence.545 
Default rules demonstrate that members do not have strong or well-defined property rights 
because their property rights are not sufficient to give them a competitive advantage in the 
bargaining process. There are other problems. Parties collude to achieve the purposes they 
established with the execution of the share sale and purchase agreement in disregard of the 
company and non-transferring shareholders. For example, the transferor may act as an agent 
                                                             
541 See Williamson, Oliver E., ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 38, N.º 3, 2000, pp. 595-613 (607) (noting that the importance of risk aversion to 
commercial contracting has been placed in doubt). Risk aversion is, however, a fact in respect to the PLLC. For 
example, in the sample of LLC agreements clauses restricting the situations where members can file for a suit are 
frequent. This is understandable, for litigation threatens the relational element and closed nature that characterize 
these business organizations. 
542 See Bainbridge, Stephen M., ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 
vol. 57, pp. 83-130 (123) (‘Behavioral economists have demonstrated that people evaluate the utility of a 
decision by measuring the change effected by the decision relative to neutral reference point. Changes framed in 
a way that makes things worse (losses) loom larger in the decision-making process than changes framed as 
making things better (gains) even if the expected value of the decisions is the same. Hence, a loss averse person 
(as are most people) will be more perturbed by the prospect of losing $100 than pleased by that of gaining $100. 
A bias against risk taking is a natural result of loss aversion, because the decision maker will give the 
disadvantages of a change greater weight than its potential advantages. Hence, the so-called status quo bias’). 
543 See ‘Business and Suing Lawyers on Malpractice’ New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast) [New York, 
N.Y] 25 May 1987: 1.34 (saying that ‘The malpractice crisis swirling about the legal profession will not soon 
subside, according to lawyers and insurance experts’). Also see Gilson, Ronald J., ‘The Legal Infrastructure of 
High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to Compete’, New York 
University Law Review, vol. 74, 3, 1999, pp. 575 – 629 (599) (pointing out that ‘When lawyers design 
procedures that are inconvenient for those who actually must implement them, the procedures tend to be 
ignored’). 
544 For a brief approach, see Vicente, Lécia, ‘Un-consented Transfers of Shares: A Comparative Perspective’, 
European Company Law Journal, December 2012, vol. 9, 6, pp. 300-304. 
545 See the treatement of each one of the selected jurisdictions in Part I. 
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of the transferee in the company to circumvent the existence of restrictions on transfer. This 
means that in these circumstances, non-transferring shareholders of PLLCs will have to deal 
with ‘rival claims’ (e.g., claims regarding the distribution of dividends) in respect to the 
shares they hold in the company.546 For instance, the transferee, who is entitled to economic 
rights, may instruct the transferor to vote in a certain way in the company’s general meeting. 
The question is: given all these circumstances, why do members of these companies choose to 
restrict transfer of shares in the first place? This question goes beyond the purposes for which 
restrictions are set forth. They are listed above. It also goes beyond the idea of a status quo 
bias. It is indeed part of the story, but it is not the whole story. This question delves into the 
need of consent for the formation of legal obligations given the relational element and the fact 
that legislators inflict environmental changes by taming property rights through default rules 
providing restrictions. As I have submitted above, these changes do not create anything new 
or provoke any genetic sweep. They build on previous legal solutions. Thus, since 
manifestations of behavioral and doctrinal path-dependence are blatant, I focus in the sections 
below on providing a normative justification for restrictions on transfer of property rights in 
shares. Considering the crossover of legal solutions suggested by the empirical data and the 
relational element that stands out in the list of purposes for setting restrictions on transfers, I 
try to understand why different contractual practices (level 3 of the model) do not evolve in 
these companies over time when it is the case that members end up not abiding by the rules 
they agreed upon in the articles of association. One could legitimately wonder why it would 
be expectable for people to abide by the rules. There can be many reasons one can think of for 
them not to. It does not necessarily imply that the rules are inefficient. For example, pursuant 
to the efficient breach theory, parties should be free to breach a contract and pay damages, if 
applicable, provided that breaching the contract is more efficient than performing it. 
Nevertheless, there can be welfare costs sliding through the three levels of the model policy if 
corporate rules are not the best market agents can have.547 In other words, if rules are bad 
because they are not efficient, the market (level 3) and the legislative process (level 2) 
                                                             
546 See Nicita, Antonio, and Rizzolli, Matteo, ‘Hold-up and externality: The firm as a nexus of incomplete 
rights?’, International Review of Economics, vol. 59, 2012, pp. 157-174 (using the term ‘rival claims’). 
547 One can reasonably ask why market agents would ask for legislation at all. Would they want to enhance their 
contractual freedom or restrict it? Part I clarifies that historically, the efforts to lobby with legislatures to adopt 
PLLCs law were driven by the attempt to fill in the needs of those who wanted to implement new investment 
strategies. However, the enactment of laws owed much more to the popularity of the matter and resolve of 
politicians and important interest-groups than to the lobby power of market agents alone. 
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become inefficient. This would negative implications for the welfare of the whole society 
(level 1).548 
 
i. The concept of equilibrium 
 
I said in the introduction to this chapter that, facing the outgrowth of new forms of 
business organizations, policy-wise legislators have created systems of property rights in 
order to assure there is equilibrium not only within the corporate structure, but also among the 
interests and protections each corporate constituency claims for itself. Equilibrium in this 
context is a balance between the influences that enable stability in the company. There is an 
idea that when a population is in stable equilibrium it will tend to return to it if disturbed.549 A 
stable equilibrium is like a spring that regains its initial form after being pressured or extended 
in one way or another. This is a stable equilibrium not because it benefits any particular 
individual, but because it is immune to ‘treachery from within’. This notion does not hold true 
with contracts or agreements such as articles of association and LLC agreements, which as a 
result of parties’ opportunistic behavior are precisely subject to ‘treachery from within’. Thus, 
because in this regard stable strategies in the sense given above are hardly adopted, it 
becomes harder to trace a line through which contractual strategies could evolve. A certain 
behavior favors a stable equilibrium if it cannot be invaded by other behaviors. That is to say, 
other rival behaviors will not succeed.550 This stable equilibrium may be broken if the 
environment changes. Environmental changes determine that the types of behavior favored by 
natural selection (level 3 of the model) change as well. Hence, a stable equilibrium depends 
on the circumstances. The analogy, if applied to the PLLC and in particular if the relational 
element prevalent therein is sticky, suggests that if the design of default rules changes or 
shareholders feel any market incentives to change, their strategy to restrict transfers to 
maintain an enduring state of stability in the company also is likely to change.551  
 
 
                                                             
548 See Part II, Chapter 4 below. 
549 See Smith, John Maynard, Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge; New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
550 See Dawkins, Richard, ‘Agression: Stability and the Selfish Machine’ in idem, The Selfish Gene, cit., pp. 71-
94 (referring to the famous example of fighting strategy between hawks and doves). 
551 The text explores this dilemma between opportunistic behavior or ‘treachery from within’ that is inherent to 
the contractual nature of the PLLC and the stickiness of the relational element that favours the status quo and the 
mummification of legal solutions. The adequate design of rules is liable to overcome such dilemma. 
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ii. The relational element 
 
Part I shows that PLLCs, unlike publicly held companies, are more likely to encompass 
manifestations of what is classically defined as private ordering, or is currently labeled as 
private governance. These phenomena, some of them described in Part I, are intrinsically 
linked to the closed nature of these business associations. I believe that they are also related to 
the fact that these business associations, at least in the selected jurisdictions, were created 
ahead of the law, the law being a byproduct of such manifestations of private governance. By 
the time the law was implemented they already had institutionalized dynamics that 
organically pulled together shareholders’ and non-shareholders’ constituencies. Moreover, 
PLLCs’ legal regime, being mostly composed of default rules, is inherently flexible and 
contractual. Data also shows that their socioeconomic structure indisputably rests on 
relational elements.552 These elements are easier to spot when the companies’ dimension is 
smaller and the ownership is less dispersed.553 Also, because these relational elements exist, 
corporate constituencies do not feel the need to enter into complex contracts. Contracts are 
often incomplete and the bargaining process does not end with the parties’ consent to a 
particular set of rules.554  
In many instances, parties ignore default rules especially if circumstances allow them to 
bargain informally. When they care about defaults, they often enforce these rules through 
non-legal mechanisms of governance.555 The analysis of operating agreements of American 
LLCs allows me to illustrate this. Parties introduced clauses through which members agreed 
that irreparable damage would be done to the good will and reputation of the company if a 
member should bring an action in court to dissolve the company. In some cases, it was further 
agreed that each member acknowledged and agreed that in the event that an investor or 
                                                             
552 See Macneil, Ian R., ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’, Southern California Law Review, vol. 47, 1974, pp. 
691-816 (760) (referring to articles of incorporation and to their general incorporation statutes as relational 
agreements. Moreover, Macneil perceives the corporation as a relational vehicle which has been historically 
capable of overcoming the dichotomy between ‘promise’ and ‘market’). 
553 See the case of family companies in Italy depicted in Part I, Chapter 2. 
554 See Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and 
States, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England, 1970, pp. 120-126 (interestingly referring to the family, 
tribe, nation, church, and parties in non-totalitarian one-party systems as forms of human grouping from which 
exit is rare).  
555 See Penner, J.E. ‘Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract’, Legal Theory, vol. 2, 4, 1996, 
pp. 325-357 at 342 (stating that ‘In the same way bilateral agreements provide the basis for notions of good faith 
or fair dealing, which is quite outside the unilateral coincidental promises model of contract, the relational 
analysis emphasizes this aspect [the maintenance in long-term economic relations of relations engendering good 
faith, give-and-take, cooperation, the mutual sharing of burdens and benefits and so on] to the point where the 
notion of agreement itself becomes attenuated’. He goes on by saying that ‘These norms [default norms] give 
rise to obligations quite outside the precise terms of any agreement recognized by classical contractual 
analysis’). 
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member seek or attempted to seek, to take any action in violation or inconsistent with the 
provisions of the LLC agreement, the company should be permitted at any time, at its sole and 
absolute discretion, to redeem that investor’s units and to thereupon immediately cause the 
company to purchase such investor’s LLC interest.556 Yet, empirical data suggest that in 
certain cases, parties do not spend much time on trying to understand the legal framework 
applicable to a deal much less the rules of the articles of association or LLC agreements. They 
do not engage in time-consuming inquiries about the accuracy of the words they should use to 
close a deal. They just close it by shaking hands, and both parties know exactly what that 
means.557 Still, members of these companies enter into PLLC agreements even when they 
have not fully understood or do not know the rules they have decided to agree on. This may 
be the case because they have been badly advised or they give a proxy to their lawyers to take 
care of the legal issues whilst they concentrate on making the firm operational.558  
Legal culture is largely transmitted by imitation, with one of the most vivid examples 
being the practice of law.559 Often, by-laws, charters, companies’ articles of association and 
operating agreements are imitated by lawyers. They draft minutes based on previous ones and 
send them to the client who simply puts her signature at the bottom of the final page and signs 
each page in the corner to provide written evidence of her agreement. This does not mean that 
clients do not read documents sent to them. Nevertheless, at times, the choice of defaults 
seems more an imposition than a clear choice by the parties.560 If parties to a contract chose 
                                                             
556 The LLC agreement of the Delaware Company Inland Territorry, LLC mirrors what is said in the text. This 
company was included in my sample of American companies. 
557 See STEVE A. McKENZIE a/k/a TOBY McKENZIE, Debtor, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4828 (where “Under the 
acts, the court notes that there is an exception for effectiveness of the restrictions on transfers. The restrictions 
may not be effective against a person without knowledge of the restrictions if the restrictions are imposed by a 
written resolution adopted by all the members, or by a written agreement among, or other written action by, all 
the members as opposed to being contained in the articles or operating agreement”. American courts, in 
particular Delaware courts, tend to adopt an objective approach to contracts. However, it is interesting to read 
Richard V. BRUNS, Ernest E. Bruns, and Sherman Plaza, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. 
RENNEBOHM DRUG STORES, INC., Walgreen Janesville, Inc., n/k/a Rennebohm Drug Stores, Incorporated, 
and Walgreen Co., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. John L. SONDEREGGER, and The Oscar 
Rennebohm Foundation, Inc., Third Party Defendants-Respondents (submitting that “Courts are beginning to 
support the proposition that the state has little interest in refusing to enforce agreements among shareholders in 
close corporations”. In the words of the Court: “We consider that the rule of strict construction of a share transfer 
agreement between shareholders in a close corporation is anachronistic”). 
558 This was reported to me by a young entrepreneur while I was attending a conference about venture capital 
and entrepreneurship in NYC on 19 November 2012. She had had recently launched a start-up company. 
559 See Part I, Chapters 1, 2, and 3 where I explain the methodology to analyse legal documents of the companies 
in my samples. The investigation also included the analysis of Portuguese, Brazilian and French rulebooks. 
560 See Brownsword, Roger, cit., p. 14 presenting a concept of default rules that is tilted towards contractualising 
business agreements (e.g., business-to-business agreements and business-to-consumer agreements). These rules 
treat parties as if they have an intention to create legal relations and are coupled with the option of expressly 
opting out. The problem with this rule is illustrated in this passage: ‘the twin default rules tilting towards and 
against contractualisation are problematic. Most obviously, the effect of these rules is that some persons 
(probably most consumers) will walk into a contractual relationship without realizing it – and this will happen 
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the law because they were badly advised, what ‘bite’ do freedom of contract and sanctity of 
contract really have? Isn’t this equivalent to a ‘pathological’ case of consent in which parties 
did not truly agree on the set of rules governing the deal? This idea challenges concepts such 
as ‘ostensive originating consent’561 and other theories of consent which view the contract as 
a framework that reveals the relationships among contractual principles.562 These theories 
place a heavy and unrealistic cognitive burden on the parties. They also do not take into 
account the situations in which parties’ intentions change or the law works against their 
expectations. The same criticisms hold as to some doctrinal constructions that perceive the 
principle of contractual freedom in the context of markets guided by competition.563 The fact 
is, however, that as much as competition has the potential to create better rules and to 
optimize economic activity, it does not forthwith provide the parties with information as to the 
set of rules they must choose in order to demonstrate their consent. There must be an external 
mechanism liable to push parties to compromise in a competitive scenario. This is so because 
even though parties give their consent to a particular contract, they do not always have the 
intention to create legally enforceable obligations.564  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
because, in business marketplaces, participants are deemed to have engaged the rules of the law of contract. 
Granted, the law permits such persons to opt-out; but, if they do not realize that they are being co-opted in, they 
will hardly seize the opportunity to opt-out. De jure, there might be the option of opt-out; but, de facto, we are 
dealing with imposition’. A bridge may be created to the idea of ‘bounded rationality’ coined by Herbert A. 
Simon insofar the rational behavior of market agents is limited to the information and time they have to make 
independent and rational choices as to their contractual framework. See Simon, Herbert A. et al. in Egidi, 
Massimo, and Marris, Robin (eds.), Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution, Aldershot, 
England; Brookfield, Vt., USA, Edward Elgar, 1995. 
561 See Brownsword, Roger, ‘Contract, Consent, and Civil Society: Private Governance and Public Imposition’ 
in Odell, Peter and Willett, Chris (eds.), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, vol. 3: Civil Society, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2008, pp. 5-37 (presenting the concept ‘Originating consent’. It 
means the agreement parties give to the application of a rule-set to govern the deal they are making. 
Brownsword’s paper was brought to my attention in a seminar held at the European University Institute. At that 
point, discussions about autonomy and regulation had become mainstream.  
562
 See Barnett, Randy E., ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 86, 2, pp. 269-321 
(Barnett is committed to explain the nature and sources of legal rights and the way they can be transferred. His 
arguments, as he himself recognizes, lay on a definition of contractual obligation which resembles Ronald 
Dworkin’s distinction between rules and principles. The concepts of will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, or 
bargain all these are considered principles that must be ordered by a framework showing where each is in 
relation to another. Barnett explains that that framework is provided by the theory of consent which is, as he 
presents it, an entitlements-based theory. In other words, a contract is the same as a transfer of entitlements or 
rights). 
563 See Basedow, Jürgen Basedow, ‘Freedom of Contract in the European Union’, European Review of Private 
Law, vol. 6, 2008, pp. 901-923. 
564 For an opposite view, see Pistor, Katharina, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’, Journal of Comparative 
Economics’, vol. 41, 2, 2013, pp. 315-330 (affirming that financial markets are legally constructed. They do not 
stand outside the law). 
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4. Conclusions 
 
By methodologically connecting law, economics, and biology I suggest that the 
uncertainty of contractual relations is not always negative. In fact, it gives legislators, 
regulators, and courts the opportunity to establish new legal policies that put aside inefficient 
legal solutions. This opportunity follows from the uncertainty of contractual relations because 
contracts are naturally incomplete. I suggest that legislators can try to aim at establishing new 
legal policies through a three-level model policy that informs the legal system in an integrated 
manner. This model embodies at the first level the society. It includes at the second level the 
legislators, regulators (politicians) and courts. It establishes at the third level the market. Law 
should be the result of the interaction of these three levels at a point that comes all the way 
from the bottom-up. The method legislators can use to create law is illustrated by the design 
of default rules establishing restrictions on transfer of property rights in shares which is, I 
aver, equivalent to the taming of the silver fox. Legislators act like the researcher who 
artificially selects the desirable characteristics of legal rules that should be reproduced. This 
task should involve a meticulous observation of reality, which cannot be undertaken by 
simply mimicking the market.565 It also cannot be achieved by only creating mechanisms that 
determine the periodic review of rules.566 I propose that it be achieved through a system of 
legal policy by which legislators look at the reality of things in order to avoid a sort of 
‘blackboard law’.567 In other words, legal policy should merit form and substance. Yet, reality 
keeps providing examples showing this is a challenging task.568 Thus, perhaps the 
                                                             
565 This was discussed, in particular, apropos the Portuguese and Spanish cases in Part 1, Chapter 2, where the 
respective legislators clearly decided to mimic the market and create default rules foreseeing restrictions on 
transfers. However, problems resulting from the relative unenforceability of un-consented transfers disclosed by 
contentious disputes challenged the merit of market-mimicked rules. See, Black, Bernard S, ‘Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, Northwestern. University Law Review, vol. 84, 2, 1990, pp. 542-
597 (arguing that the four situations in which rules may be trivial are when they are market mimicking, 
avoidable, changeable, or unimportant). 
566 See Romano, Roberta, ‘Regulating in the Dark’, cit., and Hansmann, Henry, ‘Corporation and Contract’, 
American Law and Economics Review, vol. 8, 1, pp. 1-19. 
567 This is an allusion to a term used by Coase. He uses this expression to describe systems that live in the minds 
of economists, but not on earth. ‘Blackboard economics’, as the term is used by Coase, means that ‘the firm and 
the market appear by name but they lack any substance’. See Coase, R. H., ‘The Institutional Structure of 
Production’, The American Economic Review, vol. 82, 4, 1992, pp. 713-719 (714). 
568 See Stephen Brainbridge’s comments to Roberta Romano’s proposal in the article ‘Regulating in the Dark’ of 
two key procedural requirements to overcome the stickiness of the status quo in the US political system: ‘(1) a 
requirement of automatic subsequent review and consideration of the legislative and regulatory decisions at 
some point in time; and (2) and regulatory exemptive or waiver powers, that encourage, where feasible, small 
scale experimentation, as well as flexibility in implementation’. In his blog, Bainbridge manifests his 
concurrence‘with both the diagnosis and the proposed cure’. But he seems to ‘have zero confidence in the 
wisdom of Congress or the SEC, and hence no confidence that this sensible proposal will be adopted’. See 
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construction of a network of gatekeepers that binds legislators, lawyers, notaries, market 
agents and civil society throughout the three levels of the model policy will facilitate a debate 
about legal policy held on three levels instead of a debate held on one level only. 
Normatively, restrictions are mechanisms of governance which have the effect of 
adapting property rights in shares to the purpose of the business organization. Yet, legislators 
can select any other elements and shape the market environment differently.569 Depending on 
this selective pressure, there may be a status quo that members and other corporate 
constituencies will want to keep. Moreover, the stickiness of the relational element (level 3 of 
the model) is liable to trigger a stable equilibrium that is difficult to curtail. In a scenario like 
this, default rules establishing restrictions on transfer are, for the most part, irrelevant if 
market agents adopt behaviors which can be perceived as in a stable equilibrium. However, 
even a slight change in the environment, that is, even a small change to the types of rules 
provided to market agents has the potential to alter the state of things. This is how I see the 
promise of corporate and contractual evolution – through an equivalent principle of artificial 
selection that is able to create a line through which contractual practices can truly evolve.  
The property rights-silver fox analogy highlights a fundamental change in the 
conception of property rights. This change may even be compared to the revolution in 
ownership Berle and Means refer to in the Modern Corporation and Private Property apropos 
the development of big businesses and the corporation as of the first half of the twentieth 
century onwards.570 Chapter 2 below explores the effects that the taming process can have on 
property rights, just like the size of the members, skull, color of the fur, and behavior have 
changed in the silver fox. It explains how the establishment of restrictions in the contract of 
the company can alter the physiology and morphology of property rights in shares. It extends 
the analogy to describe a manifestation of pleiotropy in law. Additionally, it establishes the 
ground wherein I scrutinize to what extent freedom of contract enhances the power of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/01/regulating-in-the-dark.html (accessed on 
20 January 2014). 
569 See Sund, Lars-Göran et al., ‘A European Private Company and Share Transfer Restrictions’, European 
Business Law Review, vol. 23, 4, 2012, pp. 483-496 (484) (arguing that transfer restrictions are not always 
beneficial. The paper refers to the multiple policy-related options open to legislators). 
570
 See Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., 
New York, 1967, p. 65 (saying in respect to the dispersion of ownership that: ‘Wealth is less and less in a form 
which can be employed directly by its owner. When wealth is in the form of land, for instance, it is capable of 
being used by the owner even though the value of land in the market is negligible. The physical quality of such 
wealth makes possible a subjective value to the owner quite apart from any market value it may have. The newer 
form of wealth is quite incapable of this direct use. Only through sale in the market as never before’). 
Finally, in the corporate system, the “owner” of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while 
the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are 
being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control”. 
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corporate constituencies and their control over the company to the point that the ownership 
veil has to be lifted to shed light on who effectively controls the company.571 To this I now 
turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
571 See Demsetz, Harold, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, The American Economic Review, vol. 57, No 2, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 1967, pp. 
347-359 (358) (referring to the management group in publicly held companies as de facto owners, and affirming 
that effective ownership, i.e., effective control of property is concentrated in the management’s hands. This is so 
due to transaction costs which would result if each member had to participate in each decision that needs to be 
made by the company). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE EFFECTS OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE COMPANY’S CONSENT: A 
HOHFELDIAN CONCEPT OF SHARE AND HYBRID PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 
 
‘Much of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from 
the fact that many of our words were originally applicable only to 
physical things; so that their use in connection with legal relations 
is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional. The term, “transfer”, is 
a good example’. 
 
Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, The Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 23, No. 1, 1913, pp. 16-59 (24). 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter draws upon the question: How does the legislator’s taming process of 
imposing restrictions on transfers affect the physiology and morphology of property rights in 
shares? The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinize the effects restrictions have on the 
definition of shareholders’ property rights in shares. As I have stated before, I use the un-
consented transfer as my laboratory. The unenforceability of un-consented transfers towards 
the company is an effect common to all jurisdictions. As a consequence, it is crucial to 
understand the legal basis for the unenforceability of the un-consented transfer towards the 
company and how the share sale and purchase agreement is affected. This will clarify effects 
that restrictions have on the definition of shareholders’ property rights in their shares.  
This begs a careful study of the nature of the shares in the selected jurisdictions (are 
they composed of management rights, economic rights or other types of rights?). Answering 
this question is a crucial task which will enable a later definition of property rights in shares 
and clarify which rights can be lawfully transferred. It will open the floor to revisiting and 
rethinking old principles of property law, such as the principle of numerus clausus. It will 
establish the ground for a new conceptualization of property rights, which does not rely so 
much on an individualistic perception of the institution. Finally, it will provide room to 
explore whether it is possible to create an alternative system of transfer of property rights in 
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shares through the adoption of a principle of abstraction and a principle of separation, which 
is dominant in German contract law and other German-speaking countries.572  
This chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 1 dwells on a definition of 
consent stricto and lato sensu. The purpose of these definitions is to distinguish between those 
situations in which an overall authorization is required by the law for the execution of a 
transaction from those situations in which compliance with specific requirements such as the 
consent of the company, pre-emption rights and other types of restrictions are demanded by 
the law or the company’s articles. On one hand, this section tries to understand if consent lato 
and stricto sensu are part of the share sale and purchase agreement. On the other hand, it tries 
to explain how these two forms of consent are liable to affect the validity of the share sale and 
purchase agreement. Section 2 focuses on the characteristics of the shares. It argues that, 
physiologically, rights in shares are similar to property rights. This section also pays attention 
to the morphology of shares and tries to describe their structure in all six jurisdictions. Section 
3 suggests a reconceptualization of property rights based on a new reading of classical 
principles of property and contract law such as the principles of numerus clausus, 
consensualism, abstraction and separation. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The dual complexity of consent and the validity of the share sale and purchase 
agreement 
 
I have made in Chapter 1 the distinction between, consent lato sensu and consent stricto 
sensu. At this point, a more comprehensive definition is in order. Consent lato sensu comes 
from the idea that some kind of approval or authorization of a third party to the transfer is 
needed. So, the reverse side of consent lato sensu is a general restriction in the law which can 
be opted out by the parties. It is reflective of the policy adopted by the legislator in the sense it 
could have selected other types of rules to attain the governance purposes of the company. 
Consent stricto sensu is the idea that there is an intention of the parties to create legally 
enforceable obligations. The need to obtain consent in these circumstances is determined by 
the imposition of specific restrictions (which may be established by the law or by the parties) 
such as the requirement to obtain the consent of the company, shareholders or directors, pre-
                                                             
572There is no abstraction principle in Austria. There is only the principle of separation. See Riegert, Robert A., 
‘The West German Civil Code, its Origin and its Contract Provisions’, Tulane Law Review, vol. 45, 1970, pp. 
48-99 (dwelling upon the principle of abstraction in German civil law. Additionally, it refers to the Swiss Civil 
Code). 
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emption rights or rights of first refusal, buy-sell agreements, and other types of restrictions.573 
The difference lies in the fact that a specific party has to agree on the transfer. Therefore, 
consent stricto sensu is the reverse side of a specific restriction included by the parties in the 
articles of association. The concept also summons up a variety of restrictions which, as I 
explain in Chapter 1, are very different and may be recombined in an unexpected fashion in 
the companies’ articles.574  
Because I am concerned with governance of relationships between corporate 
constituencies and third parties, this construction is based on the distinction between the 
internal and external relations of the parties to the share sale and purchase agreement (SSPA). 
In other words, I am interested in the effects the SSPA has toward the company and other 
third parties and the effects it has on the parties to the SSPA themselves. I then try to discover 
if and to what extent consent, generally speaking, is part of the SSPA, and what the 
consequences arising from its breach are, considering the legal scheme of transfer of property 
in each jurisdiction.575 This is a different approach from that taken by Perdíces Huetos, who, 
dealing with similar issues in Spanish law, submits a solution for the un-consented transfer 
that does not differentiate between effects toward the company and effects between the 
parties. He argues that, due to the configuration of Spanish contract law which is influenced 
by German and Roman laws, restrictions do not affect the SSPA, but absolutely impede the 
execution of the transfer toward the parties, the company and any other third party. The 
transfer, but not the SSPA, is absolutely void. On one hand, he distinguishes between the 
effects restrictions have on the act of transmission, and on the other hand he distinguishes 
between the effects they have on the contract which causes the contractual obligations. Hence, 
for him, the key to study the restrictive phenomenon rests on the analysis of the technique 
used in each restrictive clause of the company’s articles to grasp in which way it affects the 
                                                             
573 Refer to Chapter 1 for a list of the types of restrictions inserted in the articles of association of companies in 
all six jurisdictions. 
574 My work deals not so much with defining each type of restriction and treating it individually as in 
understanding the effects that restrictions in general have on the delineation of property rights of shareholders 
and on the governance of the company. This is of interest to me because I think that stronger property rights are 
likely to enable more efficient bargaining. See Perdices Huetos, Antonio B, Clausulas Restrictivas de la 
Transmision de Acciones y Participaciones Madrid, Civitas Ediciones, 1997 (describing each restrictive 
technique such as clauses determining the requirement of consent, pre-emption rights, and rescate. He 
understands that these different forms of restrictions despite having a corporate nature affect the supposed act of 
transmission (el supuesto de hecho de la transmission), and, consequently, affect the capacity of disposition of 
the transferor). Hence, for him the key for the study of restrictions is the analysis of each type of restriction used 
in each clause. 
575 This exercise will help to understand the validity of the contract between the parties, even though it has no 
effects towards the company. It will also help define property rights in shares and discover how ‘tamed’ they 
actually are. 
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supposed act of transmission.576 For me, the key lies in understanding how restrictions mold 
property rights and influence their transmission pursuant to different principles of contract 
and property law in each jurisdiction.577 
I have made the point that members frequently ignore the rule-set they have selected to 
govern their company’s articles. Therefore, these actions do not stand for the operation of 
consent lato sensu.578 Instead, in practical terms, they represent a rejection of the body of law 
shareholders have selected.579 In other words, consent lato sensu and consent stricto sensu, 
that is to say, the requirement to obtain approval for a transaction in general, and the 
concretion of such requirement through the inclusion of particular restrictions, are not always 
in tune because shareholders fail to obtain the relevant consent. Between executing a SSPA, 
or waiting until consent is obtained, the transferor opts to execute it, especially if they are 
driven by opportunistic behavior, and the applicable rules cannot be strongly enforced. This 
begs the question: does the SSPA necessarily rest upon consent, after all?580 In my view, the 
answer is 'no'. I do not think that the contractual obligations deriving therefrom necessarily 
need consent to be generated. However, it is difficult to generalize across different 
jurisdictions a statement that neither consent lato sensu nor consent stricto sensu are part of 
the sales contract. The answer to the question may depend on the purpose of a legal 
prohibition or limitation. The answer to the question will depend on whether or not to fulfill 
its purpose the prohibition or limitation would need to void the SSPA. It also depends on the 
content of the contract itself and upon what the parties agreed. For instance, the transferor 
                                                             
576 See Perdices Huetos, Antonio B., Clausulas Restrictivas de la Transmision de Acciones y Participaciones., 
cit., pp. 51-54. 
577 Chapter 4 deals with the questions that are: how can property rights, as they are molded by restrictions, affect 
the governance of the company, and who actually controls the company? 
578 I am approaching corporate law from a contractual perspective due to the default nature of the rules at stake. 
But this approach is not taken unwarrantedly. These defaults are introduced in the company’s articles, which is a 
contract. This contract has a sui generis nature. It lacks the bilateral features of a standard sales contract, for 
example. The contract of the company is drafted to regulate the internal affairs of the company. 
579 See Bernstein, Lisa, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 21, 1, 1992, pp. 115-157 (explaining how members of the diamond 
industry, by creating a system of private governance, reject the application of law to their affairs). Also see 
Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Limited Liability Unlimited’, vol. 24, 2, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 1999, pp. 407-
450 (referring to the unsuitability of default rules). 
580 I am referring to consent lato and stricto sensu. I am not referring to consent as the manifestation of intention 
to create legally enforceable obligations. See Smith, Stephen A., Contract Theory, Clarendon Law Series, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 212-215 at 214 (referring to domestic agreements and explaining that 
these agreements are not intended to be legally binding. In his words ‘Domestic agreements are different from 
ordinary commercial agreements. Specifically they are not bargains in the ordinary sense of the term; the parties 
do not enter them to gain personal advantages. Rather, domestic agreements are made in order to promote the 
parties’ shared interests. This share interest lies both in the subject matter of the agreement ... and in the goal of 
strengthening the relationship itself. Domestic agreements are therefore both expressive of, and a constitutive 
feature of the parties’ relationship. Making (and performing) such agreements is an integral part of what it means 
to be in a relationship, and part of the reason they are valuable’). 
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may want to include a clause in the agreement with a prohibition or limitation in order to 
avoid liability for culpa in contrahendo. 
This can be better illustrated by zooming in on the picture of the internal relationship of 
the parties to the SSPA. This is where it becomes tricky. Let us imagine that the SSPA does 
not need consent to produce effects between the parties. Then, the un-consented transfer is 
liable to be valid between them. This has been the understanding of some Portuguese, Italian, 
and Spanish jurisprudence. Perhaps, this has been the case in Portugal and Italy due to the fact 
that the consensual principle, by which property is transferred by mere consent of the parties, 
prevails in these jurisdictions. The case of Spain is more complicated, as it does not adopt the 
consensual principle, but some confusion has reigned in the academia and jurisprudence as to 
the effects of the un-consented transfer. For the most part, this was due to the wording of the 
law which first determined the absolute voidness of transfers in breach of restrictions, and 
later, after it was changed, foresaw that transfer in those circumstances would have no effects 
toward the company. It deliberately left the parties aside of the negative effects of the un-
consented transfer.581 In France, where the consensual principle equally prevails,582 legal 
doctrine and courts have held that the un-consented transfer is void.583 Case law shows that 
parties to the sales contract often dispute this understanding and argue that the contract is 
perfect and executed once they have agreed on the terms and conditions of such contract, 
including the price.584 Nevertheless, courts have sustained that rules on the transfer of shares 
such as Article L 223-14 have a mandatory nature. Therefore, their breach, courts have 
spelled out, determines that the SSPA be absolutely void. Acts which are absolutely void are 
damaged at the root, as if they had never been entered into and between the parties. Yet, the 
fact that voidness may prescribe in three years585 suggests that legal doctrine when referring 
to voidness actually implies a relative voidness that can only be claimed by the interested 
                                                             
581 See Article 20 of Law of 17 July 1953 and Article 112 of the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010, 2 July, which 
is currently in force and keeps the previous wording of the law when it was altered. 
582 The consensual principle in French law derives from Article 1583 of the Civil Code. It sets that ‘Elle est 
parfaite entre les parties, et la propriété est acquise de droit à l'acheteur à l'égard du vendeur, dès qu'on est 
convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique la chose n'ait pas encore été livrée ni le prix payé’ ([The contract] is 
perfect, and the property is legally acquired by the buyer from the vendor provided the thing and the price are 
agreed, even if the thing has not yet been delivered and the price payed’). 
583 It is not always clear whether jurisprudence refers to relative or absolute voidness of the sales contract. 
584 Disputes over the terms in which the price is settled are abundant in France.  
585 See Merle, Philippe, and Fauchon, Anne, Droit Commercial: Société Commerciales, 13th ed., Dalloz, 2009, p. 
248 (affirming that ‘Si la cession était réalisée sans que le project ait été notifié à la société et aux associés, elle 
serait nulle. La nullité pour violation de l’aticle L. 223-14 se prescrit par trois ans’) (If the transfer is executed 
without the proposal be notified to the company and the shareholders, it will be void. Voidness for breach of 
Article L. 223-14 prescribes after three years). 
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parties until a certain point in time.586 It follows that if the un-consented transfer is relatively 
void, it can still be confirmed because the essential element of the sales contract, that is, the 
capacity of the transferor to dispose of her property rights in the shares, has not been wholly 
uprooted.  
As to the American LLC, there are some LLC agreements which, under the wing of the 
default rule, specifically regulate the effects of the un-consented transfer.587 These transfers 
are also termed by the respective LLC agreements as improper or prohibited transfers. There 
is a first type of clauses establishing that any attempted transfer not strictly in accordance with 
the provisions of the LLC agreements will be void ab initio and of no force or effect 
whatsoever, provided that any such attempted transfer might be a breach of the agreement, 
notwithstanding that such attempted transfer is void. LLC agreements go on establishing a 
second type of clauses where other negative consequences are delineated such as the 
transferee not having managing rights or the rights to participate in the business or affairs of 
the company, to receive any reports or obtain information concerning the company, to inspect 
or copy the company’s books records, to receive economic interests in the company, to 
receive upon dissolution and liquidation of the company the net amount otherwise 
distributable to transferor. A third type of clause provides that, except as otherwise required 
by the law, the company and the manager shall treat an un-consented transfer as void and 
shall recognize the transferor as continuing to be the owner of the membership interest 
purported to be transferred. However, LLC agreements also state that if the company is 
required by law to recognize an un-consented transfer the transferee shall be treated as an 
assignee with respect to the membership interest transferred and may not be treated as a 
member with respect to the membership interest transferred unless it is admitted as a member. 
For the most part, in these cases the transferee is often entitled to receive economic interests. 
A fourth type of case is that in which transferees are entitled to receive only economic 
interests to which the transferor of such units would have otherwise been entitled. The 
transferee has no right to vote or participate in the management of the business and affairs of 
the company.588 In these circumstances, the transferor remains a member of the company with 
                                                             
586 I adopt a broad sense of interested parties to include not only the parties to the sales contract, but also the 
company and other third parties such as creditors. 
587 I am referring to the LLC agreements in my sample of American companies. They were all incorporated in 
Delaware. This state, like the state of New York, provides for default rules regarding the transfer of shares, 
which the parties are free to contract around. 
588 This is an extention of what is provided by the law. See, for example, the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act § 18-702 (‘Assignment of limited liability company interest’). Sometimes, despite the fact that 
transferees are only entitled to obtain economic rights, they may be included in the term ‘member’ according to 
the terms of the contract. 
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all rights to vote and manage until non-transferring members (often owning a majority of the 
outstanding units of the companies) consent to make the transferee a member. A fifth type of 
clause conditions the validity and effectiveness of the transfer to a written instrument, 
payment to the company of its reasonable expenses, the compliance of requirements of 
relevant state and federal securities and tax laws, or any other kind of requirements for that 
matter. In these cases consent lato and stricto sensu have the ability to deprive the parties to 
the SSPA of their capacity to execute it.589 The costs of execution would be prohibitive.  
In the United Kingdom directors may decline to sanction or recognize any instrument of 
transfer or refuse to register an un-consented transfer.590 Moreover, the transferor is deemed to 
remain the holder of the share until the transferee is entered in the register of members in 
respect thereof. Setting aside a discussion about the nature of the register (is it constitutive or 
merely declarative?), the power directors have to register or not the transfer determines the 
sales contract be valid only between the parties, and not towards the company and other non-
transferring shareholders. (No transferee can be a shareholder of a company only within the 
internal relationship she has with the transferor). United States and United Kingdom courts 
alike tend to adopt an objective approach to contracts. They refuse to provide final and 
concluded opinions about a particular provision in the articles or LLC agreements. They 
evaluate the articles, and judge parties’ rights, duties, obligations and further responsibilities 
in light of the articles’ contractual framework. Courts in the United Kingdom reckon the 
transfer of shares operates in a complex fashion. For instance, according to Re Copal Varnish 
Co. Ltd,591 first, parties enter into the contract of sale which is followed by the execution of an 
instrument of transfer containing an agreement by the buyer to accept the shares subject to the 
restrictions imposed by the articles of association. In Re Copal Varnish Co. Ltd the buyer or 
transferee was given an equitable interest in shares. However, there was no acceptance of that 
transfer by the board of directors, neither was registration. The court submitted that even 
when the share is passed, it is necessary that the name of the transferee be effectively 
registered for the completion of the transfer.  
As to the Spanish case there is a first type of clause in the articles of association that 
provides that transfers in breach of the restrictions have no effects toward the company and 
                                                             
589 Following what I have submitted in Chapter 1 and the analogy established therein with the process of 
domestication of the silver fox, the fact that consent lato sensu and stricto sensu deprive the parties to the SSPA 
of the ability to execute it is an effect of the taming process, which does not result from the way property is 
transferred in the United States, but rather from the way shares are designed. 
590 Previously, directors could decline or refuse to register discretionarily. The law has changed in this regard, 
and now they have to justify it.  
591 Re Copal Varnish Co. Ltd. [1917] 2 Ch. 349. 
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are not registered in the members' register. Additionally, the exercise of the political rights in 
the share is automatically suspended. A second type of restriction stresses that if procedures 
especially related to the exercise of pre-emption rights are not complied with, the company 
may ignore all transfers and, consequently, the buyer may not exercise any shareholder rights 
in the company. There is a third type of clause that determines the unenforceability of the un-
consented transfer until the moment the company be informed about the transfer. A fourth 
type of clause, besides determining the no-effects toward the company rule, adds that the 
company will refuse to register the transfer in the members register. A fifth type of clauses 
establishes transfers are void (ab initio) if executed in breach of the provisions of the law or 
the articles. In some cases the articles of the company were altered to become reflective of the 
law. They started by determining the voidness of the transfer because this was what the law 
first provided, just to change the effects of the un-consented transfer, once the law changed. 
The un-consented transfer, then, after the law changed became unenforceable only toward the 
company. Spanish courts have adopted different approaches to the un-consented transfer, in 
particular as a result of the doctrinal debate around the changes in the law.592 In general, 
courts considered that the un-consented transfer was valid between the parties and was likely 
to be avoided. They dwell, however, on the issue of the lack of consent when it should have 
been obtained, as required by the law or the articles when they adopt the default rule. Courts 
try to clear up whether the lack of consent determines the innate incapacity of the transferor to 
sell the property rights she owned in the shares.593 Advocates of this theory argue that the 
causal contract, however, should be considered valid and enforceable.594 For the most part, 
this is in line with the particular Spanish regime of transmission of property. In Spain property 
is not transferred by mere consent of the parties. It takes an additional element for property to 
be transferred. Spanish laws, within the tradition of roman laws, differentiate the title from the 
mode of acquisition. This is called the theory of title and mode (teoría del título y el modo). It 
provides that title only creates contractual obligations, but that property is only transferred 
after the delivery or possession of the thing. This is valid for all contracts liable to transfer 
ownership such as a sales contract. Furthermore, it applies both to immoveable and moveable 
                                                             
592 See the Spanish case discussed in Part 1, Chapter 2. 
593 This is another effect of the taming process of property rights in shares I refer to in Chapter 1. In fact, it seems 
that Spanish courts have been discussing whether consent has a constitutive effect of property rights. Putting it 
differently, they have been dwelling on the effects that consent has on the physiological and morphological 
structure of property rights.  
594 I discuss this apropos the nature of the rights transferred with the shares. 
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property.595 Thus, the Spanish regime of transfer of property puts the French law based 
consensual principle aside and adopts a legal model closer to German and German-speaking 
countries’ laws of contracts. Also deviant from the consensual principle are US and UK 
laws.596 In the United States, under UCC §2-401 (passing title), the parties can generally 
decide when title passes.597 By default, it passes upon performance. In the United Kingdom, 
ownership in movables passes when parties agree on the moment it should pass. Delivery, 
payment, or register play no role on the transfer of ownership. Therefore, the consensual 
principle in force in Portugal, Italy and France does not apply.598 
The taming process undertaken by legislators to which I refer in Chapter 1 affects the 
exercise of the rights shareholders hold under the sales contract and the fashion in which 
property rights are transferred. In the cases where the SSPA is deemed valid between the 
parties, but the transferee cannot exercise any rights toward the company, the transferor has, 
in fact, transferred empty rights in the share. This has much to do with the sort of rights 
shareholders intend to transfer and are actually transferring with the execution of the SSPA. 
For example, their ownership derives from the articles of association of the company to which 
the transferor is a party. Restrictions are set forth, or saying it the other way around, the 
requirement to obtain consent to a transfer is included in the articles pursuant to the nature 
and purpose of the company. What could possibly justify that the transferee becomes a party 
to the articles of association? The default in civil law is that everyone can choose with whom 
to be in a contract. Corporate law is an exception because it permits transfers without 
unanimous consent. 
 
 
 
                                                             
595 See Sánchez Cebrián, Joaquín, ‘Teoria General de la Transmissión de Bienes y el Registro de la Propriedad 
en España, Ver. Derecho N.º 30, Barranquilla, 2008, pp. 3-29. 
596 I use the word ‘deviant’ in the text. Nevertheless, it is interesting that for a commentator who has been 
educated in a country that adopts the separation of title and modus, the perception may be that the French system 
that adopts the consensual principal is unusual, which is moreover limited to specific obligations.  
597 See Merril, Thomas W., and Smith, Henry E., The Oxford Introduction to US Law: Property, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2010; Singer, Joseph William, Introduction to Property, 2nd ed., New York, Aspen 
Publishers, 2005; Singer, Joseph William, Property, 3rd ed., New York, Aspen Publishers, 2009; and Farnsworth, 
E. Allan, Contracts, 4th ed., New York, Aspen Publishers, 2004. 
598
 Not only the United States and the United Kingdom, but also even some civil law jurisdictions do not follow 
the consensual principle. The same result provided by US law can generally be achieved with a constitutum 
possessorium. For example, Austrian law, § 428 ABGB, which also foresees tradition brevi manu, foresees the 
establishment of the constitutum possessorium unless there is a specific prohibition such as in the case of the 
creation of a security interest. Portugal (Article 1264 of the Civil Code) and Italy (Article 2:105 of the Civil 
Code) also foresee this legal institution. 
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2. The physiology and morphology of property rights in shares 
 
In respect to the definition of shares of PLLCs, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish laws as 
well as legal scholarship have been greatly influenced by German law. Thus, I will use 
German law as a helpful analytical springboard. German law does not present a definition of 
share Aktien (AG) or Geschäftsanteile (GmbH). This concept has been especially developed 
by legal doctrine. Commentators in general have been defining share as a membership right 
(Mitgliedschaftsrecht) which comprises a bundle of rights and duties. However, the authors of 
the main comments to the AktG and to the GmbHG have not been too concerned about the 
definition in abstract.599 Still, under German law, shares have been defined as complex rights 
(Mitgliedschaftsrecht). In this concept of share, property, administrative and personal rights 
are included. This definition may be illustrated with the rights shareholders hold to share in 
the profits of the company, to participate and vote in the general meetings, to ask for 
corporate information, to be elected members of the governing bodies of the company and so 
on. Additionally, all these rights enable the emancipation of shareholders within the company. 
Not only rights, however, are part of this concept of ‘complex right’, but also duties are 
attached to it. The Mitgliedschaftsrecht has very sui generis features since it cannot be 
straightforwardly directed to the dyadic relation between property rights and credit rights. 
That is to say, this concept surmounts the dichotomy between property rights (absolute, i.e., 
‘good against the world’)600 and credit rights (relative, i.e., ‘good only against a handful of 
                                                             
599 In the commentary to § 15 of the GmbHG, paragraphs 6 and 7, Hueck et al., while referring to the provision 
of warranties on the purchase of a share, claim that the purchase of a share is the purchase of a right. Therefore, 
in principle, a warranty against defects of the thing is not provided. In contrast, it established a warranty against 
defects of the law. A different case is one in which the firm is acquired through the acquisition of all the shares 
of the company. In these situations, a warranty may be provided against the defects of the thing. Baumbach, 
Adolf and Hueck, Alfred, GmbH-Gesetz: Gesetz betreffend Gesellschaften die mit beschränkter Haftung, 15., 
erweiterte völlig überarbeitete Auflage von Hueck, Götz, Schulze-Osterloh Joachim; Zöllner, Wolfgang Beck 
‘sche Kurz Kommentare, 20, München, Beck’sche, 1988, p. 219-220. Additionally, see Fastrich in 
Baumback/Hueck, GmbHG, 20. Auflage 2013, § 14 Rn. 1 – 20, at URL: 
http://beckonline.beck.de/default.aspx?printmanager=print&VPATH=bib (accessed on 21 January 2014); 
Ebbing in Michalski, GmbHG, 2. Auflage 2010, § 14 Rn. 1- 109 at URL: 
http://beckonline.beck.de/default.aspx?printmanager=print&VPATH=bib (accessed on 21 January 2014); 
Reichert and Weller in Münchener Kommentar zum GmbHG 1. Auflage 2010, § 14 Rn. 7-44 at URL: 
http://beckonline.beck.de/default.aspx?printmanager=print&VPATH=bib (accessed on 21 January 2014); and 
Altmeppen in Roth/ Altmeppen, GmbHG 7. Auflage 2012, § 14 Rn. 1-22 at URL: 
http://beckonline.beck.de/default.aspx?printmanager=print&VPATH=bib (accessed on 21 January 2014). 
600 For example, Article 544 of the French Civil Code of 1803 (Décrété le 14 14 vetôse an XII, promulgué le 24 
(5-15 Mars 1803) provided that ‘La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus 
absolue, pourvu qu’on n‘en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements’ (‘Property is the right 
to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided their used is not prohibited by the laws or 
regulations’). In the literature see Hart, Oliver, ‘An Economist Perspective on the Theory of the Firm’, Columbia 
Law Review, 89, 1989, 1757-74 (1765) (affirming that … ownership of an asset goes together with the 
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people’). Despite this concept of Mitgliedschaftsrecht, the trend in German legal doctrine is to 
define shares of a GmbH (Mitgliedschaft) as subjective rights (subjektive Rechte).601 I reckon 
that defining them as such does not add much to the understanding of their physiology and 
morphology. Attending to the broad definition of subjective rights, it is obvious they can be 
included into the concept. 
In the Portuguese case, the concept of subjective right was insufficient to define what 
share is. I think the problem has less to do with the concept of share than with the definition 
of subjective rights (it is a concept liable to include all sorts of entitlements). Consequently, 
other alternatives have been proposed. For instance, Raúl Ventura dogmatically circumscribed 
the share by using the regime of the assignment of rights established in Articles 424 and 
following of the Portuguese Civil Code. Pais de Vasconcelos adopted a different approach. He 
argues that the share can and should be perceived as a plural form. That is to say, the share 
represents a legal relationship, but can also be understood as a subjective right or as the 
position members have in the company (status socii). In his opinion, all these qualifications 
can be accommodated.602 This is trivial because it gives no hint as to the components, the 
function, and structure of a share in a Portuguese company. 
In Italy, the concept of subjective right also was not bold enough to provide a clear 
definition of share, even though, like in the German case, part of legal doctrine still defines 
shares as a subjective right.603 Shares have been referred to as ‘subjective legal positions’ or 
as a ‘complex of subjective positions’.604 This is particularly true when the articles of 
association grant special rights to members of the company (diritti particolari dei soci)605 and 
adopt elements of the partnership to enhance these companies’ intuitus personae nature. 
Shares have also been considered by commentators as standing for a mere contractual position 
of the member summing up the rights and duties attributed to her by the articles of the 
company. The share as partecipazione is often seen as the measurement of the participation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
possession of residual rights of control over that asset; the owner has the right to use the asset in any way not 
inconsistent with a prior contract, custom or any law’). 
601 See Koppensteiner, Hans-Georg, Rüffler, Friedrich, GmbH Gesetz Kommentar, 3 aktualisierte und erweiterte 
Auflage, LexisNexis, Wien, 2007, p. 776 (stating that ʽDie Mitgliedschaft (der Geschftsanteil) ist freilich auch 
als subjektives Recht aufzufassen, das gegen den Willen des Inhabers nur im Rahmen des Gesetzes und der 
Satzung verändert werden kann und das deliktischen Schutz gegen Eingriffe durch Dritte genieβt (...) 
(Membership is certainly regarded as a personal right, which can be changed against the will of the owner only 
according with the law and the statutes, and it enjoys the tort protection from interference by third parties). 
602 See Vasconcelos, Pedro Pais de, A participação social nas sociedades comerciais, Coimbra, Almedina, 2005. 
603 See Rivolta, Gian Carlo M., La Partecipazione Sociale, Milano, Giuffrè, 1965 (debating the concept of share. 
He also discusses the structure and incidents of shares). 
604 See Cagnasso, Oreste, Tratatto di Diritto Commerciale: La Società a Responsabilità Limitata, vol. Quinto, 
Padova, Cedam, 2007 p. 138 (referring to the ‘…complesso di posizioni soggettive che rappresentano il 
contenuto della partecipazione’). 
605 See Article 2468(3) and (4) of the Italian Civil Code. 
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the member in the company.606 Some commentators, however, have tried to refine the 
concept, and have submitted that shareholders hold a diritto corporativo. The nature of this 
right is sui generis since, in the same vein as the Mitgliedschaftsrecht, tries to surpass the 
twofold reality of property rights and credit rights. In other instances, in an attempt to 
objectify the concept, commentators and jurisprudence alike have defined shares as moveable 
property (bene mobile).607  
In the United Kingdom private limited companies as well as public limited companies 
consist of issued shares. They are classified by English law as intangibles (choses in 
action).608 Ownership of the share is evidenced by a share certificate, which is different from 
the Portuguese, Italian and Spanish cases where certificates of shares of PLLCs are not 
issued.609. Section 541 of the Companies Act 2006 defines shares or other interest of a 
member in the company as ‘…personal property (or, in Scotland, moveable property) and are 
not in the nature of real estate (or heritage)’. However, in the United Kingdom the share has 
been traditionally defined as ‘…the interest of a shareholder in the company, measured by a 
sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but 
also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se in 
accordance with [the Companies Act]. The contract contained in the articles of association is 
                                                             
606 See Gagnasso, Oreste, Trattato di Diritto Commerciale, cit., p. 126. 
607 See See Gagnasso, Oreste, Trattato di Diritto Commerciale, cit., p. 126 (arguing that ‘Il legislatore, 
nell’articolata disciplina della partecipazione, pare accentuare la prospettiva, già delineate dalla dottrina ed 
accolta dalla giurisprudenza nel sistema anterior, volta ad oggettivarla, equiparandola ad un bene’) (‘The 
legislator in the articulated rules about the share seems to accentuate the view already outlined by legal doctrine 
and upheld by jurisprudence in the former legal regime, objectifies it [the share] again and equates it with an 
asset’). In jurisprudence see Cass. 12.12.1986, No. 7409 (the court held that the share of the società a 
responsabilità limitata is ‘…un bene immateriale equiparato ex. Art. 812 c.c. a bene mobile materiale non iscritto 
in pubblico registro…’) (‘…an intangible asset comparable to movable tangible property not registered in the 
public registry), and Cass. 26.05.2003 (the court considered that ‘…la quota di partecipazione in una società a 
responsabilità limitata esprime una posizione contrattuale obiettiva che va considerate come bene immateriale 
equiparabile al bene mobile non iscritto in public registro ai sensi dell’ art. 812 c.c. onde a essa possono 
applicarsi, a norma dell’art. 813 c.c., le disposizioni concernenti I beni mobile…’) (the share in a società a 
responsabilità limitata expresses an objective contractual position which must be regarded as an intangible asset 
comparable to moveable property not registered in the public registry within the meaning of art. 812 c.c., and to 
which rules on moveable property may be applied pursuant to art. 813 c.c.’). 
608 See Micheler, Eva, Property in Securities: A Comparative Study, Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 21 (saying that securities are intangibles under English law). Also see 
Pretto, Arianna, Boundaries of Personal Property Law: Shares and Sub-Shares, Oxford, Hart Publishing 2005, 
p. 41 (saying that ‘There are securities which are unique and for which a satisfactory substitute cannot be bought 
on the market, and there are securities for which a substitute is readily available. There is typically no market for 
shares in private companies, which is why a contract for the sale of shares in a private company is, ordinarily, 
enforceable by specific performance (jobson v jobson [1989] 1 wlr 1026; Grant v. Cigman [1996] 2 BCLC 24; 
Wood Preservations Ltd v Prior [1969] 1 WLR 1077 (CA); Sahota v Bains [2006] EWHC 131 (Ch)).  
609 See Section 768 of the Companies Act 2006. 
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one of the original incidents of the share’.610 Paul Davies provides a critical analysis of this 
definition. In his words  
 
...this definition, though it lays considerable and perhaps disproportionate stress on the 
contractual nature of the shareholder’s rights, also emphasises the fact that he has an interest in 
the company. The theory seems to be that the contract constituted by the articles of association 
defines the nature of the rights, which, however, are not purely personal rights but instead 
confer some sort of proprietary interest in the company though not in its property.611 
 
Commentators such as Luxton have stressed that ‘…the various contractual obligations 
incurred by a member, upon the acquisition and the disposal of his shares, are capable of 
creating rights of a proprietary nature’.612 Luxton submits the example of the pre-emption 
clause as a restriction upon the free transferability of shares. He argues that a shareholder who 
sells her share to a third party without first notifying the company’s secretary breaches the 
contract in the articles. In these circumstances, specific performance to compel the vendor to 
execute the transfer of the share will not be ordered because that would necessarily imply the 
seller breach the articles of association. Luxton, however, thinks that the unavailability of 
specific performance does not prevent the purchaser from acquiring an equitable interest 
under a trust.613 This is the case of un-consented transfers of shares in which the pre-emption 
clause was breached by the member transferring her shares. In this situation, the purchaser 
acquires equitable interests in the share.614 This is so because no conveyance of the share is 
needed for equitable interests to pass to the purchaser considering the trusteeship binding her 
to the vendor. But, then, the issue becomes one of priority between equitable interests in the 
share of non-transferring members and the purchaser.615 According to Luxton, ‘This is 
possible because of the nature of property in English law: it is the relationship between 
                                                             
610 See Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279 at 288.  
611
 See Davies, Paul L. Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed., London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2008, pp. 817-818. 
612 See Luxton, Peter, ‘Share Transfer Restrictions and the Relative Nature of Property Rights’, Journal of 
Business Law 1990, pp. 14-22.  
613 As he puts it: ‘during the period between contract and registration, the vendor holds the legal title to the 
shares in trust for the purchaser. This imposes a variety of duties upon the vendor, including the obligation to 
account to the purchaser for dividends received by him which were declared after the date of the contract’. 
614 See Borrowdale, A., ‘The effect of Breach of Share Transfer Restrictions’, Journal of Business Law, 1988, 
pp. 307-319 (advocating an opposite opinion. Borrowdale construes the right of pre-emption as an option upon 
the sale of the share by the transferor to a third party in breach of the articles. He argues the following: ‘To 
construe a right of pre-emption as an option upon the right becoming exercisable resolves the anomaly of a right 
of pre-emption being entirely defeated or breached. The right assumes the character of an option, i.e. an 
irrevocable offer, because the grantor should in first instance have offered the property to him’). 
615 See Davies, Paul L., cit., pp. 947-948 (dealing with priorities between competing transferees). 
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persons in regard to things’. Yet, it appears that the real test would seem to be whether it has 
effects towards third parties. They not only include the other members of the company, but 
also creditors of the seller who may want to seize her assets.616 Property rights both in 
common law and in equity are relative, and the priority between equitable interests is 
determined pursuant to established principles. This, his argument goes, is consistent with 
developments in land law.617 Consequently, in some circumstances, equitable interests may 
indeed pass to the purchaser upon breach of the articles.618 Interestingly, Luxton’s reference to 
Tett v Phoenix Property and Assurance Co Ltd.
619
 illustrates the idea that restrictions on 
transfers such as pre-emption rights or rights of first refusal generate equitable interests (or 
property rights) upon the breach of the articles by one of the members. Evidence of such 
equitable interests is not provided by the register of members.620 Apropos this issue, the 
United Kingdom Government is planning on introducing a public register of company 
beneficial ownership. Besides being public, the application of sanctions is foreseen if 
beneficial owners are not disclosed. In the meantime, while the new legislation is not passed, 
the fact that evidence of equitable interests is not given by the register of members grants, as 
Luxton acknowledges, restrictions on transfers (pre-emption rights in this case) ‘a force they 
would otherwise lack’.621 Moreover, it calls attention to the fact that shares are perceived as 
                                                             
616 See Chapter 4 where I provide a concrete example of this kind, and explore the consequences of the un-
consented transfer to third parties under several settings including asymmetries of information and strategic 
behavior. 
617 This is in opposition to the definition of property rights in Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, and French law. In 
these jurisdictions the perception that property rights are absolute is yet enduring. This idea is linked to an 
extremely individualistic view of these rights in these jurisdictions. 
618 Also see Davies, Paul L., cit., pp. 945-946 (referring to the transfer of beneficial interests in the shares 
notwithstanding registration of shares in the register of members has not occurred). 
619 [1984] B.C.L.C. 599, [1986] B.C.L.C. 149 (C.A.). 
620 See Davies, Paul L., cit., p. 958 (stating that ‘...although the register provides prima facie evidence of who its 
members are and what their shareholdings are, it provides no evidence at all, either to the company or anyone 
else, of who the beneficial owners of the shares are’).  
621 Herein lays the economic value of such restrictions. The author says: ‘…Outside courts, it has been 
increasingly appreciated that corporate investment in unquoted companies can be positively encouraged by the 
imposition of reasonable restrictions upon the transferability of their shares…’). Also see Re Fry, Chase National 
Executors and Trustees Corporation Ltd. v Fry and Others [1946] Ch. 312. It does not deal with a sales contract 
but with an incomplete gift. It is interesting because it shows the court rationale in respect to the transfer of 
equitable interests in the context of an incomplete gift. In this dispute, the transferor, who was residing in the 
United States, wanted to make a gift to his son of shares that he held in an English company. The transfer was 
executed and sent to the company for registration. However, pursuant to the Defence (Finance) Regulations, 
1939, reg 3A (as amended) the transfer of any securities or any interest in securities in which a person resident 
outside the sterling area had, immediately before the transfer, any interest, was prohibited unless permission 
from the Treasury had been obtained; and registration of any such transfer was prohibited without permission 
from the Treasury. Consequently, the company replied to the transferor that certain forms would have to be filled 
out by the transferor and transferee and that a license from the Treasury would have to be obtained for the 
transfer. The necessary forms were filled out by the transferor and the son, but the transferor died before the 
license from the Treasury was obtained. Facing the question as to whether the son was entitled to require the 
transferor’s personal representatives to obtain for him legal and beneficial possession of the shares, the court 
held that since the requisite of consent of the Treasury had not been obtained, and the company was for that 
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‘things’ (choses) subject to property rights.622 This idea is supported by Davies, who claims 
shares are in law and in fact ‘items of property’.623  
The Spanish legal doctrine has defined share as a membership right or a legal 
relationship which stands for the position of the member in the articles of the company.624 
Additionally, Spanish authors, for the most part influenced by German doctrine, have 
qualified the share as a complex legal relationship or a relationship of cooperation. Others 
qualify it as a patrimonial subjective right (i.e., ownership right) because, in their opinion, 
subjective rights are not more than legal relationships even if they are complex legal 
relationships or represent a bundle of rights and duties. Defining shares as patrimonial 
subjective rights implies that, in principle, individuals who own these shares are free to 
negotiate them in the market unless the law or the company’s contract establish differently.  
Shares in the French SARL (parts sociales), like in the Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian 
cases are not represented by certificates. They are not securities. The SARL, however, may 
issue bonds.625 Historically, the French Civil Code classified shares of commercial companies 
as moveable property.626 Legal doctrine has understood that this definition does not suffice, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
reason prohibited from registering the transfer the son had not acquired the right to be vested with a legal title to 
the shares. There had not been a complete gift to the son of the equitable interest in the shares, because the 
transferor had not obtained the consent of the Treasury and, therefore, he had not done all that was necessary to 
divest himself of his equitable interest in favor of his son. Another relevant case is Re Rose (deceased); Midland 
Bank Executor and Trustee Co Ltd v Rose and Others [1949] Ch 78 (dealing with the transfer of shares in a 
private company which was executed by the testator. However, since the company was a private company, the 
right to claim registration of shares was subject to the consent of directors. In this case, it is discussed whether 
this is a specific or general gift, and whether there had been an ademption of the shares). 
622 See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., St. Paul, MN; Thomson, West, 2004, pp. 1252-1253 (including shares in 
the definition of property). 
623 See Davies, Paul L., cit., p. 44 and pp. 818-819 (arguing that ‘One thing is clear: shares are recognised in law, 
as well as in fact, as objects of property which are bought, sold mortgaged and bequeathed. They are indeed the 
typical items of property of the modern commercial era and particularly suited to its demands because of their 
exceptional liquidity. To deny that they are “owned” would be as unreal as to deny, on the basis of feudal theory, 
that land is owned – far more unreal because the owner’s freedom to do what he likes with his shares in public 
companies is likely to be considerably less fettered. Nor, today, is the bundle of rights making up the share 
regarded as equitable only’). Also see Micheler, Eva, Property in Securities, cit., pp. 32-61. 
624 See Perdices Huetos, Antonio B, Clausulas Restrictivas de la Transmision de Acciones y Participaciones,cit., 
pp. 32-33.  
625 See Article 227-1 of the Commercial Code. 
626 Article 529 of the French Civil Code of 1803 (Décrété le 14 ventôse an XII, promulgué le 24 (5-15 Mars 
1803) foresaw that ‘Sont meubles par la determination de la loi, les obligations et actions qui ont pour objet des 
sommes exigibles ou des effets mobiliers, les actions ou interest dans les companies de finance, de commerce ou 
d’industrie, encore que des immeubles dépendants de ces entreprises appartiennent aux compagnies. Ces actions 
ou intérêts sont réputés meubles à l’égard de chaque associé seulement, tant que dure la société. – Sont aussi 
meubles par la détermination de la loi, les rentes perpétuelles ou viagères, soit sur l’État, soit sur des 
particuliers’). (‘Obligations and actions having as their object sums due or movable effects, shares or interests in 
financial, commercial or industrial concerns, even where immovables depending on these enterprises belong to 
the concerns, are movables by prescription of law. Those shares or interests shall be deemed movables with 
regard to each shareholder only, as long as the concern lasts. 
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nor does it suffice to say that shares are mere credit rights that members hold against the 
company. Commentators submit the share is first and foremost representative of the quality of 
member (status socii). Additionally, it is regarded as an ensemble of political rights (e.g., the 
right to information, the right to participate in the shareholders’ general meetings and to vote 
therein) and ownership rights in the corporate assets (l’actif social).627  
In the United States, LLC agreements in my sample generally define shares (units) as 
interests in the company as provided in the agreement and the respective LLC Act. They 
entitle their holders to participate in the management. They give title and interests in the 
profits, losses, deductions and credits of the company, and any and all other benefits to which 
a holder thereof may be entitled as a member, together with the obligations of such members 
to comply with all terms and provisions of the agreement. In sum, units represent an 
ownership interest in the company and rights and obligations as described in the LLC 
agreement and the law. Additionally, shares have been defined as membership interests. As to 
the nature of units or membership interests, they are conceptualized as personal property and 
this has been pacifically included in the LLC agreements. Most statutes establish through 
default rules that the transfer or assignment of ownership interests in a LLC only conveys 
economic rights. The transferee can additionally acquire management rights if the non-
transferring shareholders have given their consent to it. It being a default rule, members can 
contract around it, as they frequently do.628 As to the form, some agreements also provide that 
units of the company may be evidenced by certificates if this is approved by the board of 
directors, but there should be no requirements that the companies issue certificates to 
evidence the units. The agreements clarify that if the board determines to issue any certificates 
they shall on the face thereof bear a legend reflecting the restrictions on those securities.629630  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Perpetual or life annuities, either from the State or private individuals, are also movables by prescription of law). 
(Translated by Georges Rouhette, Professor of Law, with the assistance of Dr. Anne Rouhette-Berton, Assistant 
Professor of English). 
627 See Cozian, Maurice et. al., Droit de Sociétés, 22nd ed., Paris, LexisNexis, 2009, pp. 474-475; Merle, 
Philippe, and Fauchon, Anne, Droit Commercial: Société Commerciales, 13th ed., Dalloz, 2009, pp. 474.  
628 See Ragazzo, Robert A., and Moll, Douglas K., Closely Held Business Organizations: Cases, Materials, and 
Problems, American Casebook Series, St. Paul, Minnesota, Thomson/West, 2006, pp. 954-955.  
629 Such legend often goes like this: “Transfer is subject to restrictive legend on the back hereof”. The certificate 
should also bear a legend on the reverse side thereof substantially in the following form: ‘The limited liability 
company units have not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), or 
under the laws of any state or foreign jurisdiction, and may not be offered or sold, unless they have been 
registered under the securities act or unless an exemption from registration is available(and, in such case, an 
opinion of counsel reasonably satisfactory to the company shall have been delivered to the company to the effect 
that such offer or sale is not required to be registered under the securities act). The limited liability company 
units are subject to certain restrictions on transfer and other terms and conditions set forth in the amended and 
restated limited liability company agreement of the company, dated as of [ ], 2013, as amended from time to 
time, copies of which may be obtained from the company at its principal executive offices. Each limited liability 
company unit shall constitute a “security” within the meaning of, and shall be governed by, (i) Article 8 of the 
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The preceding paragraphs describe various theories about shares on a country-by-
country basis. It appears that there is an effort to categorize, but the reason this effort is done 
is not always clear. The United Kingdom and the United States are exceptions. Shares or units 
have a dual structure. In the United Kingdom shares are perceived as ‘things’ in the sense of 
the French word chose which are objects of property rights pursuant to common-law and 
equity. This shows how the articles of association are liable to create proprietary interests. 
The effort to categorize clarifies how corporate law, contract law, property law, and equity 
law are interconnected, especially if there is an un-consented transfer. In the United States, the 
implications of the clear distinction between economic rights and management rights is that if 
non-transferring members do not approve the transfer or assignment of membership interests, 
the transfer or assignment does not convey any governance or management rights, but, 
generally, all other rights and obligations of the member are transferred, including allocations 
of income, gain, loss, deductions and credits.631 This distinction provides a straightforward 
look at what is included in a membership interest. Arguably, in the Portuguese, French, Italian 
and Spanish cases these theories are, for the most part, inductively generated from the various 
elements of the share. The nuances in the theories are different because the rights and 
obligations such as, for example, duties of loyalty (Nachschusspflicht) differ between 
countries. It appears that in these countries, the concept of share has first been inductively 
derived and, then, further consequences have been deductively developed from it, where the 
law was not explicit.  
Physiologically, rights in shares function like property rights even though in most cases, 
with the exception of the United Kingdom and the United States where they can be 
represented by certificates, shares are incorporeal.632 Morphologically, however, their 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Uniform Commercial Code (including Section 8 102(a)(15) thereof) as in effect from time to time in the state of 
Delaware, and (ii) Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code of any other applicable jurisdiction that now or 
hereafter substantially includes the 1994 revisions to Article 8 thereof as adopted by the American Law Institute 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar 
Association on February 14, 1995. Notwithstanding any provision of the amended and restated limited liability 
company agreemtn of the company to the contrary, to the extent that any provision of the amended and restated 
limited liability company agreement is inconsistent with any non-waivable provision of Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code as in effect in the State of Delaware (6 del. c. 5 8-101, et seq.) (the “UCC”), such provision of 
Article 8 of the UCC shall control’. 
630 Most of the LLCs in the sample adopt a corporate-type and centralized management. See Ribstein, Larry E., 
‘Form and Substance in the Definition of a “Security”: The Case of Limited Liability Companies’, Washington 
and Lee Law Review, vol. 51, 3, 1994, pp. 807-841 (arguing that there is a presumption that LLC’s units are not 
securities). 
631 See, for example, Frank R. Zokaites, Appellant v Pittsburgh Irish Pubs, LLC and Colm McWilliams, 
Appellees, 2008 PA Super 281; 962 A.2d 1220; 2008 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4287. 
632 See Ball, Jane, ‘The Boundaries of Property Rights in English Law (Report to the XVIIth International 
Congress of Comparative Law, July 2006), Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 10.3, 2006, URL: 
htto://www.ejcl.org (accessed on 24 March 2013) (providing an answer to the question ‘Can incorporeal things 
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structure is different. Restrictions on shares combined with the specific regime of transfer of 
property rights in the selected jurisdictions cause empty property rights to be transferred out 
of an un-consented transfer of shares. In other words, in the case where the share sale and 
purchase agreement is valid or has not been avoided, the transferee cannot exercise 
shareholder’s rights in the company because she is not a shareholder. At most, she can 
exercise economic rights, or is entitled to equitable or beneficial interests under a trust 
(UK),633 but that does not turn her into a member of the company. Hence, empty property 
rights transferred with the execution of the un-consented transfer are, in fact, credit rights. The 
transferee, if in good faith, holds a claim against the transferor. Good faith, however, has been 
interpreted narrowly in the United Kingdom and the United States.634 In the United Kingdom 
there has been an old tendency of courts not to compromise the certainty of the contract.635 In 
the United States, the principle has been acknowledged through the Uniform Commercial 
Code636 and the Restatement (2nd) of Contracts.637 Still, it is rather perceived has a minor 
requirement.638 
I submit that the share in Hohfeldian terms is a legal configuration of a complex right.639 
The Hohfeldian conception of ‘property’ or ‘legal interest’ is that of a complex aggregate of 
rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities. In other words, property rights are a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
be the object of ownership or other property rights?)’. In the jurisprudence see, for example, Judgment of the 
Court of Appeal of Porto, process No 0051450, as of 28 March 2001 (providing that a share in a Portuguese 
PLLC (sociedades por quotas) is susceptible of ownership or any other right in rem. Moreover, the transfer of 
shares may be undertaken through a sale and purchase agreement, which in Portuguese law is defined as a 
contract to transfer corporeal things. 
633 The United Kingdom is a special case because the dual foundation of property law, which is based in 
common law and equity law, is unique and cannot be traced in the other jurisdictions. 
634 See Teubner, Gunther, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New 
Divergences’, The Modern Law Review, vol. 61, 1, 1998, pp. 11-32 (explaining the dissemination of the 
principle of good faith in the United Kingdom from a system theory’s and social perspective). Also see Piers, 
Maud, ‘Good Faith in English Law: Could a Rule Become a Principle?’, Tulane European & Civil Law Forum, 
vol. 26, 2011, pp. 123-169 (explaining how good faith has never been a general principal of English law). 
635 See, for example, CPC Group Limited v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company [2010] [2010] EWHC 
1535 (Ch); [2010] All ER (D) 222 (Jun). This relatively recent case applies the principle of good faith. However, 
such principle is read within the contractual obligations entered into and between the parties. The court held that 
‘It seems to me, therefore, that the obligation to use "all reasonable endeavours" does not always require the 
obligor to sacrifice his commercial interests. In this case, the matter is, however, clearer, because the contract 
itself, as I have already said, contains other indications that […] was not to be required to sacrifice its 
commercial interests. 
636 See § 1-201 (19) providing that good faith ‘except as otherwise provided in Article 5, means honesty in fact 
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’. Also relevant are §2-103(1)(b) and §1-
203. 
637 See § 205 (duty of good faith and fair dealing). 
638 See Summers, Robert S., ‘The General Duty of Good Faith: Its Recognition and Conceptualization’, Cornell 
Law Review, vol. 67, pp 810-840 (811) (arguing that ‘… the general duty of good faith and fair dealing is no 
more than a minimal requirement (rather than a high ideal)’). 
639 I resort to Hohfeld’s basic legal terms once more in Part II, Chapter 4 to define the broad concept of legal 
entitlement. 
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‘complex aggregate of jural relations’.640 The aggregate can be composed of multital or in rem 
‘right-duty’ relations, multital or in rem ‘privilege – no-right’ relations, multital or in rem 
‘power-liability’ relations, and multital or in rem ‘immunity-disability’ relations. Hohfeld 
calls attention to the fact that besides keeping in mind that all these elements are part of the 
aggregate, it is also important not to confuse the different classes of jural relations with one 
another. Making this distinction, he says, is of utmost practical and economic significance.641 
The conception of the share in Hohfeldian terms provides an image of the components and 
structure of the share. Additionally, it points in the direction of the number of possibilities in 
which these elements may be connected in different and unexpected ways. This calls for a re-
conceptualization of property rights.642  
 
3. A new conceptualization of property rights: To what extent can the fox be 
tamed? 
 
I have tried to define the content and essence of shares in all six jurisdictions. It turns 
out that property rights in shares are hybrid property rights.643 This is so because they have a 
mixed origin or composition for the most part due to the different contractual structures of the 
articles of association where shares are defined, and due to their doctrinal and legal 
                                                             
640 There can be found in the literature different attempts to define property rights. See Smith, Henry E., 
‘Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights’, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 
31, 2002, pp. 453-487 (454) (focusing, among other things, on what he names the ‘compositional dimension of 
property rights’). See Alchian, Armen, ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’, Il Politico, 30, 1965, pp. 816-829 
(explaining that property rights are the rights of individuals to use resources). In corporate law literature, see 
Hansman, Henry, The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996 (analyzing 
different structures of ownership across firms and industries. In this case, property rights are subject to 
organizational law). Also see Hansmann, Henry, and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘Property, Contract, and Verification: 
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 31, S2, The 
Evolution of Property Rights, A Conference Sponsored by the Searle Fund and Northwestern University School 
of Law, 2002, pp. S373-S420 (arguing that organizational law is functionally property law). In intellectual 
property rights law, the problems with intangible property echo the discussion about shares of companies. In this 
area, the problems of intangibility have largely been considered in light of digital copyrighted works. For a 
general approach, see, for example, Bently, L., and Sherman, B., Intellectual Property Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
641 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, 
The Yale Law Journal, vol. 23, No. 1, 1913, pp. 16-59 (presenting a scheme of what he called ‘jural relations’ by 
which he analyses these jural relations and provides eight individual jural conceptions). In addition, see Hohfeld, 
Wesley Newcomb, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, The Yale Law Journal, 
vol. 26, No.8, 1917, pp. 710-770 (discussing certain important classifications which are applicable to each of the 
eight individual jural conceptions. He mainly discusses in this article relations in personam (‘paucital’ relations) 
and relations in rem (‘multital’ relations). 
642 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, 
The Yale Law Journal, vol. 23, No. 1 (Nov. 1913), pp. 16-59. 
643 See Micheler, Eva, Property Rights in Securities: A Comparative Study, Cambridge Studies in Corporate 
Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 35 and ff (arguing that property rights in shares are 
hybrid, and questioning whether they can accurately be called property rights). 
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conceptualization. They have a mixed composition because, on one hand, their holder owns a 
fundamental right or claim against persons in general (right in rem). However, on the other 
hand, especially when the transfer of shares is subject to restrictions, their holder seems to 
rather own a fundamental right or claim against a single or group of persons (right in 
personam).644 This definition challenges the Roman law concept of ownership (dominium) 
because it appears that the share is not absolutely owned by the member if restrictions are 
foreseen in the company’s articles. Moreover, the requirement of consent lato sensu 
established in the default rules provided by the legislator demonstrates that restrictions on 
transfers of property rights are not at all subject to a numerus clausus.645646 The idea of hybrid 
property rights in shares bends the extraordinarily individualistic view of property rights, in 
particular in the jurisdictions that are part of the French legal family. There is this view in 
comparative law that the civil law is inherently against ‘divided’, or as I say mixed property 
rights because of the antagonism toward feudalism embodied in the civil code following the 
French revolution. This is an experience common law did not go through.647 In this respect, 
the legal solutions in United Kingdom and United States are different, and less categorically 
corseted. The UK law either through equity, a dual system of courts, and the use of trusts, or 
the US law through the partition of property rights in shares into management rights and 
                                                             
644 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, The 
Yale Law Journal, vol. 26, No.8, 1917, pp. 710-770 (718). 
645 Italian legislators adopted a principle of free transferability of shares. §603 (a) of the NY Limited Liability 
Company Law and § 18-702 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act determine that, except as provided 
in the operating agreement, a membership interest is assignable in whole or in part. Nevertheless, management 
rights are not transferred, and their exercise by the transferee depends upon the consent of all the members of the 
limited liability company. 
646 See Fusaro, Andrea, ‘The Numerus Clausus of Property Rights’, in Cooke, Elizabeth (ed.), Modern Studies in 
Property Law, vol. 1: Property 2000, Oxford - Portland and Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 309-317 (arguing 
that a convergence of common and civil law systems toward the notion of numerus clausus is apparent. 
Furthermore, the author claims that adopting a more flexible concept of ownership is better than creating new 
property rights). Also see Hansmann, Henry, and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘Property, Contract, and Verification, cit., 
pp. 399-400 (explaining that the numerus clausus doctrine operates in common law at the category level. It 
appears the same is true of civil law countries. In their words, ‘The civil law’s numerus clausus, after all, limits 
only the categories of property rights that can be created and not the content of specific rights within those 
categories’. However, they point out that this doctrine is perceived in a less formalistic way in common law 
where the creation of other types of property rights is not prohibited. ‘Rather, property rights that fall outside the 
standard categories are simply governed by highly unaccommodating verification rules that place a heavy burden 
on the holder of the right to provide notice to third parties’. 
647 See Hansmann, Henry, and Mattei, Ugo, ‘The Functions of Trust Law: a Comparative Legal and Economic 
Analysis, New York University Law Review , vol. 5, 1, 1998, pp. 434-479 (explaining that ‘During the French 
revolution, divided property rights came to be considered characteristic of feudalism. As a consequence, it was 
thought that the number of restricted property rights had to be strictly controlled and limited. The numerus 
clausus theory was developed, stating that divided interests in property must be strictly confined to a small 
number of well-defined types, such as servitudes on real property, mortgages, and usufructs. Although this 
theory was largely the product of the folklore and ideology of the French revolution and lacked a well articulated 
general rationale, it enjoyed tremendous success and continues to have a strong influence on the civil law’).  This 
is not true of the Austrian civil code, for example. It used to have provisions for feudalist tenancy that were in 
use until 1848. 
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economic rights, are more likely to accommodate new forms of transacting property rights. 
Furthermore, defining property rights in shares as hybrid property rights fundamentally 
changes the conception of contract law as requiring an object (a corporeal ‘thing’) so that the 
contract can be typified.648  
In Portugal, Pires de Lima and Antunes Varela have argued that the transfer of 
copyright and intellectual property rights raises problems similar to those involving the 
assignment of credits. They, however, do not go as far as making any reference to shares in 
their argument.649 The comparison of shares of the Spanish SRL to credits is boldly made by 
Perdices Huetos. He says that the requirement of consent of the company (clausula de 
autorizacion) affects the capacity members have to dispose of their shares. He defines shares 
as a patrimonial subjective right which, by its nature, is liable to be transacted in the market. 
He understands, however, that restrictions such as the consent of the company change the 
configuration of property rights. There are two ways of doing this, in his view. It can be done 
either by considering that members, when they included restrictions into the company’s 
articles, they entered into a pactum de non cedendo with erga omnes effects, or they 
established prohibitions to transfers of property rights. Perdices Huetos, additionally, defines 
share as a contractual position. For him, transfers of shares are transfers of contractual 
positions. The fact that this contractual position (in the company) represented by the share 
encapsulates rights and duties in the company turns it into a subjective right which can be 
transacted. This is how he reconciles the two definitions of share. Hence, the consent of the 
company, as it is construed by this author, is a technical expression of the consent of the party 
to the company’s articles of association that are to be assigned. This consent is external to the 
sales contract, but it hinders the transfer. The consent complements the transferor’s right to 
dispose of her share.650 Perdices Huetos justifies his argument with Article 1526 of the 
                                                             
648 See Cassazione Civile, 26 May 2000, N.º 5957 Dir. E Prat. Soc., 2000, 23, 95 (where the Italian Court of 
Cassation held that shares an Italian PLLC (società a responsabilita limtata) even though they are intangible, 
they have an objective economic value and can, therefore, be object of property rights). 
649 See Lima, Pires de e Varela, Antunes, Código Civil Anotado, vol. I, 4.º ed., Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 1987, 
p. 603 (commenting Article 588 of the Portuguese Civil Code, which regulates the application of the rules of 
assignment of credits to other to other institutes), There is a similar rule in German law, which for the most part 
has served as an inspiration to Portuguese legal doctrine. § 413 do BGB provides that “Die Vorschriften über die 
Übertragung von Forderungen finden auf die Übertragung anderer Rechte entsprechende Anwendung, soweit 
nicht das Gesetz ein anderes vorschreibt” (ʽThe rules of assignment of credits shall apply to other transfer of 
rights, unless the law provides it differentlyʼ). The same can be said of the French law, which in Articles 1689 
and ff of the French Civil Code equates incorporeal rights with credit rights. 
650 See Perdices Huetos, Antonio B., Cláusulas restrictivas de la transmision de acciones y participaciones, 
Madrid, Civitas, 1997, pp. 50-51 ( saying about the consent clause that ‘dicha cláusula configura el supuesto de 
hecho transmisivo del derecho, y por tanto, toda transmisión negocial queda afectada por el defecto de capacidad 
de disposición que determina en el transmitente la falta de consentimiento del beneficiario de la cláusula de 
autorización’) (This clause constitutes the condition of the factual transmission of the right and, therefore, the 
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Spanish Civil Code and Article 120(1) of the Ley de Sociedades de Capital, which compares 
the transfer of credit rights to the transfer of shares and other intangible rights.651 His doctrinal 
construction owes much to the influence of the Roman law tradition in Spanish contract and 
property laws. He also is clearly inspired by the separation principle (Trennungsprinzip), 
which Roman law also had (the distinction between titulus and modus),652 and by the 
abstraction principle (Abstraktionsprinzip), which is widely accepted by German legal 
doctrine, but did not exist in Roman law. Still, he finds that when everything else has been 
taken into consideration it is irrelevant to label restrictions on transfers as pacta de non 
cedendo or prohibitions to transfer of property rights. This is so because both techniques 
‘…create a diaphragm between the right and its owner that prevents or grants to another 
person the faculty of disposition which otherwise would be his’.653 
Shares as object of hybrid property rights fit into a broad concept of thing as more than 
just the representation of a contractual position.654 I submit that the share is a legal 
configuration of a complex aggregate of rights (claims), which encompasses a bundle of 
management and economic rights involving the position their owner holds in the company 
according to its articles of association, and which includes a number of rights, privileges, 
powers, and immunities as well as their correlative duties, no-rights, liabilities, and 
disabilities.655656 Unlike assets subject to ‘standard’ property rights which provide their 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
entire sales contract is affected by the incapacity of the transferor to dispose as a result of the lack of consent of 
the beneficiary of the authorization clause). Moreover, this construction provided by Perdices Huetos brings to 
mind some forms of factoring wherein credits are not conveyed. 
651 Article 1526 of the Spanish Civil Code provides that ‘La cesión de un crédito, derecho o acción no surtirá 
efecto contra tercero sino desde que su fecha deba tenerse por cierta en conformidad a los artículos 1218 y 1227. 
Si se refiriere a un inmueble, desde la fecha de su inscripción en el Registro’ (The assignment of a credit, right or 
claim has no effect on a third party but from the moment it is publicized according to articles 1218 and 1227. If it 
[the assignment] refers to real estate, [it has an effect on third parties] from the date of its registration in the 
Registry). Article 120(1) of the Ley de Sociedades de Capital establishes that ‘Mientras no se hayan impreso y 
entregado los títulos, la transmisión de acciones procederá de acuerdo con las normas sobre la cesión de créditos 
y demás derechos incorporales’. (‘Pending the print and delivery of the titles, the transfer of shares will proceed 
in accordance with the rules on the assignment of credits and other intangible rights’). 
652 Savigny apparently claimed to have derived the abstraction principle from Roman law. 
653 See Perdices Huetos, Antonio B, Clausulas Restrictivas de las Transmision de Acciones y Participaciones, 
cit., p. 41 (‘…un diafragma entre el derecho y su titular que impide o somete a outro la faculdad de disposición 
que de outro modo le correspondería’). 
654 For example, see Article 1128 of French Civil Code provides that ‘Il n'y a que les choses qui sont dans le 
commerce qui puissent être l'objet des conventions’. (‘Only things which may be the subject matter of legal 
transactions between private individuals may be the object of agreements’) (Translated by Georges Rouhette, 
Professor of Law, with the assistance of Dr. Anne Rouhette-Berton, Assistant Professor of English). 
655 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’. 
656 Normatively, I am treating contractual rights arising from the company’s articles as property rights, especially 
if harm is done to non-transferring shareholders and to the company as a result of the execution of the un-
consented transfer of shares. This echoes the discussion on the enforcement of contractual rights against third 
parties. See Smith, Stephen A., Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2006, p. 369, explaining that ‘…an act that makes it impossible or more costly for a contracting party to perform 
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owners with rights to take certain actions and prevent ‘the rest of the world’ from taking 
actions involving those assets (rights of exclusion),657 the share is subject to hybrid or 
‘divided’ property rights due to its complex nature.658 Three implications derive from this 
statement. First, shares are object to property rights because they can be owned. Second, 
restrictions on their transfers deviate from a principle of numerus clausus in property law 
because they imprint a new configuration of property rights in their physiognomy and 
morphology. This challenges the closed catalog of forms of property ownership, which 
includes interests in personal property like shares. (The whole idea of hybrid property rights, 
which is directly linked to the molecular structure of the share, is not subject to a principle of 
numerus clausus). Third, shares are morphologically positioned between property and credit 
rights, and this is evidenced by the effects of the un-consented transfer and the perception 
legislators have on transfer of shares. Case law analyzed in Part I suggests that the 
Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, French, United Kingdom and United States legislatures as well 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
a contract or which diminishes the benefit of a contract does not qualify as the tort of inducing a breach of 
contract, even if it done carelessly. This does not mean that the general tort of negligence could not in theory be 
extended to cover claims where the only loss suffered arises from some harm to the claimant’s contract with a 
third party. Contractual rights could be treated, for the purpose of such claims, like ordinary property rights. But 
…claims for ‘pure economic loss’ (of which this is a clear example) are not permitted under English law. As a 
general rule, the only way in which harm to contractual rights can form the basis for a claim in negligence for 
damages is where this harm has arisen from a loss or injury to the claimant’s person or property’.  
657 See Hansmann, Henry, and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘Property, Contract, and Verification’, cit, pp. S373-S420 
(defining property rights as claims on assets that can be enforceable against subsequent transferees of rights in 
the asset. For them, property rights run with the asset. They focus on voluntary transfers and, therefore, 
dissociate themselves from the ‘good against all world’ criteria. Unlike their take on property rights, this 
criterion focuses on tortuous interference). See Campbell, Kenneth, ‘On the General Nature of Property Rights’, 
vol. 3, Kings College Law Journal, 1992, pp. 79-97 (presenting a theory of the nature of ownership. Campbell 
rejects the ‘bundle theory’ to explain the concept of ownership. He advances his own understanding of the 
concept. Campbell presents an account of ownership which says nothing about the content of the rights in 
question. In his words at p. 94, ‘Provided it is a property right and that it is not dominated by any greater right of 
the same content, it is a right of ownership). Addittionally, see Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., St. Paul, MN; 
Thomson,West, 2004, pp. 1252-1253 (providing a definition of property. It is ‘The right to possess, use, and 
enjoy a determine thing (either a tract of land or a chattel); the right of ownership <the institution of private 
property is protected from undue governmental interference>. – Also termed bundle of rights’). 
658 An interesting example is provided by Article 12 of the articles of association of the company Maximat 
Proprete Service, Sarl that I analysed while creating a sample of French companies to support this study. This 
company ended up not being included in the final sample of 50 French companies, but I highlight the clause in 
the company’s articles entitled ‘Droits et obligations attachés aux parts sociales’ (Rights and Duties Attached to 
Shares). It said that ‘Chaque part sociale confère à son proprietaire un droit égal dans les benefices de la Société, 
dans la propriété de l’actif social et dans le boni de liquidation. Elle donne également droit à une voix dans tous 
les votes et deliberations. Les associés ne sont tenus à l’égard des tiers qu’à concurrence du montant de leur 
apport. Toutefois ils sont solidairement responsables, à l’égard des tiers, pendant cinq ans, de la valeur attribuée 
aux apports en nature lors de la constituition de la Société, lorsqu’il n’y a pas eu de commissaire aux apports ou 
lorsque la valeur retenue est différente de celle propose par le commissaire aux apports (…)’. (‘Each share 
entitles its owner to equal rights in the profits and assets of the company and the liquidation. It also attributes the 
right to one vote in all resolutions and deliberations. Shareholders are only liable toward third parties in respect 
to their contributions. Nonetheless, for five years they may be jointly and severally liable toward third parties for 
the value assigned to in-kind contributions upon the incorporation of the company provided that there was not an 
auditor or the value assigned to the shares is different from the one proposed by the auditor (…)’. This is an 
example that shows how rights, benefits and liabilities can comprise the structure of a share.  
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as courts perceive rules about transfer of shares – legal and conventional defaults - as some 
sort of property rules.659 In other words, not only property rights in shares cannot be sold 
without the shareholder abide by the restrictions established in the contract, but also, in 
principle, propriety rights of the shareholder in the share cannot be taken without his or her 
consent. In relation to the case-law, actions are mostly taken by the company, managers and 
other members to invalidate the transfer or to prevent it. On the other hand, the transferor 
takes actions to be able to transfer. Damages and other sort of compensations may be asked 
for, but they are not the essence of the disputes. Shareholders’ entitlements are not, therefore, 
especially protected by liability rules or inalienability rules.660 I do not think that the legal 
perception of transfer of shares adopted by legislators and courts in the selected jurisdictions 
makes shares inalienable, as it would if parties to the company’s contract had entered into a 
pactum de non cedendo by including a clause prohibiting the transfer tout court. The transfer 
of property rights in shares is restricted by contractual limitations included in the contract of 
the company, i.e., a pactum de non alienando. As a result of this contractual limitation, 
transferees are likely to acquire empty property rights because they are not entitled to exercise 
the rights the transferor can exercise in the company vis-a-vis the company itself, other 
members and other corporate constituencies. 
The effects of property rules adopted by legislators to protect the entitlements of 
shareholders in the company combined with the hybridity of rights shareholders hold in the 
share (which stands for their own position and no one else’s in that company), the consensual 
principle reigning in Portugal, France, and Italy, the rules of equity applicable to un-consented 
transfer in the United Kingdom, and the not-so-clear-cut definition of property rights in units 
of American LLCs and Spanish SrLs, demonstrate the complexity of the system of property 
rights and transfer of ownership in PLLCs. Besides, all the above-mentioned suggests that 
further research is needed to understand whether property rules are the best form to protect 
shareholders’ rights and how they can do so in the most efficient way.661 This means 
exploring the possibility of legislators to continue choosing rules that establish the consent of 
                                                             
659 I refer to ‘some sort of property rules’ in the text because entitlements allocated in the PLLC may be 
protected by property rules and by reverse property rules when pre-emption rights are given to non-transferring 
shareholders and the company. This would correspond to the mysterious rule 4 discussed by Calabresi and 
Melamed. Furthermore, this does not prevent property rules be combined with liability rules. I treat this in Part 
II, Chapter 4. Also see Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’, vol. 85, No. 6, 1972, pp. 1089-1128 (1093) (presenting their 
entitlements model). 
660 See Cabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral’; and Whincop, Michael J., ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in 
Corporate Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 19, 1999, pp. 19-50 (defining these rules).  
661 See Chapter 4. 
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certain corporate constituencies (not necessarily the shareholders) for the transfer.662 In 
addition, the idea of introducing qualifying elements to these rules which are able to mitigate 
the problems arising from the un-consented transfer should be contemplated. These elements 
could be the introduction of a time limit for the validity of restrictions on transfers introduced 
in the company’s articles. After that time limit, the decision to maintain those restrictions 
should be revisited by the shareholders. The merits of dissolution at will to overcome 
problems of combining action, asymmetries of information and a prevailing status quo in the 
company can be explored.663 I view this as a possible way of tipping balance in companies: 
indeed, as a way to champion a new kind of collectivity.664 A third possibility with somewhat 
broader policy implications is to investigate the benefits of promoting jurisdictional 
competition for the creation of a law market based on the offer and demand of new and better 
rules. These rules should be capable of protecting shareholders’ property rights and of 
nudging shareholders and potential investors to invest in the company.665 
Finally, the conceptualization of property rights I present here hints at the possibility of 
an alternative system of transfer of property rights in shares. For instance, the execution of 
such transfer by an abstract act can be sketched, following the consecration of a principle of 
separation of contracts in jurisdictions where the consensual principle prevails. Consent of the 
company would be as necessary for the effectiveness of the transfer as the performance with 
reference to (physical) delivery is in Spanish, Austrian, German, UK and US laws. The 
comparative bottom line is the following. In consensualism countries (e.g., France) third 
parties can claim the lack of consent voids the contract as a whole, whilst in separation 
countries (e.g., Germany and Austria) the lack of consent would only void the transfer.666 
                                                             
662 Liability rules allowing the transfer against compensation, or even inalienability rules may be also perceived 
as better choices on this regard. It will all depend on the policy choices made by legislators. I explore this in 
chapter 4. 
663 Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs, Stanford Law Review, 
vol. 38, N.º 2, 1986, pp. 271-301 (288-289) (saying that ‘some commentators, sympathetic to the potential plight 
of minority shareholders, have advocated relaxing the standards for involuntary dissolution and allowing a 
minority shareholder to obtain dissolution whenever his “reasonable expectations” have been frustrated’. They, 
however, argue that this assumption as well as the creation of an automatic buy-out defended by some was 
inaccurate. For them there are other alternatives such as suits for the breach of fiduciary duties, the appointment 
of a custodian or provisional director, and in case the latter remedies did not work, there was still the possibility 
of bargaining for more protection). 
664 See Mauss, Marcel, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, London and New 
York, Routledge, 2002 (arguing that there are no gifts. Gifts create a social bond that forces the receiver to 
reciprocate). By referring to a new kind of collectivity, I am thinking of a social environment in the company 
where corporate constituencies feel compelled to reciprocate. 
665 See Ribstein, Larry E. and Kobayashi, Bruce H., ‘Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for 
Limited Liability Companies, University of Illinois Law Review, vol. […], 1, 2011, pp. 91-144; and O’ Hara, 
Erin A., and Ribstein E. Larry, The Law Market, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. I explore these ideas 
in more detail in Part III. 
666 See Reichert and Weller in MüKo GmbHG § 15 Rz 362. 
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Defining the best solution will depend on which one causes a Pareto improvement. In other 
words, it will depend on the solution that constitutes the best response to any feasible 
contractual choices. In fact, the comparative analysis of the relevant legal provisions in all six 
jurisdictions shows that the consensual principle is more residual than often pictured. There 
still is space for new configurations of classic institutions of civil law in light of corporate 
law. This is how tamed the fox can be.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
After an in-depth analysis of the case law selected in Part I, I could sense the existence 
of problems of interpretation of the articles of association, of combining action, asymmetries 
of information, strategic behavior and, generally speaking, bargaining failures in PLLCs.667 
This is another situation that can be aligned with others stressed in the literature in which the 
mere assumption of zero transaction costs of the recurrently labeled Coase Theorem does not 
apply. This premise, or ‘parable’ as some have called it,668 holds that if there are no 
transaction costs, parties are able to bargain in order to satisfactorily accommodate their 
interests. In these circumstances, legal entitlements end up being, in fact, irrelevant to the 
achievement of efficient solutions.669 Reality, however, has been recounting a different story. 
There are transaction costs that impede Coasean bargaining. Because of these transaction 
costs, parties are unable to reach efficiency-improving solutions that help them maximize 
their benefits with the least costs. My case shows that shareholders’ property rights in these 
companies are often weak in the sense that they are frequently put in doubt as a result of the 
transfer system.670 Moreover, it is apparent that there is an imbalance between the allocation 
of property rights in shares and the way that they are protected. Several cases show that 
restrictions on transfer of shares were not conceived to be part of the share sale and purchase 
                                                             
667 I reckon this statement is somewhat tautological because there would be no bargaining failures if there was no 
case law. I am trying to stress, however, that this phenomenon is rather curious considering the freedom parties 
enjoy to get the best contractual outcome for themselves.  
668 See Ellickson, Robert C., ‘Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County, 
Stanford Law Review, vol. 38, N.º 3, 1986, pp. 623-687 (625). 
669 See Coase, R. H., ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 3, 1960, pp. 1-44; 
Whincop, Michael J., cit., p. 21; and Ellickson, Robert C., cit., pp. 623-687. 
670 See Nicita, Antonio and Rizzolli, Matteo, ‘Hold-up and externality: The firm as a nexus of incomplete 
rights?’, International Review of Economics, vol. 59, 2012, pp. 157-174 (noting that the reference to incomplete 
property rights is missing in the Coasean theorem. In their words, when costs of defining ex-ante a system of 
complete property rights are prohibitive, then externalities do emerge as reciprocal claims over rival uses. When 
property rights are well defined, but ex-post transaction costs over the exchange of those rights are prohibitive, 
then the externality is depicted as the social waste of having a sub-optimal Paretian allocation. In this respect, 
they say, the notion of externality would coincide with that of an inefficient market configuration). 
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agreement.671 However, the un-consented transfer determines that rights that are assigned, if 
the sales contract is not invalid, are empty property rights. (They will continue to be empty as 
long as consent stricto sensu is not obtained or the transferee does not hold priority rights 
against the members of the company, in whose benefit the requirement to obtain consent lato 
and stricto sensu was established). 
Given the above, I submit that, in general, restrictions on transfers, when introduced in 
the articles of association, assume the nature of contractual limitations on the transfer of 
property rights (pacta de non alienando).This type of agreement does not have an erga omnes 
effect as commentators attribute it to a pactum de non cedendo.672 A different understanding 
has been conveyed in respect to the restrictions on transfer of shares of the Spanish Srl. 
Commentators have described the clause providing for such restriction as a pactum de non 
cedendo. The transferability of shares is one of the most important features of the company.673 
Thus, I do not construe transfer restrictions as total bans or prohibitions on transfer of 
property rights in shares. Sometimes, however, articles of association are drafted to include 
‘prohibitions’ on transfers.674 Even when they are not drafted in that manner, the terms in 
which the transfer clause is supposed to operate renders any attempt to transfer shares 
extremely cumbersome and almost equivalent to a prohibition. Still, by including a transfer 
clause in the company’s articles providing restrictions on transfers, shareholders agree not to 
transfer their property rights in the shares. This agreement, however, is frequently ineffective 
not only because it does not deter shareholders from selling, but also because it does not 
prevent property rights or beneficial interests in the share from being transferred to a third 
                                                             
671 This will obviously depend on the purpose legislators and shareholders wanted to accomplish when they 
established those restrictions. It will also depend on the structure of the articles of association and any other side 
agreements shareholders might have entered into. 
672 See Raber, Fritz, ‘The Contractual Prohibition of Assignment in Austrian Law, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 
64, 1989, pp 171-199 (referring to the pactum de non alienando as a ‘contractual prohibition of sale and 
emcumbrance’, or a ‘contractual prohibition of alienation’. I think this is the case because he compares pactum 
de non cedendo to a pactum de non alienando. Furthermore, he considers that both types of agreements may be 
read in light of Article 364 of the General Civil Code of Austria. This provision establishes a contractual or 
testamentary prohibition to sell or encumber a thing or a real right. The idea I offered in the text about the erga 
omnes effects of the pactum de non cedendo makes sense in Austria given that there is this understanding that 
property law is supposed to provide some type of signaling for third parties. Furthermore, following the 
Zessionsrechtsänderungs-Gesetz of 2005, in Austria a pactum de non cedendo only has relative effects. 
673 Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier, ʽWhat is Corporate Law?’ in Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 1-19 
and in particular pp. 10-11 (considering transferable shares together with legal personality, limited liability, 
delegated management under a broad structure, and investor ownership basic legal characteristics of the business 
corporation).  
674 For instance, see Holt and Others v Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1953] 2 All ER 1499, [1953] 1 WLR 
1488, [1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep 506, 32 ATC 402, [1953] TR 373, 46 R&IT 801 (the court referring to the 
restrictions established by the articles of the company explained that according to those articles unfettered 
transfer to non-members was prohibited as long as a member or a person approved by the directors was willing 
to purchase the shares at the fair value to be certified). 
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party.675 If and when this happens, the share is not transferred in full. In the United States, the 
transferee is assigned economic rights that are basically the right to receive dividends and the 
liquidation value. In the United Kingdom, the transferee is entitled to beneficial ownership. In 
the other selected jurisdictions shares are not designed to have a dual structure. However, 
freedom of contract allows parties to draft contracts by which the transferee may be granted 
the economic rights that the transferor is entitled to because she still is a member of the 
company. The contract associating the purchaser with the company’s shares (convention de 
croupier or Unterbeteiligung) is a case in point.676 
The complex nature of the share and the hybridity of the property rights in it call for a 
reformulation of the consensual principle. More, on one hand, the taming process of property 
rights through restrictions on transfers puts at stake the classical understanding of principles 
of property law such as the principle of numerus clausus because elements of contract law, 
corporate law, and civil law in general are connected in surprising ways. On the other hand, it 
also calls for new theoretical constructions which, all things considered, are likely to break 
with any manifestations of doctrinal path-dependence in respect to the potential 
(re)configuration of property rights and their function. Given the configuration of property 
rights in shares presented herein, chapter 3 below attempts to unveil the functionality of 
members’ property rights in their shares within the governance structure of the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
675 See Davies, Paul L., cit., pp. 945-946 (arguing that ‘Notwithstanding that the transfer is not lodged for 
registration or registration is refused, the beneficial interest in the shares will, it seems, pass from the seller to the 
buyer (...). The seller then becomes a trustee for the buyer and must account to him for any dividends he receives 
and vote in accordance with his instructions (or appoint him as his proxy’). 
676 Vicente, Lécia, ‘Un-Consented Transfers of Shares: A Comparative Perspective’, European Company Law, 
vol. 9, 6, 2012, pp. 300-304. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EFFECTS OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE COMPANY’S CONSENT: 
PIERCING THE OWNERSHIP VEIL 
 
 
‘The wisest of you men is he who has realized, like Socrates, that 
in respect of wisdom he is really worthless’. 
 
Plato, ‘Socrate’s Defense (Apology)’ (tr. Hugh Tredennick), The 
Collected Dialogues of Plato including the Letters, in Hamilton, 
Edith; and Cairns, Huntington (eds.), Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 9. 
 
 
‘Often managers must act now and learn later; delay for more 
study may be the worst decision; the market will decide whether 
the decision was good’. 
 
Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge Massachusetts; London, 
England, 1991, p. 99. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we arrive at a fundamental question: Given the nature of property rights 
of members described in Chapter 2, who actually controls the company? Ultimately, this will 
help clarify how the taming process developed by the legislator by providing restrictions on 
transfers affects the physiology and morphology of the governance structure (decision-
making) of PLLCs in the selected jurisdictions (can managers or directors in these business 
organizations afford to think they do not know it better or cannot do it better?). I define the 
effective powers shareholders have in the company as a result of their ownership rights, as 
opposed to the powers held by managers and directors as a result of their management duties. 
It is often the case that shareholders have residual control of the company, whilst managers 
have actual control of it.677 Thus, in reality, the scope of the rights held by shareholders is 
more limited. They are even more limited, perhaps, than what articles of association foresee. 
                                                             
677 For an illustration, see the United Kingdom case in Part 1, Chapter 3. 
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It is in this context that I refer to the 'piercing of the ownership veil'.678 I use this expression to 
stress that in my view, some circumstances demand that courts ignore restrictions. The 
expression is also used here to suggest court intervention to clarify ownership of property 
rights in the shares. Here, I shall attempt to show under what circumstances this should be 
done. The idea that there may be situations in which the ownership veil must be pierced rests 
on the principle ‘substance over form’, which maintains that the economic substance of 
transactions rather than just their legal form be disclosed.  
Managers add value to the company. They are independent in the way they operate, in 
spite of the fact that in PLLCs shareholders typically can give legally binding instructions to 
managers. But at the end of the day, these managers are also employees. They must take a 
common-sense approach to their work, including the meeting of shareholders' demands. For 
instance, in order to make the business more attractive, they must ensure that information 
flows quickly. Innovation and the pursuit of new technology must be foremost in the 
managers’ mind, and this is true whether the business is small or big.679 Shareholders want the 
company to grow. Essentially, managers should have the will to take responsibility, the abilit y 
to take initiative, and the capacity to add value to the company. The company is an ecosystem 
wherein path-dependent legal solutions, as illustrated by the metaphor of the fox, lead to a 
fuzzy definition of property rights. Piercing the ownership veil entails investigating the reality 
of the company’s governance and tracing the real ownership profile of the company. It means 
asking: who controls the company (i.e., managers or shareholders?) and how 'tamed' are 
shareholders’ property rights according to the consensual agreements into which members and 
other stakeholders have entered?680  
Toward this goal, I examine the extent to which freedom of contract is likely to enhance 
the power held by managers or directors in the PLLCs, and how this can be reconciled with 
                                                             
678 See Fama, Eugene F., and Jensen, Michael C., ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol. 26, 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, 
1983, pp. 301-325 (304-305) (noting that that ‘The interesting problem is to determine when separation of 
decision management, decision control, and residual risk bearing is more efficient than combining these three 
functions in the same agents’). My understanding is that in most PLLCs, the separation of ownership and control 
is blurred. Hence, considering that members hold property rights in shares, I try to understand the scope of these 
rights, and if members in general are in a position to control de facto the company.  
679 See for example Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization’, American Economic Review, vol. 62, 5, pp. 772-795 (referring within the team production theory 
to the figure of the monitor of the members of the team. The monitor is a specialist with enough knowledge and 
motivation to reduce shirking in a team). American corporate history, however, is littered with managers who 
play on both sides of the deal). 
680 See Gelter, Martin, ‘Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a 
Comparative Light’, NYU Journal of Law & Business, vol. 7, 2, 2011, pp. 641-730 (providing a comparative 
historic account of the debate about the role of managers in running publicly held companies and whether they 
should be run exclusively in the interests of shareholders or whether the interests of other stakeholders should 
also be taken into account).  
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the ownership or property rights of the shareholders. Interestingly, we shall see that freedom 
of contract is used in different ways. For instance, corporate law is much more prescriptive in 
the United States than in the United Kingdom.681 Comparison can also be made with other 
countries. For example, in the United Kingdom it seems that freedom of contract has been 
used to enhance the power of directors.682 In Italy, where the principle of free transferability 
of shares prevails, this has not happened to the same extent. Members who are often managers 
hold the major stake in the company. Below, I look at how the taming process established by 
legislators affects the governance structure of the PLLC.  
The structure of this chapter is the following. Section 1 analyses the relationship 
between concentration of ownership and control, which is different in the PLLC and the 
publicly held company. In the PLLC, there is a high concentration of ownership and often no 
separation of ownership and control, at least to the extent there is in the publicly held 
company. The implication of this is the emergence of clashes of interests not only between 
managers and shareholders, but also between shareholders themselves. Section 2 explores the 
definition of fiduciary duties in the selected jurisdictions, in particular the duties of loyalty 
and care, and the different ways they are materialized. This section also dwells on the concept 
of business judgment rule (BJR) and links it to the piercing of the ownership veil, and the 
process of decision-making in the company. Additionally, it suggests the application of the 
BJR to civil law countries, considering that this is a mechanism rooted in US law. The idea is 
that whenever the advantages of the business judgment are hindered by the actual exercise of 
control and its manipulation, courts should be able to pierce the ownership veil, and read 
beyond the contractual terms. Finally, this section typifies the situations in which the 
                                                             
681
 See Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, ‘Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 102, N.º 8, 1989, pp. 1820-1860 (1821) (stating that 
‘Although state corporation statutes take an ‘enabling’ approach to many issues, both state and federal law 
governing corporations always have included a significant body of mandatory rules’). Additionally, see Black, 
Bernard S., ‘Is Corporate Law Trivila?: A Political and Economic Analysis’, Northwestern University Law 
Review, vol. 84, 2, 1990, pp 542-597 (544) (claiming that ‘… state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent 
companies-managers and investors together from establishing any set of governance rules they want. After a 
century of erosion through competition for corporate charters, what is left of state corporate law is an empty shell 
that has form but no content’). This idea was followed by Romano, Roberta, ‘Answering the Wrong Question: 
The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 89, 1989, pp. 1599-1617. Also 
see Atiyah, P. S., and Summers, R. S., Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study in 
Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions, New York, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987 (providing an 
overall analysis of the differences between UK and US laws). 
682 This affirmation is backed up by the analysis in Part I, chapter 3 of the sample of articles and memoranda of 
association collected for this dissertation. The design of their clauses is telling. Furthermore, this idea seems to 
be shared by Naomi Lamoreaux, whose research interests include the study of contractual freedom in Europe and 
the United States in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Her research, however, is mostly based on 
quantitative methodology.  
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ownership veil could be pierced. Section 3 concludes by pointing in the direction of a general 
theory of fiduciary duties in Europe that does not neglect hybrid property rights. 
 
1. Hybrid property rights and piercing of the ownership veil 
 
An article of the Wall Street Journal dated as of 1917 (a time when there were no LLCs 
in the United States yet) noted that  
 
Theoretically, and even in practice, if directors direct and stockholders exercise their voting 
privilege, the limited liability corporation is almost an ideal democracy. It is clear that if the 
stockholder does not receive fair play from the management, he has largely himself to thank. He 
is protected, if in no other way, by the courts and the channels of publicity.683  
 
American corporate law has come a long way since 1917. It is filled with cases in which 
directors play on both sides of the deal as a result of the effective control they have over the 
company.684 Therefore, today, in light of recent developments in corporate law not only in the 
United States, but also in Europe, the above-noted statement may sound somehow 
unwarranted. The case of the United Kingdom treated in Part I suggests strong control of 
directors over the company even though Bureau van Dijk Database (BvD) indicators show a 
high dependence level of companies on their shareholders.685 This is in line with the approach 
taken by that database. When referring to the category of employees, managers and directors 
it could have considered them as part of a collectively designated category, unable to jointly 
exert a power of control (like the category ‘public’ in the publicly held companies). 
Alternatively, it could have considered them as syndicated and jointly exerting their voting 
power. The BvD database follows the second alternative. Most importantly, this means that 
these three categories can be viewed as the ‘ultimate owners’ of a given company.686 In a 
                                                             
683 See ‘A Difficult Problem’, Wall Street Journal (1889-1922) [New York, N.Y] 29 Oct 1917: 1. 
684 Laster, J. Travis, ‘Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means’, Fordham Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law, vol. 19, 1, 2013, pp. 5-55. 
685 The basic information contained in this database is processed and analyzed in order to, among other things, 
qualify companies pursuant to their degree of independence with regard to their shareholders; list the 
shareholders of a given company with their percentage of ownership; indicate, if any, the ‘Global Ultimate 
Owner’ and the ‘Domestic Ultimate Owner’ of a given company; and provide the evolution of the ownership of 
the shareholders in a company. I use this database because it is more concerned with tracking control 
relationships than with patrimonial relationships. 
686 Other categories of shareholders are disregarded for the purpose of establishing the BvD Independence 
Indicator. These categories are: (i) the ‘public’ that is used for ‘public quoted companies’; (ii) ‘unnamed private 
shareholders’, aggregated (more than one unnamed individual or family labeled such as ‘Private Shareholders’; 
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similar fashion, when I refer to control, I mean control over the decision-making process of 
the company.687  
In many instances, the case law in Part I showcases the influence and control that 
managers wield in the PLLC. They decide whether or not to register the transfer, whether to 
consent to it or not, and the terms in which the process to calculate the fair value of the share 
must be undertaken. In most cases, it is up to them to determine the fair value of the share or 
hire an accountant to do so within a certain period.688 Indeed, often directors engage into 
dilatory schemes that hurt the intentions of the transferor to dispose of her shares. In this 
scenario, shareholders’ property rights are weak. They are not in control, but directors are.689 
Thus, I deal with the relationship between shareholders’ influence, which translates into the 
degree to which the company is dependent on them, and managerial control. The level of 
independence of the company vis-à-vis shareholders’ influence is indicated by the number of 
shareholders in a company and, most importantly, by the type of ownership they have. The 
ownership structure in LLC is naturally concentrated in few(er) members. Here, however, its 
analysis has as a backdrop the structure of the board of directors or management board, since 
they as well as employees are liable to be the ‘ultimate owners’ of the company. The case of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
‘Individual Investors’, ‘Other Individuals’, etc); (iii) other ‘unnamed shareholders’, aggregated (more than one 
unnamed shareholder containing a mixture of companies or of companies and individuals and families). 
687 See Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., 
New York, 1967, pp. 66-116 and 207-218. Also see Stigler, George J., and Friedland, Claire, ‘The Literature of 
Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 26, 2 (Corporations and Private 
Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution), 1983, pp. 237-268 (following Berle and Means 
who defined control of a corporation as the power to select a majority of the board of directors, suggest a test of 
de facto control. Their explanation runs as follows: ‘if the membership of the board of directors changes 
substantially, normal retirement aside, but the senior officer remains in office, again normal retirement aside, 
then the management is in control. With the reverse pattern, the stock ownership is in control.’ They stress that 
this test, which they have not made, is most likely applicable in times of serious crisis). 
688 This happens mostly in the United Kingdom, but I have registered this in respect to the PLLCs of other 
selected jurisdictions such as France regarding the gerants. It depends on the applicable clauses of the articles of 
association. It is important to note that in PortugaL, France, Italy and Spain there are several issues that are 
decided by shareholders in the general meeting of the company. By default, the articles of association may 
provide otherwise. In US LLC agreements, there are clauses that foresee that some management decisions are 
taken by the majority members. Some LLC agreements also foresee that managers shall not take actions such as 
sell, finance, convey, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of or refinance all or a substantial portion of the assets 
of the company; enter into any merger or consolidation of the company with or into any other business entity; 
change the name of the company, or the location of its principal office; admit a new member; incur any leases 
conveyance, mortgage or other indebtedness not included in the company’s budget, etc.  
689 See Gay Jenson Farms Co. v Cargill, Inc. 309 N .W 2d 285 (Minn 1981). (This is a case of application of the 
law of agency. It raises very important questions as to who exercises de facto control over the company. 
Furthermore, the court discusses if a creditor who assumes control of its debtor’s business becomes liable as a 
principal for the acts of the debtor in connection with the business. This case brings to mind other questions: For 
instance, can creditors become the owners of the business without the accompanying legal indicia? This is 
relevant for the purpose of this dissertation because the inference in the company’s business of banks and firms 
who provided loans to it may explain why restrictions on transfers and restrictions on changes of ownership 
structure are imposed. Also see Martin v Peyton 246 N.Y. 213; 158 N.E. 77; 1927 N.Y. LEXIS 863; and Minute 
Maid Corp v United Foods, Inc. 291 F.2d 577; 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4364. 
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the United Kingdom, as I refer to it above, is interesting because I realized that, although the 
sampled companies are highly dependent upon their shareholders (which could indicate strong 
shareholder influence, especially in private companies), in practice, control is exercised by 
directors. This is different from what formally happens in Portugal, Italy, Spain, and France 
where shareholders in the PLLC still have a considerable influence in the company.690 In the 
case of the United States, due to the business object of the companies in the sample, some of 
which are equity funds, directors are granted a great deal of control. Maybe ownership rights 
are stronger in the United Kingdom and the United States than in the other jurisdictions, and 
shareholders feel at ease to delegate managerial tasks. Or perhaps ownership is less 
concentrated in UK and US companies, which would naturally result in a lower level of 
shareholder influence and which would then determine that the effective control of the 
company was in the hands of directors. I explore this keeping in mind, as follows from 
Chapters 1 and 2, that members have statutory control rights which derive from their 
ownership of property rights in shares. In most situations, members delegate their control to 
managers. However, as Ribstein puts it when referring to the indirect effects of restrictions on 
the company’s ownership structure 
 
…restricted transferability effectively limits the passivity of even the most remote owners. As 
long as transferability is restricted either legally by share transfer restrictions or practically by 
the lack of an efficient market for the firm’s shares, the members cannot respond to problems in 
the firm simply by selling their shares. Accordingly, the members have incentives to gather 
information and to take an active role in management. This reduces the need for mandatory 
disclosure rules that ensure centralized disclosure by the firm. 691  
 
Ribstein’s words are in line with Alchian’s overall understanding that wealth 
concentration determines greater bargaining power and control. 692 It is surprising, 
                                                             
690 This hints that private companies in the United Kingdom have a different purpose than private companies in 
the other selected countries of Continental Europe. 
691 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Form and Substance in the Definition of a “Security”: The Case of Limited Liability 
Companies’, Washington and Lee Law Review, vol. 51, 3, 1994, pp. 807-841 (830) (claiming that ‘Applying a 
clear rule is desirable because establishing clear property rights allows people to make contracts based on the 
known rule’). Also see Holderness, Clifford G., ‘Legal Foundation for Exchange’, The Journal of Legal Studies, 
vol. 14, No.º 2, 1985, pp. 321-344 (326) (dwelling on how certain assignments of rights provide a foundation for 
exchange while others frustrate it. In his opinion ‘The larger is the closed class assigned rights, the greater will 
transaction costs of arranging an exchange be because a prospective buyer must negotiate with each individual 
who has been assigned rights’). 
692 See Alchian, Armen, ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’, Il Politico, 30, 1965, pp. 816-829. Also Alchian, 
Armen, and Harold Demsetz, ‘The Property Rights Paradigm’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 33, no. 1, 
1973, pp. 16–27; and Siegan, Bernard H., Economic Liberties and the Constitution, 2nd ed., New Brunswick, 
USA, Transaction Publishers, 2006. 
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nevertheless, how this may not be true of the PLLC. Data suggest that restrictions tend not to 
empower shareholders in several circumstances. They tend to empower directors. In other 
words, freedom of contract tends to enhance the directors’ control over the company. 
Therefore, inherent to the idea of piercing the ownership veil is the understanding that 
property rights in shares are hybrid and tamed.693 This means that not only their structure is 
adapted to the purpose of the PLLC, but also that their definition may be indefinite, given the 
combination of corporate, contract and civil law elements. Piercing the veil over property 
rights serves to sharpen their definition, and sets the foundation for efficient bargaining. 
 
i. Why is the Berle-Means corporation not true of the PLLC? 
 
Berle and Means introduced in 1932 their idea of separation of ownership and control. 
This notion remains the paradigm of US corporations today.694 (Their findings are now 
considered almost intuitive. But this shows how pathbreaking ideas are often simple). There 
are, however, circumstances which are not favorable to the development of a Berle-Means 
corporation, that is, there are situations in which control of the company is used to choke 
minority members or those who can only exert weak property rights. The circumstances 
include (i) the opportunistic conduct of shareholders and managers; (ii) high transaction costs 
to transfer a share in a PLLC; (iii) and the inexistence of a market for the shares. It is true that 
members can strive to create a private market by including mechanisms such as buy-sell 
agreements to that end in the articles of association,695 but this does not fundamentally change 
the lack of liquidity of these companies’ shares. Other circumstances are the weak 
enforcement of law, which renders cumbersome the task of creating sophisticated legal 
systems. Pre-emption rights, rights of first refusal and clauses establishing the terms in which 
the value of the share should be calculated are meant to protect minority shareholders from 
oppression when they want to call themselves. If rules are not enforceable, their purpose is 
empty. Additionally, managerial self-dealing, agency problems, asymmetries of information, 
                                                             
693
 Refer to Chapters 1 and 2 above. 
694 See Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C, The Modern Corporation and Private Property; and Fama, 
Eugene F., and Jensen, Michael C., ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 
26, 2, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, 1983, pp. 301-325 
(323) (defining separation of ownership and control as ‘…the separation of residual risk bearing from decision 
management..’. They say this equates with the notion of separation of ownership and control that has long 
bothered students of ‘open corporations’). 
695 See Sund, Lars-Göran, and Bjuggren, Per – Olof, ‘Protection of Ownership in Family Firms: Post-Sale 
Purchase Clauses and Management Perspective’, European Journal of Law Economics, vol. 33, 2, 2012, pp. 
359-370. 
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and lack of mandatory rules for disclosure are all likely to challenge the paradigm of 
separation of ownership and control. This paradigm is definitely challenged in the PLLC.696  
Another element to take into consideration is the correlation between ownership 
concentration and control. In this context, it is also important to differentiate member-
managed companies, in which all shareholders are managers, from manager-managed 
companies, in which only designated members or non-members or a combination of the two 
are managers. There were some Portuguese companies as of the beginning of the twentieth 
century that, despite being private, had a large number of shareholders (over twenty). The 
management controlled the transfer of shares and any changes in the structure of ownership of 
the company. These companies were more similar to joint stock companies than to 
partnerships. In most companies, however, ownership was concentrated in fewer shareholders 
and it was up to the company and its shareholders in the company’s general meeting to decide 
about giving the consent or not to transfer of shares and consequent alterations in the 
ownership structure. 
In the United Kingdom, in respect to the companies in the sample for which data are 
available, ownership is concentrated in a small number of shareholders. Directors, however, 
decide if and how the ownership structure can be altered. The management of the company is 
centralized and composed of directors who are individuals and generally do not hold any kind 
of membership interests in the company. This is outstanding, since PLLCs are normally 
associated with control exerted by shareholders over the company, namely by taking part of 
its management. UK companies also have a notable dimension. They are distinctive in the 
number of employees and level of internationalization. They easily surpass Portuguese, 
Italian, Spanish, French and most of the US companies in the samples. UK private companies 
are very large businesses and benefit from all the flexibility provided by the law that was 
historically granted to small private companies.  
On average, ownership in the Italian companies of the sample is concentrated on two 
shareholders, who also can be managers. It is often the case that there is a sole director, who 
may or may not be a member of the company. In several fifty-fifty companies, members 
outsource the management to an outsider. Some articles of association foresee a collegio 
sindicale which main purpose is to supervise and control the administration (consiglio di 
amministrazione). In some situations it is up to the sole director, who is also a shareholder 
(normally the majority shareholder), to convene the general meetings. The company, in these 
                                                             
696 One can fairly ask: when is there even a separation of roles in the PLLC? Often the managers and 
shareholders are the same people.  
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circumstances, is more likely to be in the hands of this shareholder-director. Additionally, 
there are cases in which sole directors are appointed for a long period of time. Their mandate 
can go up to a decade, more than a decade or even indefinitely.  
Spanish companies in my sample are frequently manager-managed, but managers may 
or may not be members of the company. The company is not only managed by the managers, 
but also by the shareholders gathered at the company’s general meeting. Often, the 
management is composed of a sole manager who, with few exceptions, also is the majority 
shareholder. Shareholders, however, are entitled to terminate directors’ mandates through 
resolutions taken at the general meeting. Directors are paid an amount of money from the 
profits of the company. They also receive additional benefits. So, presumably they are 
interested parties in the profitability of the company. Some clauses provide that managers 
must not develop the same business as the company. There are several cases where articles 
have been altered to extend the mandate of the managers for an unlimited period of time. This 
is recurrent in the sample, especially when the management turns out to be composed of a sole 
manager. The sole manager may be in charge of distributing dividends. Some management 
boards also include the figure of the CEO (consejero delegado) to whom managers delegate 
some of their tasks. In a company whose members were spouses it was possible to learn that 
the articles of association were changed to include the wives in the management board. There 
was one case in which the manager was simultaneously the president of the general meetings. 
Still, in these situations, shareholders are liable to hold power in the company. For example, 
by exercising their voting rights or including clauses in the company’s articles forbidding any 
agreements from being entered into without the consent of the general meeting.  
In France, SARLs may be member-managed or alternatively manager-managed. 
Management is undertaken by one or more individuals, who may or may not be shareholders. 
Generally, managers (gérants) are appointed by shareholders in the articles of association or 
by collective decision at the general meeting of shareholders. Their mandate may be for a 
limited or unlimited period of time. Frequently, the manager is the majority shareholder. In 
the internal relations with shareholders, managers must act in compliance with duties of care, 
diligence and, sometimes, are expected to devote their entire time to the companies’ affairs. 
The payment of a salary, in these situations, is not always certain. Shareholders decide on 
whether or not to pay a salary. These duties can be expressly foreseen in the company’s 
articles. In the external relations with third parties, managers enjoy full powers to represent 
and act on behalf of the company, without the need to justify special powers. Their mandate 
can be revoked by the shareholders through a collective decision at the general meeting. In the 
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internal relations with shareholders, managers may undertake all management actions in the 
interest of the company. The line separating internal and external relations of the managers is 
very thin, especially when managers also are shareholders. 
The operating agreements of the American LLC often provide definitions of 'member'. 
A member may be defined as any person holding units and who has been admitted to the 
company as a member with the approval of the manager and the management. It may also be 
provided that, except as otherwise expressly established in the agreement, ‘…no member 
acting alone shall have any authority to act for, undertake or assume any obligations or 
responsibility on behalf of any other member of the company’. In general, the business, affairs 
and management of the company is vested in the board of directors (board of managers, board 
of representatives, etc.), but it can also be the responsibility of a managing member. In some 
circumstances, the board may delegate its authority to the officers or to others to act on behalf 
of the company. Except as set forth in the respective agreement, it may be provided that 
managers serving on the board have the sole and exclusive power to do any and all acts 
necessary or convenient to or for the furtherance of the purposes of the agreement. 
Additionally, some clauses clothe members with the power to appoint one or more individuals 
to act on their behalf at the meetings of the board of managers. In these circumstances, the 
constitution of quorum in the board of managers heavily depends on its composition. In some 
agreements, it is possible to learn how the managing tasks are shared between members and 
managers. In these circumstances, there exist cases in which members retain all authority and 
control over the assets of the company but delegate certain authority to the board of managers 
or, eventually to a board of trustees. Notwithstanding any other provision of the relevant 
agreement, the members (in particular if it is a sole member) may retain the power to 
unilaterally take any and all actions required to, among other things, effectuate the 
capitalization, merger, acquisition, consolidation, liquidation, or dissolution of the company 
or any amendment, change, modification, and admit new members to the company on such 
terms as may be established by the members. When this happens, it is common practice to 
amend any schedules to the LLC agreement to reflect the name, address and capital 
contributions (if any) of the additional member and changes in membership percentage of the 
members in connection with the admission of the additional member. The terms in which 
equity funds should work are, additionally, related to the figure of the sponsor or financial 
sponsor (which can be a corporation or a partnership), its relationship with members and the 
negotiations between them as to the management and operation of the company and 
determination of its policies. From an economic perspective, this provides members with 
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managing and control powers over the return of their investment. In some cases, managing 
and operating powers are vested exclusively in the sponsor, who may act in its absolute 
discretion, unless otherwise expressly provided in the agreement. Strategically, sponsors are 
more concerned about developing the business and preparing it for a sale or initial public 
offering (IPO). The fact that some of these LLCs work as exit vehicles explains the 
corporation features most of them display in the sample. The screening of these LLC 
agreements suggests concentrated ownership,697 monitoring by members alongside strong 
management.698  
Most of the companies in the samples for each selected jurisdiction have concentrated 
ownership, show no diversification of membership and a low level of separation of ownership 
and control (it is certainly lower than in publicly held companies), except in the cases of the 
United Kingdom and the United States where privately held companies are as nearly as likely 
as publicly held companies to have a similar governance structure; that is, they are likely to be 
manager- or director-managed. This is why the Berle-Means corporation model is unlikely to 
be true of the average PLLC. 
 
ii. The implications of the Berle-Means corporation not being true of the PLLC 
 
Most PLLCs in the samples are manager-managed, but there also are cases in which 
companies are member-managed. Reportedly, there are clashes of interests in both cases. In a 
scenario of un-consented transfer of shares, there are clashes of interests between majority 
and minority shareholders and between shareholders and management, in particular when the 
transferor must seek the consent of the managing board / board of directors.699  
In most cases, the relevant clauses of the articles of association allow members to be 
managers, and, in fact, they are. When that is so, members prefer to assign the managing tasks 
                                                             
697 This is intuitive. Since the shares in these companies are not typically publicly traded there could not be 
anything but concentrated ownership. 
698 See Sheen, Albert, ‘Do Public and Private Firms Behave Differently? An Examination of Investment in the 
Chemical Industry’, Job Market Paper, January 9th, 2009, pp. 1-35 (18) (claiming that private equity-run firms 
tend to invest more efficiently than public companies. He argues that ‘Because of Private Equity’s explicit focus 
on aligning incentives, private firms that are the product of leveraged buyouts may thus be different from private 
firms which have simply never gone public’). 
699 That I do not discuss whether there is more of a clash between majority and minority shareholders, or 
between shareholders and management has to do with the fact that in most cases shareholders are also managers. 
The case law collected does not show a trend. Perhaps, this trend can be more easily seen in the UK companies 
where directors have a very strong role. See, for example, Re Inverdeck Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 242, [1998] BCC 
256. The interesting point in this case is that, despite the dispute revolving around the refusal of registration, the 
court pointed out the need for the director, who was also a member, to clarify his roles in the conflict. 
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to one or more activist members, who generally are the majority shareholders. Additionally, 
even when the company is managed by all members, there are situations in which minority 
shareholders are not able to come out and take their share of control over the company. This 
phenomenon is not new. It has been thoroughly explored by the literature on separation of 
ownership and control (in the context of the Berle-Means corporation), agency costs and 
fiduciary duties.700 The intriguing aspect of this is that normally these situations are associated 
with dispersed ownership in large public corporations. However, the prevalence of the 
relational element, the lack of a market for the shares (which dissipates the fears of IPOs and 
does not push the managers to run the extra mile for the company, for the members, or for any 
other residual claimant),701 and the lower levels of separation of ownership and control make 
the internal governance of LLCs appear elective.  
For example, the fact that members in American LLCs are allowed to waive fiduciary 
duties toward each other, which they do by including the respective clause in the LLC 
agreement, strengthens the individualist aspects of the LLC, which do not favor weaker 
members. However, manager-managed companies are susceptible to agency problems 
                                                             
700 See Scott, Kenneth E., ‘ Agency Costs and Corporate Governance’, in Newman, Peter (ed.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, New York, Palgrave, 2002, pp. 26 – 30 (providing a general 
approach to agency costs, corporate governance and fiduciary duties in the United States, Japan and Germany). 
Additionally, see Grundmann, Stefan, European Company Law: Organization, Finance and Capital Markets, 2nd 
ed., Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2012, pp. 49-52 (referring to the need to restrict freedom of 
contract when there are collective action problems in public limited liability companies). See Hansmann, Henry, 
‘Corporation and Contract’, American Law and Economics Review, 8, N.º1, pp. 1-19; and Gilson, Ronald J. et 
al., ‘Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the 
European Union’, Stanford Law Review, vol. 63, N.º 3, pp. 475-538. 
701 See Fama, Eugene F., ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, 
No. 2, 1980, pp. 288-307 (explaining how the managerial labor market influences rental rates for managers’ 
human capital depending on their performance in the firm). Not entirely coincident with my arguments in the 
text, see Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs’, Stanford Law 
Review, vol. 38, N.º 2, 1986, pp. 271-301 (275-277) (saying that ‘Illiquidity is not the problem’ However, they 
explain four ways in which the absence of a market for the shares can damage shareholders in a closely held 
corporation). Additionally, see Bainbridge, Stephen M., ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’, 
Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 57, 2004, pp. 83-130 (122) (opining that ‘Corporate directors operate within a 
pervasive web of accountability mechanisms. A very important set of constraints are provided by competition in 
a number of markets. The capital and product markets, the internal and external employment markets, and the 
market for corporate control all constrain shirking by directors and managers’). Also interesting is to compare 
how incentives provided to managers of PLLCs differ from the incentives provided to directors or members of 
the executive boards of publicly held companies. The bottom line is that the market can provide incentives to 
managers to exert their duties efficiently. See Lambert, Richard A., and Larcker, David F., ‘Golden Parachutes, 
Executive Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 7, 1985, pp. 
179-203 (providing a theoretical and empirical analysis of the association among golden parachutes, managerial 
decision-making, and shareholder wealth. Their results suggest that the adoption of GPs is associated with a 
statically significant and positive securities-market reaction. Overall, they submit that GPs have a positive effect 
on the actions of top executives). For a more critical view, see Bebchuk, Lucian A., ‘For whom Golden 
Parachutes Shine’, URL: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/for-whom-golden-parachutes-shine/ (accessed 
on 21 May 2013). This article is based upon Bebchuk, Lucian A.; et al., ‘Golden ParaChutes and the Wealth of 
Shareholders’, Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 25, 2014, pp. 140-154. In his article for the New York Times, 
Bebchuk claims that GPs weaken the disciplinary force exerted by the market for corporate control.  
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especially if managers hold no membership interests.702 Further, if the company is manager-
managed, the position of the manager may become encrusted due to her long mandate.703 
Here we see not only agency-related problems but also those related to abusive behavior on 
the part of the management, which ultimately leads to the expropriation of the members’ 
membership interests. Moreover, samples of case law in the selected jurisdictions disclosed 
shareholders’ opportunistic behavior; bargaining failures; difficulties in combining action 
among shareholders, and among shareholders and other non-shareholder constituencies such 
as creditors; shareholders holding-up others; and, finally, situations of deadlock for which 
articles of association do not provide efficient responses. These problems are accentuated by 
majority rules, the power of controlling or activist shareholders, and the benefit of hindsight 
of the knowledgeable manager acting in an opportunistic way. Such bargaining failures create 
disincentives for members to engage in the management of the company.704 Members expect 
managers do their job without much supervision. Thus, they grant the managers autonomy, 
but in the process become dependent on them to the point that unclear property rights in 
shares are not sufficient to overcome dilatory maneuvers undertaken in the shadow of 
restrictions on transfers.705  
It is often said that the separation of ownership and control leads to agency problems 
between members and managers in publicly held corporations.706 Agency problems, however, 
also are likely to happen in PLLCs, where the separation between ownership and control is 
                                                             
702 See Allen, William T. et al., Commentaries and Cases on The Law of Business Organizations, 2nd ed., 2007, 
pp. 83-109 (100-101), where they observe regarding the publicly held company that unlike officers, directors are 
not ordinarily subject to the will of the majority of shareholders and thus are not ‘agents’ of the shareholders, 
strictly speaking.   
703 For example, I reported cases in Part I in which directors of UK companies have been in their position for 
over twenty years. Articles of association of Spanish companies were frequently changed to allow mandates of 
managers for an indefinite period of time.  
704 This is rather surprising, in as much as it is a common understanding in the literature that in PLLCs, or 
broadly speaking closely held corporations, members are usually part of the management. Those who own shares 
or units in these business organizations have part of their wealth linked to the business and, therefore, 
considering that these are not liquid investments, participating in the management of the company should 
constitute an incentive for the members to protect their investments. See Cheffins, Brian R., Company Law: 
Theory, Structure, and Operation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 63 (stating that ‘Those who own equity in a 
closely held company typically have a substantial portion of their wealth invested in the firm and thus do not 
benefit greatly from diversification. Also… an ownership stake in a closely held company is ordinarily not a 
liquid investment. Consequently, participating in corporate decision-making will often be the only way for a 
shareholder to protect his interests’). 
705
 See Bruner, Christopher M., ‘The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law’, Alabama Law Review, vol. 59, 
pp. 1385 – 1449 (1410) (referring to shareholders’ moral disengagement in public corporations. However, this is 
not exclusive to this sort of corporation). 
706 See Fama, Eugene F., and Jensen, Michael C., ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, cit., p. 313. 
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frequently indistinct. Commentators have not always understood it this way.707 The fact of the 
matter is that agency problems, albeit of a different type, do crop up in the PLLC. Instead of 
agency problems between managers and dispersed shareholders, the PLLC experiences 
agency problems between the members in control of the firm and those that are not. And there 
are shareholder-creditor agency problems. These agency problems are not evident to the 
regulator (e.g., the Securities Exchange Commission, the London Stock Exchange or any 
other agencies).708709 This is so because these business organizations are not subject to the 
demands of a global market for securities, nor are they or their members bound to mandatory 
disclosure rules or whistleblower practices. Furthermore, PLLCs as well as closely held 
corporations are mostly financed by debt and retained earnings. External equity financing 
plays a small role in these companies. Therefore, without self-motivated investors minding 
the business of the company, the effective constraints on managers are small. In those 
situations where shareholders are in a weak(er) bargaining position, for example minority 
shareholders, or where the complexity of the contractual relations is such that creditors of one 
shareholder are led to think she will be in a position to capitalize on her assets when, in fact, 
she is not, due to agency problems, bargaining failures, and hold-ups in the company, there 
should be a mechanism to pierce the ownership veil in favor of those shareholders. Likewise, 
the piercing mechanism should be used in situations in which shareholders sell their shares 
without respecting requirements of consent stricto sensu established in the articles of 
association such as those of obtaining the consent of the company or of the board of 
managers. The previous chapter showed that the effects of the un-consented transfer of shares 
                                                             
707 See Fama, Eugene F., and Jensen, Michael C., ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, cit., p. 322 (saying that 
the combination of decision management and control in few agents in closely held corporations, small 
partnerships, and proprietorships avoids agency problems between ‘residual claimants’ and decision makers).  
708 See Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R. ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs’ (noting that even 
though closely held corporations avoid agency costs of the same dimension of publicly held corporations by 
rolling managers and investors into one, the fact is that this does not impede opportunism and deadlocks from 
happening. These authors adopt an objective approach to contract (for them the company is a nexus of contracts). 
Therefore, problems as those just mentioned must find an answer in the contractual framework of the company 
to which lawyers greatly contribute by providing mechanisms to overcome the costs of closely held 
corporations). 
709 It comes to mind an anecdotal report it was given to me by a manager of a closely held corporation while I 
was developing my research in New York City. This corporation has its registered office in the suburbs of New 
York City. It was composed of three members. Some of its shares were transferred to a third party without the 
consent of the company neither of the non-transferring shareholders. The third party was the brother of the 
transferor, who was also the manager. The transferee was un-documented and originally from the Dominican 
Republic. Notwithstanding this was an un-consented transfer, the transferee was tacitly accepted into the 
corporation. As time went by, conflicts between the majority shareholder and the transferee surfaced. The 
transferee threatened to take the majority shareholder to court for breach of his duty of loyalty due to problems 
related with the distribution of dividends, and the interference with employees’ strategy in the corporation. In his 
turn the majority shareholder accused the transferee of keeping information away from the management. At the 
end of it, they agreed the company would pay the transferee $100,000 for him to withdraw.   
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are not always clear. To circumvent the invalidity of the share sale and purchase agreement, 
the transferor may associate the transferee to her shares so that the latter receives economic 
rights. Parties to the share sale and purchase agreement may also agree that the transferor be a 
trustee of the transferee. In these circumstances, where clarification as to the ownership of 
shares is required, the ownership veil should be pierced. Respecting requirements of consent 
stricto sensu is crucial, especially if the transferor has pending corporate contributions to 
make, tax and environmental obligations to meet, or enjoys corporate benefits she was given 
as a result of her ownership of membership interests. 
This means two things: it should be possible to clarify if and how the management 
board controls the company to the point that decisions taken by it directly or indirectly affect 
the shareholder’s ability to exercise her property rights in the shares;710 and it should be 
possible for courts to pierce the veil, and in this way interfere with the arrangements in respect 
to which there is a perception of unequal bargaining power advanced by one of the parties to 
the dispute.  
Piercing the ownership veil, by directly interfering in a consensual agreement, runs 
counter to the objective approach that in particular common-law judges tend to adopt towards 
contracts. They are often said to consider that parties are able to look after themselves and, 
thus, interpret contracts narrowly. Often, the result in respect to un-consented transfer of 
shares is the enforcement of the prohibition against the transferee or the minority shareholder 
who is viewed as the cause of a deadlock in the company. In the other selected jurisdictions 
there are other instruments that judges can use, such as the general duty to act in good faith,711 
                                                             
710 In order to create a link to the publicly held company, see Dodd, E. Merrick, Jr., ‘For whom are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 45, 7, pp. 1145-1163 (1146 and 1153), 1931-1932 (who by 
presenting arguments close to a ‘centric shareholder approach’ to the governance of corporations, says that ‘The 
directors and other agents are fiduciaries carrying on the business in the sole interest of the stockholders. These 
latter have indeed lost much of their de jure and, if the enterprise is large one, perhaps nearly all of their de facto 
control so that  they may appear to be more like cestuis que trust than like partners. Nevertheless, they are not 
strictly cestuis que trust, for it is the association of which they are members and not an individual acting as a 
trustee for them that comes into contract relations with customers and creditors’. But most importantly in his 
contribution he refers to ‘absentee owners’. He means investors who take no part in carrying their business 
enterprises. As he puts it, in many cases these absentee owners ‘…have not even seen the property from which 
they derive their profits…’. Also see The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers of Justice Brandeis, Fraenkel, 
Osmond K. (ed.) as projected by Lewis, Clarence M., New York, The Viking Press, 1935, p. 75 (referring to 
‘absentee owners’ who are detached from the corporation and do not do much to improve wages and other 
conditions existing in the corporation in which they are financially interested. It is also noted that owners are 
responsible for the enterprise, and should behave accordingly. There is no such thing as ‘innocent stockholders’. 
This understanding derives from the idea, presented in the book, that the large corporation enables so-called 
‘industrial absolutism’. This is not the case in small businesses and the PLLC where, in principle, labor, for 
instance, shares the responsibility for the business. This is, it is argued, in line with American aspirations for 
democracy, which should be not only political, but also industrial).  
711 The duty to act in good faith is not as developed in the jurisdictions of common-law (United States and the 
United Kingdom) as it is in countries with a civil-law system. For instance, in the United Kingdom there is an 
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the principle of unjust enrichment (which also exists in common-law countries), and the 
principle of the abuse of law (abus de droit), to judge situations of alleged inequality of 
bargaining power or in which one of the parties takes dilatory or abusive actions against the 
other. An interesting consequence of piercing ownership is that judges would be in a position 
to evaluate the un-consented transfer and understand, for example, whether the transferor is 
acting like a trustee for the transferee while exercising property rights in shares towards the 
company. In other words, judges should be able to plumb the contract insofar there is 
evidence that the transferee is benefiting not only from the exercise of economic rights, but 
also from the exercise of management rights in the company, when this runs counter to the 
law and/or the articles of the company. Furthermore, judges should be able to probe the un-
consented transfer to determine that extent to which managers were indirectly hindering the 
exercise of property rights in shares and, if necessary and under certain circumstances, order 
them to consent. Elapsed time limits on establishing restrictions in the articles of association 
is an example. By piercing the veil in such circumstances, it would be possible to determine if 
control over the company, in respect to its decision-making process, is in the hands of the 
management board when, according to the articles of the company, it should be in the hands 
of the members, or that such control is being abusively held. It is true that these issues may 
fall within the rubric of business policy for which courts may not be sufficiently 
knowledgable. However, the piercing is also designed to penetrate situations in which 
managers' acts are abusive, fraudulent or destructive of shareholders’ rights. 
 
2. Fiduciary duties in PLLCs, the business judgment rule, and piercing the 
ownership veil 
 
i. Fiduciary duties 
 
Let us imagine shareholder A, who, wishing to sell her share, obtained the relevant 
consent stricto sensu as required by the company’s articles. However, the board of directors 
subsequently decides to change the articles of association to impose restrictions on transfers. 
Consequently, the share sale and purchase agreement (SSPA) is challenged by the 
management board which, on behalf of the company, does not authorize or approve the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
understanding that the commercial features in which contract law lies make it generally fit for commercial 
transactions. The idea that parties should take care of each other and not exploit one another never gained much 
ground there, as it did in civil law.  
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execution of the SSPA. Other non-transferring shareholders do not support it either. In her 
turn, shareholder A challenges this decision in a suit by asking the court to order the 
transfer.712 Let us now suppose that the transferor still challenges the decision of the 
management board, but this time to recover damages from the directors as a result of their 
decision not to authorize the transfer. Shareholder A accuses the board of not complying with 
its fiduciary duties toward shareholders. Additionally, she accuses other (majority) 
shareholders of not complying with the fiduciary duties with which they are bound toward 
minority shareholders. The first riddle is: have directors adequately performed their duties? 
The second riddle is: is this an issue of business judgment? The third riddle is: are 
shareholders bound to fiduciary duties toward each other, in particular when contracts are 
incomplete and the law does not establish procedural mechanisms to evaluate the merits of 
directors/managers and shareholders’ decisions? This scenario evokes the discussion on the 
relevance of fiduciary duties in corporate law. It also brings to the fore the debate over the 
business judgment rule (BJR).  
Relationships between shareholders and directors or managers configure a fiduciary 
relationship.713 In corporate law the economic analysis of agency costs and the doctrine of 
incomplete contracts have created the ground for discussion of fiduciary duties owed by 
managers and directors to shareholders.714 Fiduciary law imposes on fiduciaries, in this case 
directors and managers, fiduciary duties which are traditionally divided into two major 
categories: the duty of loyalty and duty of care. Then there is the duty of good faith, which 
                                                             
712 See, for example, W & A. M’Arthur Limited v The Gulf Line Ltd 1909 1 S.L.T. 279. In this case, there was a 
transfer of shares of a member to a third party. The company through a resolution of the board of directors, 
decided to alter the companies articles to prevent the registration of the transfer of shares. The court held this 
unacceptable because, among other things, the petitioner obtained a transfer of shares in the respondent 
company, and in due course and in due form presented that transfer for registration.  
713 See Frankel, Tamar, ‘Fiduciary Duties’ in Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law, vol. 2, Hampshire; New York, Palgrave, pp. 127-128 (describing the features of fiduciary 
relationships). 
714 See Easterbrook, Frank E.; and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Fiduciary Principle, the Business Judgment Rule, and 
the Derivative Suit’, in idem, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts; and 
London, England, 1991, pp. 90-108 (92) (explaining that fiduciary duties are needed to overcome the high costs 
of direct monitoring of managers by shareholders. Monitoring is needed because contracts are naturally 
incomplete. The corporation being a contract, pursuant to their ‘nexus of contract’ approach is also incomplete. 
Hence, as they put it ‘…the fiduciary principle is a rule for completing incomplete bargains in a contractual 
structure…’). Also see Butler, Henry N., and Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to 
the Anti-Contractarians’, Washington Law Review, vol. 65, 1990, pp. 1-72 (28) (viewing fiduciary duties as part 
of a contractual theory of the corporation. As a consequence, shareholders should feel free to alter these duties 
and remedies by agreement. In their words ‘The role of fiduciary duties must be understood in the context of 
contracting problems in long-term contracts’) It seems to me that at least Larry Ribstein has acknowleged, in 
some recent writings, the importance of well-defined property rights for the theory of the firm such that his 
contractual view of the firm turn out to be mitigated. Additionally, see Fama, Eugene F., ‘Agency Problems and 
the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, No. 2, 1980, pp. 208-307; and Clark, Robert C., 
‘Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties’, Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Pratt, John W., and 
Zeckhauser, Richard J. (eds.), Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School Press, 1985, pp. 55-79. 
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Delaware courts recently said is an aspect of the duty of loyalty (at least with respect to 
corporations).715 Notwithstanding the views of some corporate law commentators who treat 
fiduciary law as part of contract law pretty much based upon an economic analysis of 
corporate law, which views consensual agreements such as the company’s articles of 
association as purely contractual,716 American courts have put out a solid amount of case law 
on fiduciary duties as part of a separate field of law.717 This situation is to a certain extent 
similar in the United Kingdom. Differently, in European civil law countries, particularly 
Portugal, France, Italy and Spain, contract law is overall designed to encompass fiduciary 
relationships. In these jurisdictions, fiduciary law is not an autonomous field. With some 
exceptions such as the mandate, the contract for the benefit of a third party, la fiducie in 
France, and long-term contracts such as employment contracts or distribution contracts, which 
are liable to trigger fiduciary duties, the concept of beneficial ownership in the Anglo-
American systems is not accepted in the same terms in the selected European jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, courts in civil law systems are more likely to interfere with the consensual 
agreement and interpret the relevant contractual duties as opposed to the contractual objective 
approach adopted by courts in common-law systems, especially the United Kingdom and the 
United States.718  
In the United Kingdom there is a general notion that directors do not directly owe duties 
to shareholders.719 This rule bends whenever there is ‘a special factual relationship between 
the directors and the shareholders in the particular case’.720 This is certainly the case when 
                                                             
715 This principle is consecrated in the civil codes of Portugal Spain, Italy and France. Traditionally, it has not 
gained much ground in United Kingdom law, but it is possible to find recent court decisions that make reference 
to this principle. In the United States, Delaware courts have long recognized good faith as one of the director’s 
fiduciary duties toward shareholders. See Griffith, Sean J., ‘Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of 
Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence’, Duke Law Journal, vol. 55, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-73. 
716 See Easterbrook, Frank E.; and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Fiduciary Principle, the Business Judgment Rule, and 
the Derivative Suit’, cit., pp. 90-108; and Butler, Henry N., and Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary 
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians’, cit., pp. 1-72.  
717 See, for example, Fisk v Segal, Civil Action No. 3017 – CC, 2008 Del. Ch. Lexis 158 (Del, 7 May 2008); 
Lerner v. Westreich, 603184-2005, 12 Misc. 3d 1164(A); 819 N.Y.S.2d 210; 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS; and 
Tzolis v. Wolff, No. 5, 2008 NY Slip Op 1260; 10 N.Y.3d 100; 884 N.E.2d 1005; 855 N.Y.S.2d 6; 2008 N.Y. 
LEXIS 226; 48 A.L.R.6th 551. 
718 See Piscitelloo, Paolo, ‘La Responsabilità degli Amministratori di Società di Capitali tra Discrezionalità del 
Giudice e Business Judgment Rule’, Rivista delle Società, vol. 57, 6, 2012, pp. 1167-1183 (calling attention to 
the discretionary powers of Italian courts and saying that Italian jurisprudence is venturing new paths which 
allow a fair compensation for damages, but without an automatic overturn of the debts of the company on the 
managers).  
719 Section 170 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that ‘The general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are 
owed by a director of a company to the company’. 
720 See Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 372 where the court held that ‘Fiduciary duties owed by directors 
to shareholders only arise if there is a special factual relationship between the directors and the shareholders in 
the particular case capable of generating fiduciary obligations, such as a duty of disclosure of material facts, or 
an obligation to use confidential information and valuable commercial opportunities for the benefit of 
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there is an agency relationship between directors and members. But it can also be true beyond 
these cases wherein agency law determines directors’ fiduciary duties toward shareholders. It 
has been understood that a fiduciary duty of disclosure arises when there is blatant asymmetry 
of information between directors and shareholders, and shareholders have entrusted directors 
to inform them and give them the necessary advice.721 This, as pointed out by Paul Davies, 
particularly favors small family companies, given their nature and the relationships between 
corporate constituencies therein, in particular between managers and shareholders. Statutorily 
speaking, UK law provides a list of general duties of directors that form ‘a code of conduct, 
which sets out how directors are expected to behave’.722 These duties cover those situations in 
which ‘a director may put his own or other interests ahead of those of the company’ and those 
situations in which ‘he may be negligent’.723 The general duties listed in Articles 170 to 177 
(Chapter 2, Part 10 of the Act) are based upon equitable and common-law rules. They can be 
divided into the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence, which is formulated 
pursuant to the objective standard of the reasonable director,724 and all other duties with a 
fiduciary nature such as the duties to act within powers, to promote the success of the 
company, to exercise independent judgment, to avoid conflicts of interest, not to accept 
benefits from third parties, and to declare interest in proposed transaction or arrangement. UK 
law follows the paradigm of shareholder primacy. Even if directors have the duty to take into 
consideration first and foremost the interests of the company, authors like Paul Davies, who 
was a member of the Company Law Review Steering Group that led to the Companies Act 
2006, equate the interests of the company with the interests of shareholders. So, ult imately, 
directors are the guardians of shareholders' interests. They should only take account of other 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
shareholders and not to prefer and promote the directors own interest at the expense of shareholders’. This is also 
referred to by Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, cit., pp. 480-482. Also 
interesting is Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd.; Salomon & Co. Ltd. v Salomon [1895-1899] All ER Rep 33; 
[1895-99] All ER Rep 33 (where in the words of Lord Herschell ‘In a popular sense a company may in every 
case be said to carry on business for and on behalf of its shareholders, but this certainly does not in point of law 
constitute the relation of principal and agent between them or render the shareholders liable to indemnify the 
company against the debts which it incurs’).  
721 See Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225, NZCA. Also see Davies, Paul L. (referring to and explaining 
this case). 
722 See Companies Act 2006 (c.46), Explanatory Notes, p. 45. 
723 See Companies Act 2006 (c. 46), Explanatory Notes, p. 45.  
724 See Section 174 of the Companies Act 2006. 
‘(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.  
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with – 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out 
the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has’. 
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stakeholders’ interests if doing so would be in the interest of the company and its 
shareholders.725  
Portuguese law adopted as a standard the 'diligence of a careful manager', to assess the 
work done by managers of PLLCs (sociedades por quotas) and directors of publicly held 
companies (sociedades anónimas).726 This standard may be approached objectively or 
abstractly by reference to the bonus pater familias, or to more demanding criteria. Mainly, 
this rule is likely to determine the civil liability of managers.727 Following the common-law 
structure, the legislators made the general distinction between duties of care and duties of 
loyalty. Additionally, the law yields a communitarian view of the firm. It foresees that 
managers and directors must comply with their duty of loyalty and take into account not only 
the long-term interests of shareholders, but also of other stakeholders (e.g., employees, clients 
and creditors).  
French corporate law is suffused with the notion of social interest (intérêt social). This, 
as in Portuguese corporate law, allows managers to consider corporate constituencies other 
than shareholders when setting up the company strategy.728729 Managers (gérants) are elected 
by shareholders in the articles of association or through a resolution of the general meeting.730 
Formally, they are supposed to be under shareholders’ general control. There is a general 
understanding that managers should represent shareholders’ interests, even if they first and 
foremost legally owe their obligations to the company.731 They are like fiduciaries, in the 
                                                             
725 See Dorresteijn, Adriaan et. al., European Corporate Law, European Company Law Series, vol. 5, 2nd ed., 
The Netherlands, Wolters Kluwer, 2009, pp. 195-201 (explaining the general management structure of UK 
private and public companies). 
726 See Article 64 of the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code (fundamental duties). This Article was altered 
by the Decree-Law 76-A/2006, 29 March. It was one of many rules altered in the Portuguese Commercial 
Companies Code to adapt it to the challenges of corporate governance discussed at the time, and harmonize it 
with other Continental and non-Continental rules of corporate law. 
727 This rule was basically copied from German law (§93/I AktG). See Cordeiro, António Menezes, Manual de 
Direito das Sociedades: Das Sociedades em Geral, vol. I, 2.ª ed., Coimbra, Almedina, 2007, pp. 805-811 
(discussing whether this is a rule of conduct or a standard of guilt). Despite the fact that it was taken from 
German law, German law clearly does not talk about a pater familiae as the Portuguese law does. If anything, it 
sometimes refers to the ‘good merchant’. 
 
728 I am not considering in respect to this particular point whether French law influenced Portuguese law or the 
other way around.  
729 See Fanto, James A., ‘The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance’, Cornell International 
Law Journal, vol. 31, 1, 1998, pp. 31-91 (47) (saying that ‘The concept of the intérêt social, which permeates the 
French corporate code, permits directors to consider the interests of all constituencies in deciding upon corporate 
strategy’).  
730 See Articles L 223-18 and L 223-29. 
731 According to L 223-18 and L 221 – 4 of the Code de Commerce ‘…les pouvoirs des gérants sont déterminés 
pour les status, et dans le silence de ceux-ci, par l’article L 221-4’ (‘… the powers of the managers are 
determined by the articles of association and, in silence thereof, by Article L 221-4’). Additionally, see Article L 
223-25 stating that the mandate of managers may be revoked by shareholders, but there should be a just cause 
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strict sense of the word, that are bound by the duties that bind a bon père de famille.732 This 
intellectual framework of French corporate law is close to UK corporate law. French 
corporate law allows for the construction of a duty of care and loyalty to which it submits 
managers’ actions in the running of the company, and by which it tries to avoid conflicts of 
interest and self-dealing.733 It also provides for the duty of managers to act in good faith.734 
These duties boil down to the prohibition imposed on managers to contract any form of loans 
with the company, to be granted an overdraft in a current account or otherwise, or to 
guarantee or endorse third parties’ commitments. Managers are responsible, individually or 
jointly, as appropriate, vis-à-vis the company or vis-à-vis third parties, for violations of the 
laws or regulations applicable to the société à responsabilité limitée, or for negligence in their 
management. In addition to the action for damages for personal injury, the shareholders may, 
either individually or as a group under the conditions laid down by decree of the Council of 
State, bring an action for damages against social managers (action en responsabilité). The 
plaintiffs are entitled to pursue compensation for the entire loss suffered by the company to 
which, if any, damages are awarded.735 
The management of the Italian società a responsabilità limitata is entrusted to one or 
more shareholders elected by other shareholders in the articles of association or in the 
shareholders’ general meeting. If the management is composed of more than one element, the 
law foresees the constitution of a management board. According to the law, shareholders are 
expected to hold a clear control over the managers / management board. Managers are liable 
toward the company, but ultimately they must act in the interests of shareholders. The Italian 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(juste motif) for the revocation under penalty that managers be entitled to receive a compensation for damages to 
which interests are accrued.  
732 Managers have broad powers to represent and bind the company. See Article L 223-18 stating that ‘Dans les 
rapports avec les tiers, le gérant est investi des pouvoirs les plus étendus pour agir en toute circonstance au nom 
de la société, sous réserve des pouvoirs que la loi attribue expressément aux associés. La société est engagée 
même par les actes du gérant qui ne relèvent pas de l'objet social, à moins qu'elle ne prouve que le tiers savait 
que l'acte dépassait cet objet ou qu'il ne pouvait l'ignorer compte tenu des circonstances, étant exclu que la seule 
publication des statuts suffise à constituer cette preuve’. (‘In dealing with third parties, the manager is vested 
with the broadest powers to act in all circumstances on behalf of the company, subject to the powers expressly 
granted by law to the shareholders. The company is bound by the acts of the manager, even if they do not fall 
within the corporate purpose, unless it can prove that the third party knew that the act was ultra vires or that, 
given the circumstances, it could not ignore it, not being the publication of the articles of association sufficient 
evidence for that purpose’.)  
Additionally, see Loi n.º 2007-211 of 19 February 2007 adopting la fiducie in the French Legal System and 
Article L 233-10 1.º and 5.º. 
733 As for the duty of loyalty see the decision of the Cour de Cassation on 27 February 1996, No 94-11241 
(where the court held that within the process of reclassification of shares in which the director of the company 
was an intermediary, the director breached his duty of loyalty towards the member of the company who wanted 
to transfer his shares). 
734 See L 241 -3 of the Code de Commerce. I am deriving a duty of good faith from the sanctioning of the abuse 
of the company’s assets (abus de biens sociaux).  
735 See Article L 233-22. 
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legal system also requires managers to comply with the fiduciary duty of loyalty (which the 
Italian Civil Code treats under the provision on conflict of interests)736 and duty of care.737 
Any shareholder may bring a law suit against managers (azione di responsabilità) if there are 
serious irregularities in the management of the company. Italian law also establishes a general 
clause of responsibility for the direction and coordination of the company. It basically states 
that the companies or entities that, by exercising the management or coordination of the 
company, act in their own interest or in the interest of others in breach of the principle of 
correct corporate and business management of the company, are directly accountable to the 
shareholders of those companies for the damage caused to the profitability and value of the 
shares, as well as to the creditors for the injury inflicted to the integrity of the company’s 
assets.738 
The management structure of the Spanish sociedad de responsabilidad limitada is 
reflective of the principle of private autonomy that strongly pervades its legal framework and 
of the closed nature of these business organizations.739 The relevant legal regime shows how 
formally shareholders are in control of the company. Managers are elected by shareholders in 
the general meeting. Shareholders may also resolve to ask managers for guarantees that assure 
their competence and quality of their management. The law provides shareholders with the 
option of discretionarily adopting different forms of management. Managers, in principle, 
exercise their mandate for an indefinite period of time, but they can be removed from office if 
shareholders resolve accordingly in the general meeting. As to their duties, Spanish law sets 
forth for managers a duty of diligent management and a duty of loyalty.740 Additionally, it 
determines the prohibition to use the name of the company or to use the title of manager to 
undertake operations in their interests or in the interests of persons connected to them (e.g., 
spouses, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, and the spouses of ascendants and 
descendants); it prohibits taking advantage of business opportunities regarding the company’s 
assets and of which they have only known as a result of their mandate as managers; it 
regulates conflicts of interests, and it establishes a prohibition of competition that prevents 
managers from developing the same or similar business object as the company. Finally, the 
law imposes a duty of confidentially to which managers are bound even after their office has 
                                                             
736 See Article 2495 – ter. of the Italian Civil Code (regulating conflicts of interests). 
737 See Bordigaa, Francesco, ‘Partecipazione degli Investitori Istituzionali alla s.p.a e Doveri Fiduciarii’, Riv. 
Soc. 2013, 01, 202. 
738 See Article 2497, first pargraph of the Italian Civil Code.  
739 See Dorresteijn, Adriaan et al., European Corporate Law, European Company Law Series, vol. 5, 2nd ed., The 
Netherlands, 2009, pp. 183 – 184 (exploring the management structure of the Spanish SL).  
740 See Articles 225 and 226 of the Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2010, July 2nd, approving the consolidated text of 
the Ley de Sociedades de Capital. 
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come to an end.741 Managers are liable vis-a-vis the company, its shareholders and creditors. 
Any shareholder may bring an action on behalf of the company against managers if the latter 
breach their duties according to the law and the articles of association (acción social de 
responsabilidad). Both the resolution to bring this action and its withdrawal are subject to the 
vote of shareholders and to the majorities established in the law and the articles of 
association.742   
 
ii. The Business Judgment Rule 
 
Fiduciary duties are the reason the BJR exists.743 The BJR works as the obverse of 
fiduciary duties to protect directors or managers against personal liability while in office. The 
BJR is an old common-law principle of corporate governance that was created in late 
nineteenth and early twenty-first century. The American Law Institute defined the BJR in the 
following terms. 
 
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfils the duty under this 
section if the director or officer (1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment; (2) 
is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent to which the 
director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (3) 
rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.744 
                                                             
741 See Articles 227 to 232 of the Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2010.  
742 See Article 238 of the Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2010. 
743 See Berle, Adolf A., and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, cit., p. 296 
(claiming that ‘The management of an enterprise is, by nature, a task which courts can not assume; and the 
various devices by which management and control have absorbed a portion of the profit-stream have been so 
intimately related to the business conduct of an enterprise, that the courts seem to have felt not only reluctant to 
interfere, but positively afraid to do so’). Also see Clark, Robert Charles, in idem, ‘The Duty of Care Versus the 
Business Judgement Rule’, Corporate Law, Aspen Publishers, 1986, pp. 123-140 (123) (saying that ‘Nowhere is 
the tension between the policies of giving managers ample discretion and trying to keep them accountable as 
obvious as in the cases invoking the duty of care, the business judgment rule, or both’); Cox, James D., and 
Hazen, Thomas Lee, Business Organizations Law, 3rd. ed., West, 2011, pp. 198-201; and Gevurtz, Franklin A., 
Corporation Law, 2nd ed., West, 2010, pp. 286-311. 
744 See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 403, 
196, 1994. In the literature, see, for example, Clark, Robert Charles, in idem, ‘The Duty of Care Versus the 
Business Judgement Rule’, cit, pp. 123-124 (defining business judgement as ‘… just a corollary of the usual 
statutory provision that it is the directors who shall manage the corporation. The rule is simply that the business 
judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will 
not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business judgment – even for judgments that appear 
to have been clear mistakes – unless certain exceptions apply. Put another way, the rule is ‘a presumption that in 
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company’. Also see Bainbridge, Stephen M., 
‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’, Vand. L. Rev., 57, 2004, pp. 83-130 (89), note 35 
(quoting Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Also see Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davie’s 
Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, p. 493 (saying that ‘…the 
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This principle has traditionally been construed by US jurisprudence and doctrine as 
appropriate for handling situations in which conflicts between directors or managers and 
shareholders demand careful review because the cases are not clear-cut.745 The typical 
rationales for the BJR are the following. Courts should be competent to decide. Courts should 
not substitute the decisions taken by experienced business executives whose knowledge 
makes them more equipped to decide on business matters for the courts’ inexperienced 
judgments. Moreover, courts should adopt a standard of judicial review that enables them to 
avoid the impact of hindsight bias on their judgments regarding the risks taken by directors in 
respect to the company’s business.746 It is in this context that I link the BJR with the piercing 
of the ownership veil by courts, and the process of decision-making in the company. The link 
lies in the idea that when directors are not able to make an adequate business judgement, 
courts should be able to interfere with the consensual agreement from which directors’ duties 
derive.747 The presumption of the BJR can (leaving aside bad faith and knowing violations of 
the law) be rebutted by proving that directors did not act on an informed basis (in which case 
there is a violation of the duty of care) or that directors have a self-interest in the transaction 
(in which case there is a breach of the duty of loyalty). Piercing should take place when it is 
shown that directors acted in a self-interested way in blocking the transfer of shares. One 
could object by saying that this would apply in almost all cases. Nevertheless, the burden of 
proof to show that the ‘blocking’ decision did not breach the duties of care and loyalty would 
rest entirely on the directors (who can also be majority shareholders), as it happens in self-
dealing cases in the United States when the plaintiff has succeeded in rebutting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
“business judgment rule generally operates to relieve the directors of liability in such cases. The business 
judgment rule involves the specification of a set of procedural steps, which, if followed, will give the directors 
the benefit of a presumption that they were not negligent’). 
745 See Blair, Margaret M., and Stout, Lynn A., ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’,  Virginia Law 
Review, vol. 85, No. 2, 1999, pp 247-328 (260) (criticizing the principal-agent model by saying that ‘…the 
principal-agent model assumes that it is clear who the principal is, and who the agent is in the particular 
relationship or transaction under study. Yet many of the most important relationships inside corporations may be 
more ambiguous, in the sense that both parties may be contributing productive inputs and neither may have 
authority over the other. In fact … this fundamental ambiguity underlies the basic structure of corporate law and 
provides the foundation for a more useful theory of public corporations’. I would say the same applies to the 
PLLC in particular due to its contractual nature. I suggest the pierce of the ownership veil is this theory applied 
to the PLLC in order to overcome the ambiguity of the relationships between corporate constituencies in 
particular managers and shareholders). 
746 See Rachlinski, Jeffrey, J., ‘A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hinsight’, University of Chicago 
Law Review, 65, 1998, pp. 571 – 625 (suggesting that the business judgment rule is an example of a situation in 
which courts do not apply a liability rule when a particular course of action could have been in hindsight 
considered negligent). 
747 This contractual setting is composed of the articles of association, but may also include other contracts of 
which the articles of association are part of as an exhibit, for instance. 
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presumption of the BJR. Being a principle which is rooted in US corporate law, the 
application of the BJR to civil-law countries may be difficult, but it is not impossible.748  
The business judgment rule has been understood and designed in legal doctrine in 
different ways, in particular in respect to publicly held corporations. For example, Stephen 
Bainbridge generally points out the role of the board of directors. Most US corporate law 
scholars do not go this way. For him, though, the BJR is meant to establish a compromise 
between two competing values: authority and accountability.749 These values, as Bainbridge 
explains, correspond to the need to guarantee that the board of directors holds a discretionary 
power over the decisions it takes and the need to hold the board accountable for these 
decisions. He advocates for a ‘directors’ supremacy theory’. This paradigm is meant to 
answer two essential questions of corporate governance: Which constituency’s interests will 
prevail when the ultimate decision maker is presented with a zero sum game?; and, in which 
organ of the corporation is the ultimate power of decision vested?750 US corporate law 
scholars who plead for the shareholder primacy model in public corporations argue that 
directors must exert their corporate decision-making power to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth.751 They also yield that shareholders hold the residual power in the corporation despite 
the separation of ownership and control.752 This is, in fact, a view followed by the Italian 
legislator in respect to the Italian counterpart – società per azioni753 - as well as by the 
Portuguese legislator with the sociedade anónima754, by the French legislator with the société 
                                                             
748 In Germany, it was largely adopted by the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in the II ZR 175/95 
‘ARAG/Garmenbeck’ case. It was also established in Section 93 of the Aktiengesetz (AktG).   
749 See Bainbridge, Stephen M., ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’, cit, pp. 83-130.  
750 See Bainbridge, Stephen M., ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’, cit., p. 85. 
751 See Deakin, Simon, ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and 
Sustainability in the Business Enterprise’, Queen’s Law Journal, vol. 37, pp. 339-381 (criticizing the model of 
shareholder primacy because in his opinion it is at odds with the real structure of business enterprise. On the 
contrary, Deakin supports a multi-stakeholder model which encompasses the interests of all corporate 
constituencies). Additionally, see Klein, Peter G. et al., ‘Who is in charge?: A Property Rights Perspective on 
Stakeholder Governance’, Strategic Organization, vol. 10, 3, 2012, pp. 304-315 (indirectly stating that 
maximizing shareholder wealth is not equivalent to maximizing the economic value of the corporation. They 
refer to property rights as possible avenues to run the shareholders-stakeholders debate. The authors, 
additionally, make the interesting claim that property rights economics is mostly absent from the governance 
debate). 
752 Unlike some European countries, in the United States shareholders of publicly held companies cannot give 
orders to the board of directors. See §141(a) of the Delaware Geral Corporation Law (DGCL). 
753 Article 2364 of the Italian Civil Code lists a number of competences that exclusively belong to the general 
meeting of shareholders such as resolve on those issues brought to it by the directors of the corporation or by the 
collegio sindicale. This rule is also applicable to the società a responsabilità limitata. 
754 Article 376 (1), c of the Commercial Companies Code provides that the general meeting of shareholders 
makes the general evaluation of the management board and supervision board of the corporation and resolve 
about the dismissal or manifest its distrust regarding administrators. This rule is subsidiary applicable to the 
Portuguese form of PLLC – the sociedade por quotas.  
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anonyme,755 and the Spanish legislator with the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada.756 In all 
these jurisdictions shareholders are provided with tools that enable them to formally have 
their hands on the work directors are doing through the resolutions taken at the general 
meetings, in particular to approve the accounts of the corporation, or through the exercise of 
rights to obtain information directly from the board of directors. This is not only true of the 
publicly company in these countries, but also of the PLLC in the selected jurisdictions of 
Continental Europe. It is not the same in the United States. The picture is also different in the 
United Kingdom. In the case of the United States, the empirical work I have developed so far 
hints at a tendency for directors’ powers to be contractually enhanced compared to the power 
of shareholders. This happens in the United States in respect to the LLC because there is 
enormous flexibility of the governance mechanisms. In the United Kingdom this occurs in 
respect to the private company as the law does not foresee general meetings of shareholders, 
and thus gives quite a lot of leeway to directors.757 Legally, however, shareholders are granted 
a substantial control over the company. Shareholders’ control is translated into their power to 
decide who sits on the board, and to resolve on issues such as increase and reduction of 
capital, mergers and acquisitions, divisions, dissolutions, among others. Furthermore, 
provisions requiring the approval of members for certain transactions can be found in the 
Companies Act 2006.758 As the analysis of data provided by the BvD database suggests, 
despite the strong dependence of United Kingdom private companies on their members, 
members seem not to be as involved in the affairs of the companies as their legal status allows 
                                                             
755 For example, Article 225 – 108 establishes that ‘Le conseil d'administration ou le directoire, selon le cas, doit 
adresser ou mettre à la disposition des actionnaires les documents nécessaires pour permettre à ceux-ci de se 
prononcer en connaissance de cause et de porter un jugement informé sur la gestion et la marche des affaires de 
la société’. (‘The board of directors or management, as the case may be, must send or make available to the 
shareholders the necessary documents to enable them to make decisions based on a knowledge of the facts and 
arrive at an informed judgment on the management and progress of the company and its business’) (Translated 
by Louis Vogel, Professor at the University of Paris II, at URL:  
file:///C:/Users/Lecia%20Vicente/Downloads/Code_32.pdf, last accessed on 27 April 2014). 
756 For instance, Article 516 of the Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2010, July 2nd foresees that ‘En las sociedades 
anónimas cotizadas el consejo de administración, con informe a la junta general, aprobará un reglamento de 
normas de régimen interno y funcionamento del proprio consejo, de acuerdo con la ley y los estatutos, que 
contendrá las medidas concretas tendentes a garantizar la mejor administración de la sociedad’. (‘In listed 
companies, the board of directors approves, upon report to the general meeting, a regulation of internal rules and 
operation of the board itself, according to the law and the statutes which contain the specific measures aimed at 
ensuring the best management of the company’). 
757 However, the articles of association of the private company Clipper Windpower Ltd included in my sample of 
UK companies foresee general meetings. Still, it is not a meeting exclusive to shareholders, for directors can also 
participate irrespective of not being shareholders. 
758 See Chapter 4 of the Companies Act 2006 regulating transactions with directors requiring approval of 
members. 
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them to be.759 This role seems to be increasingly played by directors, and freedom of contract 
has been used to increase directors’ powers of control.  
In US corporate law literature, Bainbridge is one of the few voices saying that 
‘…shareholder primacy is neither normatively persuasive nor descriptively accurate.’760 He 
puts forward a director primacy model as an alternative to the shareholder primacy model, and 
endorses the ‘nexus of contracts’ doctrine as he submits that ‘the director primacy model 
describes the corporation as a vehicle by which the board of directors hires various factors of 
production’. In this sense, the board is not an agent of the shareholders but it rather is a 
corporate principal serving as a nexus of contracts making up the corporation.761 He 
understands that director primacy is able to identify the tension between authority and 
accountability, which for him is the central problem of corporate law. He suggests that this 
impasse is solved by the BJR. Nevertheless, he yields a very particular conception of it. He 
perceives the BJR not as a standard of liability, but rather as a doctrine of abstention by which 
courts excuse reviewing decisions of the board unless strict preconditions for review are 
met.762 The problem seems to be the identification of appropriate intervention situations for 
courts.763 Regardless, Bainbridge's view is that the courts should not even ask whether or not 
the board breached its duty of care.764 This is, for him, the whole point of the BJR. By 
                                                             
759 See Cheffins, Brian R., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, Oxford, Claredon Press, 1997, pp. 
61 -62 (apropos control over corporations he explains that ‘Almost invariably, the power to manage the company 
is delegated to the board of directors. Nevertheless, the members will in most circumstances retain the authority 
to select who sits on the board. Consequently, in legal terms, shareholders have substantial control over 
corporate affairs. Still, an observation which has often been made about shareholders is that the extent of their 
actual involvement does not correspond with the important legal role which they have’). 
760 Bainbridge, Stephen M., cit., p. 86. 
761 Bainbridge, Stephen M., cit., p. 86. 
762 See Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case’, The Business Lawyer, vol. 
40, 4, 1985, pp. 1437-1455 (1454) (stressing that giving shareholders as well as their attorneys more leeway to 
sue directors for damages and, thus, to interrupt transactions is not in the best interests of shareholders. In his 
words ‘One of the major problems in the principal agent relationship between managers and shareholders … is 
… that managers already have incentives to avoid risk because of their inability to diversify the value of their 
human capital. Liability rules that reinforce this incentive will operate to shareholders’ detriment’). 
763 Bainbridge refers to Omnicare, Inc. V NCS Healthcare, Inc, 818 A2d 914, 927 (Del 2003) and, most 
importantly, Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc. 25 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) as emblematic decisions treating the 
business judgment rule as a standard of liability. Following the rationale established in these decisions, some 
courts and scholars have claimed that the BJR enables directors to avoid liability provided they have acted in 
good faith. Others argue that the BJR only affects the degree to which directors would be considered liable (e.g., 
mere negligence, gross negligence or recklessness). Alternatively, the author quotes Shlensky v Wringley 237 
NE 2d 776 (III. App. CT 1968), which applies Delaware law, to back up his understanding of the BJR as a 
standard of abstention. In this case, the principle of good faith does not establish a standard of liability, but rather 
a standard of abstention that prevents courts from reviewing claims of duty of care, unless the plaintiff can prove 
that there was a breach of the principle of good faith. 
764 See Bainbridge, Stephen M., cit., p. 128 (saying that ‘The business judgment rule builds a prophylactic barrier 
by which courts pre-commit to resisting the temptation to review the merits of the board’s decision’. He goes on 
to say that ‘The question is not whether the directors violated some brightline precept, but whether their conduct 
satisfied some standard of judicial abstention’). 
 288 
 
imagining directors who are moved by a public interest and by quoting Plato, this author puts 
forth the idea that directors are a sort of ‘Platonic masters’ or ‘Platonic guardians’ of the 
corporation. Additionally, the directors’ obligation to maximize shareholders’ wealth, his 
argument runs, is an implied contractual obligation in American business law. The key point 
is that corporate constituencies such as shareholders – the human factors of production – have 
no say in the decision-making process of the company. Referring to the publicly held 
company, he says that its chief distinctive feature is the separation of ownership and control. 
In many circumstances, shareholders who are said to be residual claimants according to the 
supporters of the shareholder primacy model have, in fact, no control over the company and 
no decision-making power. Their only choice is to react.  
This is not quite the case for the PLLC, where shareholders are much more involved in 
the day-to-day business of the company and in its decision-making process because they are, 
frequently, shareholders as well as managers. Plus, they are fewer in number than in publicly 
held companies, which on a theoretical basis, at least, reduces the number of problems related 
to collective action. Bainbridge construes the BJR in this setting of separation of ownership 
and control, and stresses that the difficulty of the matter lies in the fact that authority and 
accountability are antithetical: ‘one cannot have more of one without having less of the other’, 
he says.765 His position is that by holding boards accountable, the decision-making authority 
is shifted to shareholders or judges. This claim is understandable, but not totally convincing.  
It is a commonplace that with great(er) authority comes great(er) responsibility. Following 
this reasoning, there should be no problem in delegating to shareholders or other gatekeepers 
such as courts the power to question the merits of the decisions of the board. Board members 
should be ready for it. This is particularly so when it is proven that shareholders delegated a 
great deal of power to directors, and the fate of the company as well as of businesses worth 
millions is on the line. Of course, it all depends on how much shareholders and courts know 
about the business, and how well educated they are in issues of corporate law. It may be true 
that allowing shareholders and courts to interfere with the business judgment of the board will 
prevent directors from taking riskier and more ambitious business decisions. That directors’ 
actions are highly constrained by markets and that these constraints are not imposed on faulty 
judges is indisputable.766 It is a fact, however, that directors’ decisions are affected by 
‘bounded rationality’ and asymmetries of information, and that this alone should be enough to 
turn the task into a spiky one. 
                                                             
765 See Bainbridge, Stephen M., cit., p. 104. 
766 See See Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel Daniel R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, cit, p. 100. 
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The corporation is more than just a ‘nexus of contracts’, and the role of directors is 
typically not limited to the 'hiring factors of production'. Directors also safeguard 
shareholders’ property rights. Attributing this function to directors would enhance the value of 
human capital in the company as a factor of production and work as a refinement of 
Bainbridge’s thesis.767 The company’s contract regulates each corporate constituency’s part in 
the organization of the company and in the decision-making process. If not, because the 
company’s contract is incomplete, normally the respective default rule applies. Whilst 
directors contribute with their expertise to the corporate production (to use the term used by 
Bainbridge), shareholders, whether they are managers or not, still hold the power to review 
directors’ business judgments through their votes in the general meetings. (The problem in the 
PLLC is that they do not always do so: They are passive. This situation provides leeway to 
directors, who are often shareholders, to take advantage of the ambiguity of the corporate 
relations.)768 
Can the BJR also be applied to managers of LLCs and to managers of PLLCs of the 
other selected jurisdictions? In general, I think that it can be applied to managers of LLCs, 
                                                             
767 See Blair, Margaret M., and Stout, Lynn A., ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, Virginia Law 
Review, vol. 85, No. 2, 1999, pp. 247-328 (presenting another vision of the economic function of the board of 
directors. Their mediating hierarchy approach suggests that directors should be under direct control of neither 
shareholders nor other stakeholders. This model, which is an internal governance structure, is intended to surpass 
team production problems such as shirking and rent-seeking. It entails the surrender of important rights by team 
members such as shareholders (including property rights over the teams’ joint output and over team’s inputs 
such as financial capital and firm-specific human capital) to a legal entity created by the act of incorporation. 
The corporate assets would then belong to the corporation itself and not to the shareholders. In the corporation, 
control over those assets is exercised by an internal hierarchy which is supposed to coordinate the activities of 
the team members, allocate the results of production, and mediate disputes among team members over that 
allocation. At the top of the hierarchy is the board of directors, whose authority over the corporate assets is 
absolute and whose independence from individual team members is protected by law. In my view, in this case 
the construction of the BJR disfavors the shareholder primacy view which underscores many other constructions 
of the BJR. Blair and Stout say that their proposed model highlights the important function that the BJR can 
serve. They affirm that the rule can prevent coalition members (in particular, shareholders) from using lawsuits 
as strategic devises to extract rents from the coalition. This is so because the BJR works to ensure that directors 
can only be found liable for breach of the duty of care in situations wherein a finding of liability serves the 
collective interests of all firm members. (see p. 300). Their view of the firm translates into what they call 
‘corporate coalition’ and the BJR is designed accordingly. It is important to note that the mediating hierarchy 
approach makes greater sense when applied to publicly held corporations than to closely held corporations, as 
indeed the authors stress. In their words ‘… in a closely held firm, stock ownership is usually concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of investors who not only select and exercise tight control over the board, but also are 
themselves involved in managing the firm as officers and directors’ – p. 281. This paper, however, converges 
with my own work in the sense that views the role of directors as not exclusively linked to the representation of 
shareholders, but rather to the representation of the interests of the corporate constituencies as a whole). 
768 See Painter, Richard W., and Kirchner, Christian, ‘European Takeover Law: Towards a European Modified 
Business Judgment Rule for Takeover Law, European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 1, 2, 2000, pp. 
353 – 400 (putting forward an internal mechanism of governance that consists of shareholders’ review of 
defensive measures based upon the veto of those measures or directors business judgments in the context of a 
takeover bid. They explain that the principle of neutrality in Europe binds directors and, for that reason, the 
directors do not have the discretionary power that is wielded by their American counterparts under Revlon and 
Unocal).  
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which eliminates judicial review of management decisions. The problem, however, is that the 
LLC has a peculiar contractual setting in which rules of governance are not always easy to 
interpret. Additionally, it is also difficult to control abuses, especially when one of the parties 
does not have strong bargaining power in a context where the relational element is pervasive. 
This calls for a reflection at the contractual level. The standards of loyalty and care in these 
companies may call for a different standard of judicial review.769  
In respect to the LLC, most case law regarding breach of fiduciary duties centers on the 
duty of loyalty. Members of LLCs make every effort to eliminate fiduciary duties, and the 
Delaware LLC Act allows them to eliminate even the duty of loyalty.770 LLC operating 
agreements in my sample illustrate this. Additionally, relevant cases on this matter are Fisk v. 
Segal,771 Lerner v. Westreich,772 and Tzolis v. Wolf.773 These cases raise important questions 
as to the applicability of fiduciary duties in LLCs (which are not creatures of state but rather 
of contract)774 as opposed to the conventional applicability of fiduciary duties in the 
corporation. They also show the dominance of contract under Delaware law. Only the 
principle of good faith seems to limit a posteriori this contractual supremacy. Courts adhere to 
an objective theory of contract and, thus, they decide whose business judgment is more in 
keeping with the plain meaning of the contract. Members, managers and officers may act 
selfishly insofar as the behavior does not jeopardize the reasonable expectations of the other 
party. If according to the contract a certain course of action is expected and is not expressly or 
implicitly limited by the agreement of the parties to the contract, courts tend to be reluctant to 
condemn a particular conduct. Tzolis v. Wolff shows that derivative suits can be filed by LLC 
members against managers who do not comply with their fiduciary duties, in particular the 
                                                             
769 See Miller, Elizabeth S, and Rutledge, Thomas E., ‘The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions: 
The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organizations?’, The Delaware Journal of Corporate 
Law, vol. 30, N.º 2, 2005, pp. 343-388 (discussing the role played by the BJR in the context of unincorporated 
companies. These authors question the feasibility of the BJR in the contractual framework of unincorporated 
companies such as the partnership, the limited partnership and the LLC). 
770 See Del. C. § 18-1101(c) allowing the elimination of all fiduciary duties as part of the LLC Agreement. Only 
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be preserved. Regarding the Delaware 
corporation, only the duty of care can be eliminated. On this topic, also see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Pre-formation 
Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: another NY Problem’, 21 June 2010 at http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/06/21/pre-
formation-fiduciary-duties-in-llcs-another-ny-problem/ (accessed on 21 April 2013). 
771 See Fisk v Segal, Civil Action No. 3017 – CC, 2008 Del. Ch. Lexis 158 (Del, 7 May 2008).  
772 See Lerner v. Westreich, 603184-2005, 12 Misc. 3d 1164(A); 819 N.Y.S.2d 210; 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
1377; 2006 NY Slip Op 51058(U). 
773 See Tzolis v. Wolff, No. 5, 2008 NY Slip Op 1260; 10 N.Y.3d 100; 884 N.E.2d 1005; 855 N.Y.S.2d 6; 2008 
N.Y. LEXIS 226; 48 A.L.R.6th 551.  
774 Still, LLCs must be registered to gain legal personality. 
 291 
 
duty of loyalty, or enroll in self-dealing.775 Derivative suits, however, are not the only remedy. 
Besides, there are impending collective action problems when shareholders resolve to bring 
an action on behalf of the company against a third party as well as high litigation costs to 
handle for a LLC.776  
In respect to the PLLCs of the other selected jurisdictions, I do not see a problem in 
applying the BJR. However, much of its implementation will have to do with the scope of 
fiduciary duties in each jurisdiction. Unlike the United States, where an objective standard for 
the evaluation of the board of directors has long been established and where the BJR is 
supported by a backbone of case law that perceives it as a palliative to avoid directors’ 
liability, in the United Kingdom the BJR did not break through in the same way.777 UK 
courts, like their US counterparts, adhere to an objective theory of contract,778 but they are 
often reluctant to apply the BJR, especially because of the strong power exerted by company 
directors. However, this reluctance of UK courts is offset by the cautiousness they must have 
when interpreting the contractual terms of the articles of association and other side 
agreements as a result of the objective standard set by the law of a reasonable director. 779 
Furthermore, UK courts should be prepared to deal with situations where there is lack of 
clarity as to who should take responsibility for fiduciary duties in the investment chain, 
especially when members are simultaneously managers.  
                                                             
775 See Fanto, James A., ‘The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance’, Cornell International 
Law Journal, vol. 31, 1998, pp. 31-91 (80-85) (providing an excursion into derivative actions in the French legal 
system).  
776 See Romano, Roberta, ‘The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?’, Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization, vol. 7, 1, 1991, pp. 55-87 (assessing shareholder litigation in publicly held corporations. She 
concludes that shareholder litigation is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance). In respect 
to collective action problems in publicly held corporations, see Gilson, Ronald et al., ‘Regulatory Dualism as a 
Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union’, Stanford Law 
Review, vol. 63, 2011, pp. 475 – 538. Finally, see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Litigating in LLCs’, The Business Lawyer, 
vol. 64, 2008-2009, pp. 739-755 (calling attention to the inadequacy of derivative suits as a default remedy for 
LLCs). 
777 See Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, cit., pp. 493-494 (claiming that 
‘The Law Commissions thought such a rule unnecessary in the United Kingdom; and there is certainly a risk 
with the business judgment rule that the courts will come to regard cases where the procedural standards have 
not been met as presumptively negligent. The Commissions thought that one could expect the courts to be alive 
to the probability that they are better at dealing with the conflicts of interest than with the assessment of business 
risks and to the desirability of avoiding the luxury of substituting the courts’ hindsight for the director’s 
foresight’). Also see Languado Giraldo, Carlos Andrés, cit. p. 147 (arguing that the United Kingdom adopts a 
low / implicit model of application of the BJR. He says that ‘Accordingly, a low model of application of the BJR 
is the one embraced by the United Kingdom where, despite the inexistence of a legal structure called ‘the 
business judgment rule’, its elements, and the general understanding of its functioning have been implicitly 
recognized by the courts, providing, at least facially and psychologically, the lowest degree, of certainty to the 
directors’) 
778 This is clear in the judgements included in the sample of case law adjudicated by UK courts. 
779 See Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, cit. pp. 488-490 (explaining 
that historically common law was based on a low standard of care because it was subjectively construed by 
courts). 
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The BJR is foreseen in Portuguese law.780 However legal commentators, mostly 
influenced by the debate on the subject that has taken place in Germany, have framed the rule 
within the scheme of civil liability, and tend to say that it operates first and foremost as an 
exclusion of culpability on the side of the manager or director. This is different from the way 
the BJR is viewed in the United States, its native home. It is seen there as as a rule on how 
courts will evaluate directors’ decisions, rather than as a construction of tort law. 
Courts and legal doctrine in Italy have accepted the BJR, at least regarding the publicly 
held company (società per azioni).781 Italian courts tend not to evaluate the merits of a 
business judgment unless decisions are taken without the care that is required from managers 
by the nature of their job and by their specific skills.782 French and Spanish Courts do not use 
the BJR as a standard rule of review.783 
In all six jurisdictions, shareholders and other stakeholders share an expectation that 
managers and directors will act in an informed and fair manner. Plato’s above-noted advice 
counts for little if managers are unable to provide convincing evidence that they have done 
everything possible to keep themselves, the company and shareholders informed. 
                                                             
780 See Article 72 (2) of the Commercial Companies Code. This provision was also included upon the legislative 
reform of the Decree-Law 76-A/2006, 29 March. The Portuguese legislature sought inspiration not only in the 
American rule, but also in § 93/I of the AktG which was altered by UMAG as of 22 September 2005.  
781 See Montalenti, Paolo, ‘Amministrazione e controllo nella società per azioni: riflessioni sistematiche e 
proposte di riforma?’, Rivista delle Società, vol. 58, 1, 2013, pp. 42-77 (saying that ‘…il merito della qestione, e 
cioè il contenuto delle scelte manageriali è assistito – il punto è pacific anche nel nostro ordinamento – dalla c.d. 
business judgment rule: le operazioni gestorie degli amministratori non sono sindacabili, né dal collegio 
sindacale né dal comitato audit né dai revisori né dal giudice, se non in caso di manifesta irrazionalità 
[underlined by the author]).  
782 See Tribunale di Milano, 10 febbraio 2000, Giu. Comm. 2001, II 326 (where the court held that ‘Nell 
adempimento delle obbligazioni verso la società, l’amministratore deve osservare la diligenza del mandatario, 
che non può prescindere da un connotato di adeguata perizia consistente nella prudenza ed avvedutezza in 
relazione a quelle attività, negoziali e materiali, tipicamente implicate dalla gestione societaria – commerciale’) 
(While fulfilling the obligations toward the company, the director must observe the diligence of the agent, which 
cannot withdraw from a standard of adequate expertise based upon prudence and foresight in relation to that 
contractual and material activity, typically inherent to corporate management’). Also see Article 2392(1) of the 
Italian Civil Code providing that ‘Gli amministratori devono adempiere i doveri ad essi imposti dalla legge e 
dallo statuto con la diligenza richiesta dalla natura dell'incarico e dalle loro specifiche competenze. Essi sono 
solidalmente responsabili verso la società dei danni derivanti dall'inosservanza di tali doveri, a meno che si tratti 
di attribuzioni proprie del comitato esecutivo o di funzioni in concreto attribuite ad uno o più amministratori’. 
(‘The directors must comply with the duties imposed upon them by law and by the articles of association with 
the care required by the nature of the job and their specific skills. They are jointly and severally liable vis-à-vis 
the company for damages deriving from the failure to comply with such duties, unless it is the case that such 
duties are attributions of the executive committee or functions specifically assigned to one or more directors’). 
783 See Joordan, Hendrik F., ‘A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Fiduciary Law: Why Delaware Should Look 
Beyond the United States in Formulating a Standard of Care, The International Lawyer, vol. 31, 1, pp. 133-161 
(claiming that ‘…France’s standard of care, lacking Delaware’s protective business judgment rule, ranks among 
the most exacting standards in Western Europe’). The BJR implies a procedural process that French judges do 
not apply. The same happens in Spain, even though some literature has interpreted judgments as implicitly 
accepting the BJR. For a comparative overview of the BJR, see ‘Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability’, 
prepared for the European Commission DG Markt by: Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Philipp Paech and Edmund 
Philipp Schuster (Department of Law, London School of Economics), pp. 108-118. 
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Nonetheless, the burden of proof regarding the meeting of the elements of the BJR generally 
rests on the plaintiff, and not on the defendant directors. This is in line with general principles 
of civil procedure, which hold that the responsibility for meeting the elements of a claim lies 
with the claimant. If plaintiffs manage to rebut the BJR because managers or directors were 
acting in a self-interested manner in blocking the transfer of shares, a piercing of the 
ownership veil should induce a shift in the burden of proof, and managers or directors would 
have to show a lack of bad faith or miscarriage of duties of care and loyalty regarding the 
protection of the interests of the company, its shareholders and other stakeholders. If they are 
unable to do so, the BJR or courts’ review according to the abstract standard of the bonus 
pater familiae established in Portuguese and French laws, or to objective standards 
established by law and case law in the United Kingdom, Italy and the United States, will not 
hold in their benefit.  
Nevertheless, there is a grey area wherein the nature of relationships between managers 
and shareholders is somewhat murky.784 Often, a single shareholder or a group of 
shareholders hold a controlling block of shares in the company. Not infrequently, these 
shareholders are entitled to choose the members of the board. Managers or directors appointed 
under these conditions are attentive to the business policy of the company and are keen to 
satisfy the interests of those who elected them. In these situations, it is easy for controlling 
shareholders to manipulate the decision-making process in the company.785 Other scenarios 
include when shareholders also function as managers, and when shareholders behave in a 
passive way because they rely on the relational element that binds them to the company and 
other shareholders. Courts should be permitted to pierce the ownership veil and read beyond 
the contractual terms when the manipulation of control has been shown to hinder the 
advantages of business judgment. 
 
iii. Piercing the ownership veil 
 
The notion of piercing the ownership veil yields an increased degree of court 
intervention precisely because law is a byproduct. The piercing would entail scrutiny of the 
'genetic' composition of the law, and an assessment of the need to modify its 'DNA'. Clearly, 
                                                             
784 See Re Inverdeck Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 242, [1998] BCC 256 wherein not only the registration of the transfer 
was refused, but also it was apparent that the director, who was also a member, did not succeed in distinguishing 
his role in the conflict.  
785 One might ask whether managers are obligated to follow shareholders' resolutions instructing them to do 
something, even when these resolutions did not follow a proper procedure. I would say that, in this case, the 
relevant resolutions are invalid. 
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this approach represents a challenge to judicial systems and to courts that would be called 
upon to intervene in situations in which the principle of freedom of contract has traditionally 
kept them at arm’s length. This is how I picture the breaking of path-dependence in the PLLC, 
especially if such path-dependence translates into negative externalities or market 
inefficiencies. In other words, in cases of dispute similar to that with which I opened this 
chapter, courts should be able to examine what market agents are doing empirically, including 
the design of fiduciary duties. Still, breach of fiduciary duties is not the only circumstance in 
which courts should be able to interfere with consensual agreements and practice the above-
mentioned ‘substance over form’ principle. They should be free to pierce the ownership veil 
in the presence of any of the issues listed in the clusters of legal issues in Part I. Legal issues 
in these clusters derive from problems of interpretation, problems concerning the functionality 
of restrictions on transfer of shares, and breach of formalities. Specifically, the veil of 
ownership should be pierced when:  
1. Managers engage in dilatory schemes that damage the ability of shareholders to 
transfer their shares. 
2. Managers indirectly hinder the exercise of property rights in shares. 
3. The decision-making process is abusively held. 
4. Restrictions tend to enhance directors’ control over the company and a clear 
definition of shareholders’ property rights is needed to establish the foundations 
for efficient bargaining.786 
5. Shareholders, despite having the right to take part in the decision-making 
process of the company, become dependent on directors to the point that the 
property rights they hold in their shares are unclear, and they lose the ability to 
overcome dilatory maneuvers undertaken by managers in the shadow of 
restrictions on transfers. 
6. When shareholders who want to transfer their shares are in a weak(er) 
bargaining position in respect to other non-transferring shareholders, managers 
or directors.787 
                                                             
786 This would be necessary especially if the restrictions that were introduced in the company’s contract were not 
intended to enhance directors' or managers’ power in the company. In these situations, the enumeration of 
shareholders’ rights in the law is not enough. 
787 One could fairly ask why the transferor needs to be protected. Did she not voluntarily put herself into the 
bargaining position ex ante by buying the shares under the terms of the company’s articles? Buying shares in a 
PLLC does not mean that shareholders must become prisioners of their own investment, especially if the 
company’s contract does not efficiently accommodate the expectations of the members throughout the life of the 
company.  
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7. When there is a deadlock caused by a minority shareholder which threatens to 
dissolve the company.788 
8. When shareholders are not able to comply with their obligations vis-a-vis third 
parties (e.g., creditors) due to agency problems, bargaining failures, and hold-
ups in the company.789 
9. The transferor sells her share without obtaining consent stricto sensu, and acts as 
a trustee of the transferee so that she can indirectly exercise property rights in 
the shares (e.g., management rights when she only is allowed to exercise 
economic rights pursuant to the law and the articles of association).790 
10. The transferor causes a reduction in the social welfare of the company by 
executing an un-consented transfer.791 
11. The control over the decision-making process is manipulated by managers or 
directors, who act in a self-interested manner in blocking the transfer and, 
therefore, hinder the advantages of the business judgment. 
 
This taxonomy of cases is exemplificative. Depending on the dynamics of the 
company’s contract, there may be other situations in which courts may be called to pierce the 
veil of ownership to understand its structure and how it affects the governance of the company 
or vice-versa. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to determine who actually controls the PLLC. In light of the 
nature of property rights in shares discussed in Chapter 2, I submit that the answer to this 
question ultimately sheds light on how the legislator’s taming process affects the physiology 
                                                             
788 Naturally, restrictions may have been included in the company’s contract because the minority shareholder 
bargained for this power ex-ante, otherwise she would not have invested in the firm. This is certainly a bargain 
courts should honor. I am, however, referring to those situations in which the petitioner who is a minority 
shareholder unreasonably seeks a winding-up order instead of accepting the majority’s view regarding their 
shares. See, for example, Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd and others; Re Abbey Leisure Ltd [1990] BCLC 342, 
[1990] BCC 60. 
789 I am not questioning the principle of limited liability or the idea of ‘asset partioning’. This recalls the 
situations in which members of these companies are prevented from capitalizing on their investment, which can 
jeopardize the legitimate expectations of third parties. 
790 In case of conflict, ‘piercing’ will allow the court to understand who exactly exerts power in the company – 
the transferor or the transferee? 
791 In this case, piercing will also help the court investigate who effectively is controlling the company. 
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and morphology of the governance structure of the PLLC.792 This is another manifestation of 
pleiotropy in law that exemplifies how the contractual setting based upon restrictions on 
transfers is liable to affect the governance of these business organizations. Their governance 
is delimited by a network of interaction among corporate constituencies which are linked by 
the fiduciary duties managers owe to shareholders, and shareholders owe to each other. 
Governance is also delimited by the interaction of corporate constituencies and their 
environments. Courts, as external agents, are part of the ‘institutional environment’ and are 
liable to change the dynamics of governance. This idea enhances the importance of fiduciary 
duties precisely because property rights in shares are tamed like the fox which, unlike its wild 
forebears, lacks some of the characteristics that make it absolute (valid against everyone) and 
generally unrestricted. This analogy hints at the construction of a general theory of corporate 
fiduciary duties for Europe that takes into account hybrid property rights,793 and is capable of 
introducing new formulations that are not merely designed with the old molds of contract and 
tort laws. The leap that courts, as gatekeepers, will have to make in this regard may be 
different in different countries. 
The idea of piercing the ownership veil in the PLLC runs up against the perception of 
courts and adjudication in civil-law systems where judges are expected to interpret the law, 
but not to make law. As my argument for legal policy is a normative one, it could be 
implemented either through the legislature or by the courts with the available doctrinal tools 
(e.g., teleological interpretation). However, I am not dogmatic as to how it would be 
implemented. Courts could be able to do it by themselves by employing specific doctrinal 
arguments based upon an explicit comparative method, for example. The idea of ‘piercing’ 
also challenges the understanding of courts and adjudication in common-law systems where 
courts tend to adopt an objective reading of the contract.  
I am not oblivious to the fact that this understanding may raise questions to which 
problems that more positivist readings of the role of courts call attention. The ‘irrationality’ of 
courts, the threat to the separation of powers because courts take over prerogatives that belong 
to the legislature, the fear of interfering with freedom of contract, and the fear of judicial 
supremacy are some salient examples. However, from a normative perspective there is no fear 
of risk if we think of PLLC law as a byproduct of private ordering manifestations or an 
extended phenotype. This would require that courts observe market agents empirically before 
adjudicating and engaging in ownership piercing. 
                                                             
792 For a reference to the taming process I refer to in the text, see Part II, Chapter 1. 
793 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PROTECTING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE PLLC: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE RULES OF PROPERTY, LIABILITY AND 
INALIENABILITY 
 
 
‘How fleeting are the wishes and efforts of man! How short his 
time! And consequently how poor will be his results, compared 
with those accumulated by Nature …! Can we wonder, then, that 
Nature’s productions should be far “truer” in character than man’s 
productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted to the 
most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp 
of far higher workmanship?’ 
 
Darwin, Charles, The Origin of Species by means of Natural 
Selection, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1996, p. 41. 
 
 
‘…sound work in law can and must build on and borrow the direct 
operational approach so well tested in the Services, or in 
engineering’. 
 
Llewellyn, K. N., ‘The Modern Approach to Counseling and 
Advocacy – Especially in Commercial Transactions’, Columbia 
Law Review, vol. 46, N.º 2, 1946, pp. 167-195. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Starting from the premise that fiduciary duties alone are not sufficient to overcome 
bargaining problems in the PLLC and to protect hybrid property rights in shares,794 this 
chapter investigates whether or not there are alternatives in corporate law to well- delineated 
property rules. One could ask: why would we expect fiduciary duties to accomplish this? The 
legal imposition of fiduciary duties has been seen as a remedy drawn upon equity, which can 
                                                             
794 See Whincop, Michael J., ‘Painting the Corporate the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in 
Corporate Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 19, 1999, pp. 19-50, p. 33 (saying that fiduciary duties 
confer a range of entitlements on the shareholder, which, he argues, have the object not of deterring fiduciary 
duties as such, but of structuring bargaining to encourage trades who are likely to be Pareto-superior).  
 298 
 
do no harm, not only due to its legal component, but also due to the ethical relationship 
established on trust that bonds the parties. However, the reality of the matter is that, often, 
fiduciaries’ interests coincide with the interests of those who trust. Moreover, monitoring the 
actions of fiduciaries can be costly, especially when they are supposed to be aligned with the 
two fundamental duties of loyalty and care. Furthermore, the external monitoring of 
fiduciaries is frequently impracticable, or simply impossible. Thus, the purpose of this chapter 
is to determine if liability and inalienability rules can work as good alternatives to property 
rules to solve problems of governance in the PLLC, to surpass bargaining problems and to 
protect entitlements in these business organizations. To this end, I look at property, liability 
and inalienability rules and try to understand which of these types of rules best serve the 
interests of shareholders and other corporate constituencies. It is difficult to measure this 
without having access to disposable values and data that allows the drawing of an exact 
profile of the circumstances in which applying one or the other rule would be preferable. 
Moreover, while evaluating the efficiency of each type of rule, I stress the variable of welfare 
maximization. Hence, this chapter presents a theoretical model based on assumptions that 
involve two layers of cognition - the layer of the market and the layer of the aggregate or 
society. Both layers are read in accordance with Pareto efficiency. I adopt the following 
concept of efficiency. A transfer of shares is efficient or optimal if there is no further transfer 
that makes everybody better-off. Another way to view it might be that a transfer is efficient if 
there is no further transfer that can make someone better-off while making nobody worse-
off.795 Because efficiency is a social concept, I look at both levels of my theoretical model and 
try to understand how resources can be allocated so as to maximize benefits with the least 
cost. 
The first layer is that of the individual shareholders who, facing an offer of transfer of 
shares, behave pursuant to the benefits and losses each and every single one of them will incur 
with the transaction. This implies awareness of the objectives of shareholders regarding their 
holding of shares in the company. For instance, at some point, shareholders may wish to be 
free to sell their shares, thereby diversifying their investment. They may also wish to retain 
this as a personal privilege, on the basis of the notion that a widespread ability to do so might 
cause distortions in the company.  
The second layer of the theoretical model regards the aggregate, that is, the society, as a 
whole. It tries to establish the welfare effects deriving from a scenario in which a shareholder 
                                                             
795 In this dissertation, I am not using the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
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wants to transfer her share. At this level, I consider the regulator (e.g., legislators, politicians, 
and courts) and the enforcement costs related to the types of rules designed by it to sanction 
such type of transactions. Part I has shown the economic relevance of the PLLC. 
Consequently, I make the case for the centrality of an appropriate regulatory framework. As 
mentioned above, the crux of the problem is the fact that the default rules included by 
shareholders in their articles of association can be avoided by the transferor and the transferee. 
I call this the 'problem of un-consented transfer of shares'.796 Because it leads to inefficient 
outcomes,797 I look at the types of rules applicable in each jurisdiction to the transfer of 
shares. I try to establish their positive and negative welfare effects, by taking into account the 
scenario of an un-consented transfer of shares. I also look at the enforceability of these rules. 
Different enforcement levels may impact shareholders’ incentives to hold on to their shares; 
they may impact on shareholders’ commitment toward their company (e.g., if the incentive 
structure does not favor collective action). This exercise should hint at whether or not law 
should be reformed, and if so, in which direction (e.g., by making it more or less difficult for a 
would-be seller to sell her shares).798 It also hints at the ideal role of lawyers in law reform 
and market design. Hence, the question underlying the investigation at this level is: what kind 
of rule is most welfare-enhancing?  
Additionally, in light of the concept of share presented in Chapter 2, which is related to 
the nature of the rights shareholders hold in it, this chapter aims to disclose the paradigm 
adopted by legislators to allocate and protect legal entitlements (property rules, liability rules 
                                                             
796 Again, one could ask: Why is it a problem? Default rules are so termed precisely by dint of their avoidability. 
Otherwise, they would be mandatory rules. I am referring in the text to those situations in which transferor and 
transferee breach the articles of association to execute the sales contract, instead of contracting around the 
default rule by changing the articles of association.   
797 Absent market failure, one would expect that parties, by contracting around default rules, do not want to 
achieve inefficient results. The fact is that parties seem not to care about changing the rules they did not opt out 
of in the first place, possibly because it is too costly, which leads them to litigation. For a possible link with this 
question, which basically asks why shareholders do not opt out of rules ex ante, and prefer to breach them ex 
post, see Whincop, Michael J., ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate 
Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 19, 1999, pp. 19-50 (32) (stating that ‘… the value of a contractual 
term depends in part on the extent of its use by others. Products that feature network externalities are 
problematic, because there is no guarantee that a free market will produce them in optimal quantities. Firms may 
opt for more commonly used terms of lower intrinsic value because of the positive network externalities 
associated with them. This, I suggest, could be true of standard-based terms like fiduciary duties. One might 
accept the deficiencies of fiduciary duties sufficiently to believe that parties should be able to contract out of 
them. However, given the diffuse risk that shareholders face, any replacement contractual term is likely to be 
highly open-ended and standard based, and face a significant risk of misinterpretation. Accordingly, shareholders 
may accept a term which they recognize as inferior because of the external effects conferred on the term because 
of its widespread use’). 
798 In this case, a solution that could be explored to strengthen the law is to make it more costly for existing 
shareholders to sell, therefore creating incentives for them to invest more in the company (after all, if 
shareholders are stuck with their shares, they will try to maximize their value).  
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or inalienability rules) in the PLLC.799 Teasing out these paradigms will help to clarify 
legislators’ views on market functioning. It is often the case that property rights are not well 
defined, especially in jurisdictions in which business organization law has exploded in the last 
several decades. On the other hand, shareholders have been justly described as the bearers of 
the residual risk of the firm, since their claims come last after the claims of the company’s 
creditors have been satisfied. Their contractual position in the company’s contract is naturally 
incomplete and contingent.800 Thus, investigating the relevance of property rights in shares 
and the choice of this over other forms of protecting entitlements will shed light not only on 
the reasons legislators opt to protect some entitlements and not others, but also on the 
potential that rules have to shape the relationships between corporate constituencies, and to 
overcome the fallback of contractual incompleteness and bargaining failures in these 
corporations. Ultimately, this chapter attempts to clarify the need for reform of rules toward 
greater liberalization of the PLLC. In other words, it aims to determine if the absolute 
freedom to sell shares is more efficient, on balance, than a restrictive approach. 
Section 1 looks at the features of the market and how entitlements are allocated within 
market dynamics. It also contextualizes the creation of a theory of defaults informed by an 
entitlements framework. Section 2, drawing upon the seminal work of Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed, presents four types of rules liable to protect entitlements in the PLLC: 
Property Rule 1, Liability Rule 2, Reversed Property Rule 3, and Reversed Liability or Rule 
4.801 This section borrows the entitlements framework developed by those authors and applies 
                                                             
799 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral’, vol. 85, No. 6, 1972, pp. 1089-1128 (asking ‘In what circumstances should we grant a 
particular entitlement? And ‘In what circumstances should we decide to protect that entitlement by using a 
property, liability, or inalienability rule?’). Also see Whincop, Michael J., ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: 
The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 19, 1999, p. 30 (stating 
that ‘Any attempt to understand the structure of costly bargaining needs to be premised on a description of how 
the law allocates and divides entitlements between parties, and protects the entitlements so allocated. Especially 
in the closely held corporation context, the exchanges between actual and potential coalition partners are 
significantly affected by bilateral monopoly conditions. That is, the parties are substantially locked into dealing 
with each other’). Also see Kaplow, Louis, and Shavell, Steven, ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An 
Economic Analysis, Harvard Law Review, vol. 109, N.º 4, pp 713-790 (providing an economic analysis to 
answer the question of whether or not property should be absolutely protected by property rules, or by liability 
rules). 
800 See Scott, Kenneth E., ‘Agency Costs and Corporate Governance’, in Newman, Peter (ed), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, New York, Palgrave, 2002, p. 26. Also see Posner, Richard A., Economic 
Analysis of Law, New York, Aspen Publishers, 2007, p. 429 (asking why the corporation has shareholders rather 
than just creditors, since investors are really just a type of creditor. He says the answer lays in the fact that 
‘…there is an ineradicable uncertainty about the level of profits, and the shareholders are simply the investors 
who have agreed to be the recipients of this uncertain stream of earnings rather than negotiating for a fixed 
return’). 
801 As is noted by Ian Ayres, before Calabresi and Melamed’s famous Rule 4, this was previously discussed by 
Atwood, James R., ‘An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts’, Stanford Law Review, vol. 21, N.º 2, 1969, 
pp. 293-315. However, it appears that Calabresi and Melamed were better at marketing their views. 
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it to the un-consented transfer of shares. This is undertaken in the context of the two-layer 
model which considers at layer 1 the market, and at layer 2 the aggregate, or society. 
Following the principle of Pareto efficiency, this section tries to clarify which types of rules – 
property rules, liability rules or rules promoting inalienability – are best suited to protect the 
interests of the company, the shareholders and the society, in general. It also suggests 
mechanisms such as a second-price auction which lawyers can use to draft the relevant 
contractual setting. Section 3 concludes by stressing the importance of a normative 
construction based on property rules that gives shareholders the chance to affirm their hybrid 
property rights in the shares of the company. 
 
1. The market and the production of new forms through natural selection: A 
promising new theory of defaults based upon a framework of entitlements 
 
I have tried to show in Chapter 1 how rights in corporate law are bound together by a 
web of complex relations.802 Any change in legal relations, regardless of changes in the 
environment itself, will necessarily affect others. Besides, the crossover between different 
legal institutions is a general phenomenon. The complex structure of entitlements in the 
PLLC, their allocation and the effects of the existing legal mechanisms for their protection is 
illustrative in this regard. The concept of legal entitlement is very broad, for it embodies all 
sorts of rights. To define them, I once more resort to Hohfeld’s scheme of jural relations.803 I 
have submitted that ‘share is a legal configuration of a complex right in Hohfeldian terms. 
The Hohfeldian conception of ‘property’ or ‘legal interest’ is that of a complex aggregate of 
rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities. In other words, property rights are a 
‘complex aggregate of jural relations’.804 According to Hohfeld’s scheme of jural relations, an 
investigation of the concept of entitlements in the PLLC entails a consideration of who owns 
what in a particular context. For example, if shareholders have the right (or claim) to receive 
dividends, managers have a correlative duty to distribute them. If managers have the ‘power’ 
to refrain from registering a transfer of shares in the register of members, the transferor and 
transferee have a corresponding ‘disability’ to prevent them from doing so. Alternatively, if a 
                                                             
802 See Darwin, Charles, The Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, Chicago, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc., 1996, p. 37. 
803 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, 
The Yale Law Journal, vol. 23, N.º1, 1913, 16-59.  
804 See Part II, Chapter 2 above. 
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particular shareholder holds a ‘privilege’ to sell her shares, other non-transferring 
shareholders have the opposite ‘duty’ to facilitate this transfer.805  
Before delving into the efficiency of legal rules, I now take a step back and look at the 
market that forms the 'DNA' of legal solutions. This is genetic material that legislatures are 
not free to ignore.806 I highlight both the organic and inorganic features of the market to which 
market agents are exposed. Also here, natural selection acts through the preservation and 
accumulation of beneficial variations. These variations do not occur suddenly. They take time. 
They are effected by a slow, long-standing process of change. Ultimately, every element and 
condition of the market is improved. This improvement allows market agents to organize 
themselves into firms by hiring human capital and contracting factors of production that will 
contribute to the advancement of the organization.807 The question is, to which standard of 
advancement is natural selection likely to lead? We know that natural selection is likely to 
lead to the specialization of corporate constituencies inasmuch as this specialization allows 
them to better perform their functions. Furthermore, and considering that market agents are 
continuously seeking to maximize their utilities in the market economy, natural selection has 
the potential to prevent retrogression in the organization by fitting each constituency to its 
role in the firm which, if otherwise, would have been taken by useless and ill-fitting elements. 
Entitlements are allocated accordingly. That is to say, they are allocated to those who value 
them most considering the role they play in the advancement process of the firm. 
Nevertheless, if organic beings to which I compare the market, as well as its elements such as 
firms, households and even governments tend to get better or ‘rise up the ladder’, how is it 
that some less-developed forms still persist?808 Do not all organic beings, including the 
market, possess an innate tendency towards perfection? Natural selection does not necessarily 
imply progressive development. Change will come if it is advantageous for each market agent 
within her web of complex relations. It appears that lower forms have been retained because 
                                                             
805 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, 
cit., pp. 16-59 (clarifying several terms that are typically included in the rights-duties binomial by exploring his 
scheme of ‘opposites’ and ‘correlatives’). 
806 The articles of association with practical solutions preserved for almost one century contain some of this 
genetic material. 
807 See Coase, R. H., ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, vol. 4, 16, 1937, pp. 386-405. Also see Coase, R. H., 
‘The Nature of the Firm: Origin’, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 4, No. 1, 1988, pp. 3- 17 
(explaining how his approach ‘succeeded in linking up organisation with cost’). 
808 I do not mean to convey the idea that some organisms are ‘higher’ or ‘better’ than others. This would be a 
view rejected by most contemporary evolutionary theorists. What I mean is that some organisms are more 
complex than others. This does not imply, however, that they are necessarily the ones best adapted to their 
environment. 
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they have not been subject to competition or, at least, noticeable competition.809 It may also 
be that in some cases there was indeed retrogression of the organization. In any case, variation 
among organic beings is contingent upon a number of complex relations. What is more, their 
preservation depends on the environment and on each other organisms with which each being 
has come into competition. The preservation of variation is also related to inheritance from 
other beings who were themselves equally involved in an intricate web of relationships. This 
is another advantage of the firm. Besides surpassing transaction costs, which would be higher 
if market agents decided to hire factors of production through a chain of arms-length 
contracts, the firm potentiates the convergence of character of corporate constituencies 
through the business organization, even if these constituencies do not share the same genetic 
background. However, this does not affect the diversity in structure, constitution and 
corporate habits caused by the complexity of relations in the market and in the firm. 
Variations are accepted, and tend to be kept, if they are advantageous for the welfare of each 
corporate constituency. Given the principle of inheritance, certain actions, measures, 
decisions and sorts of behavior tend to be inherited, and create a noticeable path-dependence 
in the firm. Market choices obey a principle of natural selection that in the struggle for life 
through cooperation and competition is viewed as a source of advancement in the 
organization. There are, however, limitations to evolution.810 Not all minor variations 
(including the intermediary ones) are advantageous. This is a problem to which legislators are 
not immune, especially if manifestations of socio-economic path-dependence are on the way. 
This is where legal engineering, that is,811 a theory of corporate default rules informed by an 
entitlements framework fits in.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
809 One might question whether competition will necessarily lead to more complex forms. It is indisputable, 
however, that complexity has its cost, and it might not be the best adaptation. Complex adaptations may also be 
lost if their costs outweigh their benefits. 
810 Refer to Part 1 Overview. 
811 See Howarth, David, Law as Engineering: Thinking about what Lawyers Do, Cheltenham, United Kingdom; 
Northampton, MA, USA, 2013 (developing the analogy between law and engineering). 
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2. Property and liability rules and inalienability: engineering the protection of 
entitlements in the PLLC 
 
i. Calabresi and Melamed’s entitlements framework 
 
In their seminal paper, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed present a framework for entitlements.812 They open 
their discussion with the general problem of entitlement.813 The state must decide to whom to 
give an entitlement, and also must make other difficult second-order decisions in respect to 
the transfer and trade of entitlements, which side in a dispute should win, and the kind of 
protection that should be granted. They consider three types of entitlements, and distinguish 
between them insofar as they are protected by property rules, liability rules or inalienability. 
They note that while this categorization is not absolute, it helps them to sort out the reasons 
behind legislators' choices of certain entitlements over others. The authors highlight the fact 
that most entitlements are mixed.  
Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral explores 
two primary questions. First, under which circumstances should a particular entitlement be 
granted? Second, in which circumstances should the legislator decide to protect that 
entitlement by using a property or liability rule, or by making it inalienable? The authors 
address the first question by considering the issues of efficiency, distribution, and justice. If 
there are transaction costs, entitlements are allocated to those who value them most.814 In 
addition, Calabresi and Melamed argue that distributive considerations should also be made. 
On one hand, economically efficient allocation of entitlements, that is to say Pareto-optimal 
solutions, varies with wealth distributions. On the other hand, distributions of wealth imply 
their own Pareto-optimal allocation of resources. This is why, they explain, distributions of 
wealth may affect a society’s choice of entitlements. As to justice considerations, the authors 
seem to have some difficulty in extracting a normative statement. Perhaps, because the 
concept of justice itself is too broad, Calabresi and Melamed instead define efficiency and 
                                                             
812 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 85, N,º 6, 1972, pp. 1089-1128.  
813 See Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven, ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’, 
Harvard Law Review, vol. 109, No 4, 1996, pp. 713-790 (748) (considering that the term ‘entitlement’ is unclear 
and unhelpful). 
814 This is what Pareto optimality stands for. This has been generally accepted in the literatures of law and 
economics. For a different approach, see Ayres, Ian, Optional Law: The Structure of Legal Entitlements, 
Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press, 2005.  
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distributions of wealth.815 They do not extend the ‘efficiency-distribution locution’, to use 
their own expression, to justice and equality considerations. However, justice, or better, ‘other 
justice reasons’, seems to be a back-seat concept that is pulled out whenever there is a need to 
delve into other reasons that, even though linked to efficiency, are autonomous or, if linked to 
distributional goals, cannot be fairly described in terms of equality. 
The authors advance three types of rules liable to protect entitlements. First, they refer 
to property rules, which they define as rules that protect entitlements which can be voluntarily 
transacted provided the price of the entitlement is agreed upon by its holder. Second, liability 
rules protect entitlements which can be taken without the consent of the respective holder or 
be destroyed, provided that she who takes the entitlement or destroys it pays an objective 
value for it. Liability rules involve state intervention, in particular to set up the respective 
compensation. Such intervention is higher than state’s intervention through property rules. 
Third, entitlements are inalienable when their transaction is not allowed under any 
circumstances. The state intervenes in respect to these entitlements not only to set forth 
compensation if they are taken or destroyed, but also to assure they are not sold.  
Calabresi and Melamed demonstrate how entitlements are allocated, and how each of 
these rules operates by using the classic example of a nuisance or pollution problem. The 
authors refer to three rules that are traditionally applied to the nuisance-pollution problem. 
First, polluter A may not pollute unless his neighbor, B, allows him to do so. B has the right 
to clean air and, therefore, A is not permitted to pollute. In this case, an entitlement is given to 
B, and it is protected by a property rule. Second, A may pollute, but B is entitled to be 
compensated for damages. In this situation, B is still granted an entitlement, which is 
protected by a liability rule. Third, A has the right to pollute at will and B cannot stop him or 
ask for damages. If B wants to stop A, B must pay off A. Here, the entitlement is awarded to 
A, and is protected by a property rule and a liability rule (reverse property rule). Calabresi and 
Melamed add a fourth rule that consists of the following. When A tries to pollute, B can stop 
A from polluting, but must compensate A for her loss (reverse liability rule). This last rule 
poses innumerable difficulties. It does not prevent freeloader and holdout problems, especially 
if there are several neighbors ('B's). It also makes it difficult for courts to determine the 
relevant benefits tax. The authors suggest that these difficulties have hindered scholars and 
courts from adequately developing a ‘Rule 4’ type of formulation. However, Rule 4 may be 
important vis-à-vis goals of efficiency and distribution, particularly if the choice between 
                                                             
815 As to economic efficiency and wealth distribution preferences, one must think like this: ‘there must be good 
efficiency and distributional reasons for preferring an entitlement to one good over another’.  
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liability entitlements is based on the asymmetry of the costs of collective determination, pretty 
much like the choice between property entitlements can be based on asymmetry of transaction 
costs.816  
The analogy to the polluter is the shareholder who tries to sell her share to a third party 
to whom other shareholders of the PLLC object. In respect to transfer restrictions the 
following rules can be observed: 
- Property Rule 1: the sale cannot be executed without consent.817 
- Liability Rule 2: the sale can be executed, but the shareholder must pay for damages. 
- Reverse Property Rule 3: there is no transfer restriction.818 
- Finally, pre-emption rights, even if they are frequently coupled with property rules, are 
not property rules. They closely resemble Calabresi and Melamed’s Rule 4. A can sell, 
but the other shareholders may stop her by paying her the same price. Putting it 
differently, they pay her the same price to prevent her from giving her share to the 
buyer they do not want. This situation can be equated with that of the polluter who can 
be stopped, provided she is paid for her lost profits. 
 
An interesting aspect of Calabresi and Melamed’s line of reasoning is that they assume 
costless bargaining as a means to achieving Pareto optimality. The authors maintain that 
individuals know what is best for them and, therefore, they bargain. This is the principle 
underlying their concept of efficiency. When no transaction costs exist, the choice of 
entitlements is irrelevant, a proposition that is an extension of the so-called Coasean Theorem. 
But this is rather utopian. Thus, the question that poses itself is how to bargain in order to 
achieve Pareto efficiency. From an economic point of view, Calabresi and Melamed would 
use property rules if they believed that the polluter could more cheaply avoid or reduce the 
costs of pollution than the pollutee.819 This hypothesis, however, relies on the idea that the 
transaction is cheap or even cost-free. The moment that that is no longer the case, everything 
changes and the bargaining is most likely to fail. This is particularly true if the number of 
parties increases, making extremely costly (due to holdout and freeloader problems) the 
buying out of the other party(ies). These difficulties would still exist even if the party trying to 
                                                             
816 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed Douglas A., cit., pp. 1121. 
817 This is the normal rule in Germany or Austria, for example, when a GmbH agreement stipulates a restriction 
on transfer (although the seller could sell if consent is unreasonably withheld). It is also the default rule under 
Portuguese, French and US laws such as DLLCA §18-702. In the particular case of the United States, however, 
economic rights can be transferred without consent. 
818 This is the default rule in Italy, Germany and Austria. 
819 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., cit., p. 1118. 
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buy the other out placed a higher value on the good in question.820 So, when transaction costs 
are too high, particularly on both sides, the allocation of an initial entitlement, even if 
incorrect from the point of view of economic efficiency, will most likely not be altered 
through bargaining. It is in these circumstances that liability rules can be applied as a 
protection.821 As Calabresi and Melamed explain, the cost of establishing the value of an 
initial entitlement by negotiation is frequently so great that even though a transfer of the 
entitlement would benefit all concerned, such transfer will not occur. If a collective 
determination of the value is available instead, the beneficial transfer would quickly come 
about. Thus, liability rules are used where markets fail.822 This is the essence of these rules. 
Additionally, there are other reasons for preferring liability rules to other types of rules. They 
can be used in the case of accidents. Damages are settled by their collective valuation. 
Liability rules facilitate a combination of efficiency and distributive results which would be 
difficult to achieve under a property rule alone. They can be employed for redistributive 
goals. Moreover, if transaction costs and bargaining barriers are present and relevant (e.g., 
high), and we are not certain who is the ‘cheapest cost avoider’, economic efficiency is not 
attained by property rules, but rather by liability rules.823 
Calabresi and Melamed focus mostly on property and liability rules. However, they 
explain in which situations inalienability should be afforded to protect entitlements. They 
maintain that inalienability may fulfill efficiency objectives in situations of paternalism, self-
paternalism, and externalities. Paternalism is an exception to Pareto optimality in the sense 
that it does not take into account the individual’s valuation of what is best for her. Under the 
                                                             
820 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., cit., p. 1119 (explaining how in situations in which 
transaction costs are not symmetrical, that is, transaction costs are not high on both sides, property rules can still 
be used).  
821 Liability rules help surpass the freeloader and holdout problems, which is something parties cannot always do 
through bargaining because it is too costly. See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., cit., p. 1107 
(saying, apropos the example they give on eminent domain, that ‘If a society can remove from the market the 
valuation of each tract of land, decide the value collectively, and impose it, then the holdout problem is gone. 
Similarly, if the society can value collectively each individual citizen’s desire to have a park and charge him a 
“benefits” tax based upon it, the freeloader problem is gone. If the sum of the taxes is greater than the sum of the 
compensation awards, the park will result’).  
822 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., cit., p. 1110 (arguing that ‘… a very common reason, 
perhaps the most common one, for employing a liability rule rather than a property rule to protect an entitlement 
is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that is, it is either unavailable or too expensive 
compared to a collective valuation’). 
823 See Whincop, Michael J., ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate 
Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1999, vol. 19, pp. 19-50 (exploring this idea. The author assumes a 
relatively low bargaining cost, which is a reality he acknowledges particularly in respect to closely held 
corporations, and therefore considers that property rules are the best protection of entitlements in these 
circumstances. However, he acknowledges that whenever there are asymmetries of information, liability rules 
may work to facilitate the transaction by nudging the parties to disclose their valuations of the assets. I will claim 
later in the text that it can be created a scheme by which property rules can exert a similar nudging effect).  
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corset of paternalism, the individual is not able to choose what is best for herself and, 
therefore, the state or other individuals make that choice for her because they know what is 
going to make her better off. This is typically based on a judgment that the individual was not 
in a position to choose best for herself when she made a certain choice.824 This is the rationale 
to determine when contracts are void or inexistent rather than avoidable, for example. Self-
paternalism rests on the understanding that the individual herself limits her own actions 
because she knows what is best for herself. This does not contradict Pareto efficiency, in as 
much as no one but the individual knows what is best for herself. Self-paternalism justifies 
cases in which the law determines the invalidity of contracts entered into by drunk parties, 
coercion, error, or undue influence.825 The third case, in which entitlements are inalienable, is 
that of a transaction that creates considerable externalities or costs to third parties that are not 
collectively measurable by an objective and non arbitrary standard. These externalities 
include what has been recurrently called moralisms.826   
Calabresi and Melamed describe lawyers’ work as solely based on an ad hoc case law 
approach from which they extract relevant categories. This, like model building, has its own 
limitations and only provides one view of the cathedral. Despite the caveats they present, the 
authors hold that their model may be applied in other fields of law. Michael Whincop has 
applied it, for example, to issues of corporate law, and tried to paint the cathedral that lawyers 
are said to give only one side of.827 I also apply it to treat the selling of shares of PLLCs for 
which consent stricto sensu is required.828 I concentrate on property and liability rules. 
Nevertheless, I will refer to inalienability, considering the system of transfer of property rights 
in the selected jurisdictions, and the definition of shares discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
                                                             
824 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., cit., p. 1114 (affirming that ‘…the most efficient pie is no 
longer that which costless bargains would achieve, because a person may be better off if he is prohibited from 
bargaining’). 
825 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed Douglas A., cit. p. 1113 (referring to most of these examples). 
826 See Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, Douglas A., cit., pp. 1111-1112.  
827 See Whincop, Michael J., ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: cit, pp. 19-50. 
828 I am investigating which types of rules are more advantageous from an entitlements’ point of view. However, 
other approaches could be followed, such as looking at the choice of rules from the perspective of administrative 
costs, risk aversion, and income distribution. See Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell, cit., pp. 739-745 (making 
considerations of this kind whilst comparing property and liability rules in the context of externalities). 
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ii. The entitlements framework applied to the transfer of shares and a two-layer 
theoretical model 
 
I apply the entitlements framework to the transfer of shares by a member of a PLLC for 
which consent stricto sensu is required. I have thus far highlighted property rights and, 
depending on the circumstances as we shall see below, the legislators of all six jurisdictions 
treat the transfer of shares under property rules. There may be several reasons for this. 
Legislators may have wanted to insulate members from risk, whilst they would not be 
protected under a liability rule due to the uncertainty of takings and the magnitude of 
damages. Furthermore, for distributive reasons, property rules favor owners over takers.829 
This is indeed reconcilable with the closed nature of these business organizations. Perhaps 
another reason is the fact that the holder of property rights does not depend on the other 
party’s ability to pay (if the other party cannot pay, a liability rule cannot be enforced). 
However, entitlements protected by these property rules are allocated differently in the six 
jurisdictions. In Portugal, Spain, France and the United States, legislators have by default 
allocated the respective entitlements to the company.830 UK law determines that shares and 
interests of any shareholder are transferable in accordance with the company’s articles.831 
Italy establishes by default the freedom of transfer, unless otherwise established in the articles 
of association. In the particular case of the United States, the laws of the states of New York 
and Delaware allow the transfer of economic rights but not the membership.832 This means 
that, in order to transfer her membership interests, the transferor needs to obtain the consent of 
the other non-transferring members or possibly managers or directors – a property rule. 
In most cases in the samples collected, shareholders include restrictions on transfers 
(consent stricto sensu), which may be the consent of shareholders or the company, pre-
emption rights or rights of first refusal (which are equivalent to Rule 4) or other more 
                                                             
829 See Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell, cit., pp. 770 – 771 (considering how owners are’… well insulated 
from risk under property rule protection, whereas they are not fully shielded under a liability rule, assuming that 
there is uncertainty as to the magnitude of damages’. They go on saying that as for the distribution of income, 
they note that ‘…property rule protection favors owners over takers. Under property rule protection, when 
owners sell things, they tend to receive more than the value they place on them; they are generally able to extract 
some of buyers’ surplus. Under the liability rule, owners’ valuation is all that they are in principle awarded, and 
when damages are too low, they will suffer undercompensated takings or pay bribes to others to refrain from 
taking things’). 
830 See Part 1, Chapters 2 and 3 to learn about Article 228(2) of the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code, 
Article 107 of the Spanish Law 1/2010, Article L 223-14 of the French Commercial Code, 18-702 Delaware 
Limited Liability Company Act and §603 New York Limited Liability Company Law. 
831 See section 541(1) of the Companies Act 2006. 
832 See Article 2479 of the Italian Civil Code and §18-702 Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and §603 
New York Limited Liability Company Law. 
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sophisticated restrictions.833 I have stressed the hybrid nature of property rights in shares, and 
their 'domestication' by the legislator, which puts to the test the idea that the owner of a thing 
has the absolute right to prevent others from taking it.834 The wish shareholders have to 
maximize their individual utilities must be reconciled with welfare concerns, that is, with the 
maximization of the firm’s value and corporate wealth.835 I also look at the aggregate and try 
to perceive how the framework of transfers can affect the society as a whole. In light of the 
problem of un-consented transfers, the underlying question of this section is: Would the 
company, shareholders, and society in general be better off if transfer of shares were rather 
treated under liability rules or made inalienable? I start with two hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is the following. If transferors make relatively ambitious offers, they decrease the 
likelihood that non-transferring shareholders will execute hold-ups or hold-outs. An offer is 
ambitious if it consists of the transfer of the share, plus market idiosyncrasies. The transferee 
will pay the price and promise to add human and social capital to the company. The transferor 
will sell the share for a value that exceeds its actual value. The offer also has the potential to 
prevent bargaining failures in general. This will be the case because the company and its 
shareholders as well as managers see the transferee as a major asset for the company. This is 
so because the amount received for the share will greatly exceed the reservation price. The 
second hypothesis is: If legislators were to incentivize shareholders to maximize the firm’s 
long-term value, they would need to lock them into their shareholdings for a long time. 
This scenario is filled with constantly shifting coalitions among shareholders and 
coalitions of shareholders with managers. In this setting, shareholders have difficulties in 
acting collectively. They hold-up others. Oftentimes, the situations resemble bilateral 
monopolies. Opportunistic behavior on the part of the parties results in frequent bargaining 
failures.836 In these situations, bargaining is obviously costly. Based upon the way law 
allocates and protects entitlements in respect to the transfer of shares, and considering the way 
shareholders allocate and protect entitlements in the articles of association, I will try to 
understand the structure of costly bargaining inside PLLCs. So, viewing articles of association 
                                                             
833 See Part 1 and Part II, Chapter 1 for a definition of the types of restrictions included in the articles of 
association of PLLCs in each jurisdiction. 
834 See Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell, cit., p. 774. By 'absolute right' I do not mean an unrestricted right. In 
countries following the French civil law tradition as well as in German speaking countries an absolute right is 
perceived as right against everyone (e.g., property) as opposed to a relative right (e.g., a contractual claim). 
However, absolute rights are not unrestricted.  
835 See Bratton, William W. & Wachter, Michael L. ‘Shareholders and Social Welfare’, Seattle University Law 
Review, vol. 36, pp. 489-526 (referring to maximization of corporate wealth as a narrower claim for economic 
efficiency and not as a claim for social welfare). 
836 See Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, 
New York, The Free Press; London, Macmillan Publishers, 1985. 
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as incomplete contracts, I consider situations in which there is an un-consented transfer of 
shares that triggers post-contracting between shareholders and other corporate constituencies.  
Let us think of the following example. Shareholder A owns a share representing 55% of 
the company’s share capital (share x).837 She entered into a bank loan agreement with Bank Y 
in order to pay the employees and suppliers of a trading company she owned.838 Bank Y had 
knowledge of the commercial activity undertaken by shareholder A, and given that she was a 
long-standing customer of the bank, did not place obstacles in the way of granting the loan. 
The loan was to be repaid in instalments by the end of the first half of 2012. By that time, 
shareholder dividends would have been allocated. In February 2012, shareholder A entered 
into a share sale and purchase agreement selling share x to Mr. D without the company’s prior 
consent. Mr. D. was involved in several enforcement proceedings that had been brought 
against him for non-payment of the debts accumulated in his existing business. As a 
consequence of Mr. D’s purchase of share x, his personal creditors believed he had sufficient 
assets to clear his outstanding debts and expected to be paid through the execution of the 
relevant enforcement proceedings. This is the example that is further discussed in the 
following subsections. 
Let us assume that the law clothes the company and its residual claimants, that is, its 
shareholders, with the entitlement to the shares the transferor wishes to sell. This entitlement 
is allocated by means of a rule foreseeing pre-emption rights (reversed liability rule 
corresponding to the mysterious Rule 4), and couples it with the consent of the company if it 
does not wish to subsidiary exercise its right to pre-empt (property rule). This entitlement, 
however, could have been protected by a liability rule (Liability Rule 2) included in the 
articles of association by which shareholder A would be allowed to sell her share without 
consent as long as she compensated the company and other non-transferring shareholders.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
837 It may be questioned whether or not a 55% share is enough to control the company. However, this fact in 
itself does not leave aside the requirement to obtain consent to the transfer. Perhaps, being a majority shareholder 
gives the transferor enough confidence to execute an un-consented transfer. A minority shareholder may not 
display the same confidence.  
838 While the sale of a majority share implies the transfer of control over the company, its economic value does 
not necessarily correspond to the nominal value of the share that has been sold. 
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A. Layer 1 
 
(i) Allocation of shares when there is bargaining under conditions of perfect information 
 
I take efficiency as the primary goal. If there is no further transfer that makes everybody 
better off, then I consider the current allocation of shares in the company to be efficient or 
optimal. Shareholders may hold shares for two opposite reasons. After staying in the company 
for a while, and receiving the dividends of their membership, shareholders may want to leave 
the company and invest elsewhere when a business opportunity comes along. Conversely, 
shareholders may not want shares to be transferable or to be sold easily if this may cause 
distortions in the company. Let us imagine that there is a status quo that non-transferring 
shareholders want to keep in the company. So, this is in line with the reason shareholders do 
not want shares to be sold. However, this status quo is freezing the value of shares, in 
particular because there is not an open market for them. It will likely provoke the 
retrogression of the company. According to the efficiency principle, the law and the articles of 
association that transcribed it should facilitate the transfer of shares when shareholder A (SA) 
values the share more than the non-transferring members, which as opposed to SA give more 
value to the prevailing status quo (VSA > VSB).
839 Another way to put it would be that articles 
of association should facilitate the transfer if the value or price SA receives from the transfer 
is greater than the value of her staying in the company both to herself and to other, non-
transferring members. If the parties have perfect knowledge of the terms of the business and 
there are not asymmetries of information (such as hidden knowledge regarding the execution 
of the loan with Bank Y), it should be irrelevant whether they chose to protect the entitlement 
with a property or a liability rule. If the entitlement was protected by a property rule, and VSA 
> VSB, SA could bargain with other non-transferring shareholders and managers to sell her 
share provided she makes an ambitious offer to Mr. D.840 This would prevent passive non-
                                                             
839 Often the consent to the transfer of shares is constituted by the consent of the company and not of its 
members. Nevertheless, the company is a legal fiction and not someone who can have incentives and interests 
for an economic analysis. V stands for value. SA stands for shareholder A. SB stands for other shareholder(s) who 
is (are) not transferring.  
840 An ambitious offer includes the share, plus idiosyncrasies associated with the business object of the company, 
which is a start-up company. This is an innovative venture capital LLC. Shareholder A wants to leave the 
company because she has her own idea of business, has already secured venture capital, and believes that she 
will become a millionaire once she incorporates her own company in Silicon Valley. On this matter, see Gilson, 
Ronald J., ‘Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial 
Contracting’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 110, 3, 2010, pp 885-918 (894-900) (establishing an interaction 
between technology, organizational structure, and financing that undergirds the innovative activity of start-up 
companies. Gilson makes an interesting point regarding the fact that a mature employer company sometimes 
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transferring shareholders from free-riding on more active non-transferring shareholders’ 
resolutions at the company’s general meeting.841 This would make passive shareholders care 
about the investment in the company by any potential buyer, in particular Mr. D. So, the price 
paid for the share should be P> VSA > VSB. Moreover, P must be smaller than the value of the 
share for Mr. D. This transaction would be Pareto-superior because both the non-transferring 
members and SA would wind up better off. The question is: Why would the buyer or indeed 
anyone pay such a high price for a share whose value is likely to be frozen by the policies 
adopted by non-transferring shareholders on behalf of the company? This company is a 
promising start-up. The buyer will gain market idiosyncrasies that come along with the share. 
Therefore, because entitlements are protected by property rules and there are no asymmetries 
of information she could easily bargain in order to maximize her individual utility.  
Let us now imagine that the entitlement of the company is protected by a liability rule. 
In this situation, SA could sell her share without consent, but she would have to pay a 
compensation to the non-transferring shareholders that would, minimally, leave them no 
worse off than if the transfer had not been executed. Under conditions of perfect information, 
both non-transferring shareholders and the transferor would be better off (Comp ≥ VSB as 
long as Comp < VSA). The crucial point here is that even though efficiency is obtained, the 
taking as such weakens non-transferring shareholders’ property rights in their shares because 
physiologically and morphologically, property rights in shares as such are not strong enough 
to prevent a taking from happening. Furthermore, even though non-transferring shareholders 
can bargain the compensation, the amount will be diffuse.842 Again, this shows how tamed 
property rights in shares are. One may counter by asking: Is this not the case for all situations 
where entitlements are protected by liability rules? Yes, it is true that takings can happen in 
other scenarios. Still, the introduction of restrictions on the transfer of property rights in 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
chooses to let a company employee go and pursue a valuable innovation through a startup company (possibly a 
LLC). An employer company might do this because transaction costs and asymmetries of information that result 
in efficiency advantages for the start-up’s form offset the employer’s tax, informational, scale and scope 
advantages. Sometimes the employee, if she stays in the company, may threaten further development of her own 
idea. To that end, she influences the company’s decision-makers against the implementation of her own valuable 
innovation. Other times, the employee will try to hoard the innovation to protect her property rights in it. This 
illustrates how a lack of teamwork, the existence of transaction costs and the lack of information-sharing may 
lead the employer company to lift employee exit restrictions. This dynamic is said to be the basis of the 
development of the most profitable start-up companies in Silicon Valley.   
841 Passive shareholders free-ride because they do not want to be accountable for the decisions taken in the 
general meeting, even though such decisions bind all shareholders equally. By letting others do it, they detach 
themselves from the decision-making process. They do not show up in meetings, and typically send up a proxy.   
842 It is up to courts to establishe compensation. When I refer to bargaining between the parties to a dispute to set 
up the amount of compensation, I am thinking about those situations in which they potentially can settle before 
going to court. Indeed, the fact that courts have to intervene to settle compensations is a crucial difference from a 
property rule (1 and 3) where the parties would have to bargain. 
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shares reduces property rights’ resistance to takings because they need consent stricto sensu to 
be executed. Courts then go from being gatekeepers to something more challenging, 
especially if they must analyze who benefits and who loses if efficiency is the principle they 
use for the adjudication. Results will depend on whether or not courts have access to costless 
information, and on whether courts are apt to understand the implications that restrictions 
have on the definition of property rights, shares and governance.843 
 
(ii) Allocation of shares when there is bargaining under conditions of unverifiable 
information and strategic behavior 
 
Now, I assume that parties behave strategically. In this case, the transferor, who cannot 
contract around the property rule due to the number of non-transferring shareholders, ends up 
selling without consent of the company, other shareholders, or the managers. If the company’s 
entitlement is protected by a property rule, but there is strategic bargaining, P> VSA > VSB 
may not happen just because the company is bargaining hard, even when it would be 
beneficial for the company not to do so, and let Mr. D take the share. So, the problem of the 
un-consented transfer comes to the surface. In these circumstances, liability rules can be 
thought of as alternatives to protect the company’s entitlement. If Comp > VSB, but <VSA, the 
latter could bargain, and Mr. D. could even take the share. Bargaining under liability rule may 
not happen if Comp = VSB because of strategic bargaining which can boil down, for example, 
to hold-outs by shareholders or managers for a greater value than the actual value of the share 
(they claim that the economic value of the share is greater than its nominal value).844 
Shareholders would feel that all the gains of the transaction would go to VSA, which would 
                                                             
843
 I note, however, that my comparison between property and liability rules rests upon what have been called 
‘traditional liability rules’or ‘first-order liability rules’. For example, Ayres and Balkin have tried to demonstrate, 
from a normative point of view, that bargaining is also possible with liability rules through what they have 
defined as ‘second or higher order liability rules’. Their perspective is that these rules, unlike traditional liability 
rules, would allow bargaining by promoting reciprocal takings between the plaintiff and the defendant. Their 
theory is an extension of the caveats of the Coase Theorem, namely that transactions in the real world are filled 
with asymmetries of information and other transaction costs that prevent efficient bargaining, regardless of the 
allocation of entitlements. Their construction is also an extension of Calabresi and Melamed’s ideas, for it tries 
to go beyond property and liability rules and provide a unifying concept of the two types of rules. The problem, 
however, is to understand in a comparative perspective whether different legal systems allow second or higher-
order liability rules. See Ayres, Ian, and Balkin, J. M., ‘Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Beyond, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 106, N.º3, 1996, pp. 703-750. Also see Ayres, Ian, Optional 
Law, cit.  
844 It would seem that under a liability rule (Rule 2), no bargaining is necessary. I am referring, however, to those 
cases in which parties seek a settlement. 
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thwart the distributional effects of the liability rule.845 Another problem to which Whincop 
calls attention to is the lack of sufficient information provided to the court by the parties, 
which makes the information ‘observable but unverifiable’. Imperfect verifiability leads to 
situations in which the court may tend to overvalue or undervalue the assets. Moreover, given 
the relational element dominant in these companies, the last thing shareholders and other 
corporate constituencies may want is to deal with a lawsuit and with providing documentation 
that could actually help the court assess the value of the shares. It is unlikely that shareholders 
and managers would be pleased to allow courts to undertake a ‘judicial due diligence’ and 
strip the company’s accounts, go through directors and general meetings’ minute books, 
private correspondence, and all manner of evidence that shareholders and managers thought 
would always be kept private. Consequently, despite the problems of overestimating and 
underestimating, which can lead to overcompensation or, conversely, to undercompensation 
of one of the parties to the dispute, this fundamental aspect in respect to the relational features 
of the PLLC is, I believe, a strong drawback in the choice of liability rules for the protection 
of entitlements in the PLLC.846 This is so, even though liability rules can be efficiently used, 
depending on the structure of bargaining and the amount of compensation claimed.847 
 
(iii)Allocation of shares when there is bargaining under conditions of asymmetries of 
information 
 
Let us assume that SA was told by Mr. D that he is in debt with Bank Y, besides having 
other small debts as a result of the business he runs. However, facing SA’s ambitious offer, 
Mr. D guarantees he is up to the task and will pay the price as agreed. On his side, Mr. D. asks 
SA for a guarantee that there are not hidden defects in the shares (vices cachés), nor 
environmental debts attached to it. In this situation, SA knows the company’s valuation of the 
share and she also knows Mr. D’s valuation of the share. Nevertheless, neither the company 
nor Mr. D. is aware of the other’s valuations. Plus, as part of their respective bargaining 
                                                             
845 See Whincop, Michael J., cit., pp. 37-38 (explaining that liability rules are said to surpass strategic bargaining 
including holdout and freeloader problems because a bilateral agreement is not a precondition for a transfer. This 
is even more so when the party who wishes to contract around the property rule has to deal with two or more 
owners. He seems to recognize, as I suggest in the text, that the number of parties makes it difficult to apply 
liability rules. So, he suggests as an alternative to liability rules, which corporate law adopts, the reliance on the 
corporate fiction. Putting it differently, each shareholder is bound by the majority decision taken at the general 
meeting approving the transaction, and which binds the company. Consequently, majority approval is described 
by Whincop as a likely solution to holdouts). 
846 See Whincop, Michael, cit., pp. 38 – 39. 
847 See Whincop, Michael J., cit., p. 38. 
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strategies, all of them make sure to confidentially hold information that could damage the 
transaction. Therefore, they know their own valuation of the share, but are not completely 
sure about each other’s valuations. In this sense, SA and Mr. D are in a better position towards 
the company when it comes to the setting of strategy to execute the sale.848 In the background, 
it is the same scenario of freezing status quo. Moreover, each and every single one of them 
hides information in order to be in a position of competitive advantage toward the other. So, 
we end up in a situation where SA knows her own valuations, the company’s and Mr. D’s 
valuation.849 The company does not know anyone’s valuations but its own. Mr. D. knows his 
own valuations and SA’s valuations. At this point, SA still valuates the share more than the 
company, which valuates its status quo more (including ownership and governance 
structures). In this situation, a property rule alone would not efficiently work. This is so 
because due to asymmetries of information coupled with strategic bargaining the share may 
not be transferred even when SA values it more than the company values its own status quo. 
The share could also be sold under SA’s valuations just because the company is bargaining 
hard and playing strategically. This is when the problem of the un-consented transfer surfaces. 
Applying a property rule as such would result in inefficient effects. Nevertheless, applying a 
traditional liability rule to protect the company’s entitlements would not be any better. The 
problem with this rule is that it would raise the same difficulties related to unverifiable 
information, and make ‘judicial due diligence’ overly difficult.  
I suggest that a property rule be used to protect the company’s entitlement, but coupling 
the rule with the normative possibility of piercing the ownership veil.850 In other words, the 
court would read the articles of association and other parallel contracts, as well as the offer of 
the transferor, and interfere in the consensual agreement to learn to what extent non-
transferring shareholders and managers are sabotaging the transaction. Most importantly, 
courts should be well positioned to discover who controls the decision-making process in the 
company and, in this way, cause information to be spilled over. This would also cause 
information spillover on the side of SA and Mr. D., because the court would not only base its 
inquiry on incidents brought to it by the parties, but would also assume a more discretionary 
                                                             
848 Naturally, the other non-transferring shareholders who control the company would be in a better position to 
know about hidden defects in the share. But Mr. D. trusts SA’s guarantee that no such defects exist, considering 
that SA is still a member of the company and should, therefore, have insider knowledge about it. 
849 This is so because SA is the only element in this complex relationship that is simultaneously linked to the 
company and to the buyer. The company and the buyer are third parties toward each other. 
850 See Part II, Chapter 3. 
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role in the dispute.851 Most importantly, the default rules and the articles of association should 
signal the strong level of enforcement applicable by courts when piercing the veil of the 
ownership. One could ask: Does not this lead us to a problem of imperfect verifiability, as 
occurs with liability rules? Perhaps it does. However, in this case the court is not so much 
dependent on the evidence that parties bring to the dispute, but rather on the level of 
enforcement the default rule was designed to provide. The threat of enforcement of rules or 
provisions that parties included in the articles of association together with the oversight of the 
parties’ behavior by a third party would nudge them to be more cautious, and rethink their 
behavior.852 This need not necessarily be done under a liability rule. Obviously, the party that 
values the asset most would be willing to run the extra mile and unveil information, if doing 
so was essential for the execution of the transaction. However, it could be that this improved 
the bargaining position of the other parties, unless lawyers would be able to come up with a 
system through which the opposite party would also be driven to disclose information. This is 
reminiscent of a second-price auction by which parties would be forced to disclose their own 
valuations, or at least behave in a way that hints at what their valuations are. I refer to it in 
Layer 2 of the theoretical model.  
In sum, property rules in this case are not only used to protect entitlements, but also 
used to create a fiction that nudges the bargaining structure towards efficiency (i.e., towards a 
point where no further transfer would make everybody better off). They can also be used to 
create a market where none exists.853 
 
 
 
                                                             
851 See Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99, No. 1, 1989, pp. 87-130 (proposing ‘penalty default rules’ to induce the 
disclosure of information). 
852 This is an idea that illustrates how regulators can correct contractual relations by balancing costs and benefits. 
This effect is normally achieved through the exercise of property rights, in particular when transaction costs are 
not terribly high. This is another example of regulation as a substitute for property rights. 
853 This is in line with the approach that is currently dominant in the literature. See Klein, Benjamin et. al., 
‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol. 21, 2, 1978, pp. 297-326; Alchian, Armen A., and Demsetz, Harold, ‘Production, Information 
Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, vol. 62, 5, 1972, pp. 777-795; Demsetz, 
Harold, ‘The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 26, 2, 
1983, pp. 375-390; Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New 
York, Free Press, 1975; Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting, New York, Free Press, 1985; Furubotn Eirik G., and Pejovich, Svetozar, The Economics 
of Property Rights, Cambridge, Massachussets, Ballinger Pub. Co., 1974; Coase, R. H., ‘The Nature of the 
Firm’, Economica; vol. 4, No. 16, 1937, pp. 386-405; Coase, R. H., ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of 
Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1960, pp. 1-44. 
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(iv) The case for inalienability protection: Is there really a case? 
 
I now consider the inalienability of entitlements. None of the default rules of the 
selected jurisdictions regulating the transfer of shares protects entitlements through 
inalienability. This is so because the transferability of shares is one of the general features of 
the company. The question is: Would it be economically efficient if defaults protected 
entitlements through inalienability? Let us imagine that the relevant legislator thought that the 
best way to protect entitlements in the PLLC was to prohibit the sale of shares, or establish a 
number of preconditions for the validity of the sale. Additionally, let us imagine that this 
legislative policy was based on the idea that locking shareholders in the company by limiting 
transactions over their shares would necessarily induce them to invest in the company. 
Basically, the legislator assumes a paternalistic attitude and thinks of members of these 
companies as market agents that need to be guided on their own contractual options in order 
to prevent unnecessary externalities.  
A possible externality would be the costs deriving from an un-consented transfer for Mr. 
D’s creditors such as distributors, suppliers, the promissory share purchasers, holders of a 
right of compensation or other creditors in general. Having been made aware of the 
conclusion of the share sale and purchase agreement, Mr. D’s creditors may hope for the 
inclusion of the purchased share in the debtor’s assets and be included in the debt recovery. I 
can also imagine claims of more diffuse creditors. Let us imagine that one of this company’s 
biggest financial burdens is its environmental debt. This will, in fact, constitute in the future 
the centerpiece of the company’s financial concerns. The full costs of developing the 
company’s industrial activity amount to millions of Euros. This amount of money, that is to 
say, externalities, corresponds to bills paid by the government to clear the nearest river, and to 
the costs borne by fisheries, local businesses, families and healthcare providers. So, in a way, 
buying factors of production such as carbon has not been that costly for the firm because it 
has been subsidized by the victims. This environmental debt is present in every transaction 
shareholders make, including the transfer of their shares. It does not mean that shareholders 
are responsible for the debts of the company, but rather that these debts depreciate the value 
of the shares.854 In the mind of a paternalistic legislator, allowing the transfer of these shares 
or any sort of market for shares to which environmental debts are attached would mean 
allowing the running of a business that perpetuates the harm done by the act of pollution. It 
                                                             
854 Shares are depreciated in their value for the society, but not for the members of the company who are 
indirectly subsidized by the lack of internalization of these externalities. 
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would mean lowering the value of local businesses or creating fiscal instability because 
municipalities, if not the state, would have to take money out of their budgets to face claims 
of the victims in respect to the overall damage pollution caused to the environment and 
directly to them. Therefore, the legislator targets SMEs (which more likely will adopt the 
legal form of a PLLC) and which business is likely to create harmful externalities. It will do 
so by taxing heavily certain activities harmful to the environment. It will also do so by taxing 
the transaction. The corresponding tax may be high, depending on the price of the sales 
contract. The price of the sales contract may include hidden defects, environmental debts, or 
any type of debts.855 Furthermore, protecting entitlements by making them inalienable would 
lock in shareholders to their shares and make them accountable for the environmental and 
social costs that should be, by all rights, introduced into the company’s accounts. Protecting 
entitlements in companies of this sort by making them inalienable would bring changes in 
business reporting and disclosure, even if in the context of PLLCs. The need to create more 
efficient infrastructures would boost the overall economy. The inalienability of the share 
would make members strive for new corporate policy innovative solutions, and open the door 
to clean development, and to accounts stripped of environmental debts. This would 
presumably avoid the bargaining failures often associated to property rules, and the difficulty 
of collective valuation of damages linked to liability rules.856 
However, shareholders are not better off if they are prohibited from transferring their 
shares, be it for policy-related, paternalistic or moralistic reasons. Additionally, the 
inalienability of shares is not the best form to protect entitlements in the PLLC and the society 
as a whole from harmful externalities.857 On the contrary, allocating property rights to market 
agents enables them to internalize externalities.858 This is undertaken through the 
                                                             
855 See Kaplow, Louis, and Shavell, Steven, ‘Why the Legal System is less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 23, No. 2, 1994, pp. 667-681 (emphasizing that 
redistribution through legal rules is less efficient than redistribution through the income tax. They recognize, 
however, that normative economic analysis of legal rules should primarily focus on efficiency than on 
distribution of income. In this context, it is an interesting paper because it addresses the additional role legal 
rules may play). 
856 See Calabresi, Guido, and Melamed, Douglas A., cit., p. 1111-1115. 
857 See Holderness, Clifford G., ‘A Legal Foundation for Exchange’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 14, N.º2, 
1985, pp. 321-344 (326) (arguing that ‘Alienable contract rights are more valuable than inalienable contract 
rights because after the formation of a contract, but before its completion, relative prices, incomes, or tastes 
could change such that completion of the contract is no longer efficient. In this eventuality it is in the interest of 
both the promisor and the promisee (assuming he is compensated) to terminate the contract and transfer the 
resources to more valued uses. When contract rights are inalienable, this flexibility is lost, and rights thus 
become less valuable’). 
858
 See Demsetz, Harold, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, The American Economic Review, vol. 57, No. 2, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 1967, pp. 
347-359 (348) (noting that the ‘primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a 
greater internalization of externalities’). 
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readjustment of property rights, which would not be possible if they were constrained by legal 
prohibitions to their sale. This readjustment is a dynamic process, which is not immediate. It 
should be aligned with social and market values and technology.859 Moreover, prohibiting 
shareholders from transferring their shares is not reflective of how the market works. Organic 
features of the market, which legislatures must inevitably cope with, have the ability to 
modify by contract the initial delineation of entitlements set forth by the legislature. If the 
efficiency standard is the shareholders’ maximization of individual utilities, inalienability as 
such creates market friction, that is, resistance to the relative motion of the market against the 
paternalistic rubbing effect of the law. The most likely consequence is that market agents will 
not become members of PLLCs in the first place. Therefore, there is no case for inalienability 
in respect to transactions of shares of PLLCs. It is not ‘genetically’ feasible.860  
 
B. Layer 2 
 
I now turn to the second layer of the theoretical framework. I am here concerned with 
the aggregate, that is, the society and the effects that un-consented transfers may have on it. 
At this level, the role played by the regulator is crucial. It is also essential to keep in mind the 
enforcement costs borne by members, managers, employees of the company, as well as the 
society in general, if there is a change in the ownership structure of the company as a result of 
a transfer of shares. This is particularly so if this develops into a contentious dispute. Taking 
into account the role of the regulator (e.g., legislatures and courts) as well as on the impact of 
enforcement costs (e.g., informal or private mechanisms of dispute settlement, and formal 
mechanisms of dispute settlement provided by courts which are supported by taxation) is 
important, since different enforcement levels may affect the incentives of shareholders to hold 
onto their shares and invest in the company. It can also impact on the incentives of managers 
to care about doing their jobs right. For example, a potential buyer may think that if it is too 
costly to sell shares in the company, she might well not acquire them at the first place. In this 
layer, the question is: Which types of rules best maximize the benefits of the aggregate with 
the least costs? 
The social costs of controlling market failures consist not only of designing general and 
abstract rules that are independent of which and how many individuals will probably commit 
                                                             
859 Refer to the model legislative policy in Part II, Chapter 1 where three levels are presented: L1, the society, 
L2, the legislator, the regulator and courts, and L3, the market. 
860 See Rose-Ackerman, Susan, ‘Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 
85, No. 5, 1985, pp. 931-969 (making a case for inalienability). 
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the act foreseen by the law, but also of enforcement. In terms of policy, legislatures have 
opted to adopt default rules that facilitate bargaining between parties so that they find optimal 
solutions. This may also be thought of as a strategy to spare the aggregate from bearing 
enforcement costs, considering that parties, in principle, know what is best for them, and will 
bargain until they find an optimal solution. However, in most cases, parties do not expressly 
agree that, in addition to all other aspects established in the contract, enforcement costs should 
be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, this economic incentive legislatures give to market 
agents to efficiently design their own contractual framework is in many instances weakly 
enforceable, or just virtually enforceable. On one hand, this is the case because courts not 
always are technically fit to monitor the contract entered into and between the parties. The 
legislature provided default rules as a way to avoid courts being called upon to execute any 
sort of ‘judicial due diligence’ of contracts, in particular when both parties freely chose the 
rules to govern that contract. On the other hand, the policy choices as to the types of rules 
protecting entitlements in the PLLC were not undertaken in a setting where regulators 
specified a strong enforcement policy. This was a setting where regulators’ enforcement 
policy was limited to making sure that an un-consented transfer would not have any effects 
towards the company. This limitation on regulators’ policy choices derives from the fact that 
it is generally understood, as a matter of principle, that regulators do not have to monitor 
contractual relations or police their non-compliance.  
Regulators provide economic incentives through default rules to avoid or minimize 
enforcement costs. It is a commonplace that reduced enforcement costs imply reduced costs 
for market agent compliance. However, this is not necessarily true. Where there are economic 
incentives for market agents to bargain and comply, surprisingly, enforcement costs can be 
quite high. Any un-consented transfer attests that the threat of a penalty was not enough to 
deter shareholders from selling their shares. Considering the protection of entitlements in a 
scenario like this, where the transaction costs and default rules are not strongly enforceable 
(as the un-consented transfer illustrates), I try to investigate how policy choices regarding the 
protection of entitlements will affect enforcement costs and the aggregate. The goal is to 
present an economic argument which suggests that a transfer would be welfare-maximizing if 
the regulator is required to intervene less, with consequently lower enforcement costs, 
depending on the kind of protection adopted to protect entitlements in the PLLC.  
Let us return to the above-noted examples, in which individuals try to maximize their 
utilities when there is bargaining under conditions of perfect information, of unverifiable 
information and strategic behavior, and of asymmetries of information. Applying property 
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rules, liability rules or opting for inalienability not only affects the bargaining structure in 
different ways, but also entails different levels of enforcement and costs for the society.   
 
a. The aggregate’s maximization of benefits with the least costs when there is bargaining 
under conditions of perfect information  
 
I have submitted that if the parties bargain while having perfect knowledge of the terms 
of the business, and there are not asymmetries of information it should be irrelevant the 
fashion in which entitlements were allocated. This follows from the so called Coasean 
Theorem. I have explained that under property rules, and when there are not asymmetries of 
information and transaction costs are low, parties are able to bargain without major 
contingencies until they find an optimal solution. They can easily bargain to maximize their 
utilities. Additionally, this is the case because property rights are clearly defined and there are 
not harmful externalities. When this happens, property rights encompass the respective 
transaction completely. This also means that parties have found an equilibrium which is 
simultaneously socially optimal. So, this is valid for the corporation. In a scenario of low 
transaction costs shareholders and other corporate constituencies should not find any 
problems in acting together.861 There are zero costs of enforcement associated with the 
execution of the transaction.  
 
b. The aggregate’s maximization of benefits with the least costs when there is bargaining 
under conditions of strategic behavior and asymmetries of information  
 
Sometimes, parties have perfect information, but the information is unverifiable. Unless 
they get themselves into a contentious dispute, in which case liability rules would apply, the 
transaction costs should not be high, or at least not so high that the parties cannot bargain. 
This would lead us toward a situation similar to the one described above, in which the way 
entitlements are allocated is irrelevant. Thus, parties are able to bargain in order to reach an 
optimal solution under property rules. However, some cases involving unverifiable 
information boil down to asymmetries of information that originated in strategic behavior of 
the parties. It may be that in these circumstances even the party that most values the asset will 
be prevented from acquiring it because the other party is holding-out or playing hard. This is 
                                                             
861 I am thinking about the resolution of a company’s general meeting to consent to the transfer, or the register of 
the transfer into the register of members by the managers or directors of the company.  
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not efficient at the level of shareholders’ maximization of their own utilities, nor is it efficient 
from the point of view of social welfare.  
I, however, do not immediately yield the advantages of liability rules in these 
circumstances, especially because liability rules may be problematic if information about 
value is unverifiable. The way by which the use of property rules in a setting where parties 
bargain hard and hide information from each other could be efficient at both layers is through 
the creation of a scheme similar to a second-price sealed-bid auction. A second-price sealed 
auction can be defined as a setting where ‘…each potential buyer is allowed to submit a 
sealed bid, bi ≥ 0. The bids are then opened and the buyer with the highest bid gets the good, 
but now he pays the seller an amount equal to the second-highest bid’.862 Going back to my 
case, SA wants to sell her share. She knows the company of which she is a shareholder is 
bargaining hard. SA, the transferor, informed the other non-transferring shareholder, SB, that 
there was a potential buyer for her share. Since the other non-transferring shareholder held 
pre-emption rights under the articles of the company, SA had to inform her and the company 
about the deal. The non-transferring shareholder says she will not pay more than 7, even 
though she values the share at 9. SA argues that the criteria to determine the share’s fair value 
established in the articles of association are outdated, and since this is a promising start-up, 
she asks for a higher price than the non-transferring shareholder wishes to pay for it. Mr. D is 
offering 10, but he values the share at 11. Neither the non-transferring shareholder, neither Mr. 
D reveal their own valuations. The two potential buyers, that is, the non-transferring- 
shareholder and Mr. D., know that this is an auction. Once the bids are opened, the non-
transferring shareholder realizes she is about to let a new shareholder come into the company 
because Mr. D.’s bid is the highest, but he will only pay the price equal to the second-highest, 
which is 7. If the non-transferring-shareholder really wants to keep her status quo, she will bid 
for a higher price.  
Hence, a second-price auction has the potential to nudge parties to disclose their own 
valuations.863 It has the potential to cause efficient solutions. In my case Mr. D., who values 
                                                             
862 See Mas- Colell, Andreu, et al., Microeconomic Theory, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 
p. 866.  
863 See, however, Ayres, Ian, Optional Law, cit. p. 99 (considering that both liability and property rules are 
special cases of what he calls reciprocal-takings options. In his opinion, reciprocal-takings options or second 
higher-order liability rules, if optimally structured, can be Pareto-superior to either traditional liability or 
property rules. This is so because they hold an auction-like structure which can potentially harness private 
information, for they favor truncated auctions. He affirms that ‘…if policymakers appreciate that property and 
liability rules are part of a larger family of auction mechanisms, they may turn to more traditional auctions … 
that will often be less cost to administer’. It appears, nevertheless, that this scheme is more appealing to those 
who believe liability rules are more efficient than property rules in gearing information held by the parties and 
implementing truncated auctions, even if transaction costs are low).  
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the share most, would get the share under his valuation. SA would sell over the price offered 
by the non-transferring shareholder. Furthermore, the scheme of a second-price auction is 
likely to break situations of bilateral monopoly in the company that can appear due to an 
imperfect market structure or even due to the inexistence of a market for the shares of the 
company. Thus, modeling contractually something as such could help create a market for 
shares similar to the e-bay auctions market.864 The asset may not worth much, but its value is 
increased by the incentives competition creates on market agents to bid up for it.865 The 
transaction deriving from the auction would be welfare-maximizing, even though there were 
asymmetries of information and parties behaved strategically. This solution would be superior 
to that in which the asset goes to the party who has the greatest bargaining power. The reason 
for this is because it may be that their competitive advantage comes precisely from hiding 
information and playing hard, when the party who has the greatest bargaining power may not 
even be the one who values the asset most.  
 
c. The aggregate’s maximization of benefits with the least costs. The case of liability 
rules 
 
Let us suppose that, this time, the entitlement of the company is protected by a liability 
rule. I have noticed that even though efficiency can be obtained at the level of maximization 
of individuals’ utilities, the taking as such weakens shareholders' property rights. There are 
several possible scenarios. Let us consider a situation in which a welfare function maximizes 
the utility of all individuals.866 What I am trying to do is determine the best set of rules.  
In the case of liability rules, one has to question first whether or not the system of 
compensation works better with the intervention of a court. Let us start with the picture of a 
‘jungle economy’ where no courts exist. In this situation, anyone can take anything from 
anyone else. The asset is allocated to the strongest. It would not be possible to talk about 
welfare maximization here because it would not be possible to satisfy all individual 
                                                             
864 See Avery, Christopher, and Kagel, John H., ‘Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An 
Experimental Investigation’, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 6, Issue 3, pp. 573 – 603. 
865 See Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed., New York, Aspen Publishers, 2007, pp. 47-49 
(referring to the auctions of broadcast rights and explaining how a broader concept of property rights in the 
economic sense of the word can be used as device by which divergences between private and social costs or 
benefits are reduced). 
866 I am taking a utilitarian approach because it renders things comparable. The utilitarian approach, which is 
used by most economists, owes much to the ideas and writings of Jeremy Bentham. See Bentham, Jeremy, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Burns, J. H. and Hart, H. L. A. (eds.), London, The 
Athlone Press, University of London, 1970. 
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preferences of the members of the society. This is, nevertheless, a very strong assumption 
which is not in line with reality. 
When courts are in the picture and have the power to observe everything, we have 
another sort of situation. There are no asymmetries of information. Mr. D., who took the 
share, and the company go to court. Both parties to the dispute bear the cost of going to court. 
Additionally, the asset (e.g., the share) has a value. The company (plaintiff) would go to court 
if the value of compensation is higher than the costs to file for a suit. On his part, Mr. D. 
(defendant) would pay because it is cheaper to pay the compensation than to be taken to court. 
In this context, there are reasons to create an economy where the asset can be taken, but the 
taker has incentives to pay. The company obtains full compensation. Mr. D. gets the asset, 
against the payment of compensation.  
There may be, yet, a third situation. There still are courts, but this time they cannot 
observe everything. There are asymmetries of information. Parties behave strategically. 
Consequently, there is a risk of the court overvaluing or undervaluing the asset which will 
revert on the amount of compensation to be paid by Mr. D. If there is a concrete chance of 
overvaluation, the company may have more incentives to go to court. The contrary is also 
true, that is, if there is a bigger risk of undervaluation, Mr. D. will have more incentives to file 
a suit. Depending on the expectations of the parties to the dispute as to the result, there will be 
greater or fewer less incentives to litigate.  
Courts should be ‘constrained efficient’ in the last two hypotheses for the purpose of 
welfare maximization. For example, in principle, it should not be too costly for an owner to 
go to court. It should, however, at least in principle, be more costly for the taker. One might 
imagine that the taker, Mr. D, values the share more highly than the company does, the latter 
of which is more concerned with the preservation of a status quo that will most likely cause 
the retrogression of the company in the long-run. Even if this is the case, the fact that Mr. D. 
most values the share should compel him to pay whatever price is being asked for it. So, from 
the point of view of welfare maximization and given the examples I have just drawn, property 
rules are superior to liability rules.867 These examples suggest that the social costs deriving 
                                                             
867 I get away from the orthodox view that considers liability rules superior if transaction costs are high. One of 
this view’s flag wavers is Posner. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed., New York, Aspen 
Publishers, 2007, pp. 56-57 (noting that more important than the distinction between conflicting claims to a 
resource and conflicting or incompatible uses of resources is the distinction between low and high transaction 
costs. His arguments is that when transaction costs are low ‘…the law should require the parties to transact in the 
market, which it can do by making the present owner’s property right absolute (or nearly so), so that anyone who 
thinks the property worth more has to negotiate with the owner’. On the contrary, if transaction costs are high, 
Posner argues that in this setting ‘…people must be allowed to use the courts to shift resources to a more 
valuable use; the market is by definition unable to perform this function in those settings. This distinction is only 
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from the protection by liability rules are higher than they would be if entitlements were 
protected by property rules.868 Of course, one cannot be oblivious to the private costs market 
agents have to bear when entitlements are protected by property rules. But market competition 
has the ability to scatter them. Liability rules would only be advantageous for the moment, but 
not for the long-run. They would also be advantageous if the taker did not have all the money 
required for the investment, and would rather rely on the payment of compensation as a 
surrogate of the value of the asset.869 
 
d. The aggregate’s maximization of benefits with the least costs: The case of 
inalienability. 
 
I do not make a case for inalienability as an overall form of protection of entitlements 
which would be welfare maximizing. Shares of PLLCs are not public goods. Yet, one could 
think that the business object of these companies such as the sale of weapons to mercenaries, 
industrial activities that cause high levels of pollution and nuisance, traffic of human organs, 
drug trafficking, etc., could justify more active policy-oriented interference of the state and, 
therefore, the provision of the inalienability of entitlements. These could even be cases in 
which protecting entitlements through inalienability would be efficient and right from the 
distributive point of view. Yet, this would only be a second-best solution, if it would be a 
solution at all, considering that the law that directly regulates these cases, or any other law 
(e.g., criminal law, administrative law, constitutional law) should apply. Furthermore, there 
are no paternalistic reasons that justify the inalienability of shares of PLLCs. PLLCs are 
private business organizations. In this context, the state should not keep a close eye on them, 
or bring them under its wing, unless there are insurmountable market failures.870   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
imperfectly reflected in the law’). Additionally, see Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven, ‘Property Rules versus 
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’, cit. (considering that liability rules are superior where there are harmful 
externalities, but not when it comes to protect possessory interests in things).   
868 This goes against an orthodox view which has always perceived tort law in general and liability rules in 
particular, as the best way to solve problems in law. 
869 See Demsetz, Harold, ‘When does the Rule of Liability Matter?’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, No. 1, 
pp. 1972, 13-28 (noting that when there are zero transaction costs, the function of liability rules is limited to 
wealth redistribution. When transaction costs are positive, or cannot be negligible, liability rules have the 
function to allocate resources. In principle, if information is available to the society, the legal system should be 
able to allocate resources by holding liable the party that was expected to avoid the costly interaction between 
parties most cheaply). 
870 See Rose-Ackerman, Susan, cit., p. 969 (saying that ‘Inalienability is frequently justified not as an ideal 
policy but as a second-best response to the messiness and complexity of the world. It is generally possible to 
conceive of an alternative policy that would be superior if transaction costs were lower’). 
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3. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand whether liability rules or inalienability 
more efficiently solve problems of governance in the PLLC, overcome bargaining failures, 
and protect entitlements in these companies than do property rules. I have looked at the 
default rules legislators have designed in each selected jurisdictions and to the form in which 
entitlements were allocated. I concluded that in some cases, legislators have opted to allocate 
entitlements to the companies, which are protected by property rules (Property Rule 1). This 
is also a choice that is taken by shareholders by including similar rules in the articles of 
association of the company by which they require the consent of the company to execute the 
transfer.871 However, transfer clauses in the articles of association are diverse, and 
entitlements can be allocated differently. Looking at the entitlements framework presented by 
Calabresi and Melamed, I suggest three other possible ways in which entitlements can be 
allocated and protected. The entitlement can be allocated to the company and be protected by 
a liability rule (Liability Rule 2); the entitlement may be allocated to the transferor and, in this 
case, there are no transfer restrictions (Reverse Property Rule 3); and, finally, entitlements can 
be allocated to the transferor, who can sell, but the other non-transferring shareholders can 
stop her by paying the same price (Reverse Liability or Rule 4). 
I then examined the essence of property and liability rules and the possibility of 
inalienability within two layers of a theoretical model based on assumptions. If the goal is 
Pareto efficiency by which there is no further transfer that makes everybody better off, 
property rules seem to be sounder mechanisms than liability rules or inalienability to deal 
with market frictions and situations where private and social costs and private and social 
benefits diverge. In a scenario of high transaction costs, asymmetries of information and 
bargaining failures, and weak enforceability of rules, the problem of the un-consented transfer 
of shares is likely to occur. This is when the existence of an appropriate regulatory framework 
is of utmost importance. It may sound caricatural, considering that the most distinctive feature 
of the PLLC is the flexibility of its legal regime which is, in most cases, an ode to the 
principle of freedom of contract. The regulatory framework I propose is based upon the 
interference of courts into the consensual agreement of the parties by overseeing what they 
are doing when there are attempts to sabotage the interests of the party who most values the 
                                                             
871 Rules of the articles of association vary. Sometimes entitlements are allocated to non-transferring 
shareholders, to the majority shareholder, or to directors. This means that the respective share cannot be sold 
without these individuals’ consent.  
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asset. Of course, courts have to be called to the matter, and the way this happens is by filling a 
suit. Then, the courts’ task of adjudication should not only be carried out by the evidence 
parties bring to it, but also guided by the level of enforceability of default rules provided by 
the legislator and designed in the articles of association. The level of enforceability should be 
such that, once a court is called to intervene, this fact alone would cause information to 
spillover from both parties. Default rules should be able to induce this. I call these 'incentive 
default rules'. ‘Penalty default rules’ are a subset of incentive default rules.  
Additionally, I use assumptions to illustrate that it is possible that lawyers, as 
gatekeepers, engineer the articles of association of a company by creating well-crafted clauses 
and clever solutions based on Pareto efficiency.872 The scheme of a second-price bid auction 
to which I refer echoes this understanding. To this end, I find property rules superior. They 
more easily enable market agents to make transactions that improve their net welfare. 
However, in general, the protection of entitlements is not undertaken by one single type of 
rule alone. Such protection is mixed, and it is up to the lawyer to understand what the parties 
really want, and design legal solutions pursuant to the parties’ maximization of utilities. 
Concomitantly, lawyers should seek welfare-maximizing solutions. This is so because 
otherwise, market agents may not have incentives to acquire shares in these companies at the 
first place, and invest in them. This is the lawyer’s take on market design in a situation in 
which such design is missing. Nevertheless, looking at both levels –the market and the 
aggregate or society – to explain how resources can be used so as to maximize benefits with 
the least cost, implies that a decision be taken regarding the relative value one assigns to the 
society or the market. This is a tough call. 
Normatively speaking, this chapter was driven by the goal of finding a balance between 
the ex-post bargaining inefficiencies and the ex-ante economic incentives shareholders are 
given to invest. I wondered whether such balance could be achieved through a certain type of 
rule. I submit that property rules constitute the most promising path to finding an optimal 
point between two extreme positions in respect to transfer of shares in the PLLC: absolute 
protection, and no protection at all. This hints at a legal reform that takes into full account the 
                                                             
872 See Gilson, Ronald J., ‘Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 94, (year), pp. 239-313 (243) (referring to business lawyers as ‘transaction costs engineers’). 
Additionally, see Dent, George W., Jr., ‘Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects’, The Business Lawyer, vol. 
64, n.º 2, 2009, pp. 279-328 (criticising Gilson’s view and defining lawyers as ‘enterprise architects’; and Vany, 
Arthur S., et al., ‘A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-
Economic-Engineering Study, Stanford Law Review, vol. 21, 6, pp. 1499-1561 (taking a multidisciplinarity 
approach in respect to the creation of a system of property rights in the electromagnetic spectrum by which it 
interweaves law, economics and engineering). 
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empirical behavior of market agents (and this is in its true sense a bottom-up approach),873 but 
also designs default rules that are both facilitative and incentive-based. It seems simple, but it 
is not. In terms of legislative policy, this implies determining the best choice when it comes to 
allocate entitlements.874 It also entails serious thought about the design of defaults and how 
they can contribute to the development of contractual and corporate solutions which are 
primarily created from below.  
This raises the question as to which form default rules should take, given the uncertain 
nature of market agents’ preferences. There has been no consensus in the literature on this 
issue. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel treat ‘…corporate law as a standard-form 
contract, supplying terms most venturers would have chosen but yielding to explicit terms in 
all but a few instances’.875 Their theory of standardization, however, falls short of explaining 
why market agents would call for standardization in the first place.876 On the efficiency level, 
this conception of default rules calls for the application of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of 
efficiency by which the majority of the market agents would be driven to choose defaults that 
maximize their wealth. So, poor people would always be losers, regardless of their individual 
utilities. They would automatically be excluded from the flock of market agents whose voice 
is actually heard in respect to the implementation of legal policies for this matter.877 Still, 
                                                             
873 Often in Europe, discussions about a bottom-up approach to the development of EU law and its relationship 
with courts and legislators at the national level do not really sound like discussions about a bottom-up approach. 
The contours of round-table discussions on this side of the Pond are still informed by constant attempts to push 
forward answers to a list of questions raised with primarily positive objectives. In other words, these discussions 
tend to look at the law as it is, and do not look at the law as it had been in the past. In these circumstances, the 
said bottom-up approach is missed. The top-down approach continues regnant. 
874 This recalls the example of the reserve clause provided by Demsetz. See Demsetz, Harold, ‘When does the 
Rule of Liability Matter?’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 13-28 (dealing with the question 
‘…whether the identity of the owner of a player’s baseball services will alter the allocation of his playing 
activities’. An application to the Coase theorem to the question suggested that a reserve clause, by which a 
baseball club may or may not authorize a player to leave the club even if their contractual obligations toward 
each other had terminated, should not have an effect on the identity of the team for which a player plays’. 
Reserve clauses were abolished in baseball in the 1970s. They have been generally substituted in sports for a 
scheme of free agency. Europe saw the well-known Bosman case (Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football 
Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman). However, in this situation, transaction costs were prohibitive). 
875 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, 1991. 
876 A similar question was asked at the workshop ‘European Regulatory Private Law – The Paradigms Tested’, 
held at the European University Institute on 16-17 May 2013, organized by Hans Micklitz and Guido 
Comparato. I had the opportunity to attend. My analogy with evolution in biology tries to provide an answer to 
this by describing the way law is and should be generated. I try to put forward the idea that, generally, changes in 
law come about when market agents feel that the changes would be advantageous to them. So, even if law offers 
a number of off-the-rack rules to overcome contract incompleteness possibly generated by transaction costs and 
information withholding, market agents may still refrain from adopting them because they are seeking something 
else.  
877 See O’Connor, Erin O’Hara, and Stake, Jeffrey Evans, ‘Economics, Behavioral Biology, and Law’, Supreme 
Court Economic Review, vol. 19, 2011, pp. 103-141 (124) (claiming that ‘Since law and economics analysis 
often applies, whether expressly or impliedly, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, policy makers ought not jump from the 
statement that a change is efficient to the conclusion that the change is desirable’). 
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according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, this would constitute welfare maximization, provided 
the gainers were in a position to compensate losers for their losses.878 As long as the 
transaction was potentially Pareto-superior, it would be welfare-maximizing.879 Ayres and 
Gertner opine differently. They say that courts, in order to set defaults efficiently, must go 
beyond ‘the parties would have wanted theory’. They suggest a theory of ‘penalty defaults’ 
that are purposefully set at what the parties would not want. This is a form to nudge the 
disclosure of relevant information, which parties may withhold as an element of strategic 
behavior.880 Ayres' and Gertner's ideas comport well with this notion. 
It is inherent to the concept of efficiency I use in this chapter that each individual 
captains her own ship. Clearly, I use the criterion of efficiency with a normative objective 
which, starting from the assumption that an individual knows best what she wants for herself, 
is fuelled by the idea of free competition and by an organic setting for bargaining. In these 
circumstances, one who most values the asset is ready to show it, irrespective of the money 
with which she may have to compensate those who are not ready to do that. She who most 
values the asset would be ready to run the extra mile, and that would result in welfare 
maximization. This is a normative framework, centered on a normative analysis of 
entitlements. This construction gives shareholders of PLLCs the opportunity to affirm their 
hybrid property rights in shares, and try to profit from their investment in these shares.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
878 The question is: Is wealth maximization the appropriate normative focus for a theory of defaults? 
879 See Mathis, Klaus, Efficiency instead of Justice?: Searching for the Philosophical Foundations of the 
Economic Analysis of the Law (trans. Deborah Shannon), Law and Philosophy Series, vol. 84, Lucerne, 2008, 
pp. 38- 49 (analyzing and criticizing the Kaldor-Hicks criterion). Also see Kaplow, Louis, and Shavell, Steven, 
Fairness versus Welfare, Harvard University Press, 2006 (using welfare, rather than efficiency, as a standard to 
evaluate legal policies). 
880 See Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules. 
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PART II OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
Part II is the diagnostic phase, wherein I identify the differences and similarities 
between the laws of the selected jurisdictions. I assess the problems deriving from the 
establishment of restrictions on transfer of shares of PLLCs pursuant to the legal framework 
of each jurisdiction. This part is driven by the analogy between property rights in shares and 
the evolution of the silver fox. This analogy implies a universal interwovenness in law. That 
corporate law cannot be fully grasped without an adequate theory of contract law and property 
rights illustrates the principle of pleiotropy in law. Additionally, this analogy suggests that 
law can be designed to break paradigms or the status quo, when and if necessary, for the sake 
of economic development. I use this analogy in respect to the PLLC, which is contractual by 
nature. The public company, which is a business organization designed to operate in financial 
markets, with transferable shares (at least in principle) and restrictions imposed only in very 
exceptional cases, differs markedly. Hence, the problems deriving from the contractual 
limitation of property rights in PLLCs are not found in the public company. The analogy 
opens the floor to a discussion about the (re)conceptualization of property rights and classic 
principles of civil law such as the numerus clausus, and the principle of consensualism in 
France and other countries whose civil codes have been modeled on the Napoleonic Code 
(Code Napoléon). This is the case of Portugal, Italy and Spain. It ventures a less individualist 
conception of property. Restrictions introduced to the company’s contract are liable to alter 
the configuration of property rights, but also are liable to affect the physiology and 
morphology of shares which are objects of these property rights. This is yet another display of 
pleiotropy. I define shares in Hohfeldian terms. Share is an aggregate of rights (claims), 
privileges, powers, and immunities. Property rights in shares are hybrid because they have a 
mixed origin or composition determined by the contractual structures of the company’s 
contract in which shares or membership interests are defined. Additionally, these contractual 
structures are likely to enhance the power of corporate constituencies, especially managers 
who can simultaneously be shareholders, to the point that the ownership veil must be pierced 
to determine who effectively controls the company. The idea of piercing the ownership veil is 
framed by the debate on form and substance. The seminal work of Berle and Means 
popularized the notion that ownership matters. There is, nevertheless, a difference between 
the Berle and Means corporation and the PLLC. In the PPLC, shareholders are frequently 
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managers, and the lines dividing control and ownership are blurred. In the situations where 
there seems to be a strong dependence of the company on its shareholders, in practice, the 
decision-making process is led by managers or directors. Given the case law collected 
showing ex-post situations of opportunism, asymmetries of information, and holdups, and the 
structure of the companies, the proposal to pierce the ownership veil is meant to be a standard 
of adjudication. It calls for an inquiry into the ownership structures of the companies to 
resolve clashes of interests or contentious disputes. In fact, this is a standard of adjudication, 
but which also can be considered by lawyers when they face a scenario of contentious dispute 
caused by un-consented transfer. In these situations, it may be necessary to pierce the 
ownership veil and discover who really controls the company, and who is making the 
decisions that affect the interests of the transferor. If this is the case, the following questions 
should be asked. Should the design of default rules selected by the members be different? 
How is the design of defaults affecting the development of the company and the investment of 
members in it? The answers to these questions may be arrived at by using a model of legal 
policy that takes a bottom up approach to law. Also critical is the construction of original and 
efficient contractual frameworks that reinforce the hybrid property rights that shareholders 
have in their shares. This is a conundrum that requires a solution to be developed at the dual 
levels of policy and contractual experimentation. Toward this end, property rules are more 
suitable than liability rules or inalienability.  
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PART III  
 
GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH CONTRACT: 
THE PROMISE OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION 
 
(Connecting the dots) 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE COMPANY’S CONTRACT TO REARRANGE THE RELATIONSHIPS OF 
SHAREHOLDERS AND OTHER CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES
881
 
 
 
 
‘The best structure cannot be derived from theory; it must be 
developed by experience. We should be skeptical of claims that 
any one structure – or even a class of structures – is best. But we 
can see the sorts of promises that are likely to emerge in the 
competition for investments’. 
 
Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Corporate 
Contract’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 89, N.º 7, Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law, 1989, pp. 1416-1448 (1420). 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As stated above,882 I try to avoid any sort of contractual determinism in providing a 
normative account of articles of association which is able to accommodate the introduction of 
contractual clauses establishing restrictions on transfer of shares. I also describe these 
restrictions provided by default rules as tools that legislators use to adapt property rights in 
shares to the nature and purpose of the PLLC. I have equated this with a process of artificial 
selection by which legislators enable corporate constituencies, in particular shareholders, to 
maintain the closed nature of their business, and to ensure that transfers or changes in the 
company’s ownership structure are approached from an entitlements perspective. At the same 
time, these restrictions influence market agents’ behavior as to the way they perceive their 
investment in the company, and the relationships of power between members and directors of 
the company. All in all, restrictions are contractual mechanisms of governance. The questions 
that pose themselves are the following. What is this governance of? What is this governance 
for? 
                                                             
881 I am thankful to the Institute of International Economic Law (KATTI) of the Faculty of Law of the University 
of Helsinki for having hosted me while I was preparing an earlier draft of this chapter. Research on this chapter 
has been partly supported by research mission funds of the Law Department of the European University Institute. 
882 See Part II, Chapter 1. 
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Market failures, that is to say, asymmetries of information, negative externalities, 
restrictions on competition, collective action problems that cause a sort of institutional apathy, 
and opportunistic behavior in general, have traditionally been attributed to a need for more 
regulation. It is even said that these problems justify the restricting of shareholders’ freedom 
to contract and design the company’s articles both at the moment of its foundation, and 
beyond.883 I have stressed throughout this dissertation the contractual nature of company law. 
It is my strong belief, however, that this contractual core must be tempered with the right 
approach to property rights. This would include their governance by contract. Against this 
backdrop, the shaping of fundamental legal institutions executed by lawyers is of undeniable 
importance.884 Lawyers, by acting as gatekeepers, can engineer the company’s articles 
through well-crafted and clever solutions based on Pareto efficiency.885 However, default 
rules informing the contractual choices taken by market agents and their lawyers are designed 
by legislators. Oftentimes, these rules have revealed weak enforceability. They also fail to 
create incentives for market agents to change, particularly when the legal framework no 
longer fulfils their interests. In addition to managing with an outdated legal framework, 
market agents may also be ill-advised. Thus, I suggested a three-level model policy by which 
law can be generated from the bottom up.886 In general, formal changes to law occur at level 2 
(the level of legislatures) after market agents’ behavior at level 3 (the level of the market) has 
consistently unveiled longstanding practices adopted at this level. Legal changes are likely to 
affect the society as a whole (level 1).887 In this context, this chapter explores the alternatives 
available to lawyers, from a contractual and property rights point of view, to (re)adjust the 
relationships between corporate constituencies. This creative endeavor can be compared to the 
drafting work of an engineer. The lawyer, like the engineer, understands the import of 
relevant information being effectively communicated (in the case of the lawyer, upon the 
                                                             
883 See Grundmann, Stefan, European Company Law: Organization, Finance and Capital Markets, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2012, p. 51 (stating that considerations in respect to collective action 
problems that lead to ‘shareholders’ apathy’ ‘… are important for restricting the freedom to design the 
company’s statutes at the moment of its foundation, but they are certainly no less important for restricting the 
freedom to change the statutes later’). 
884 See Coffee, John C., Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance, Oxford, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2006. Also see Flood, John, ‘Institutional Bridging: How Large Law Firms Engage in 
Globalization’, Boston College Law Review, vol. 54, 1, 2013, pp. 1087-1121. 
885 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
886 See Part II, Chapter 1. 
887 There are, however, several reasons legislatures and regulators (politicians) will not always enact or reform 
law pursuant to the interests of the market. Market can be defined in economic terms as a transaction by which 
there is interplay between supply and demand. Markets have different structures and some of them have very 
complex structures. There is this view that markets are legally construed and can exist only in the framework set 
by law and government. This is the case of financial markets. See Pistor, Katharina, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance, 
Journal of Comparative Econonimcs, vol. 41, 2013, pp. 315- 330.  
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incorporation of the company and the drafting of its constitutional documents). She is keenly 
aware of the need for the ‘conventions of engineering drawing’ to be understood, and to 
remain functional throughout the life of the firm.  
This chapter is about drafting the company’s contract. It proceeds as follows. Section 1 
tries to explain the importance of the company’s contract by taking into account two . First, I 
consider the approaches taken in the literature to corporate law and the ‘corporate contract’. 
Second, I treat some of the proposed views that try to explain why firms are thought to be 
more beneficial than markets. Section 2 is an attempt to create a scheme of governance of the 
company’s contract. This scheme is mostly based on an analysis of property rights in different 
circumstances. Lawyers are described as reflexive intermediaries who assess current realities 
and harness them to create the best possible solutions. A scheme of governance of the 
company’s contract calls for mechanisms that strengthen property rights through contract. 
Again, not only lawyers play a special role, but also legislatures are important in this 
framework. Section 3 focuses on the definition of property rights ex-ante. It proposes two 
solutions to strengthen property rights at this stage – the dissolution of the company at will 
and the inclusion of lock-in clauses in the company’s contract. Section 4 concludes. This 
normative construction of the interplay among property rights, transaction costs and economic 
and political concerns owes a large debt to Ronald Coase.  
 
1. The company’s contract: Why do members use it? 
 
I shall begin with the economic question of why members need to draft a contract when 
they incorporate the PLLC. The answer is dual-pronged: it relates both to one's approach to 
corporate law and to the ‘corporate contract’, which has much to do with the structure of the 
firm and the definition of legal entity, and to the proposed view of interactions among 
individuals, which tries to put forward an explanation for the benefits of the firm in 
comparison to those of the market.888  
The so-called ‘nexus of contracts’ theory stands out in any discussion of 'corporate 
contract'.889 This theory submits that the firm is nothing but a nexus of contractual 
                                                             
888 See Coase, R. H, ‘Coase, R. H., The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 1937, pp. 386-405 (pp. 391-392) 
(arguing that whether a multiparty activity will be organized within a firm or through market transactions is 
dependent upon the respective transaction costs). 
889 See Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H., ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, 1976, pp. 305-360; Easterbrook, Frank H. 
and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 
England, Harvard University Press, 1991. 
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arrangements. In other words, the firm is what holds together a bundle of contracts such as 
employment contracts, supply contracts, lease contracts, and so on.890 Pursuant to this theory, 
corporate law is composed of a number of standard terms available to parties to use as they 
please.891 The nexus of contracts theory has been challenged by an increasingly strong 
property rights approach which maintains that some features of the company cannot be 
subjected to freedom of contract. Cases in point are limited liability, capital lock-in, and even 
fiduciary duties, when creditors and possibly members’ rights are at stake. It is indeed true 
that the contractual nature of the firm has long been recognized. For example, it has been 
framed within the conceptual lines of long-term contracts. It also has been defined as an 
alternative to the coordination offered by the market through the pricing system, and which is 
based upon a contract that sets the limits within which the entrepreneur directs the factors of 
production.892 I try, however, to put forward an explanation for the efficiency of some 
contractual solutions over others. This entails having an eye on the ‘residual rights of control’ 
that come along with the ownership of property rights in the firm.893  
With respect to the interactions among individuals that have fostered most of the 
theories of the firm, three lines of thought are worth mentioning. One is followed by the 
proponents of transaction costs economics (TCE),894 another emerges from property rights 
literature,895 and the third is supported by literature on incentives theory.896 The basic question 
                                                             
890 Ayotte, Kenneth, and Hansmann, Henry, ‘Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts, Michigan Law 
Review, vol. 111, pp. 715-758. 
891 See Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Corporate Contract’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 89, 
N.º 7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, pp. 1416-1448 (1445). It is important to note that default law is 
not an inherent consequence of nexus of contracts, although Easterbrook and Fischel have strongly argued in 
favor of default rules. There also are mandatory rules in many fields of contract law. Besides, the traditional 
view of fiduciary duties is that they are mandatory, and that one cannot, in principle, opt out of if one is a 
fiduciary. This view has been eroded somehow regarding the LLC.  
892 See Coase, R. H., The Nature of the Firm, cit., pp. 391-392. 
893 See Coase, R. H., ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’, The American Economic Review, vol. 82, 4, 
1992, pp. 713-19, which basically consists of his Nobel Lecture (saying that because in the world of positive 
transaction costs it is extremely costly and unprofitable for individuals to negotiate, even when a great deal of 
contracting is allowed by the law (e.g., defaults), the rights individuals possess are to a great extent determined 
by the law. In his words ‘It is obviously desirable that these rights are assigned to those who can use them most 
productively and with incentives that lead them to do so and that, to discover (and maintain) such a distribution 
of rights, the costs of their transfers should be low, through clarity in the law and by making the legal 
requirements for such transfers less onerous. Since this can come about only if there is an appropriate system of 
property rights (and they are enforced), it is easy to understand why so many academic lawyers (at least in the 
United States) have found so attractive the task of uncovering the character of such a property rights system, and 
why the subject of “law and economics” has flourished in American law schools’). 
894 See Coase, R. H., ‘The Nature of the Firm, Economica, cit.; Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions 
of Capitalism, New York, The Free Press, 1985. 
895 See Hart, Oliver, and Moore, John, ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 98, 6, 1990, pp. 119-1158; Grossman, Sanford J., and Hart, Oliver D., ‘The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, N.º 4, 1986, 
pp. 691-719; Demsetz, Harold, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, The American Economic Review, vol. 57, 
No. 2 (Paper and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association), 
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is: Why do companies exist? Putting it differently, why is it that individuals often prefer to 
organize their activities into a firm rather than transacting on an individual basis in the 
market? What drives integration? Classically, TCE sees the firm as an alternative method of 
coordination to the pricing mechanism. The firm appears out of an attempt to avoid 
transactions costs of carrying out transactions through the market (e.g., costs of drawing a 
contract, costs regarding inspections or policy costs of the contract, arrangements to settle 
disputes, etc.). Also, the allocation of resources is undertaken through administrative 
decisions of a board, which has drawn the attention of Coase, and later Jensen and Meckling, 
to what has been defined as agency relationships (e.g., master and servant, employer and 
employee). These considerations have been developed in modern writings, in particular in the 
field of new institutional economics (NIE).  
The approaches taken by TCE and the property-rights literature can be distinguished 
from one another by two elements: transaction costs and the incompleteness of contracts. TCE 
takes the transaction as a ‘basic unit of study’.897 Private ordering (or private governance) is, 
therefore, the distinctive aspect of the formulation drawn by this literature. Driven by the 
token of efficiency, private ordering, in the form of the most diversified contractual 
arrangements, is considered to be in itself self-sufficient in terms of incentives to overcome 
contractual inefficiencies ex-post. Since there are transaction costs and, consequently, 
contracts are naturally incomplete, parties will manage to find the best solutions to overcome 
inefficiencies ex-post.898 Taking a different tack, the property rights literature centers on 
contractual inefficiencies ex-ante. It tries to create incentives such as ‘residual rights of 
control’ by which bargaining inefficiencies are surpassed ex-ante. It is interesting to note that 
TCE does not disregard the importance of ownership arrangements. Nevertheless, it rejects 
the construction of a scheme of property rights based exclusively on a centralized legal 
system that defines a priori the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ when it comes to the allocation of 
ownership. TCE bases the construction of a system of property rights on private ordering. For 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1967, pp. 347-359; Klein, Benjamin et al., ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 21, 2, 1978, pp. 297-326; and Crain, Mark W., and 
Zardkooki, Asghar, ‘A Test of the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm: Water Utilities in the United States, 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 21, N.º 2, 1978, pp. 395-408 (providing a brief, but helpful summary of the 
literature). 
896 See Holmstrom, Bengt, and Milgrom, Paul, ‘The Firm as an Incentive System’, The American Economic 
Review, vol. 84, N.º 4, 1994, pp 972-991.  
897 See Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. 
898 It may be too late to solve contractual inefficiencies ex-post. The point of incomplete contract theory is that 
incompleteness leaves space for ex-post opportunism for which the parties need to find a solution ex-ante. See 
Maskin, Eric, and Tirole, Jean, ‘Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 66, 1999, pp. 83-114. 
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the advocates of TCE, property rights matter because the owner wields decision-making 
power in those areas in which the contract is incomplete. 
I do not see these views in an either / or context. Rather, this dissertation combines the 
two.899 I question whether the design of rules can affect the investment and consequent 
development of the company. This involves considerations of legal policy that set the tone on 
mechanisms of contractual efficiency ex-ante such as the terms by which ownership and 
control are allocated in the company. It implies thinking of property rights differently, in a 
context wherein the lines dividing ownership and control are often blurred. It demands an 
understanding of who has the residual decision-making power and how that affects the design 
of rules.900 It implies considering those situations in which control in the company may be 
acquired through an un-consented transfer, which allows that a third party interferes with the 
business of the company even if the so-called ‘owners’ have not given their consent to it. 
Ultimately, it is all about understanding, and making use of, the dynamics of control.  
PLLC members use a company’s contract because they need to follow a standardized 
procedure that is implied in the creation of a PLLC. They are thus advised by their lawyers 
who draft the contracts for them. But even if, in reality, members often ignore the contract 
they themselves made sure to be drafted, either because of close ties amongst them or because 
they want to keep a certain status quo, the fact is that by using the company’s contract they 
allocate a priori the resources available for the operation of the firm and execution of the 
respective legal entity. It gives them the psychological wherewithal to move on with their 
business. However, the company’s contract cannot keep up with the company's business. 
Except for the alteration of the members of the company, the directors, the share capital or the 
registered office as well as other relatively easy alterations to do, business practices are likely 
to become rooted into a status quo that shields corporate constituencies. Governance of the 
contract can help break this status quo and induce the renegotiation of the contract ex-post.901 
This is the other reason that members use the contract. It allows them to use governance 
                                                             
899 The incentives theory mentioned above in the text is basically a variety of the property rights theory of the 
firm. Therefore, I do not explore it. 
900 It is true that managers and directors of PLLCs control the company in many situations. But it is also true that 
in the PLLC, unlike in the public company, members can pass binding instructions to the management, and they 
do not suffer from collective action problems as much as public shareholders, especially if the company is small. 
The concept of ‘piercing the ownership veil’ that is dealt with in Part II, Chapter 3 has much to do with who 
truly exercises the residual decion-making power in the company. 
901 See Möslein, Florian and Riesenhuber, Karl, ‘Contract Governance – A Draft Research Agenda’, European 
Review of Contract Law, vol. 5, 3, 2009, pp. 248-289 (distinguishing four topics of contract governance – 
governance of contract law, governance of contracts, governance by means of contract law, and governance 
through contract. In theory, the lines demarcating these forms of contract governance are more or less clear. In 
practice, the dividing lines are not so evident).  
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mechanisms that will generate renegotiation at a future point in time.902 One way to 
conceptualize this governance opportunity is to think of governance of property rights by 
contract. Property rights of members, for example, should be strong enough to make other 
corporate constituencies such as managers feel that it is in their self-interest to behave in a 
manner that will put them in an advantageous bargaining position in the future regarding the 
members that have stronger property rights. This is true particularly if future transactions are 
planned. Let us imagine a situation in which managers or directors are appointed by one of the 
members. If a merger is planned by which the member that appointed managers in the 
company will obtain a greater stake in the new undertaking, managers or directors are 
naturally committed in aligning their interests with the interests of the member that appointed 
them. On the member’s side, it is useful to have allies in a company that now merges two 
different corporate policies, in particular regarding the distribution of dividends and retained 
earnings of the company. It may be that the only way to beat opportunism is by using 
opportunism itself. The question is, how do we strengthen property rights to this end?903 
 
2. Giving strength and substance to property rights through contract: How to 
manage the governance opportunity 
 
The idea of governance of contractual relations goes back to late Coase and his 
groundbreaking work on the nature of the firm. The understanding that market agents can 
alternatively choose between the market and the firm for the organization of factors of 
production is in itself a governance choice.904 The problem with the word ‘governance’, 
however, is that it is often ill-defined in respect to its foundations, object, and purpose or 
                                                             
902 It is true that the theory of incomplete contracts treats the phase of renegotiation as one way in which parties 
can behave opportunistically ex-post. See, for example, Segal, Ilya, ‘Complexity and Renegotiation: A 
Foundation for Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, 1999, pp. 57-82 (58) (stating that 
‘Each inefficient future trade is a potential hold-up opportunity: each party may claim that it is efficient trade, in 
the hope of extracting a greater share of ex post surplus’). However, this should not prevent the parties from 
being provided with tools that enable them to surpass high transactions costs involved in the revision or redraft 
of a contract or serve the company and the interests of its members by breaking a dominant status quo that is not 
beneficial. 
903 See Williamson, Oliver E., ‘The Economics of Governace’, The American Economic Review, vol. 95, N.º2 
(Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 
Philadelphia, PA, January 7-9, 2005, pp. 1-18 (14) (stating that property and contractual hazards invite the use of 
private ordering to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains from trade’).  
904 See Williamson, Oliver E., ‘The Economics of Governace’, cit., p. 2 (claiming that ‘As against simple market 
exchange, governance is predominantly concerned with ongoing contractual relations for which continuity of the 
relationship is a source of value’). 
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functionality.905 The word governance is used by the layman in several ways to mean control, 
power, management, administration, the exercise of authority, or the act of governing. When 
it comes to the corporation, I try to give normative substance to the word ‘governance’ by 
framing it within a perspective that takes the relationships between shareholders, managers 
and other third parties (possibly creditors) into account. This is in line with the evolutionary 
thread of this dissertation, which suggests that in law, everything is connected. This also is 
true of corporate constituencies.906 Hence, it is in this setting that I try to design a scheme to 
govern the company’s contract, and the relationships between corporate constituencies. This 
scheme is based, for the most part, on tracing the shape of property rights in different 
circumstances. 
 
(i) Governance as reflective of reality and lawyers as ‘reflective intermediaries’ 
 
The foundations of contract governance rest on the uncertainty that accompanies 
contractual incompleteness. The incompleteness of contracts may be associated with the 
extent to which shareholders can exercise residual rights of control,907 and managers can 
exercise their discretion and business judgment.908 In the context of this uncertainty that is 
part and parcel of the impossibility of foreseeing all possible future events that may originate 
losses of efficiency, the governance structure of a company by contract should be a reflex of 
reality. In this context, lawyers work as reflexive intermediaries. They look at the market and 
market agents’ demands and try to make the business go through by adopting a 360º degree 
perspective. Yet, market agents can shape the market for the benefit of a particular agent or 
group of agents. If this happens, what are the guarantees that lawyers will provide the best 
                                                             
905 See Smith, Henry E., ‘Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights’, 
Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 31, 2002, pp. 453-487 (455), note 5 (referring to ‘governance’ to mean the ‘…high 
degree of delineation of rights to resources in terms of use..’. He clarifies that ‘…governance can be supplied by 
norms, regulation, or contract. This dovetails with prior usage, because we often use the term “governance” to 
refer to the norms of use in common-pool regimes, to the exercise of power of the state, and to organization of 
economic activity through contractual restrictions’. Later, on his paper (p. 470) he says that ‘Governance … 
consists of a set of norms picking out important uses of the asset. In between are proxies that target sets of uses 
of varying sizes. Along this spectrum are various hybrid rules, which deny access to attributes on the basis of 
features or activities of the potential entrant; for example, commoners may have a rule that limits the number or 
type of animal an appropriator can bring onto the commons’).  
906 See Part II, Chapter 4 where I say that ‘…the firm potentiates the convergence of character of corporate 
constituencies through the business organisation, even if they do not share the same genetic background’. 
907 I am clearly following modern property rights literature. 
908 See Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 98, N.º 6, pp., 1119 – 1158; Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D., ‘The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A theory ofVertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, N.º 4, pp. 691-
719; Aghion, Philippe and Holden, Richard, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We 
Learned over the past 25 Years?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 25, N.º 2, 2011, pp. 181-197. 
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solutions?909 What happens if evolution encounters limitations? Law can still be used as a 
commodity, as is explained below. 
 
(ii) A multi-stakeholder perspective of the company and a ‘chicken and egg’ question – 
what comes first: the market or the law? 
 
The company must be viewed not only from the perspective of shareholders’ 
investment, but also from a perspective that considers the creation of economic value. This 
demands a holistic view of the company in which all corporate constituencies are viewed as 
potential contributors to the creation of such economic value. When these circumstances 
obtain, law can be seen as a commodity for evolutionary purposes. Putting it differently, law 
can be used as an instrument that is legislatively processed and put to the use of shaping the 
market when it comes up against evolutionary limitations.910  
One might ask whether the duty to ‘restore’ optimality rests upon the law or upon the 
market. It is notoriously difficult to answer this question. In fact, it can be perceived as a 
‘chicken or egg question’ (what comes first: the law or the market?). In my view, however, 
law follows the markets in most situations. I argue that, in most cases, law comes 
afterwards.911 This can be illustrated with the cases of Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom, where the PLLC was first created by market agents with the support of lawyers and 
notaries, without the existence of a legal framework for these companies.912 Hence, I submit 
that law has the potential to restore optimality through a selective process based upon 
experimentation, where legislatures operate as selective agents, and lawyers operate as legal 
                                                             
909 Apropos the role played by lawyers during and in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, two popular European 
roundtable questions are: ‘Is there a role for lawyers today?’and ‘What happened to the law during the 2008 
crisis?’ since in those very recent circumstances law was overridden by economic rationality. It is important to 
note that many of these debates are informed by a sociological point of view from which law and economics are 
both approached. On this topic, see Coffee, John C, Jr., Gatekeepers, cit. 
910 I am referring to the situations metioned in Part I Overview where I explain that mutations are subject to 
limitations and change does not happen or, when it does, it does not go a long way. There are physical 
limitations to evolution. This also is true for legislation. In the context of drafting the company’s contract, which 
this chapter is discussing, constraints to evolution derive to a great extent from the pervasiveness or stickiness of 
the relational element that binds the parties to the company’s contract. 
911 See Freeman, Mark et al., Shareholder Democracies?: Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland before 
1850, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2011 (analyzing the practice of governance in joint-
stock companies in Britain between the Bubble Act of 1720 and the Companies Act of 1844. According to the 
authors, this was a period during which the legal status of the joint-stock company in England was most 
uncertain, and in Scotland and Ireland was still not entirely resolved. They explain that the reason for the choice 
of this period is that it was one in which corporate governance structures, whether in corporations or in 
unincorporated companies, were largely formed without state intervention. They refer to it as the ‘key era of 
experimentation in British corporate governance history’). This is a good illustration of how law sets its 
foundations from below. 
912 See Part I, Chapters 2 and 3. 
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engineers. In this framework, experimentation trenches the traditional delineation of property 
rights to find cues for the using of property rights as a form to alleviate inefficiencies.  
Experimentation can be undertaken through contract governance, the object of which is 
the respective contract (management of contractual relations). Articles of association analyzed 
for this dissertation are an elucidative example of how legal engineering and experimentation 
can be undertaken under the arrow of default rules. There are multiple ways to engineer the 
contract of the company. It can be performed by including clauses regulating the voting and 
structure of the general meeting, the voting and structure of the management board (e.g. the 
creation of a sort of supervisory board, or the inclusion of one particular member in the 
management board. This member frequently is the majority shareholder or an ‘activist’ 
shareholder. It can be a member that, alone or together with its representatives, possesses the 
expertise, knowledge and sophistication in financial and business matters, and in types of 
transactions in which the company proposes to engage. This member is expected to be 
capable of evaluating the merits and economic risks of acquiring shares or holding the units or 
shares. She should be able to bear all such economic risks in the present and in the future.  
Other mechanisms to engineer the company’s contract can be, for instance, to provide 
additional warrants and representation clauses,913 pre-contractual agreements (e.g., 
promissory share sale and purchase agreements, escrow agreements, certificates, instruments 
and other documents foreseen in those agreements), transfer restrictions, the determination of 
situations in which only the company can take action, the regulation of ownership interests, 
capital contributions, the distribution and allocation of capital, tax allocations, limitation of 
fiduciary duties of directors to the company, any member and to other directors (this is mostly 
found in LLCs’ operating agreements), and limitation of corporate opportunities for directors, 
the regulation of deadlocks, accounting reports, tax matters, indemnification and 
compensation of members, employees and agents. All these are mechanisms of managing or 
directing the contractual venture.   
However, giving strength and substance to property rights through contract work that 
lawyers can do, at the level of the market, and legislatures can do, at the level of legal policy, 
requires an accurate understanding of the mechanisms that can be used for that purpose. It is 
                                                             
913 For example, LLC agreements may require that each member represents and warrants to the company and to 
each other member that (a) the member is acquiring membership interests in the company for the member’s own 
account and investment; (b) the member acknowledges that the interests have not been registered under the 
Securities Act of 1933 or any state securities laws, and may not be resold or transferred by the Member without 
appropriate registration or the availability of an exemption from such requirements; and (c) the Member agrees 
to the terms of the Agreement and to perform the Member’s obligations hereunder. This can be seen in the LLC 
agreement of Cornerstone Healthcare Partners, LLC included in the sample of US companies. 
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not just a matter of doctrinal knowledge or political convenience. It should be a matter of 
adequate reasoning and market sensitivity to the situations that can originate negative 
externalities and inefficiencies ex-post.914 The first question to ask is: are stronger property 
rights more likely to incentivize development and investment in the company? Let us consider 
the scheme of a second-price sealed-bid auction.915 This scheme has the potential to nudge the 
parties to disclose their own valuations. From a functional stand point, the company’s contract 
can be drafted to meet this purpose. It can also be drafted to enable the periodic readjustment 
of property rights in order to internalize harmful externalities.916 It is likely that well-defined 
and strong property rights, which, again, can be achieved through specific clauses regulating 
voting rights, the composition of the management board, capital contributions, fringe benefits, 
loans that must be granted by members to the company or the procedure for the transfer of 
property rights in shares, will unleash behavior that may be socially beneficial. On one hand, 
bargaining failures may be constrained by virtue of the clarity and enforceability of the 
applicable rules. On the other hand, there can be a psychological effect that induces members, 
managers and employers of the company, for example, to be keener to align their interests 
with the interests of those who hold stronger property rights to benefit from the control they 
exert in the company. However, there are no guarantees that they will be rewarded by those 
holding the stronger property rights.  
Part of the work of legal engineering has largely to do with choosing governance 
mechanisms with the potential to enable the above-suggested effects. This task is greatly 
facilitated by default rules provided by the legislator. However, it must be preceded by an 
effort to define property rights each corporate constituency holds in the company.  
 
3. Mechanisms to define property rights as a management strategy of the 
governance opportunity 
 
As put by Alchian and Demsetz, ‘The strength with which rights are owned can be 
defined by the extent to which an owner’s decision about how a resource will be used actually 
                                                             
914 See Kobayashi, Bruce H., and Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law Production, 
Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS11-27 (referring to the lack or weakness 
of property rights in law held by private lawmakers, which prevents them from engaging in innovation). 
915 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
916 See Demsetz, Harold, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, The American Economic Review, vol. 57, N.º 2, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 1967, pp. 
347-359 (stressing that property rights work as mechanisms of internalizing externalities. In his words, property 
rights permit that the cost of externalities is brought to bear on the decisions of all interacting persons). 
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determines the use’.917 Accordingly, the way the scope of property rights in shares is designed 
is likely to have an influence on the exercise of these rights.918 It also is likely to affect the 
management of the company. Hence, delimiting a workable and efficient system of property 
rights is vital, especially if experiments are to be made at the market and legal policy levels to 
test the best way to adopt the best rules or to adjust existing ones. Delimiting here means 
specifying rights, duties, privileges and powers that are certain in their content and 
enforceable. It means adding value to the rights of shareholders so that they will want to hold 
on to their shares unless a buyer is willing to pay the right price for them. This is an 
alternative to what is laid down above about renegotiation, which is undertaken through 
unspecified arrangements that encourage renegotiation ex-post to reach optimal results. 
Delimiting property rights ex-ante is equally important for a market to develop.  
There are two types of contractual strategies that can be drawn to strengthen property 
rights: dissolution at will (or its threat) and the inclusion of lock-in clauses in the company’s 
contract. At this point, it is worth remembering Dawkin’s description of how genes cooperate 
and compete against the background of a process of natural selection. By resorting to the 
image of a rowing competition, he explains that in order to win the evolutionary race genes 
must not only compete, but also cooperate with each other in order to coordinate their actions. 
By the same token, it is important to find mechanisms that enable market agents to choose the 
best rules, and legislators to draft the best legislation through competition and coordination. 
Consequently, the question is: will the adoption of a particular governance mechanism induce 
market agents to cooperate and compete for the most efficient legal solution? I try to answer 
this question regarding the above-mentioned dissolution of the company and lock-in clauses. 
 
(i) Dissolution at will as a remedy for the un-consented transfer of shares 
 
Several cases in the sample of case law analyzed were brought to court following a 
deadlock, dissention between members, or equivalent situations of bilateral monopolies where 
shareholders switching costs were prohibitively high. Judicial dissolution has been treated in 
the literature as well as jurisprudence as a mechanism to overcome these situations and 
                                                             
917 See Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold, ‘The Property Rights Paradigm’, The Journal of Economic 
History, vol. 33, N.º1, The tasks of Economic History, 1973, pp. 16-27 (17).  
918 Refer to Part II, Chapter 2 wherein a Hohfeldian definition of share comprising rights and duties, privileges 
and no-rights, powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities is presented. 
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respond to unexpected changes in the relationship of the parties.919 An interesting case worth 
pointing out is Kirksey v. Grohmann920 which was appealed to the South Dakota Supreme 
Court. It will serve as a springboard for discussing the same issues in the remaining 
jurisdictions. 
Kirksey v. Grohmann deals with the feud between four sisters who inherited from their 
mother equal ownership interests in family land. They decided to incorporate a LLC to which 
they transferred their property interests in exchange for equal shares in the LLC’s share 
capital (25% each). They decided to create the LLC to avoid paying estate taxes; to keep the 
land in the family in light of the fact that it had been there for over 100 years, and to make 
sure that the sisters and not their spouses would retain ownership interests in the real property. 
Following early valuations of the land and to obtain the benefit of those valuations, not only 
were family members required to live there, but also the land was used for agricultural 
purposes. The eldest sister had lived there as a hired hand before their mother’s death. 
Additionally, two other sisters, together with the eldest, owned livestock on the land. So that 
agricultural activities could continue, the sisters decided that the LLC would enter into a lease 
agreement by which the land would be leased to three of them. However, soon after the LLC 
was created, the relationship between its members begun to deteriorate. One of the members 
complained that the others ‘failed or refused to share information’ to which she believed that 
she was entitled as a tenant to the lease. Moreover, the complaining member claimed that two 
other members subleased part of the land without notice to the LLC as required by the 
operating agreement. The eldest sister and one of the members the complaints were made 
against responded by saying that the necessary information was always given. Moreover, she 
argued that all members had received notice of the sublease as they were all aware of the 
sublease arrangement when the sublease payments were initially equally distributed. The 
complaining party ended up selling her interest in the livestock. At that point she was no 
longer a tenant. Nevertheless, this did not end the acrimonious relationship settled between 
the members of the LLC. Two members who were not tenants to the lease (including the 
complaining member and one other sister) hired a real estate agent to value the land. The 
price, which was estimated at several million dollars, caused those two members to seek the 
                                                             
919 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Close Corporation Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm’, Western 
New England Law Review, vol. 33, 2011, pp. 531-565 (561) (defending that judicial dissolution is a contractual 
mechanism for responding to unforeseeable changes in which owners cannot cheaply exit via sale of their 
shares). 
920 Kirksey v Grohmann, Kirksey, 2008 SD 76, 754 N.W. 2d 825.  
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termination of the lease agreement, the dissolution of the LLC, and the partition of the land.921 
These members filed a motion to terminate the lease agreement at the general meeting of the 
company. The two other members opposed the motion. Given that the company’s contract 
required resolutions be taken by majority vote, the motion failed due to the deadlock. In the 
face of the deadlock, the member who moved the action and the one who seconded it filed a 
petition with the circuit court of South Dakota requesting that the court dissolve the LLC 
because ‘its economic purpose was unreasonably frustrated and it was not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the company’s business in conformity with the articles of organization 
and the operating agreement’. They added that ‘the strained relationship between the sisters 
made it impossible for any major decision-making’ and that the two opposing members had ‘a 
personal financial interest in continuing the lease agreement and preventing dissolution of the 
LLC’ to the detriment of the plaintiffs. The circuit court denied the plaintiffs’ petition. 
Consequently, they appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, invoking the error of the 
lower court in granting summary judgment against judicial dissolution of the LLC. The 
Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants and 
remanded the case for entry of an order of judicial dissolution and winding up pursuant to 
S.D. Codified Laws § 47-34A-806. The Supreme Court provided that  
 
The sisters created their company with the understanding that they would have relatively equal 
say in its over-all management and operation. Although each sister has an equal vote, there no 
longer exists equality in the decision making. [G and R] have all the power with no reason to 
change the terms of a lease extremely favorable to them. Leaving two sisters, half the owners, 
with all the power in the operation of the company cannot be a reasonable and practicable 
operation of a business. Moreover, their deadlock certainly impedes the continued function of 
the business in conformity with its operating agreement. No procedure exists in the company’s 
documentation to break a tie vote and protect the company in the event of changed condition. As 
long as the company remains in control of, and favorable only to, half its members, it cannot be 
said to be reasonably practicable for it to continue in accord with its operating agreement. 
 
The court goes on saying that in this case 
 
… we have two members of an LLC that hold all the power, with the other two having no power 
to influence the company’s direction. We recognize that forced dissolution is a drastic remedy 
                                                             
921 This is an example of opportunism. They were trying to dissolve the LLC that was set up exactly to prevent a 
split-up of the land. 
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and may produce financial repercussions for the sisters, but how can one reasonably conclude 
that the economic purpose of this company is not reasonably frustrated? The members cannot 
communicate regarding the LLC except through legal counsel. The company remains static, 
serving the interests […] of only half its owners. They neither trust nor cooperate with each 
other. The sisters formed their company contemplating equal ownership and management, yet 
only an impenetrable deadlock prevails. [Highlighted by the author] 
 
At this point, one might ask why dissolution is needed for this. Could not this situation 
of self-dealing be resolved under the duty of loyalty? If fiduciary duties do not provide a 
solution, dissolution is still considered an alternative. Next, one might wonder about less 
severe solutions for the problem, such as changes in the governance agreement. The rub lies 
in the idea that even though rights were foreseen statutorily, the reality was not reflexive of 
the agreement into which the members had entered. Furthermore, this is a case that mirrors 
how the relationships of power in small companies are liable to freeze the business purpose 
for which they were created. The astaticism that subverted the purpose of the ownership 
interests led the court to dissolve the LLC.  
It is interesting that in this case the court opted for taking a drastic measure such as 
dissolution instead of reasoning about other remedies like, for example, breach of fiduciary 
duties, and breach of contract or invoking controlling shareholders’ opportunism.922 In this 
dissertation, I have treated a case in which restrictions on transfer of shares fail as a 
governance mechanism of the PLLC which, given its nature and purpose, frequently begs for 
a contractual structure that limits the openness of the market for its shares. The failure rests on 
the fact that shareholders end up selling their shares in breach of the requirement of consent 
stricto sensu stipulated in the company’s contract (un-consented transfer).923 It is true that, in 
                                                             
922 See Thompson, Robert B., ‘Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations’, Washington 
University Law Quarterly, vol. 66, N.º 2, 1988, pp. 193-238 ( stating that ‘The legislation and judicial decisions 
expanding dissolution rights and providing alternative remedies reflect this reality more accurately than the 
traditional statutory and fiduciary norms, which overlooked the intimacy of the participants’ relationship, the 
illiquidity of their investment, and the inability of participants in such enterprises to plan adequately for 
disharmony’). Courts have been keen to reiterate the principle stated by the US Supreme Court that ‘where a 
dispute arises from obligations that are expressly addressed by contract, that dispute will be treated as a breach of 
contract claim’. Moreover, any fiduciary claims arising out of the same facts that underlie the contract 
obligations would be foreclosed as superfluous’. On this, see Fisk Ventures v. Segal, 2008 Del. Ch. 158 (May 7, 
2008); Vila v Bvwebties LLC, -- A3d --, 2010 Del. ch. Lexis 202 (Rel. ch. Oct. 1, 2010 citing Nemec, 991 A.2d 
at 1129 (citing Blue Chip Capital Fund, 906 A.2d 827, 833 (Del. Ch. 2006); Gale v. Bershad, 1998 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 37, 1998 WL 118022, at *5 (Del. Ch. March 3, 1998).  
923 This is, in fact, stressed by Gruebner, Meghan, ‘Delaware’s Answer to Management Deadlock in the Limited 
Liability Company: Judicial Dissolution’, The Journal of Corporation Law, vol. 32, 3, 2006, pp. 641-657 
(arguing that ‘A buy-sell agreement is probably the best solution for management deadlocks, because it allows 
the communication of the company within the control of one of the original members. Furthermore, it does not 
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the United States, if the transfer is not consented, the transferor can still transfer economic 
rights. Furthermore, there are European countries where such a transfer may be considered by 
courts as entirely unenforceable. The problem is that often these measures are not sufficient to 
prevent the indirect influence of a third party in the company, which subverts the purpose for 
which the PLLC was created. One could think that the fact that the articles of association offer 
an exit mechanism such as rights of appraisal would be enough to prevent the bargaining 
failures and situations of bilateral monopoly we have seen in this dissertation. Nevertheless, in 
countries like the United Kingdom, such rights are not statutorily established. There are, in 
fact, situations of lock-in of shareholders if directors decide not to register the transfer in the 
register of members. Also in the United Kingdom, the validity of tag-along and drag-along 
clauses, for instance, introduced in the articles of association has not been tested in courts yet. 
Besides, when exit mechanisms are ‘consecrated’ in the company’s contract, they may be 
outdated because they were agreed upon at a time when the contractual expectations of the 
parties were different. 
Thus, given these circumstances, the question is whether it is normatively acceptable to 
push the remedy of judicial dissolution beyond fault of controlling shareholders, as in Kirksey 
v. Grohmann. In other words, can dissolution be used in broader terms for protection of the 
interests of corporate constituencies?924 It is difficult to say conclusively, because dissolution 
is in and of itself a drastic measure. However, in the United States, LLCs like partnerships are 
often at will. That is, any member can send the company into dissolution. Even, otherwise, a 
court may order dissolution for some important reasons such as the frustration of the 
economic purpose of the company. Furthermore, I refer to dissolution because constituencies 
hold common interests in the company and, therefore, a possible scenario of dissolution has 
the potential to (re)adjust the interests of shareholders, managers, employees, and even 
creditors.925 This is so because, if the company ends, any economic rents they expect to draw 
from the PLLC will most likely be destroyed and managers and employees will lose their jobs 
if the company is dissolved. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
force the members to continue the business in disagreement and provides the departing member with a fair value 
for his interest in the company’). 
924 See Freeman, Mark, et al. Shareholder Democracies?, cit, pp. 179 – 210 (referring to special rights of 
dissolution in conjunction with the clause of limited liability). 
925 In the context of the problems raised by dissolution, see Li, Jianpei, and Elmar Wolfstetter, ‘Partnership 
Dissolution, Complementarity and Investment Incentives’, CESifo Working Paper No. 1325, 2004, pp. 1-23 
(analyzing the relationship between investment and the dissolution decision. The dissolution rule to which they 
refer is typically a buy-sell provision, which they propose be combined with a right to veto the proposed 
dissolution. Otherwise, dissolution will always entail an efficiency loss). 
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Portuguese law provides that the articles of association may determine penalties for 
transfer of shares that is executed without the consent of the company.926 Given that these 
penalties are not specified, it seems that the law gives the members considerable leeway on 
this matter, and dissolution may be included in a contractual clause as a mechanism to sort out 
or avoid drastic situations of holdups and bargaining failures.927 Portuguese law also foresees 
judicial dissolution following the petition of the interested party based on a fact determined in 
the law or the contract. The idea of dissolution at will, that is, the dissolution of the company 
as per the exclusive will of one of its shareholders, is alien to Portuguese law. There is a 
manifest legislative intent to preserve the substance of the company. Nevertheless, possible 
scenarios of feud between members can arguably justify a request for dissolution even if the 
majority of members are against it. This is, in fact, more understandable in those situations in 
which the company’s contract does not provide any sort of lock-in clauses,928 and the minority 
shareholder sees her opportunity of investment being corseted by the status quo promoted by 
the majority. Dissolution can be even more pressing when there is a deadlock between the 
members (e.g., in a 50%-50% PLLC). When this obtains, the design of the clauses of the 
company’s contract ought to play an important role.  
Spanish law determines that companies are dissolved by the existence of a legal or 
statutory cause acknowledged by the general meeting or by a court order.929 The law lists 
several causes of dissolution, one of them being a cause foreseen in the company’s contract.930 
Judicial dissolution is also established.931 Additionally, the company may be dissolved by 
mere agreement of the general meeting.932 Thus, a legislative intent to preserve the substance 
of the company is also manifest in Spanish law. Nowhere in the law is dissolution at will 
foreseen. Notwithstanding this fact, most rules are defaults and, therefore, the legislator gives 
a large amount of freedom to market agents to design the company’s contract in the manner 
                                                             
926 See Article 229 of the Portuguese Commercial Companies’ Code.  
927 See Article 141/1 of the Portuguese Commercial Companies’ Code determining that the company is dissolved 
in the cases foreseen in the contract. 
928 As discussed below, lock-in clauses are contractual devises that can be used for holding the member and 
securing her investment in the company.  
929 See Article 362 of the Ley de Sociedades de Capital (providing that ‘Las sociedades de capital se disolverán 
por la existencia de causa legal o estatutaria debidamente constatada por la junta general o por resolución 
judicial’).  
930 See Article 363 / 1 (h). 
931 See Article 366 / 1 (determining that ‘Si la junta no fuera convocada, no se celebrara, o no adoptara alguno de 
los acuerdos previstos en el artículo anterior, cualquier interesado podrá instar la disolución de la sociedad ante 
el juez de lo mercantil del domicilio social. La solicitud de disolución judicial deberá dirigirse contra la 
sociedad’). (‘If the general meeting is not called, held, or does not resolve in accordance with any of the 
agreements referred to in the preceding article, any part may request the dissolution of the company before the 
judge of the Commercial Court located where the company has its registered registered office. The petition for 
dissolution of the company must be filed against the company’). 
932 See Article 368. 
 352 
 
they deem fit. In this sense, contractual clauses providing not only judicial dissolution, but 
also dissolution at will besides any other type of penalties for the un-consented transfer of 
shares or irreparable situations of deadlock in the company and disputes between members 
can be drawn.933 
Italian law, unlike Portuguese and Spanish law, foresees the principle of free 
transferability of shares, unless it is otherwise determined by the company’s contract.934 
However, it establishes that transfers of shares only have effects toward the company if the 
share sale and purchase agreement with the authenticated signatures of the parties is filed by 
the authenticating notary at the office of the Companies Registry in whose jurisdiction the 
company maintains its registered office.935 Thus, the refusal of the notary to authenticate the 
signatures or file the agreement may as well work as a sort of penalty for un-consented 
transfers before drastic resort to dissolution. Still, the law, like, for the most part, Portuguese 
and Spanish laws, provides that the public company, the limited partnership and the Italian 
version of the PLLC (societá a responsabilita limitata) can be dissolved upon the occurrence 
of the causes listed in the law and upon any other clauses established in the company’s 
contract.936 As a consequence, the law makes the distinction between the causes for 
dissolution provided by the law itself, and those provided by the articles of association. Like 
the two previous jurisdictions, in Italy, the conservation of the company’s assets 
(conservazione del patrimonio sociale) is seen as a fundamental principle.  
In France, a company may be early dissolved by resolution of the shareholders.937 Early 
dissolution may also be ordered by the court at the request of a shareholder for just cause 
(justes motifs), particularly when contractual obligations are breached by a shareholder, or 
there is a disagreement between shareholders that paralyzes the functioning of the company. 
                                                             
933 The dissolution of the company is not seen by many in Spain as an optimal solution due to the principle of 
conservation of the company (‘conservación de la sociedad’). It even has been regarded as an easy way for 
parties to part ways, a situation that is not consistent with an economic policy to keep factors of production. 
Moreover, it is said not to benefit minority shareholders. However, if the parties value their business enough they 
will not want to dissolve the company unless that is imposed by a mandatory rule or by contract. 
934 See Article 2469 of the Italian Civil Code.  
935
 See Article 2470 of the Italian Civil Code. 
936 See Article 2484/7 of the Italian Civil Code (Codice Civile) (establishing that ‘Le società per azioni, in 
accomandita per azioni e a responsabilità limitata si sciolgono … per le altre cause previste dall'atto costitutivo o 
dallo statuto’). (The public company, the limited partnership and the limited liability company are dissolved … 
for the other causes established in the articles of association or by laws [of the company]. 
937 The transfer clause of the company’s articles (statuts constitutifs) of the French SARL, Boucherie Gilles is 
illustrative. This company is included in the sample of French SARLs that I scrutinized. Its registered office is in 
Paris. The company’s contract provides for the early dissolution of the company if consent to the transfer is not 
given within one year as of the date the transferor made the offer to the company and other non-transferring 
shareholders. This company had two shareholders at the time it was incorporated. 
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French jurisprudence has clarified the meaning of justes motifs in several instances.938 
Furthermore, the company may be dissolved for any other cause established in the articles of 
association.939 French law does not provide for dissolution at will.  
UK law regulates the striking off of the company in general, which can be carried out 
by the registrar when the company is not carrying on business or in operation (registrar’s 
power to strike off defunct company); or by voluntary application by the company (voluntary 
striking off).940 The application for striking off of the company may be withdrawn by notice to 
the registrar.941 Essentially, it mirrors the same principle of conservation of the company that 
prevails in the jurisdictions treated above. Besides, United Kingdom law foresees the winding 
up of a company by a court on just and equitable grounds.942 It is difficult to draw a taxonomy 
of situations in which courts will consider that it is just and equitable to wind up a company. 
The generality of the words is obvious. English courts take a case-by-case approach and 
evaluate each case on its own merits.943 It is, however, possible to set out a number of 
circumstances that have determined the granting of a court order of winding up on just and 
equitable grounds: 
1. Dissention between members often involving minority shareholders 
oppression.944  
2. Feud between members and directors leading to a breakdown of trust and 
confidence.945 
3. Directors’ misconduct.946 
The power that courts possess to make a winding-up order, if they consider that it is just 
and equitable that the company should be wound up, has been provided by the Joint Stock 
Companies Winding-up Act 1848 and then by the Companies Act 1862. Neither the literature 
nor jurisprudence has established a consensus on the words ‘just and equitable’. For more 
than five decades as of its contemplation in the law, this expression has been interpreted to 
                                                             
938 See, for example, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Commerciale, N.º 08-22073, 23 March 2010; and Cour de 
Cassation, Chambre Commerciale, N.º 02-14750, 14 December 2004. 
939 See Article 1844-7 /4.º, 5.º, and 7.º of the French Civil Code. The company is in liquidation from the moment 
of its dissolution. The French Commerce Code provides rules regarding the liquidation of the company. In this 
sense, Articles L 237-1 and L 237-2 are worth reading. 
940 See Section 1003 and ff of the Companies Act 2006. 
941 See Section 1003. 
942 See Section 122 (1) (g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (providing that a ‘A company may be wound up by the 
court if … the court is of the opinion it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up’). 
943 See Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd and others [1973] AC 360, [1972] 2 All ER 492, [1972] 2 WLR 
1289. 
944 See Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd and others; Re Abbey Leisure Ltd [1990] BCLC 342, [1990] BCC 60. 
945 See Re Zinotty Properties Ltd. [1984] 3 All ER 754, [1984] 1 WLR 1249, [1984] BCLC 375, [1983-85] BCC 
99,139. 
946 See Re Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 , [1972] 2 All ER 492, [1972] 2 WLR 1289.. 
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include a list of circumstances ejusdem generis. In order to limit the scope of application of 
the words, there has been a tendency to list the situations which they are to apply. However, 
jurisprudence has tended to use this power broadly to judge those cases where the shareholder 
has relied on any circumstances of justice or equity which influenced her in her relations with 
the company and other corporate constituencies such as managers and other shareholders.947  
Another relevant aspect that singles out the hybrid features of the private company in 
the United Kingdom is the bridge to partnership law that is created by jurisprudence, in 
particular regarding companies that are, in substance, partnerships. Indeed, given the size of 
certain companies and the close ties normally binding its members, the analogy with 
partnership law is, in these cases, intuitive. In addition, it favors the design of creative 
mechanisms of governance, especially if the relationship between corporate constituencies 
may reach a stage which cannot be predicted by the parties at the time they draft the 
company’s contract. 
In the United States, I refer particularly to the laws of Delaware and New York states. 
According to the Delaware LLC Act, a LLC is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up 
upon, among other causes, the happening of events specified in a LLC agreement.948 It is 
apparent that, generally, the Delaware LLC Act focuses very strongly on the agreement. 
Courts are not very likely to overrule a governance agreement for which the parties explicitly 
bargained. This stands in contrast with older case law on close corporations.949 Additionally, 
case law on fiduciary duties emphasizes the priority of contracts.950 The Delaware LLC Act 
also foresees judicial dissolution. Courts may order dissolution for some relevant reasons such 
as when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with a LLC 
agreement.951 As to the 'reasonably practicable' standard for judicial dissolution, and for the 
most part similarly to the case Kirksey v. Grohmann above, courts have ordered dissolution of 
a LLC where there is a deadlock.952 However, it is not infrequent that operating agreements 
                                                             
947 See the words of Lord Wilberforce in Re Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd. Also see Re Thomas Edward 
Brinsmead & Sons [1897] 1 Ch. 406 (winding-up on just and equitable grounds due to the constitution of a 
company for fraudulent purposes); Re Diamond Fuel Co (winding up) (1879-80) LR 13 Ch. D 400 (oppression 
of a minority shareholder by majority); and Re A&BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1975] 1WLR 579 (winding-up 
following a situation of deadlock). 
948 See § 18-801 (dissolution). This is a default rule, which means that members have considerable leeway to 
dispose otherwise. 
949 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, Smith v. Atlantic Properties. 
950 See Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84. 
951 See 6 Del. C. §§ 18-802 (judicial dissolution). Some court decisions stress that in cases in which the standard 
for judicial dissolution is met, the ultimate determination of whether dissolution should be ordered is committed 
to the relevant court's equitable discretion. See, for example, Haley v Talcott, 864 A.2d at 93. 
952 See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel 294 N.Y. 112, *; 60 N.E.2d 829, **;1945 N.Y. LEXIS 820, ***; 159 A.L.R. 
280. 
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include a waiver clause by which members agree that the initiation of a dissolution action will 
cause ‘irreparable damage’ and they, as a consequence, agree to waive their rights to seek 
dissolution or the appointment of a liquidator. Not differently from the Delaware LLC Act, the 
NY LLC Law determines that a LLC is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up upon the 
first to happen of several cases, namely the happening of events specified in the operating 
agreement.953 The law also provides for judicial dissolution ordered by the Supreme Court in 
the judicial district in which the office of the LLC is located on application by or for a 
member whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with 
the articles of organization or operating agreement.954  
The LLC is often described as a hybrid entity (at times, referred to in the jurisprudence 
as an alternative entity) that combines characteristics of corporations, limited partnerships and 
general partnerships. It is not uncommon to see that not only partnerships are at will, but also 
LLCs frequently are. Perhaps the reason why LLCs are at will, but European PLLCs are not, 
is that the US LLC laws are based on partnership law (the statutes being very similar), while 
European PLLCs are small versions of the corporation.955 It has not always been like this, 
especially at a time the LLC had not been implemented yet.  
At this time, however, when the Treasury Regulation §§ 301 – 7701-2 defining business 
association was still in force,956 Larry Ribstein, the recognized intellectual authority in the 
field, claimed that given the high costs related to the illiquidity of partnership interests, a 
partner’s power to dissociate from the firm at will was desirable. Nevertheless, he called 
attention to ex ante uncertainty and the costs that non-dissociating partners would have to 
bear. For example, the abusive exercise of dissolution at will by a partner ‘…may cause all of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
In this judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, it is stated that ‘Any corporation may arrive at a 
condition where dissolution is the right and necessary course’. This is true not only of the corporation, but also 
the LLC. 
953 See the N.Y. LLC. LAW § 701: NY Code - Section 701 (dissolution), which is a default rule. 
954 See N.Y. LLC. LAW § 702 NY Code - Section 702 (judicial dissolution). This is a default rule.  
955 This is apparent if one reads the Bill Jacket of the NY LLC Law, where reportedly Chapter 34 of the 
Consolidated Laws Limited Liability Company Law was enacted at the same time that partnership and business 
corporation laws were amended. It was possible to learn through a letter of John B. Daily, Senator for the 61st 
District, dated as of 13 July 1991, addressed to Ms. Elizabeth D. Moore, the Counsel to the Governor, that the 
Bill of the LLC for the State of New York would not only allow the formation of LLCs under New York Law, 
but also the recognition of general partnerships that provided professional services as registered limited liability 
partnerships (RLLLPs) under state law, and the recognition of limited liability status of general partnerships that 
provided professional services that had registered as limited liability partnerships (LLPs) in other states. It is 
understandable that the joint treatement of LLCs and RLLPs, especially for tax purposes, determines similar 
legal solutions for different types of business organizations to be adopted. 
956 This refers to regulations 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3, also know as ‘check-the-box regulations’ 
which allowed members of LLCs to elect to have the business treated as a corporation given that LLCs were 
‘disregarded’ as separate taxable entities, and were treated as sole proprietorships for tax purposes. See the US 
case described in Part I, Chapter 3. 
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the non-dissociating partners to give up partnership assets without adequate compensation or 
to lose the benefit of firm specific human capital’.957 Thus, he fashioned a cost-and-benefits 
approach to partner dissociation.958 One interesting idea is the fact that dissolution at will can 
not only be used by partners when they were not able to predict ex ante potential causes of 
dissociation, but also it can be used when there is no uncertainty in the face of the contractual 
obligations assumed by the parties. In these circumstances, dissolution can be used as a ‘threat 
of dissociation to force renegotiation of the bargain’.959 Another possibility is to utilize 
dissolution at will in order to induce a particular investor to invest more. This investor, who 
can be a ‘vital resource contributor’, will have considerable leverage to renegotiate the 
company’s contract if faced with the threat of dissociation by other members. If other 
members dissociate, the investor will lose the investment made to that point. Another 
argument put forward by Ribstein in favor of dissolution at will is the fact that this ends up 
being a cost-efficient contractual device that avoids higher costs of dissociation and prevents 
the withdrawal of firm-specific investments in human capital, for instance.960 Nevertheless, he 
points out that his conclusions do not necessarily apply to corporations (closely and publicly 
held alike). No reference is made to the LLC because it only would be created a few years 
after. Still, dissolution at will is an alternative that is plainly foreseen for partnerships, but 
which also is worth exploring in respect to the LLC.961 This is, in fact, done by the court in 
Fisk Ventures, LLC v Segal, where the court applies by analogy the statute for limited 
partnerships.962 
                                                             
957 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation’, Washington University Law Review, 
vol. 65, 2, 1987, pp. 357 – 426 (390). 
958 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation’, cit., pp. 357 – 426. 
959 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation’, cit., p. 390. 
960 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation’, cit., p. 391 (arguing that ‘A related 
point favoring dissociation at will is the availability of cost-efficient contractual devices to protect against costly 
dissociation. If the statute provides for dissociation at will, the partnership can discourage dissociation and 
protect against withdrawal of human capital and other resources by developing firm-specific capital the partners 
would lose by leaving, by limiting the compensation to be paid to the dissociating partner, by providing for 
payment of liquidated damages, or by limiting post-dissociation competition’). 
961 I am grateful to Larry Ribstein for having discussed this idea with me while I was a Visiting Scholar at the 
University of Illinois College of Law in 2011. See § 18-801 (b) of the Delaware LLC Act were it is foreseen that 
‘Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the death, retirement, resignation, 
expulsion, bankruptcy or dissolution of any member or the occurrence of any other event that terminates the 
continued membership of any member shall not cause the limited liability company to be dissolved or its affairs 
to be wound up, and upon the occurrence of any such event, the limited liability company shall be continued 
without dissolution’. 
962 See Fisk Ventures, LLC v Segal, --A3d --, 2009 Del. ch. Lexis 7 (Del. ch. Jan 13, 2009) aff’d 984 A.2d 124 
(Del 2009). Additionally, see statute provision 6 Del. C. §17-802. It is also worth seeing Vila v Bvwebties LLC, 
-- A.3d --, 2010 Del. ch. Lexis 202 8Rel. ch. Oct. 1, 2010 where the court applied by analogy the statutory 
provision 8 Del C. § 273 of the DGCL (dissolution of joint venture corporation having two shareholders). 
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Additionally, courts can generally order corporate dissolution or other relief when cases 
of deadlocked members or managers or manager misconduct make judicial dissolution 
warranted.963 The dissolution order may be issued based upon equitable considerations. This 
means that dissolution may be a sound alternative and, therefore, granted despite the LLC 
agreement containing an exit mechanism (e.g., a put right) because, for example, it would ‘not 
be equitable to force [the petitioning member] to use the exit mechanism where the member 
would remain liable on personal guaranty of entity’s mortgage after exit’, or it would not be 
fair to force a buy-out at all if, according to the operating agreement, the petitioner is given an 
option to leave and, depending on the circumstances, it decides not to do so.964 This is a 
business decision of the petitioner that does not necessarily imply a circumvention of the 
agreement.  
As ‘creatures of contract, designed to afford the maximum amount of freedom of 
contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved’965 LLCs’ legal framework, 
especially the one provided by the Delaware LLC Act, is meant to be very flexible. It allows 
the parties to structure their company as they deem appropriate. The wide scope of freedom of 
contract, private ordering and, consequently, flexibility enables members to draw property 
rights in their shares by experimenting with new solutions. Additionally, they can align their 
interests in ways that can seem innovative in the eyes of an outsider, but which make perfect 
sense considering the context of the company. The LLC is a good example of how contract 
law can create a laboratory – an analytical legal matrix – that sets the grounds for new 
conceptualizations of property rights and their delineation. It also sets the grounds for 
mechanisms to (re)arrange the members and managers governance relationship. The 
alternative of dissolving a company should be understood in light of the ample scope of 
freedom of contract and the enforceability of the company’s contract that statutory default 
                                                             
963 See Vila v. Bvwebties, LLC, -- A.3d --, 2010 Del. Ch. Lexis 202 (Rel. ch. Oct. 1, 2010); Phillips v. Hove – 
A.3 d --, 2011 Del. ch. Lexis 137; Achaian, Inc. v. Leemon Family LLC, 25 A.3d 800 (Del. ch. 2011) (this case 
poses the following question: may one member of a Delaware limited liability company assign its entire 
membership interest, including that interest's voting rights, to another existing member, notwithstanding the fact 
that the limited liability company agreement requires the affirmative consent of all of the members upon the 
admission of a new member, or, must the existing member assignee be readmitted with respect to each additional 
interest it acquires after its initial admission as a member ?); and Fisk Ventures, LLC v Segal, --A3d --, 2009 
Del. ch. Lexis 7 (Del. ch. Jan 13, 2009) aff’d 984 A.2d 124 (Del 2009). In this last case the court famously stated 
that ‘… if that deadlock cannot be remedied through a legal mechanism set forth within the four corners of the 
operating agreement, dissolution becomes the only remedy available as a matter of law. The Court is in no 
position to redraft the LLC Agreement for these sophisticated and well-represented parties’). 
964 See Haley v Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 88, 96-98 (Del. ch. 2004) and Fisk Ventures, LLC v Segal, --A3d --, 2009 
Del. ch. Lexis 7 (Del. ch. Jan 13, 2009) aff’d 984 A.2d 124 (Del 2009). 
965 See Fisk Ventures, LLC v Segal,--A.3d--,2009 Del. Ch. Lexis 7 (Del. ch. Jan 13, 2009) aff’d 984 A.2d 124 
(Del 2009) quoting R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, C.A. No. 3803-CC, 2008 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 115, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (quoting TravelCenters of Am., LLC v. 
Brog, C.A. No. 3516-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, 2008 WL 1746987, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008). 
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rules provide.966 By reading dissolution (including dissolution at will) in light of the principle 
of freedom of contract, the validity of contractual clauses that use it to avoid acute bargaining 
failures in the company is maintained. That does not jeopardize courts’ competence to order 
judicial dissolution. 
The imposition of restrictions on transfer of shares is liable to create deadlocks and 
hold-ups and, consequently, prevent the company from operating or furthering its business 
object purpose (for example, the decision-making process of the company would be seriously 
affected if resolutions at the general meeting are subject to impasse). If this happens, it may 
not be reasonably practicable for the company to carry on its business. A clause allowing 
dissolution at will, by which a company may be dissolved as per the will of one of its 
members, is understandable because, pursuant to the reasons given above, is less likely to 
result in a destruction of going concern value. It would be, however, interesting to evaluate 
the costs and benefits resulting from the alternative parties are given by law to contract around 
such provision instead of drafting for it. This implies thinking about the principle of 
maintaining the substance of the company that all six jurisdictions, in one way or the other, 
consider in light of mechanisms of governance. Again, it may be that the only way to beat 
opportunism is opportunism itself (e.g., a threat of dissociation). This does not eliminate 
questions related to minority or majority oppression. Nevertheless, if bargaining is optimal, 
those who most value the company and their investment in it will take that threat seriously. 
Hence, dissolution costs may work as a red light that pops up if members and managers 
threaten to jeopardize the enabling environment created by the defaults they have chosen 
when they entered into the company’s contract. Dissolution costs comprise those incurred 
from accountancy and legal advice (which include services regarding personal liability, 
restructuring, liquidation and insolvency, and taxation). These are costs that the parties to the 
company’s contract (including the transferor), much less the transferee, may not be ready to 
bear. Furthermore, the parties to the company’s contract as well as managers and the 
employees of the company may have sunk investments on human and physical capital they 
are not willing to lose with the premature dissolution of the business.967  
                                                             
966 See Ribstein, Larry E., ‘A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation’, cit., p. 364) (enhancing the relative 
flexibility of closely-held firms by saying that ‘Despite variation among firms, the relatively closely-held firm is 
a suitable model for designing statutory dissociation provisions because economies of scale of transaction costs 
make large firms more likely than smaller ones to enter into customized agreements’). 
967 See Guinnane, Timothy, and Rodriguez, Susana Martinez, ‘For Every Law, a Loophole: Flexibility in the 
Menu of the Spanish Business Forms’, Department of Economics Yale University, Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 103, Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1012, 2012, pp. 1-31 (24) (referring to 
one of their findings which was that Spanish firms they included in their sample and belonging to the ‘chemicals 
and pharma’ sector seemed to be more worried about untimely dissolution than other firms such as those in the 
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(ii) Lock-in clauses  
 
Lock-in, in this context, means investment commitment.968 A lock-in contractual clause 
is engineered in such a way that it is reflective of the needs of the company and its 
shareholders in the long-run. For that reason, lawyers while drafting the company’s contract, 
which gives legal form to the firm, will tend to not ignore the importance of the ‘contractual 
technology’ they are using.969 Lock-in techniques are used intentionally to bond market agents 
to a commitment they made when they assumed contractual obligations. I have said that the 
stickiness of the relational element in PLLCs leads to a stable equilibrium that is difficult to 
upset.970 Putting it differently, when the relational element prevails, different contractual 
practices are hardly developed in the PLLC in the long-run, for there is stable equilibrium 
from which market agents appear not to deviate (even when deviating from it would seem to 
be beneficial). However, the case law collected illustrates how opportunistic the behavior of 
members and managers of these companies can be. Thus, the purpose of lock-in clauses is to 
enable institutional change and contractual innovation and simultaneously avoid opportunistic 
behavior or ‘treachery from within’.971 I explore one possible type of lock-in clauses: the 
periodic revision of the clauses of the company’s contract.972 However, there are other 
alternatives. It will all depend on the imagination, knowledge, intuition and expertise of the 
lawyer.973 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
‘food and drink’ sector because the former type of firms ‘…had more sunk investments in intellectual property 
and firm-specific human and physical capital…’). 
968 See Blair, Margaret, ‘Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century’, UCLA Law Review, vol. 51, 2003-2004, pp. 387- 455 (referring to the corporation in the 
late nineteenth century as a form to promote resource commitment). 
969 See Davis, Kevin E., ‘Contracts as Technology’, New York University Law Review, vol. 88, 2013, pp. 83 -
127. Also taking a ‘contract as technology’ approach, see Ribstein, Larry E., ‘Close Corporation Remedies and 
the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm’, Western New England Law Review, vol. 33, 2, Symposium: Fiduciary 
Duties in the Closely Held Firm 35 Years After Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 2011, pp. 531-565. 
970 See Part II, Chapter 1. 
971 See Part II, Chapter 1 where this expression is used. It tries to explain that, unlike certain forms of 
equilibrium in nature that are not subject to ‘treachery from within’ to use Richard Dawkins expression, 
contracts are, for the most part, subject to treachery from within, that is, opportunistic behavior. 
972 I thank Henry Hansmann for having discussing this with me.  
973 For example, drafting a clause providing a mechanism equivalent to a put-option or a ‘right to sell’ as an 
insurance or guarantee of minority shareholders’ investment and of shareholders’ investment in general may be 
an alternative to dissolving the company and, at the same time, overcome bargaining failures if they exist. The 
exclusion of the transferor from the company when there is an un-consented transfer could be drafted as another 
type of lock-in clause. The question that poses itself is: Which member - the transferor or the transferee? The 
answer is intimately connected with the system of transfer of property rights in the selected jurisdictions. On this, 
see Part II, Chapter 2. 
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The idea of creating revisable clauses is in line with the construction of an environment 
that potentiates longstanding investment of market agents in the companies of which they are 
members, and dissuades them from behaving opportunistically. These are clauses that make 
members, managers and employees of the company put their money where their mouth is. 
Unlike the dissolution clause, these clauses pay due respect to the principle of substance of 
the company. The regular update of clauses, and particularly the transfer clause, is meant to 
help surpass inconsistencies and ambiguities in the interpretation of the company’s contract. It 
also is supposed to trigger disclosure of information which, in these companies, is more likely 
to be omitted or kept secret since there are no mandatory requirements of disclosure as there 
are in respect to public companies, especially if listed in stock markets.974  
Roberta Romano stresses that the standard pattern of financial regulation is the 
provision of legislation in a crisis atmosphere under conditions of great uncertainty followed 
by 'status quo stickiness', for the legislator somehow waits until she gets a consensus on an 
understanding of what has happened so that a tailored solution can be designed. In order to 
face this problem, Romano proposes that Congress and regulations include, as a matter of 
course in financial legislation and regulation adopted in the midst or aftermath of a financial 
crisis, procedural mechanisms that require automatic subsequent review and reconsideration 
of those decisions along with regulatory waiver powers which create enough flexibility in 
implementation and promote experimentation.975 She is dealing with financial regulation and 
suggesting solutions to be implemented, for the most part, at what I have defined as level 2 of 
the legal policy model.976 Her understanding echoes the idea that, in the face of substantial 
uncertainty followed by what she calls ‘status quo stickiness’, it is crucial that legislatures and 
regulators are in a good position to facilitate a change of paradigm. Lock-in clauses, however, 
should be contextualized in what I called level 3 of the policy model.977 They should be 
understood at the level of contracting. PLLCs are contractual in their nature and purpose.  
Periodic clause review can be provided for in the company’s contract, but so can 
restrictions on transfer of shares. Thus, this is not a guarantee that members will abide by 
these contractual clauses. There must be incentives to reviewing. The problems do not differ 
very much from those which effect contracts to be incomplete – uncertainty, high transaction 
                                                             
974 Drafting or redrafting a contract normally requires the reviewing of the former contractual framework and the 
collection of new information from the parties so that the revised contractual setting matches their expectations.  
975 See Romano, Roberta, ‘Regulating in the Dark’, in Goglianese, Cary (ed.), Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis 
of Confidence in US Regulation, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, pp. 86-117. However, the 
idea of ‘sunset legislation’ is not new.  
976 See Part II, Chapter 1. 
977 See Part II, Chapter 1. 
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costs, weak property rights that do not render their holders a strong bargaining position. The 
possibility for any member to trigger the reviewing process by convening the general meeting 
of the company or requesting this directly to the management board constitute build-in 
mechanisms to induce revision of the company’s contract.978 Triggering this process of 
periodic revision should be conceived as part of the managing rights of any shareholder.  
It is difficult to say which contractual strategy will work best, for this depends on the 
circumstances of the business. Still, the transfer clause as well as other clauses of the 
company’s contract, especially those dealing with the governance and ownership structure of 
the company, should be attuned to the reality of changing circumstances in business. This 
may be achieved through experimentation at the lower level – the level of contracting - which 
is likely to determine that the environment in the company also changes. Lock-in clauses 
serve this purpose. The special aspect of these clauses is the fact that, if well drafted, they are 
liable to make market agents commit to their investment. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This chapter proposes a scheme for the governance of the company’s contract. In doing 
so, an eclectic language is used that makes reference to concepts of law, engineering, 
economics and biology. Default rules, which members normally include in the company’s 
contract, give members a governance opportunity. Members have the option to adopt these 
rules, or contract around them and choose other contractual solutions. One possible way to 
manage this governance opportunity is to adopt mechanisms that allow members to manage 
their property rights through contract. I point out two alternative strategies – dissolution at 
will and lock-in clauses.  
In respect to the dissolution of the company at will, I make a connection with 
partnership law. This makes sense especially for PLLCs, which are in substance partnerships. 
There are obligations that are so basic that, if broken, the company can arguably be dissolved. 
However, the principles of partnership law depend very much on the law of specific countries. 
If dissolution at will is foreseen in the company’s contract, members are empowered in their 
ownership rights. The threat of dissolution at will is likely to encourage members and 
managers to align their interests by nudging them to act non-opportunistically. Furthermore, 
the mechanism of dissolution may work as an investment incentive since it gives members 
                                                             
978 If unanimity or majority requirements are foreseen, reviewing will be more difficult to effect. 
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and potential investors the idea that it is possible to leave the business, if particular 
circumstances obtain. This is a mechanism that can be used not only by the transferor to 
pressure other shareholders to provide their respective consent stricto sensu, but also by any 
other non-transferring shareholder. The latter can threaten to dissolve the company in the case 
of an un-consented transfer.  
Lock-in clauses appear here as mechanisms that are supposed to be reflective of the 
needs of the company and its shareholders, and are able to lock-in investment. One possible 
clause is the periodic revision of contractual clauses. While drafting the respective clauses, 
lawyers act as reflexive intermediaries whose task is to craft the company’s contract to govern 
the property rights of members and (re)arrange the relationship between corporate 
constituencies whenever it is needed.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS AND KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER: 
CAN JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FORCE A POLITICAL CHANGE IN 
EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW?
979
 
 
 
  
‘The principle of states’ rights and the idea that each state is a 
laboratory are strong in this country. 
On the other hand, one can fairly hope that the growth of the law in 
a civilized society should be evolutionary’. 
 
Cary, William L., ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 83, No. 4, 1974, pp. 
663-705 (696). 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided some insights regarding mechanisms to govern the 
contract of the company and give strength and substance to property rights. Experimentation 
with the solutions suggested therein at the lower level (market) through the work developed 
by lawyers, notaries, and other gatekeepers will, I believe, provide new legal grounds within 
which the internal and external relationships of shareholders and other corporate 
constituencies can be rearranged, especially if there is a scenario of un-consented transfer of 
shares. This chapter explores the benefits of jurisdictional competition980 in creating new legal 
solutions. For example, could national legislators feel compelled to adopt dissolution at will 
as a remedy for bargaining failures in the context of PLLCs law? Additionally, this chapter 
                                                             
979 This chapter is based on a seminar paper titled ‘Bringing the Essence of Regulatory Competition Back: 
Evolving Business Practices, Networking of Market Agents, and Competition as Sources of European Company 
Law’. I presented this paper at the seminar ‘Territorial Laws in a Global Era’, which was organised by the 
research project The Architecture of Regulatory Competition, at the University of Helsinki on 22-23 November 
2013. I thank the participants for their helpful comments. I also am particularly thankful to Erin A. O’ Hara and 
Jan Smits for their questions and comments on the ideas I brought to the seminar. These ideas are, for the most 
part, exposed herein. 
980 I preferentially use the term jurisdictional competition because in my opinion it emphasizes the competition 
between states. However, the expressions jurisdictional competition and regulatory competition are 
interchangeably used in the literature.  
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considers the differences and similarities between the corporate law families I have chosen for 
this study. It is against this background that I suggest a theoretical reasoning based upon an 
evolutionary market process. The aim of such reasoning is to explain if and how it is possible 
to create a common denominator or common standards on major principles of corporate law 
that enable jurisdictional competition in Europe. Jurisdictional competition is viewed here as a 
means to reach the best legal solutions. It is, therefore, related to the principle of Pareto 
optimality.981 As principles of company law I emphasize the concept of the company as a 
separate legal personality with limited liability, and in particular transferability of shares. I 
bear in mind that companies are incorporated for different purposes, even though the design 
of the respective companies’ contracts follow very similar patterns in respect to form and 
substance. On the other hand, I keep in mind that Member States have different market 
structures as well as different socio-economic standards. This being said, I look closely at 
jurisdictional competition, as a way to force a political change in corporate law when and if it 
is needed.  
The focus of the competition dynamics is on corporate default rules. A parenthesis is 
due here. This chapter is not about how the judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
on freedoms of movement, which have been the engine of jurisdictional competition in 
corporate law in Europe, are likely to affect transfer of shares of PLLCs. Neither is this 
chapter concerned with whether restrictions on transfer of shares of PLLCs breach the 
freedoms of movement provided by the EU Treaties. Most of the rules establishing 
restrictions on transfers are default rules, as we have seen. Arguing that they breach freedoms 
of movement would be equivalent to saying that they breach constitutional rights ─ and 
constitutional rights are inalienable. This is not the case of property rights in shares of PLLCs, 
which pursuant to freedom of contract may be disposable or not. Furthermore, if we assume 
that the ECJ would affirmatively judge such restrictions as violations of freedoms of 
movement like it did regarding the so- called golden shares cases, we would be attributing a 
mandatory nature to the rules that regulate transfer of shares in private limited liability 
companies. This goes against their purpose, which is different from that of publicly held 
companies.982  
                                                             
981 In the previous chapter, I have stated that policy-wise, it is important to find mechanisms that enable market 
agents to choose the best rules and legislators to draft the best legislation that come about through competition 
based on coordination. Law, in this sense is a commodity because, considering that there are limitations to 
evolution, it provides the infrastructure to transpose such limitations in the market. The major thrust of this 
chapter is: How does this work at the transnational level? 
982 I thank Dhammika Dharmapala for having discussed my views with me while I was a Visiting Scholar at the 
University of Illinois College of Law in 2011. All mistakes and omissions are, of course, mine. 
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Default rules restricting transfer of shares may work for small companies. Nevertheless, 
this may not be the case for larger companies where it is desirable that membership be 
changed. This echoes the issue of non-competition agreements between employer and 
employee, which were non-enforceable in the American state of California. Ronald Gilson 
argued that the unenforceability of these restrictions in the State of California was partially 
responsible for the development of Silicon Valley because it encouraged employees to 
change. In my case, restrictions on transfers prevent third parties from entering into the 
company. This is the context in which I explore the possible inefficiencies of defaults 
establishing restrictions on transfers. I suggest that defaults restricting transfer of shares can 
potentially hinder a knowledge-spillover effect which would likely contribute to the 
development and investment in the company. This is particularly so if the rule is outdated or 
members have been ill-advised.  
The market evolutionary dynamics and the idea of knowledge spillover as sources of 
competition, economic aggregation, innovation and growth provide the normative frame 
within which I investigate possible incentives for states to change their legislative policy 
agenda.983 It is the frame within which I try to understand if it is possible to create an adequate 
institutional framework for jurisdictional competition in Europe. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 draws upon the concept of market and 
tries to put forward a definition that can accommodate the exercise of freedoms of movement 
as they are defined in the EU Treaties and have been forged in the judgments of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). This section tries to convey the idea that different markets have 
different structures, and that this point should be considered in any construction of 
jurisdictional competition in Europe. Further, it explores the relationship between market 
integration (for which freedoms of movement are crucial) and jurisdictional competition. 
Section 2 reviews the question as to whether jurisdictional competition creates a race to the 
bottom or a race to the top, to understand what could be the channels of competition, if they 
exist at all. It takes a bottom-up approach to the promise of jurisdictional competition in 
Europe and proposes the creation of a network between market agents, lawyers, notaries and 
other gatekeepers, at the market and society levels, and legislatures, at the political level. 
Section 3 extends the idea described in the previous section. It dwells on the construction of a 
                                                             
983
 See Budzinski, Oliver, ‘Monoculture versus diversity in Competition Economics, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 32, 2008, pp. 295-324 (312) (stating that ‘Which path of development the evolutionary process 
of competition of a specific market eventually takes depends sensitively of the institutional framework’). 
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theoretical framework which is able to bring sustainability and a common ground to a scheme 
of jurisdictional competition in Europe. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The definition of market and EU Treaty freedoms 
 
(i) The concept of market 
 
I have described a three-level model of legal policy by which legislatures (level 2) and 
markets (level 3) interconnect at a point where law is created from below. It is, however, 
important to define market. The judgments of the ECJ are relevant for this matter. ECJ’s 
judgments in cases such as Centros, Uberseering, Inspire Art, Sevic and Cartesio highlight 
freedom of choice. National law only is allowed to restrict such freedom for public interest 
reasons, and this only on a case-by-case basis.984 Another interesting point is the debate 
regarding the codification and creation of a European Civil Code because of the concept of 
market and the implications which may derive from it. For example, Stefan Grundmann asks: 
‘A European Code on the use of private parties’ power to shape their relationships 
autonomously and on the regulatory prerequisites of such a freedom – too audacious a 
vision?’985 In respect to this question it is important to stress that markets vary. This variation 
depends, among other elements, on property ownership. The structure of shares and how 
property rights are contractually defined influences market structures. Legislators would do 
well to pay close attention to this, particularly when they undertake any codification actions 
with harmonization purposes.986  
On the point of harmonization, some authors have suggested a process of reflexive 
harmonization by means of which regulatory innovation would be stimulated. One of the 
advantages of a process like this is that it would promote cross-border capital mobility. It also 
could be used for creditor and employee protection to avoid a situation of race-to-the-bottom 
if jurisdictional competition was in place. Additionally, harmonization would likely limit 
competition. As a result, the autonomy and diversity of legal systems would be preserved 
while the process of evolutionary adaptation of rules at the state level would be induced or 
                                                             
984 See Grundmann, Stefan, European Company Law: Organization, Finance and Capital Markets, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2011, p. 255. 
985 See Grundmann, Stefan, ‘On the Unity of Private Law from a Formal to a Substance-Based Concept of 
Private Law’, European Review of Private Law, vol. 18, 6, 2010, pp. 1055-1078 (1078). 
986
 See Samuel, Geoffrey ‘All that Heaven Allows: Are Transnational Codes a ‘Scientific Thruth’ or Are They 
Just a Form of Elegant ‘Pastiche’?, in Monateri, P.G. Methods of Comparative Law. Research Handbooks in 
Comparative Law Series, Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 165-191. 
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‘steered’.987 This is how these authors normatively craft the legitimacy of the regulatory 
process at the EU level which, in their view, should be based upon the transnational 
harmonization of markets. Labor laws constitute an interesting example within which 
standards are implemented as ‘floor rights’. The merit of this construction is evident, and even 
more so if one does not single out the fact that markets are different. If one does single it out, 
then, this aspect can be a problem. Moreover, ‘reflexive harmonization’ provides states with a 
number of options, but on the level of law implementation.988 I stress the merits of market 
integration and free movement law in stimulating jurisdictional competition and legal 
innovation as opposed to a procedural idea of law implementation. I understand, however, 
that some level of harmonization may be needed to facilitate a phenomenon of jurisdictional 
competition identical to that which obtains in the United States. Yet, the existence of different 
market representations should be taken into account. The two above-noted examples referring 
to the scope of the freedoms of movement and projects of codification in Europe can 
potentially be a showcase of different representations of market. For the purpose of this study, 
I am interested in understanding which definition of market best fits the concept of freedoms 
of movement as they are provided by the EU Treaty and have been interpreted by the ECJ in 
the cases abovementioned. 
The concept of market has been treated in the literature in different ways. The market 
has been described as ‘economic organic’, a form of ‘social organization’.989 According to the 
transaction costs economics literature, markets as well as firms and other mixed modes are 
alternative instruments of governance. The underlying characteristics of the transaction(s) in 
question determine the suitability of these instruments to mediate a transaction or a set of 
transactions.990 Williamson interestingly refers to natural selection forces in respect to the 
operation of the market. He says that ‘Natural selection forces do not always operate quickly, 
                                                             
987 See Deakin, Simon, ‘Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law’, ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 163. Also see Smits, Jan, ‘A 
European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System: Towards a Ius Commune through the Free Movement of Legal 
Rules’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 5, 1998, pp. 328-340.  
988 See Korkea-aho, Emilia, ‘Implementation of Territorial Laws in a Global Era: An Emerging Arena for 
Regulatory Competition?’ (paper presented within the seminar Territorial Laws in a Global Era, organized by 
the research project The Architecture of Regulatory Competition, 22-23 November, University of Helsinki. This 
paper is not published and is on file with the author) (claiming that the focus should be put on implementation / 
enforcement if we want to think of jurisdictional competition as a feasible hypothesis within the EU. She 
suggests a sort of activism on the level of law implementation which should be undertaken at the states' level and 
not so much at the transnational regulators’ level. The author, inspired by O’Hara and Ribstein’s Law Market, 
emphasizes jurisdictional competition on the implementation level based upon the use of voice by which a 
proposed law can be spoken out and/or it can be shaped after it has been adopted). 
989 See Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., New 
York, 1967, p. 313. 
990 See Williamson. Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, 
New York, The Free Press, 1985, p. 129. 
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however. So the market can be compared, as I do, to a living organism’.991 As he puts it, 
markets, unlike internal organizations, do not show a propensity ‘to manage complexity, to 
forgive error, and to engage in logrolling’.992 ‘The market is a marvel … not merely because 
of its remarkable signaling properties (under the requisite preconditions), but also because of 
its remarkable capacity to present and preserve high-powered incentives’.993 Additionally, he 
concludes that ‘… market mediated transactions rely more on high-powered incentives and 
less on the administrative process (including auditing) to accomplish the same result’.994 
Harrison White says ‘A market is an ‘act’ which can be ‘got together’ only by a set of 
producers compatibly arrayed on the qualities which consumers see in them’.995 This author 
explains how markets are a construction which is undertaken through a complex and erratic 
process that is liable to yield a number of outcomes. He affirms that ‘Markets are defined by 
self-reproducing cliques of firms, and not the other way around’.996 In his words ‘… firms 
seek niches in a market in much the same way as organisms seek niches in an ecology’.997 
Gilson and Kraakman state that ‘… market discipline in the form of heavy trading losses will 
restrain idiosyncratic traders and may even eliminate them through a “Darwinian” process of 
natural selection’.998 These authors agree that there is an evolutionary bias that pushes 
markets towards efficiency. They recognize, however, that market efficiency need not pertain 
to to any particular type of information. Referring to the efficiency of capital markets they 
hold that for some types of information, at least, there is fully efficient equilibrium. In an 
attempt to apply their analysis beyond the ‘specialized world of securities traders’ their view 
is that ‘Markets, after all, are pervasive phenomena. They mediate the allocation of far more 
than capital. Moreover, the extent of informational efficiency is surely a central determinant 
to the pricing behavior and institutional underpinnings of all markets, and not merely of the 
securities market’.999 Oliver Hart says that the market is a ‘complex equilibrium process’.1000 
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the market is a space where self-interested actors 
                                                             
991 See Williamson. Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, cit., p. 129.  
992
 See Williamson. Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, cit., p. 149. 
993
 See Williamson. Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, cit., p. 161. 
994 See Williamson. Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, cit., p. 161. 
995 See White, Harrison C.’, Where do Markets Come From?’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 87, No. 3, 
1981, pp. 517-547, p. 519. 
996 See White, Harrison C.’, Where do Markets Come From?, cit., p. 520. 
997 See White, Harrison C.’, Where do Markets Come From?’, cit. p. 520. 
998 See Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’, Virginia Law Review, vol. 70, 
N.º 4 (Fifty Years of Federal Securities Regulation: Symposium on Contemporary Problems in Securities 
Regulation), 1984, pp. 549-644 (583). 
999 See Gilson, Ronald J. and Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’, cit., p. 643. 
1000 See Hart, Oliver, ‘An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 89, 
No. 7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 1989, pp. 1757-1774 (1764), note 31. 
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interact. This interaction has the ability to review the discretion with which market agents 
adopt contracts.1001 These authors also say that ‘“Markets” are economic interactions among 
people dealing as strangers and seeking advantage’.1002 They stress that all economic activity 
is an interaction between real people. They are careful, however, to stress that they do not 
personify markets. They also make reference to markets as products of natural selection and 
as places where competition has a space to evaluate the effects of contracts in general and the 
corporate contract in particular. Corporate governance devices that have survived in many 
firms for extended periods demonstrate that the durability of a practice both enables people to 
gauge its effects and allows competition among firms to weed out the practices that do not 
assist investors. Apparently, there is no similar process of winnowing out of academic ideas 
or regulations.1003 In the words of Sir Arthur Salter, which were quoted by Coase, ‘The 
normal economic system works itself. For its current operation is under no central control, it 
needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity, and human need, supply is 
adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and 
responsive’.1004 As Coase himself puts it, ‘The market is a complicated structure with 
exchange transactions’.1005  
Given the above, markets can be described as a social construction that creates the 
environment framing the expectations of market agents. In this sense, the word ‘ecology’ fits 
well, since it alludes to the relationship between organisms and their environment or even to 
the relationship between human groups and their social environment. Markets can be a 
political construction based upon a scheme that governs the exchanges between market 
agents. Markets also are an economic construction where the supply and demand lines 
intersect, and where transactions are incentive-based. It is an exchange of goods and services 
where a price is established. Since markets have different structures,1006 it is understandable 
that different market structures diversely affect the supply and demand sides of law.1007 This 
                                                             
1001 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., ‘The Corporate Contract’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 89, 
No. 7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 1989, pp. 1416-1448 (1418). 
1002 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., ‘The Corporate Contract’, cit., p. 1422. 
1003 See Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Corporate Contract’, p. 1442. 
1004 See Coase, R. H., ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, vol. 4, 16, 1937, pp. 386-405 (387). 
1005 See Coase, R. H., ’The Nature of the Firm’, cit., p. 388. 
1006 For example, departures from perfect competition change the characteristics and outcomes of the market in 
various ways. A good comparison between different types of competition and the respective outcomes is 
between Bertrand competition and Cournot competition. Bertrand competition is a market situation in which 
firms compete based upon their decisions on market prices. Cournot competition is a market situation in which 
rival firms compete in light of their choices of quantity. The interdependence between the decisions of rival 
firms in terms of pricing or quantity decisions determines differences in industry structure.  
1007 See Schumpeter, Joseph A., Can Capitalism Survive?, New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London, 
Harper Colophon Books, 1978 (saying that ‘… as regards practically all the finished products and services of 
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should not only be taken into account in the debate about the feasibility of jurisdictional 
competition in Europe, but also in the discussion of whether it can stand for an adequate path 
to create better law. 
 
(ii) The definition of market access and ECJ’s criteria for interpreting rules of the Treaty 
on freedoms of movement 
 
In the early judgments of the ECJ, criteria to interpret rules of the Treaty contemplating 
freedoms of movement and to understand whether national measures were restricting these 
freedoms were based on the principle of non-discrimination, and in particular on the grounds 
of nationality.1008 In reviewing the relatively recent cases of the ECJ not only with regard to 
free movement of capital, but also to other freedoms, it is clear that there has been a paradigm 
shift, and that the language of discrimination has been increasingly complemented.1009 The 
Court has developed the market access or restrictions test.1010 This test provides that national 
measures likely to prohibit, impede, hinder, or make less attractive the exercise of freedoms of 
movement restrict access to the market. However, these formulations do not specify what it is 
meant by ‘impede’, ‘hinder’, or ‘render less attractive’. The concepts are rather loose and 
involve a considerable degree of uncertainty. Often the Court’s response has been rather 
intuitive.1011 On the other hand, the ECJ has been developing and refining its techniques for 
interpreting the rules of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to limit 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
industry and trade, it is clear that every grocer, every filling station, every manufacturer of gloves or shaving 
cream or handsaws has a small and precarious market of his own which he tries – must try – to build up and to 
keep by price strategy, quality strategy – “product differentiation” – and advertising’). Also see Gelter, Martin, 
‘The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, vol. 
5, pp. 247-284 (showing, from a legal standpoint, several aspects in which the structural conditions of European 
market for corporate law is different from the United States). 
1008 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR I - 649; Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (Dassonville) [1974] ECR I-0837; 
and joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard 
[1993] ECR I-6097. 
1009 To a certain extent, both principles of non-discrimination and market access overlap. For instance, in Cassis 
de Dijon the Court did not abandon the language of discrimination. However, the idea reflected in that judgment 
that goods lawfully produced in a Member State should have unrestricted access to the markets of other Member 
States’, that is, the consecration of the principle of mutual recognition, forms the essence of the market-access 
test. 
1010 For an account of the use of the market-access test in the jurisprudence, see Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard 
v Consiglio dell’ Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR 4165, para. 37. On this matter, also 
see Barnard, Catherine, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 17-25. 
1011 See Rosas, Allan, ‘Life after Dassonville and Cassis: Evolution but no Revolution’, in Maduro, Miguel 
Poiares and Azoulai, Loïc (eds.), The Past and the Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 
50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 444. 
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the all-too encompassing nature of the market-access or restrictions test.1012 The Court has 
played this role mostly by presenting the conditions of justifications, by using the principle of 
proportionality. As for the proportionality, the ECJ has held that rules or national measures 
must be appropriate to ensure achievement of the intended aim, and must not go beyond that 
which is necessary in order to achieve that objective.1013 
Freedoms of movement give individuals and companies the opportunity to invest in the 
internal market by promoting the openness of this market. To that end, Member States, and 
their legislators and courts must be aware of the effects that national measures or rules will 
have on investors of other Member States. Many of these rules regulate private relationships, 
and are enshrined in traditional codes, which are less vulnerable to EU law. It is important to 
note, however, that the ECJ has interpreted differently the concept of market access.1014 Let us 
take as an example the case of special shares (golden shares) that used to be held by some 
Member States in public companies. Some of ECJ’s judgments considered that national 
measures, including the creation of circumstances or legislation that once adopted were likely 
to prevent or limit the acquisition of shares in the undertakings concerned or to deter investors 
of other Member States from investing in their share capital, fell within the concept of 
restrictions or barriers to access to the market.1015 Other judgments defined as restrictions any 
rules, since rules impose compliance costs that can potentially render the exercise of freedoms 
less attractive.1016 And, finally, rules whose effects on freedoms and intra-union trade could 
be intuitively grasped have also been considered restrictions.1017 Second, it is true that not 
                                                             
1012 For example, in the opinion of the Advocate General Lenz that was delivered on 20 September 1995 in the 
case C-415/93 Union royale belge des societies de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club 
liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-
Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para. 200 ‘... in examining the compatibility of national provisions with the 
provisions of Community law on the fundamental freedoms, it is not so important which specific fundamental 
freedom a particular factual situation is to be measured against. What should be decisive is rather whether the 
provisions in question hinder trans-frontier economic activity and – if that is the case – whether those restrictions 
are justified’. 
1013 See, for instance, case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141, para. 
45. 
1014 See Barnard, Catherine, cit. pp. 21-23. 
1015 I am referring, for instance, to the introduction of clauses in the articles of association of publicly held 
companies stating the assignment of special rights to the respective Member State, when introducing these 
clauses was a decision taken by the relevant Member State in the course of privatization of the companies. See 
joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v Netherlands [2006] ECR I-0000. 
1016 It is of interest the court judgment in case C- 49/89 Corsica Ferries France v Direction Générale des Duoanes 
[1989] ECR I 4441 in which the ECJ states the following: ‘As the Court has decided on various occasions, the 
articles of the EEC Treaty concerning the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital are fundamental 
Community provisions and any restriction, even minor, of that freedom is prohibited. 
1017 See cases C-438/05 The International Transport Workers, Federation and the Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti (Viking) [2007] ECR I-0000; C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others (Laval) [2007] ECR I-0000; and C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert, in his 
 372 
 
every restriction on the opportunities that individuals and companies have to invest must be 
considered a restriction on the exercise of economic freedoms.1018 And, in this context, it is 
important to single out the principles of direct effect and supremacy of EU law.1019 These 
principles bind not only legislatures, courts and the administration, but also private parties. 
The different approaches to this test made by the ECJ converge on the premise that rules 
stemming from legislation or any instruments of private regulation such as articles of 
association in the circumstances involving golden share cases, protecting positions acquired 
by economic operators established on the national market, by restricting the entry of new 
operators and rendering trade between Member States more difficult than internal trade, 
violate fundamental freedoms.1020  
Market access potentiates competition not only between market agents, but also 
between states. Thus, it is fair to say that freedoms of movement are likely to lay the ground 
for a market for law and competition among EU Member States. So far, however, the main 
reported vehicle of competition has been the mobility of companies under freedom of 
establishment.  
 
(iii)The internal market and the supply and demand of efficient rules 
 
Besides establishing a European legal order, the ECJ stated in Van Gend en Loos that the 
objective of the EEC Treaty was to establish a common market, the functioning of which was 
of direct concern to interested parties in the community.1021 Fifty years after this 
groundbreaking decision, the current wording of Article 3, par. 3 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) states that ‘The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work 
for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
capacity as liquidator of the assets of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG v Land Niedersachsen (Rüffert) 
[2008] ECR I- 0000. 
1018 Advocate General Poiares Maduro in his opinion delivered on 7 April 2005, case C-446/03 Marks and 
Spencer PLC V David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-0000, para. 40, claims that ‘...not every 
restriction on economic or commercial freedom is a restriction on the exercise of the freedoms of movement’. 
1019 Case-law C- 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR I - 000, C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970], C-106/77 Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA. [1978] ECR I – 629. 
1020 Opinion delivered by Advocate General Poiares Maduro on 7 April 2005, case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
plc v David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes) [2005], ECR I-000, paragraphs 39 and 40. 
1021 See Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62. Also see in the 
literature Weiler, Joseph H.H., ‘The Transformation of Europe’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 100, 8, Symposium: 
International Law, 1991, pp. 2403-2483.  
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shall promote scientific and technological advance’.1022 In spite of the different ways in which 
the Court and the provision of the law define internal market, both display a liberal 
understanding of the term.  
Regulation is part of the integration process of the internal market. It is complemented by 
competition law and rules on freedoms of movement. The internal market has a life of its 
own. In this sense, it fits the definition of market presented above.1023 It is within the internal 
market that challenges to the EU are generated either at the EU level, or at the national level. 
One of these challenges rests on discovering how far integration of the internal market can go 
so that it is truly competitive. The opening of markets, however, not only involves the supply 
and demand of goods, persons, capital and services, but also comprehends the opening of 
these markets to the supply and demand of efficient rules.1024 What is, then, the relationship 
between the level of integration of the market and jurisdictional competition? Is jurisdictional 
competition institutionally possible in Europe? I try to answer these questions by looking at 
the ECJ’s jurisprudence on economic freedoms.  
The European case is different from the American case, where the debate about 
jurisdictional competition has been going on for over thirty years. Firstly, the EU is not a 
federation of states, even thought it has been read by the ECJ through a constitutional lens that 
goes beyond the Member States. Hence, the political structure of federalism does not have a 
take on the dynamics of (re)incorporation of companies as it has in the United States. 
Secondly, in respect to company law, there is not a state in Europe that plays or is in a 
historical position to play the same role as Delaware in the United States when it comes to 
drive interstate competition.1025 ECJ’s case law on freedoms of movement has been the 
leading engine of jurisdictional competition in Europe, despite the fact that in Europe the 
‘endless dismal search by the ECJ for a principle to free movement law’ is often stressed. 
Still, cases such as Centros,1026 Uberseering,1027 Inspire Art,1028 Cartesio,1029 have repeatedly 
                                                             
1022 It shows the manifest influence of ordoliberalism. 
1023 See section 1 (i). 
1024 See O’Hara, Erin, and Ribstein, Larry E., The Law Market, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
1025
 See Gelter, Martin, ’Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law’, Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, vol. 5, 2005, pp. 247-284 (251-252) (explaining how Delaware historically obtained its monopoly 
position). Also see Romano, Roberta, ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 1, 2, 1985, pp. 225-283 (242) (claiming that Delaware is ‘… able to 
retain its commanding lead in the incorporation market by a mix of institutions with powerful incentives, visible 
to firms, that goad the state to be responsive. The dependence on franchise tax revenues is forward-looking, 
warranting that Delaware will continue to respond to corporate needs, while the constitutional supermajority 
voting provision is backward-looking, ensuring that the thrust of policies can be reversed only with great 
difficulty’). 
1026 See Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (Case C-212/97, 9 March 1999). 
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shown that the Court understands freedom of establishment as fundamental to form a 
company in a ‘single market’.10301031 Consequently, this opened a window of opportunity for 
jurisdictional competition in Europe. Open markets favor competition. Refining the 
understanding of free movement law, which is a necessary instrument of market 
integration,1032 means creating a setting where Member States can compete on an equal and 
fair footing for the supply and demand of goods, persons, capital and services, and also law. 
This setting can favor jurisdictional competition in Europe. The higher the level of 
integration, the greater will be the possibility of competition. However, neither empirical 
research nor the social sciences have provided a clear picture of what make countries compete 
against each other, especially for the best laws or at least for laws that achieve certain goals 
(e.g., the goal of franchise fees in Delaware).1033 At this point, it is worth recalling the case of 
Italy described in Part I, Chapter 2 wherein certain companies in the early twentieth century 
(perhaps even the late nineteenth century), in what was then the Kingdom of Italy, would 
incorporate in Trieste in order to take the form of limited liability companies, while having 
their seat of business elsewhere. This is a very interesting case of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ which 
took place in this Italian province in the beginning of the twentieth century (if not earlier), 
well before Centros. Despite this evidence, often the contemporary debate on jurisdictional 
competition in Europe is redirected to problems in the field of choice of law and conflict-of-
law rules.  
For example, in fields such as property law the terms of the discussion have been held 
solely at a normative level.1034 Thinking about regulatory competition in this field will 
necessarily entail a new definition of property rights and a revision of objective connecting 
factors that determine the choice of law. The establishment of objective connecting factors 
such as the lex rex sitae or lex situs is a way for jurisdictions to internalize the costs and 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1027 See Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) (Case C-208/00, 5 
November 2002). 
1028 Inspire Art (Case C-167/01, 30 September 2003). 
1029 Cartesio (Case C-210/06, 16 December 2008). 
1030 Freedom of establishment is provided in Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). 
1031 See par. 27 of Centros and par. 138 Inspire Art. Also relevant is Daily Mail (Case 81/87, 27 September 1988) 
(restricting the scope of freedom of establishment). 
1032 See article 26 of TFEU, especially paragraphs 1 and 2. 
1033 See, however, Murphy, Dale D., The Structure of Regulatory Competition: Corporations and Public Policies 
in a Global Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006 (using a number of case studies to explain 
international regulatory competition. His findings and qualitative methodology do not allow the creation of a 
direct causal connection between firms’ behavior and regulatory competition. However, they create a theoretical 
framework that helps predict situations where there can be regulatory competition). Also see Eidenmüller, Horst 
(ed.), Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution, München, Beck; Oxford, Hart, 2013. 
1034 I thank Teemu Juutilainen for having briefly discussed this aspect with me.  
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benefits of free choice of law. These connecting factors, which are, for the most part, linked to 
a traditional conception of property rights,1035 easily corset the chances for states to compete. 
If real estate is located in Liechtenstein, then the laws of Liechtenstein should apply. 
However, there may be cases inevitably calling for a shift to party autonomy and creating, in 
this way, a playing-field for state competition. The case of securities law is illustrative.1036 
The lex rex sitae has proved unsatisfactory to determine the law applicable to securities held 
with intermediaries. This has most likely to do with the uncertainty caused by the 
development of new forms of register, which are made electronically and make it difficult to 
determine with precision the location of the intermediary or securities account. Additionally, 
the uncertainty is originated by the ambiguous definition of the rights of the account holder in 
the different legal systems (e.g., regular deposit, special deposit, co-property rights, other type 
of property rights?). It was in this context that the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary has moved away from the 
principle lex rex sitae to embrace an express agreement between the account holder and the 
intermediary on the choice of law.1037 The problems with the definition of property rights in 
securities echo those regarding the delineation of property rights in shares.1038 Property rights 
in shares are changed in their substance due to the introduction of contractual clauses 
imposing restrictions. In this specific case, property rights are enabled by contract. This 
frames property law in a different way (almost as a component of corporate law) which, in 
principle, makes it more susceptible to change due to competitive pressures coming from 
other jurisdictions.1039 
I have used gene interaction, which is executed through a process of competition and 
coordination, as a metaphor to describe how law is created, for the most part, at the market 
level through a process of natural selection. While developing the work of comparison, I have 
dwelled on the idea of finding mechanisms that enable market agents to choose the best rules 
                                                             
1035 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
1036 See Micheler, Eva, Property in Securities, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
1037 See Goode, Roy et al., Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Create 
Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary, ed. Permanent Bureau, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, in particular the comments on Articles 2 (1), 4 and 5 of the Convention. The authors 
also explain the Convention did not completely move away from the lex situs principle since it still provided the 
’Qualifying Office’ principle. This principle determined that the law chosen by the parties to govern the account 
agreement would only apply if the intermediary held an office in the state which law was selected at the time of 
the agreement. 
1038 See Part II, Chapter 2. 
1039 See Dammann, Jens C., ‘Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law’, Yale Journal of International 
Law, vol. 29, 2, 2004, pp. 477-544 (480) (stating that ‘While European corporations may remain less mobile than 
their US counterparts, the efficiency gains to be derived from free choice in Europe may well exceed those 
reaped in the United States’). 
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and national legislators to enact the best legislation by favoring competition based on 
coordination. The riddle is whether this idea of law generated through a process of natural 
selection can be accommodated in respect to a market construed at the transnational level. 
This has much to do with the definition of market, and in particular the internal market. The 
views expressed above1040 often compare the market’s dynamics and biological evolution (‘it 
works itself’). In the particular case of the internal market, in light of the difficulty of defining 
it solely in reference to the jurisprudence of the court, it has been accepted by doctrine that 
‘… internal market is consistently understood throughout the Treaty in terms of an area of 
equal and undistorted competition – a level playing field for competitors and consumers’.1041  
The prospect of jurisdictional competition in Europe has been rather gloomy. As Martin 
Gelter puts it  
 
The European level of legislation and regulation is less likely to influence the conduct of 
national actors in the market than the federal level in the United States, because Europe lacks an 
influential common public sphere, the legislative process is slow, and there is no court system or 
European securities authority with substantive influence on corporate law in place.1042  
 
Hence, the key for jurisdictional competition in Europe, if one exists at all, lies in 
market integration backed up by the refinement of free movement law. 
 
2. Jurisdictional competition in Europe: more than a promise or just a fallacy? 
 
In the late eighties and early nineties, the discussion about jurisdictional competition in 
the United States revolved around the question whether jurisdictional competition would lead 
to a ‘race to the top’ or a ‘race for the bottom’, to use the expression that was epitomized by 
William Cary.1043 The debate also created two factions comprised by the supporters of those 
                                                             
1040 See section (i). 
1041 See Davies, Gareth, ‘The Court’s Jurisprudence on Free Movement of Goods: Pragmatic Presumptions, not 
Philosophical Principles’, European Journal of Consumer Law, 2012, pp. 25-38 (28). 
1042 See Gelter, Martin, ‘Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law’, cit., p. 284. For an affirmative 
account, see Armour, John, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation versus Regulatory 
Competition’, Current Legal Problems, vol. 58, 1, 2005, pp. 369-413. Both authors, however, acknowledge 
some ‘defensive regulatory competition’. In this case, Member States do not actively compete for incorporations, 
but they try to stop their firms from leaving by reducing the required share capital, for instance. This arguably 
occurred in Germany with the implementation of the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur 
Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG). Additionally, see Dammann, Jens C, ‘Freedom of Choice in 
European Corporate Law’, cit. p. 486 (responding affirmatively to the question as to whether a member state will 
ever have the incentive to compete as Delaware). 
1043 Generally, in the literature, the expression used is ‘race to the bottom’. 
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who considered that state competition would favour the interests of managers in detriment of 
the interests of shareholders and those who were convinced that state competition would lead 
to efficient rules that would enable shareholders’ wealth maximization. This chapter sidesteps 
these questions, and zeros in on the more fundamental question of why states might choose to 
compete.  
Unlike US corporate law in respect to which states benefit from the revenue they obtain 
with franchise taxes and incorporation fees, Europe does not charge the payment of such taxes 
and fees for the incorporation of companies. Therefore, there is no market for incorporation in 
Europe.1044 Additionally, most member states adopt the company seat principle (siége réel). 
The registered office of the company constitutes the connectivity factor with the legal system 
in the same way as nationality for a natural person. It is true that after Überseering, the 
company seat principle became of little significance, as the ECJ decided that companies 
incorporated in a Member State are entitled to move their actual centre of administration to 
any other Member State without having to reincorporate there to have legal capacity.1045 
However, there still exist costs involved not only in the change of real seat of the company, 
but also of its actual centre of administration such as those related with the language, lawyers, 
and all sorts of bureaucracies which often dissuade small and medium enterprises from 
reincorporating or moving elsewhere.1046 On the other hand, there is not a predominantly 
responsive state to the demand side of laws which has invested in legal and human capital like 
Delaware did in the United States.1047 In order for states to start competing there would have 
to be a steep increase in the inbound state migration rate of companies. Furthermore, in terms 
                                                             
1044 Levying such taxes and fees is forbidden in Europe pursuant to Directive on Indirect Taxes on the Raising of 
Capital (Directive 69/335 EEC [1969] OJ L249/25) as amended by Council Directive 85/303/EEC of 10 June 
1985. This directive was repealed by Council Directive 2008/7/EC of February 2008 concerning indirect taxes 
on the raising of capital, which in its turn was amended by Council Directive 2013/13/EU of 13 May 2013 
adapting certain directives in the field of taxation, by reason of the accession of the Republic of Croatia. 
1045
 See Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (2002) C-208/00. 
1046 See Bratton, William W. and MacCahery, Joseph A., ‘An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability 
Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition’, Washington & Lee Law Review, vol. 54, 1997, 
pp. 629-686 (676) (providing that ‘The degree of transaction cost sensitivity thereby implicated makes foreign 
organization an unlikely first choice even in the case of a suboptimal domestic statutory provision’). 
Additionally, see Enriques, Lucas, and Gelter, Martin, ‘How the Old World Encountered the New One: 
Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, Tulane Law Review, vol. 
81, 3, 2007, pp. 577-646 (585) (referring to the implications deriving from the change of real seat). 
1047 Delaware is referred to in the literature as a 'first-mover'. It is undisputed that first movers often cause the 
biggest impression. See Macey. Jonathan R., and Miller Geoffrey P., ‘Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, Texas Law Review, vol. 65, 3, 1987, pp. 469-523 (472-473) (stating that ‘…Delaware, 
over time, has developed an important capital asset in the form of a legal environment that is highly desired by 
consumers of its corporate law both for the present structure of its rules, and – perhaps more importantly – for 
the reliable promise it makes that rules adopted in the future will also be highly desired. These ‘first mover’ 
advantages cannot be fully emulated by other states’). 
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of policy, there would have to be a sort of ‘common component’ to the EU member states as 
is often said to be the case regarding the fifty-one American jurisdictions.1048  
Moreover, Europe has no incentive for firms to move in great numbers and concertedly 
to a particular state. One could venture the idea of transforming Luxembourg into the 'new 
Delaware' of Europe.1049 Not only is the ECJ located therein, but also this is a tax harbour in 
the heart of Europe. Nevertheless, in comparative institutional terms, the federal and state 
courts in the United States are much more functionally aligned than are the ECJ and the 
national courts. In the United States, federal courts have original jurisdiction. Even the United 
States Supreme Court, which is primarily an appellate court, has original jurisdiction 
regarding a small number of cases. It is, therefore, understandable that authors like William 
Cary, who advocated that jurisdictional competition led to a race for the bottom, claim for 
general public standards for the incorporation of companies in Delaware and elsewhere which 
would be subject to the jurisdiction of federal courts.1050 The scope of ruling of the ECJ is 
more limited than the United States Supreme Court. All in all, the jurisdiction of the Court is 
limited to EU law. Thus, the parties to a dispute on matters of national law cannot directly 
bring an action to the ECJ because it is not provided with original jurisdiction. For the most 
part, Europe lacks a common legal and institutional platform that creates a setting for 
competition between states. The political process in Europe that triggers new legislation is 
normally slower, public opinion’s judgement, and lobbying are not so likely to cut down 
existing legislation.1051 It is not clear (in many cases it is not even likely) that businesses and 
                                                             
1048 See Besley, Timothy, and Case, Anne, ‘Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick 
Competition’, The American Economic Review, vol. 85, No. 1, 1995, pp. 25-45 (41) (arguing that the United 
States is a good source to study yardstick competition ‘…given that there is a significant common component to 
incumbent’s environment’). 
1049 See Latty, Elvin R., ‘Pseudo-Foreign Corporations’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 65, 2, 1955, pp. 137-166 
(referring to England as the 'Delaware of Europe' in the second half of the nineteenth century). Also see 
Buxbaum, Richard M., ‘Is There a Place for a European Delaware in the Corporate Conflict of Laws?’, The 
Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law, vol., 74, 2010, pp. 1-24; and Drury, Robert, ‘A 
European Look at the American Experience of the Delaware Syndrome, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, vol. 
5, pp. 1-35; and Enriques, Luca, ‘EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware’, European Business 
Law Review, vol. 15, 6, 2004, pp. 1259-1274. 
1050 See Cary, William L., ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware’, The Yale Law Journal, 
vol. 83, 1974, pp. 663-705. For an opposite line of thought, see Winter, Ralph K., Jr. ‘State law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 6, No. 2, 1977, pp. 251-292 
(252) (despite advocating that proposals of federal regulation should not be automatically accepted, saying that 
‘Existing federal economic regulation is so pervasive that the absence of federal control over the governance of 
major economic units seems anomalous to some’). 
1051 See Macey, Jonathan R., and Miller Geoffrey P., ‘Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate 
Law’, cit., pp. 469-523 (setting out an interest-group theory of Delaware corporate law, and stressing the 
interests of the Delaware bar for the making of corporate law in that state) Also see Carney, William J., ‘The 
Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 26, No. 1, 1997, 
pp. 303-329 (saying that interest-groups have played a smaller role in American corporate law than in Europe. 
He essentially says that the reason for no jurisdictional competition in Europe is caused by the status quo interest 
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courts know the laws of other jurisdictions. So, it is difficult to draw a starting line for a race 
between states in Europe. It is even harder to establish the actual top and actual bottom.1052 
However, there have been legal reforms to the corporate law of Member States that 
could hint at a phenomenon of jurisdictional competition. For instance, the United Kingdom is 
often perceived as an attractive jurisdiction for incorporation. Courts enjoy a good reputation, 
and the law is flexible enough (also called ‘liberal’). In 2009, the Law for the Modernization 
of the GmbH and Stopping its Misuse (Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur 
Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen or MoMiG) came into force. It reformed the GmbHG, which 
had not been reformed since its enactment in 1892. This revolution in and for small-size 
companies came as a response of the German legislator to the allure of the UK private 
company. This was so, in particular after ECJ’s judgement in Centros which favoured 
freedom of establishment over the real seat principle (siege réel) that is in force in most 
Member States. This is a case of ‘defensive jurisdictional competition’ by which states are not 
as concerned to attract firms to (re)incorporate in their territory as they are preoccupied with 
seeing their national firms leave their borders.1053 Even though it could serve as an illustration 
of the phenomenon of jurisdictional competition, it is difficult to learn what the channels of 
competition were in this case.1054 This example shows that the reading of freedoms of 
movement, in this case freedom of establishment, by the ECJ and its relevant outcome are 
liable to compel national legislators to change the law and break with doctrinal and socio-
economic manifestations of path-dependence, which in these circumstances were not 
surprising since it was a law dating from the late nineteenth century. 
Jurisdictional competition in Europe can be more than just a promise. The actualization 
of this competition, however, must be supported by empirical and interdisciplinary work in 
economic history and political science. This work remains to be done. In the meantime, from 
a normative standpoint, the creation of mechanisms to encourage states to start competing can 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
groups try to keep by pushing forward the adoption of directives that facilitate harmonization rather than 
competition). 
1052 See Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Hamdani, Assaf, ‘Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition over Corporate Charters’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 112, 2002, pp. 553-615 (challenging the idea 
of state competition in the United States. They argue that interstate competition for incorporations is weak or 
absent in the United States. In their opinion, this casts doubts on the advantages of state law rules in comparison 
to mandatory federal rules, which they consider superior. This scenario could be improved by federal 
intervention that would be ‘choice-enhancing’. In their view, this would be a measure of good public policy. The 
authors, however, refrain from engaging with the issue of the influence of interests groups in the implementation 
of this kind of measure). 
1053 In situations of defensive jurisdictional competition, it might be asked if states are still competing for the best 
rules, and if it creates a race to the top or a race to the bottom. These questions go beyond the limits of this 
chapter. 
1054 This gap could be filled in by the reading of preparatory documents, reports, parliamentary discussions and 
other relevant documents that can reveal the purpose of German legislators. 
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be envisioned. I suggest the creation of a network between market agents, lawyers, notaries 
and other gatekeepers at level 3 (the market level) and the ECJ and the EU legislator 
(Commission, Parliament, Council) at level 2 (legislatures) of the model of legal policy.1055 
This scheme is, however, complicated by the number of stakeholders in the political and 
legislative processes of the EU. One of the incentives to sustain this network could be the fees 
paid to lawyers.1056 Talking about lawyers as leading elements for the delineation of 
jurisdiction competition in Europe could lead to a discussion on access to the legal profession, 
but this exceeds the bounds of this study. Once this network was created, jurisdictional 
competition would develop within an evolutionary framework, and be prone to 
experimentation. There must be, however, a common component that lends sustainability to a 
system like this in the field of corporate law. It is to this common denominator that I now 
turn. 
 
3. Evolutionary dynamics and knowledge spillover as sources of regulatory 
competition in Europe and change in legal policy 
 
Despite the fact that few empirical studies treat the problem of jurisdictional 
competition in Europe from the social sciences perspective and model- building in law, there 
seems to be an understanding that a phenomenon like this is likely to force a political change. 
Nonetheless, the project is closely linked to the institutional framework that is set locally, 
nationally and even regionally. If there is not enough jurisdictional competition in Europe 
after Centros, at least to the point of bringing considerable change to the EU Member States 
corporate legislation, one might ask whether there is an adequate institutional framework for 
that to happen.1057 This section addresses this question, and suggests a theoretical platform 
                                                             
1055 I thank Roberta Romano for having discussed my ideas with me during one of my visits to Yale Law School. 
In this context, see Sabel, Charles F., and Zeitlin, Jonathan (eds.), Experimentalist Governance in the European 
Union: Towards a New Architecture, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. This book proposes an 
experimentalist architecture based on a revisionary rule-making process. The list of governance forms includes 
two levels of legislation, European Commission rule-making that relies on networks of national regulators, peer 
review, open consultation, and built-in mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing the regime. These governance 
modes comprise experimentalist architecture. However, they are still, for the most part, political and perceived 
from a top-down approach. I am not certain how effectively they can be in overthrowing an embedded status quo 
at the political and market levels. 
1056 See Gelter, Martin, ‘The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law’, Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, vol. 5, pp. 247-284 (p. 269) (saying that ‘… the direction of regulatory competition in 
corporate law is ultimately determined by which persons and interests groups are in position to create demand 
within the market, i.e. who decides whether and where to reincorporate, and what interests determine the 
decisions’). 
1057 On the pratical impact of Centros, see Dammann, Jens, ‘The Future of Codetermination After Centros: Will 
German Corporate Law Move Closer to the US Model’, Fordham Journal of Corporate Law and Financial Law, 
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upon which to erect a system of economic development and growth which compels states to 
compete and coordinate their actions. The assumption is that increasing market integration 
leads to more knowledge spillover, which favors innovation. These three elements are 
potential drivers of jurisdictional competition. Nonetheless, jurisdictional competition is 
associated here with the concept of Pareto efficiency. That is to say, jurisdictional competition 
is viewed as a promising means to implement the best rules. It is in this context that the 
purpose of default rules establishing restrictions on transfers may be questioned, especially if 
there is litigation that suggests the existence of bargaining failures. The argument rests on the 
idea that default rules as such may be desirable for small companies. The problem is with 
companies of larger dimensions and which are historically known for their significant output 
and their business activities abroad.1058 In the context of larger PLLCs, is a rule like this still a 
good rule?  
 
(i) The evolutionary process of competition in the internal market 
 
This dissertation assumes policy goals by exploring governance mechanisms and legal 
and economic frameworks for the development of small businesses. I focus, therefore, on 
private enterprise within a system of market economy. I look at this system within an 
evolutionary process. I also take into account the political, social and legal institutions on 
which it rests.1059 The argument is that capitalism is by nature a form or method of economic 
change.1060 Economic structures are changed, or even revolutionized from within in a 
dynamic process wherein destruction of old economic infrastructures is a prerequisite for the 
creation of new ones. This is an organic process that unfolds over time as it takes decades, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
vol. 8, 2, 2003, pp. 607-686 (advocating that, after the ECJ’s judgments, namely Centros, German law should 
extend the principle of co-determination to companies incorporated elsewhere). See McCahery, Joseph A., and 
Hertig, Gerard, ‘Company Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory 
Competition?’, European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 4, 2, 2003, pp. 179-211 (saying at the time 
that after recent judgments of the ECJ on freedoms of movement, it appeared that Member States were lead to 
provide more competitive business forms, and that market agents were responsive to that. However, they 
criticized the reforms and attempts of harmonization undertaken by the European Commission at the level of 
company and takeover law through the ‘Action Plan on Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union’). Also see Becht, Marco et al., ‘Centros and the Cost of Branching’, Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies, vol. 9, 1, 2009, pp. 171-199 (demonstrating that after Centros, Überseering, and 
Inspire Art, a market for incorporations grew in Europe, however, branching remained costly). 
1058 This is the case for many companies in the United Kingdom and United States which are private, but are 
similar to public companies in their governance and ownership compositions. 
1059 I am inspired by the Austrian School of Economics and New Institutional Economics, which I tackle from 
the perspective of evolutionary theory in law. 
1060 See Schumpeter, Joseph A., Can Capitalism Survive?, New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London, 
Harper Colophon Books, 1978 (referring to capitalism as a natural order. He also makes an analogical use of 
biological terms. The expression ‘industrial mutation’ is one example). 
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even centuries. The threat of destruction of old economic infrastructures and, consequently, of 
engrained positions of status quo through the implementation of new technologies and ideas 
triggers a process of ongoing adaptation. This dynamic process creates an environment that 
naturally tends to remove the barriers that private property puts in the way of development.1061 
This requires the creation of an economic strategy which is able to compromise between the 
establishment of restrictive measures to private property in the short-run1062 and the need for 
adaptation and consequent lifting of those restrictions in the long-run. This suggests a new 
outlook on the facts, on social constructions, and on the design of legal institutions. It implies 
a new reading of competition for laws that differs from textbooks’ explanations. The 
competition in place derives from law that is seen as commodity, from the new technology 
(‘contractual technology’), from the new type of business organization.1063 This kind of 
competition disciplines market agents, the businessman, members and directors of companies 
who, even if only faced with the threat of change, compete with themselves for the best 
output. Besides being an economic process, this is, additionally, a social and political process. 
Societies, governments and decision-makers in general, have a role to play. It is not only a 
matter of biology. Still, they too are a product of this organic process. This idea can, at first, 
be aligned with concerns pertaining to path-dependence that have been widely addressed in 
the literature. However, more than that, it points out the need for a critical understanding of 
institutions, and an openness to constant transformation in the economy, law and society.  
It is difficult to know whether jurisdictional competition can effect change to the law in 
the short run. However, in a globalized world and an increasingly integrated Europe, it is 
difficult to elude a change in the socio-economic order that slowly works deep down below 
and which eventually transforms the extant institutional framework, such as the legislation 
applied to the private enterprise, property and respective contractual setting. One might ask if 
such a system would not ultimately destroy itself. The answer is that it is not a movement 
toward self-destruction. Rather, it is a movement toward cyclical transformation and renewal. 
The process is not deterministic because transformation obeys a natural order of events. It is 
this theoretical reasoning that could serve, in principle, as a common denominator for 
competition between states in Europe.  
 
                                                             
1061 A clarification is in place. The process described in the text differs from socialism. Whilst in a capitalist 
system this phenomenon would be developed by a natural order, in a socialist system it would be imposed by a 
central authority. 
1062
 See Schumpeter, Joseph A., Can Capitalism Survive?, cit. p. 103 (saying that ‘…in these things a century is a 
“short run”). 
1063 See Schumpeter, Joseph A., Can Capitalism Survive?, cit., p. 24. 
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(ii) Are default rules establishing restrictions on transfer of shares beneficial for large 
PLLCs? 
 
The bargaining problems that seem to derive from the selection of a particular type of 
default rules establishing restrictions on transfers call to mind the reported influence of 
California law on the building up of Silicon Valley. Business and Profession Code Section 
16600 provided a prohibition of covenants not to compete. This meant that non-competition 
agreements prohibiting employees from working for a competitor of its former employer or 
settling with a firm with a competing business object were not enforceable pursuant to 
California law. Ronald Gilson calls attention to the effects prohibition of restrictions on 
competition such as post-employment covenants not to compete have had on the growth of 
industrial districts such as Silicon Valley. He compares the rise of this high-profile district 
with the decline of Route 128 in the state of Massachusetts, where post-employment 
covenants not to compete were enforceable. In his opinion, the decline of Route 128, which 
was the bastion district of technological innovation until Silicon Valley took over in the mid-
seventies, was directly related to the respective legal infrastructures of the regions.  
 
Coupled with the limited usefulness of trade secret law in California as elsewhere, Silicon 
Valley employers’ early efforts to prevent employees from leaving to compete by using 
employers’ proprietary tacit knowledge failed. Employees learned that they could leave; 
employers learned that they could not prevent high velocity employment and the resulting 
knowledge spillover. And that legal infrastructure cause employers, however reluctantly, to 
adopt a different strategy, one of cooperation and competition, that generated a dynamic process 
leading to Silicon Valley’s characteristic employee career pattern, lack of vertical integration, 
knowledge spillovers, and business culture. Thus, the initial condition supplied by Silicon 
Valley’s legal infrastructure ultimately generated the conditions necessary to support a second-
stage agglomeration economy, which allowed it to reset its product cycle and thrive while Route 
128 rode its product cycle down the curve.1064 
 
                                                             
1064 See Gilson, Ronald J., ‘The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, 
Route 128, and Covenants not to Compete’, New York University Law Review, vol. 74, 3, 1999, pp. 575-629 
(609). Additionally see, Booth, Richard A., ‘Give me Equity or Give me Death – The Role of Competition and 
Compensation in Building Silicon Valley, Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal, vol. 1, 2, 2007, pp. 265-282 
(arguing that equity compensation, which might have been used to bind employees to the companies given the 
non-enforceability of no-compete agreements in California, may have been the cause for the rise of Silicon 
Valley). 
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Gilson’s point is that California’s legal framework is partially responsible for Silicon 
Valley because it encourages employees (from the CEO to the lowest ranked employee) to 
change. Free competition, which originates knowledge spillover and a flurry of identical 
measures on the employer side (if one does not include a covenant not to compete in the 
employment contract, others will not either), favors innovation and growth. It is even reported 
that the enforceability of covenants not to compete in Massachusetts has led to litigation that 
does not exist in California because those restrictions were not allowed there.1065 The saying 
'secrecy is the soul of business' seems not to hold in these circumstances, since the fact that 
employees are not restricted on their changing plans allows them to use their know-how with 
a new employer. The new employer will partake in the maximization of value that the 
freedom of knowledge spillovers provides.  
Along the same lines, a default rule which restricts the transfer of shares may hinder the 
spillover effect that Gilson thought was beneficial for the development of start-up companies 
in the San Francisco Bay.1066 This may be so if the rule that is outdated, poorly drafted or ill-
fitting to the needs of the members of the company keeps those who want to leave the 
company from leaving it, at least at low cost or no cost at all. Besides enabling the study of 
possible inefficiencies in the PLLCs, this context permits that a bridge be created to a broader 
idea of jurisdictional competition based upon a free market. A dynamic process of 
development would be put into motion by means of cooperation and competition to the point 
it is likely to echo the phenomenon of economic aggregation to which Gilson refers regarding 
the high technology industrial district of Silicon Valley.1067 Pertaining to whether default rules 
establishing restrictions on shares are beneficial for large PLLCs, it is difficult to establish a 
causal effect between the existence of restrictions and output of these companies. However, in 
light of the above, it may be that restrictions on transfer of shares of large PLLCs, in 
                                                             
1065 See Booth, Richard A., cit. p. 278 (noting that ‘For example, under Massachusetts law the corporation must 
show that it had a specific or express expectation relating to a business opportunity in order to show that an 
officer or director usurped the opportunity in violation of his fiduciary duty to the corporation. To be sure, this 
may be pure coincidence. And one must be careful not to make too strong a claim for a causal connection. But 
California appears to have been relatively free of such litigation’). 
1066 Given the substance of the articles of association and the case law analyzed in all six jurisdictions, I am 
assuming that there is no knowledge spillover in these companies because restrictions on transfer of shares are 
imposed. It is true that since this rule is a default, members can in principle alter the articles of association. There 
is, however, in many situations a status quo that impedes members from changing the company’s contract. 
1067 Finland, and in particular its main city Helsinki, have been called the next Silicon Valley of Europe because 
it is an appealing market for a number of startup companies in Europe. Much of it has to do with the prevailing 
culture in Finland where companies, after observing other companies’ success, are not afraid to take the plunge. 
Availability of public funding, the quality of the education system, and an open attitude towards a global market 
make this rather insulated country score high when it comes to the incorporation of startups. However, 
establishing a causal relationship between the content of labor, corporate and intellectual property rights laws 
and the development of these companies is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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particular if they do not have a closed nature, may constitute unnecessary market frictions. 
This is an argument in favor of further European integration for the sake of competition in the 
internal market and the creation of aggregative centers of development.1068 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This chapter explores the idea of jurisdictional competition as a means to create new 
legal solutions in corporate law. This question is informed by a concept of Pareto efficiency. I 
tend to answer this question in the affirmative. It is not clear, however, that even after ECJ’s 
judgments Europe has the necessary institutional framework for jurisdictional competition to 
be more than a promise. It also is uncertain whether, once implemented, jurisdictional 
competition would lead to a race to the top or to a race to the bottom. William Cary’s quote 
introducing this chapter makes sense not only for those like him who advocated the race to the 
bottom theory, but also for those who believed that jurisdictional competition can lead to a 
race to the top. It seems not to be so much a matter of principle, but policy. Thus, this chapter 
has focused on providing a theoretical reasoning based on the idea of market integration as a 
catalyst of jurisdictional competition. The Silicon Valley / Route 128 story tries to exemplify 
this. The openness of markets, which is guaranteed by freedoms of movement, is crucial for 
creating incentives to innovation, economic development and growth. Yet, the 
implementation of freedoms of movement, although it has opened the door to jurisdictional 
competition, has not created a system of corporate law that binds businessmen, members of 
PLLCs, managers, directors, employees, lawyers, notaries and other gatekeepers, interest 
groups, the society, politicians and regulators to strive for the best policies, and force a 
political change if necessary for the equilibrium of that system. Law should be seen as part of 
an evolutionary process of continuous innovation and renewal where everything is connected. 
The fact that the market, the economy and society are susceptible to being renewed should in 
and of itself serve as an incentive for periodic revision of legal policy agendas at the national 
                                                             
1068 See Caniëls, Marjolein C. J. and Verspagen, Bart, ‘Barriers to Knowledge Spillovers and Regional 
Convergence in an Evolutionary Model’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 11, 2001, pp. 307-329 
(arguing that the existence of spillover barriers such as borders between countries leads to convergence between 
regions. This is a paradoxical result which, as the authors recognize, goes against the main tenets of policies in 
favor of increasing European integration. They find a similar result due to structural differences between regions. 
They explain these contradictory findings with the existence of ‘local’ centers in the case of barriers to spillovers 
or (large) structural differences between regions. These ‘restrictions’ may benefit peripheral regions which may 
then become local centers. Other, even more peripheral regions that are located nearby will additionally benefit 
from this, which causes lower disparity between regions. In terms of policy, their argument is that regional 
policies matter for the purpose of further European integration). 
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and transnational levels. Legal categories and principles, as much as they help us understand 
the nature of law, fall short of being a common denominator for change. A proposal of a self-
standing legal system for it can renew and recreate itself organically and, consequently, create 
an environment that removes resistance to development is a contribution of this chapter.1069 
Nevertheless, more interdisciplinary and empirical work needs to be done in this field to fully 
grasp the dynamics of competition among European states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1069 See Grundmann, Stefan, European Company Law: Organization, Finance and Capital Markets, Antwerpen, 
Oxford, Intersentia, 2007, p. 96 (providing that ‘As legislatures are certainly subject to limitations of knowledge 
and to conflicts of interest, a system, if functionally designed, which subjects legislatures to a mechanism 
indicating the level of performance and in which as much information as possible can be processed (from many 
sources) is certainly desirable. In European company law, this basic principle is not yet as clearly accepted as it 
is in the USA’). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
COMPLETING THE PICTURE: COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS 
 
 
 
Quand nous instaurons un classement réfléchi, quand nous disons 
que le chat et le chien se ressemblent moins que deux lévriers, 
même s’ils sont l’un et l’autre apprivoisés ou embaumés, même s’il 
courent tous deux comme des fous, et même s’ils viennent de 
casser la cruche, quel est donc le sol à partir de quoi nous pouvons 
l’établir en toute certitude? sur quelle «table», selon quel espace 
d’identités, de similitudes, d’analogies, avons-nous pris l’habitude 
de distribuer tant des choses différentes et parreilles? 
 
Michel Foucault  
in Les Mots et les Choses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At this point, the real work of comparison is done by the synthesis, which is the output 
of the intersection of both entries of the empty comparative table presented in Part I, Chapter 
1. The synthesis has the effect of a periscope that enables the observation of the object of 
research. This chapter provides answers to the seventeen questions that were intuitively asked 
when the research question and the terms of the investigation were being designed. I decided 
to keep them as they were asked for the first time. This chapter also creates a full circle that 
brings the reader back to the beginning. It proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides the answers 
that result from the interconnection of the two entries. Section 2 concludes. 
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1. Synthesis: Filling in the Comparative Matrix  
 
This section matches the answers asked in the left column of the comparative matrix 
with the jurisdictions indicated in the top row. The answers to each question are provided 
below. 
 
Table 1 
Comparative Matrix 
 
  Portugal Spain Italy France 
UK 
(England 
& Wales) US 
1 - When and why was the law adopted? 
      
2 - What kind of restrictions on transfer of shares does 
the law foresee? 
      
3 - What is the purpose of restrictions on transfer of 
shares foreseen by the law? 
      
4 - Do these restrictions constitute a source of 
inefficiency (unenforceability) of the legal framework 
of transfer of shares? 
      
5 - How do legislators approach the transfer of shares 
and protect entitlements (inalienability rules, property 
rules, or liability rules? 
      
6 - What kinds of costs result from the transfer of 
shares according to the approach taken by legislators? 
      
7 - What kinds of agency problems derive from the 
transfer of shares according to the approach taken by 
the legislators? 
      
8 - In practice, do defaults reduce bargaining failures? 
      
9 - Is there a demand for efficient company (corporate) 
law rules? 
      
10 - What kind of ownership structure do these 
business organizations have? 
      
11 - On average, how big is the PLLC (i.e., how many 
shareholders do these business organizations have)? 
      
12 - What kind of control structure do PLLCs have 
(e.g., (i) one controlling shareholder; (ii) many 
controlling shareholders through a shareholder 
agreement or through occasional coalitions; (iii) no 
controlling shareholder)? 
      
13 - Which constituency is most likely to efficiently 
assess the transfer of shares (e.g., shareholders, 
managers, creditors, employees, consumers/ 
customers?) 
      
14 - Are the company's and shareholders' interests well 
protected considering the constituencies intervening in 
the transaction process? 
      
15 - Is the choice of the constituencies which are 
competent for the assessment of the transaction liable 
to be affected by the environment in which the 
company operates (e.g., financial context, taxes, links 
with hedge funds, and with the uncorporation of larger 
dimensions? 
      
16 - Is the (competitive) context in which the company 
operates likely to be a source of efficiencies which may 
lead to: (i) containment of bargaining failures; and (ii) 
allowing the evaluation of the right amount of benefits 
which should be granted to the shareholder who wants 
to leave the company? 
      
17 - Do default rules adopted by legislatures allow any 
single corporation to submit transaction costs to the 
constituencies which are more likely to correctly assess 
its commercial value? 
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1. When and why was the law adopted? 
 
In Portugal, the law was adopted in 1901. Portuguese legislators were essentially 
influenced by German legislators who had formally adopted the German GmbH, in 1892. 
Portuguese legislators also looked at the market and at the options market agents were taking 
at this level with the help of lawyers and notaries. The enactement of the law of the 
Portuguese version of the PLLC (sociedade por quotas) was pressed by business associations, 
professional organizations and syndicates. 
In France the law of the SARL was adopted in 1925. Despite the existence of this type 
of business organizations before, the French legislature decided to regulate them, especially 
after the conversion of the territories of Alsace and Loraine where the GmbH had been 
incorporated under German law. However, the French legislature stressed its intention to 
follow the model of the United Kingdom private company, and create a law that was adequate 
to the features of these business organizations in France. The SARL in France was created at 
the contracting level. In these circumstances, lawyers and notaries played an extraordinary 
role. Jurisprudence also was important at the institutional level because it adapted the existing 
forms at the time, namely the joint stock company to the specific needs of small businesses. 
After a relatively long period of indifference of Italian legislators, the SrL was legally 
adopted in Italy in 1942. This possibility had already been discussed in 1882, in the context of 
reform of the Commercial Code. These business organizations had existed already in the 
provinces of Venezia Giulia and Tridentina, which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.These provinces were annexed to Italy after the First World War. The SRL was 
adopted in Italy to replace the joint-stock company and be a legal form better adapted to the 
purposes of smaller businesses. 
Spain adopted the SRL in 1952. For the Spanish legislator it was essentially a matter of 
opportunity, given that the legislation regulating the public company had just been reformed. 
However, these companies have existed in Spain at least since the early 1850s. 
The private company was legally accepted in the United Kingdom in 1907. Its existence 
had been known for more than forty years, at least, since the enactment of the Companies Act 
1862. The debate in the United Kingdom was rooted in the ambiguity of the concept of 
private company. The private company was created in the United Kingdom at the lower level 
of contracting, before it was finally foreseen in the law. It was created to avoid situations of 
fraud potentiated by the use of unregulated private companies. 
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The creation of the LLC in the United States is attributed to the State of Wyoming in 
1977. Nevertheless, data suggest that there were forms of limited liability similar to the LLC 
in the late nineteenth century. Businessmen and interest groups lobbied with legislators for the 
creation of the LLC. But its breakthrough only occurred after a tax reform providing the 
members of these business organizations with a passthrough treatment. 
 
2. What kind of restrictions on transfer of shares does the law foresee? 
 
The articles of association of the PLLCs in the six jurisdictions foresee pre-emption 
rights and rights of first refusal, clauses prohibiting the pledge of shares, liens or any charges 
over the shares, and their usufruct, formulas determining the price of sale of shares, which are 
especially associated with the exercise of pre-emption rights by the company and the 
members (but not necessarily), and administrative corporate procedures prior to which a 
transfer will not be effective. I point out the complexity of many of the transfer clauses of the 
articles of association of Spanish PLLCs. They are based on an intricate scheme of 
notifications between the transferor, the company and other non-transferring shareholders. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting the complexity of the clauses determining pre-emption rights. 
Clauses of American LLC agreements also are complex. They include tag-along rights, rights 
of co-sale, sale purchase rights, buy-sell agreements, put-rights, and similar rights. These type 
of clauses are also included in the articles of association of United Kingdom private 
companies. However, there still is not a body of jurisprudence that helps define the validity of 
drag and tag along clauses in the United Kingdom. Both in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, management boards have wide powers to discretionarily refuse a transfer. There 
are other types of restrictions that can be tracked in the articles of association such as vesting 
requirements, forfeiture provisions, minimum retained ownership requirements or other 
similar provisions, clauses limiting transfers to competitors, and lock-up prohibitions.  
 
3. What is the purpose of restrictions on transfers of shares foreseen by the law? 
 
For the most part, restrictions on transfer of shares are drafted to safeguard the purpose 
of the company and the expectations of their members. They also are meant to adapt the 
ownership structure to the puporse of the respective business. In many other cases, they are 
introduced in the articles of association as a matter of imitation or crossover of legal 
knowledge. 
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4. Do these restrictions constitute a source of inefficiency (unenforceability) of the 
legal framework of transfer of shares? 
 
In many instances, restrictions constitute market frictions. In this sense, they potentiate 
inefficiencies at the contracting level. The problems of bargaining failures revealed by the 
case law collected is likely to be increased in PLLCs with larger dimensions not only in terms 
of earnings, but also in terms of the number of shareholders. Bargaining failures in PLLCs 
call attention to the fact that, within the corporate form of the PLLC, there are several types of 
companies and firms.1070 
 
5. How do legislators approach the transfer of shares and protect entitlements 
(inalienability, property rules, or liability rules)? 
 
Legislators may choose among a contractarian approach, a statutory approach or an 
intermediary solution. The legislator takes a contractarian approach if she provides a number 
of default rules around which shareholders may or may not contract. Portuguese, Italian, 
Spanish, US and UK legislators follow this path. In the particular case of the United States 
legislators of the state of Delaware and New York assume a contractarian position. However, 
Delaware law can be more contractarian and less prescriptive than New York law. On the 
contrary, legislators take a statutory approach if they establish a prescriptive law that market 
agents are obliged to follow. This is the case in France, where a mandatory rule on the transfer 
of shares has been historically provided. The different configuration of these rules – default or 
mandatory rules – influences in different ways the conceptualization of property rights, 
specifically property rights in shares of PLLCs. 
Rules on transfers of shares can be designed in different ways. A possible formulation is 
one that foresees four types of rules:  
                                                             
1070See Lutter, Marcus, ‘Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies’ International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, vol. XIII, ch. 2, 1998, s. 5; and Behrens, Peter, ‘Ein. B – Die GmbH im internationalen Recht 
in Rowedder, Heinz, and Schmidt-Leithoff, Christian, Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschften mit beschränkter 
Haftung (GmbHD), Kommentar, 5. Auflage, München, Verlag Franz Vahlen, 2013, pp. 74-75 (arguing that in 
respect to small companies like the PLLC, there only are two possible alternative corporate forms from which to 
choose. These corporate forms are the private limited company or the public company. This comment, however, 
alienates the PLLC of larger dimensions, whose members are not interested in transforming it into a public 
company, at least for the time being. 
 
 392 
 
- Property Rule 1: the sale cannot be executed without consent. 
- Liability Rule 2: the sale can be executed, but the shareholder must pay for damages. 
- Reverse Property Rule 3: there is no transfer restriction. 
- Reverse Liability Rule 4: foresees pre-emption rights, often coupled with property 
rules. 
 
6. What kinds of costs result from the transfer of shares according to the approach 
given to it by the legislator? 
 
The costs resulting from the transfer of shares are transaction costs which include the 
costs of defining, strengthening and governing property rights. These costs are incurred by 
parties within a contractarian or statutory approach. They are more likely to happen, however, 
within a contractarian approach to transfers of shares. It is important to note that property 
rights have a complex dynamics which can not be sufficiently tackled within the framework 
of transactions costs economics. This interesting dynamics of property rights was revealed in 
all six countries. There is an unexplored dimension which has to do with their form and 
composition and the way they react to contractual measures. This calls to the fore the 
theoretical framework of new institutional economics. Although, there is this particular aspect 
wich is the need to analyse the molecular composition of property rights (claims, duties, 
privileges) and how the relevant elements interconnect, depending on the circumstances. For 
this, lawyers are most suitable.  
 
7. What kind of agency problems derive from the transfer of shares according to the 
approach given to it by the legislator? 
 
Agency costs derive from conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers and 
from conflicts of interests between majority and minority shareholders. Considering that the 
line dividing ownership and control is frequently blurred in these companies, it is difficult to 
set a trend regarding this kind of conflicts. Conflicts between shareholders and directors are, 
however, more evident in UK private companies. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the law 
does not foresee rights of appraisal. Furthermore, the law does not regulate general meetings 
of shareholders. This leaves considerable room for enhancing directors’ powers by contract. 
 
8. In practice, do default rules reduce bargaining failures? 
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In practice, default rules do not necessarily reduce bargaining failures. However, they 
can be drawn to do so. 
 
9. Is there a demand for efficient company law? 
 
The answer to this question may be given in the affirmative, even though the data 
collected do not expressly reveal this fact. There is, however, an element of jurisdictional 
competition to provide the most efficient rules. 
 
10. What kind of ownership structures do these businesses organizations have? 
 
In most of these companies the ownership is very concentrated. Only in very 
exceptional cases is this not the case. Furthermore, there is a strong dependence of the 
companies on their shareholders, which does not necessarily translate into the control that is 
exercised by managers at the governance level. 
 
11. On average, how large is the PLLC (i.e., how many shareholders do these business 
organizations have? 
 
On average, the PLLCs in the samples have a small number of shareholders, which may 
range from two to four individuals. However, in terms of share capital, number of employees 
and earnings, there is a considerable number of big businesses in the samples. This is 
particularly true of UK private companies. 
 
12. What kind of control structure do PLLCs have (e.g., (i) one controlling shareholder; 
(ii) many controlling shareholders through a shareholder agreement or through 
occasional coalitions; (iii) no controlling shareholder)? 
 
There can be one controlling shareholder. In general, it is the majority shareholder who 
also is a manager of the company. Case law reveals that in certain circumstances, especially 
when there are conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, control in the company 
is exerted through occasional coalitions between members.  
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13. Which constituency is most likely to efficiently assess the transfer of shares (e.g., 
shareholders, managers, creditors, employees, consumers)? 
 
Shareholders are generally the group deciding the terms of the incorporation. However, 
this may not be true if managers have at an initial stage and afterwards sufficient political 
representation in the company and can gain the support of other corporate constituencies, 
namely shareholders. Furthermore, decision-making about the terms of incorporation also 
depends on the types of incentives to efficient bargaining established in the company’s 
articles. The inclusion of dissolution at will in the company’s contract may create more 
incentives for shareholders to efficiently assess the transfer than for unpaid or badly 
remunerated managers. 
 
14. Are the company and shareholders’ interests well protected, considering the 
constituencies intervening in the transaction process? 
 
The answer to this question should be similar to the previous one. In addition, inherent 
to drafting the contract there should be a serious concern to allocate entitlements efficiently in 
the company. This may imply adopting or designing different types of default rules. If there is 
need for better rules there should be, eventually, an intersection between markets (at the 
contracting level) and legislatures (at the policy or institutional level) for the enactment of 
these rules. 
 
15. Is the choice of the constituencies which are competent for the assessment of the 
transaction liable to be affected by the environment in which the company operates 
(e.g., financial context, taxes, and links with hedge funds and with larger PLLCs)? 
 
This question should be answered in the affirmative. I have suggested that everything in 
law is connected. This is illustrated by the idea of pleotropy in law. Furthermore, given 
limitations to evolution, law can be used as commodity to affect the socio-economic 
environment, and point market agents in the direction of the best legal solutions. 
 
16. Is the (competitive) context in which the company operates likely to be a source of 
efficiencies which may lead to: (i) containing bargaining failures; and (ii) allowing 
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the evaluation of the right amount of benefits, which should be granted to the 
shareholder who wants to leave the company? 
 
I answer this question in the affirmative. There is another point that is related to 
jurisdictional competition. The effects of jurisdictional competition are relatively unexplored, 
especially within an evolutionary framework. Nevertheless, jurisdictional competition can be 
perceived as a promising force for legal reform which, in turn, affects the choices of market 
agents at the contracting level. 
 
17. Do default rules adopted by legislators allow any single corporation to submit 
transaction costs to the constituencies which are more likely to correctly access its 
commercial value? 
 
In principle, this will depend on how well market agents use the opportunity to govern 
their contractual relations by adopting the defaults provided by the legislator. However, this 
investigation has shown that there were cases of un-consented transfer in all six jurisdictions. 
They were originated in agency problems and bargaining failures, in general. It seems that, 
depending on the circumstances, defaults are not strongly enforceable. The corrective, 
however, may not rest in the default rules themselves, but in the techniques of legal 
engineering. 
 
2. Conclusions 
 
This table sketches the comparative work undertaken in this dissertation. In the absence 
of a standard method for comparative law, I created a comparative matrix which was based on 
legal intuition, the law and a preliminary treatment of jurisprudence in the six examined 
jurisdictions. The results not only create the image of a full circle, but also constitute a 
starting point for the final conclusions. 
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PART III OVERVIEW 
 
In this part, I connect the dots. In other words, I make a concerted effort to understand 
the relationships that exist between jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are interrelated in three ways. 
First, I look at the company’s contract and use contract law as an instrument for legal design 
or legal engineering. The goal is to create efficient rules to overcome situations of bargaining 
failures across all six jurisdictions. Second, I connect the jurisdictions through a socio-
economic model that is liable to trigger jurisdictional competition. It starts from the 
assumption that competition between states is likely to facilitate the creation of specific legal 
structures that may significantly contribute to business development in Europe. To this end, I 
draw a theoretical framework regarding the market process to contextualize the idea of legal 
evolution through jurisdictional competition. Third, I fill in the comparative matrix and yield 
the answers that derive from the intersection of the preliminary research questions asked for 
each jurisdiction. The connecting the dots phase is gone through, as it should be, by looking 
backwards. It sets the stage, nevertheless, for the coming final conclusions. 
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PART IV 
 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS:  
THE TALE OF THE SILVER FOX AND THE RE-VISIONING OF CORPORATE 
LAW THROUGH THE LENS OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 
 
The research question driving this dissertation is: How does the design of clauses 
establishing restrictions on transfer of shares of private limited liability companies affect 
investment made in these companies and their consequent development? I have set up a 
laboratory for the legal research by drafting seventeen ancillary questions which helped in the 
task of yielding an answer to the main research question.  
I started with a hypothesis. There is a status quo that market agents like to preserve 
regardless of the default rules provided by legislatures which they can contract around, if and 
when necessary. The comparative work, the selection of case studies and case law, was 
intended to falsify my hypothesis – the existence of an inscrutable status quo. There were 
situations in which it was clear that the status quo was meant to be maintained. There were 
other situations in which bargaining failures were found to be related to other exigencies. 
These included the poor enforceability of the rules chosen by the parties, the uncertainty and 
the effects of un-consented transfers, and weakness in governance structures, which ended up 
affecting those with weaker property rights.  
The main theoretical framework of this dissertation is evolutionary theory. It was 
chosen quite deliberately. When I initiated the research for this dissertation, the reading of 
private documents of companies and legislative preparatory works suggested a curious 
dynamic that could not be grasped entirely by reading the literature. The dynamics of the law-
making and the use of legal rules resembled evolutionary processes in biology where 
everything (in this case, the civil society, legislatures and markets) appeared to be connected. 
This idea is illustrated here by the ‘analogy of the fox’ and situations of pleiotropy in law. The 
first impression may be that it conveys an idea of path-dependence of legal solutions, but it is 
not limited to that. The evolutionary framework of this dissertation yields the understanding 
that legal evolution becomes impaired if it is trapped into a paradigm. Indeed, law can be 
designed to break paradigms or status quo, if necessary, for the sake of the development of 
business organizations.  
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Methodologically, I am calling for a more general epistemological debate in law. I try to 
explain a sociological phenomenon – the status quo in PLLCs – through legal knowledge. 
Lawyers understand that corporate law, property law, intellectual property rights, tax law and 
other fields cannot be viewed as insulated categories, particularly, if the goal is to explain 
complex problems. The novelty of the methodology I use herein lies in the fact that it is more 
than a method wherein files of companies are analysed. It is a new method in legal research 
wherein social and economic facts are analysed through the lens of legal knowledge.1071 It 
involves the realization of a legal ‘due diligence’ by which businesses are evaluated in 
context. This is something for which lawyers are especially 'vocationed'. This dissertation 
takes a social sciences approach to law and legal doctrine.  
On the normative side, this dissertation also tries to answer the questions it raises within 
system-building in law, which is a relatively recent topic. It takes a theoretical approach with 
a normative focus, which gives the necessary ground for analyzing the details of property 
rights in shares and the bargaining that undergirds property rights contracts. The analysis of 
articles of association and court decisions provide the empirical support for this task.  
In terms of policy, this dissertation is based upon the economic goal of promotion of 
small businesses, and offers policy proposals regarding the legislative process. It bridges 
different corporate cultures with the purpose of creating a scheme of legal rules that attends to 
the goals of market agents, and that pays attention to the genetic features of the market. In this 
sense, jurisdictional competition is presented here as a promising tool to induce legal reform. 
I have determined that there is no conclusive answer to my main research question 
concerning the design of default rules. It is, however, possible to guess what will happen if 
certain type of legal policy measures are taken. My thesis is that, if there is a status quo that is 
not beneficial, the types of legal policies that are likely to break it are those that promote the 
regeneration of business organizations at the lower level of contracting. Private ordering is 
one very important driving force of evolution in law, especially the law of the PLLC. This 
also says a lot about law itself. Law should be able to regenerate itself to comply with this 
function. This is illustrated, in this dissertation, by a new conception of property rights and the 
relationship between fields of law, in particular, corporate law, property law, and contract 
                                                             
1071 See Samuel, Geoffrey, ‘Is Law Really a Science?: A View from the Comparative Law’, Cambridge Law 
Journal, 67, 2, pp. 288-321; and Samuel, Geoffrey, ‘Taking Method Seriously: (Part One)’, Journal of 
Comparative Law, vol. 2, 1, 2007, pp. 94-119 (arguing that legal thought is still capable of making an 
independent contribution. Nonetheless, the author does not develop this argument). Also see Samuel, Geoffrey, 
‘Taking Method Seriously: (Part Two), Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 2, 2, 2007, pp. 210-237. 
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law. Institutionally, this process of regeneration is sustained by a model legal policy that takes 
a bottom-up approach to law and promotes market integration. 
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